Trent University, 2006, -181 pp.
The word `democracy’ has been used to describe many different political systems, which often yield wildly different outcomes. The simple rule of `decision by majority’ can be made complicated in several ways:
Granting veto power to some participants (e.g. the permanent members of the UN Security Council or the President of the United States), possibly subject to `override’ by a sufficiently large majority of another body (e.g. the United States Senate). .
Requiring a majority by two different measures (e.g. in a federal system, a constitutional ammendment might require the support of a majority of the population and a majority of states/provinces).
Giving different `weight’ to different voters (e.g. different shareholders in a publically traded corporation, or different states in the European Union).
Forcing voters to vote in `blocs’ (e.g. political parties)
First, we will consider the simplest kind of democratic decision-making: that between two alteatives. Nevertheless, we will see that aforementioned complications engender many surprising phenomena.
Strictly speaking, democracy only insures that the majority will be goveed no better than they deserve; the rest of us will also be goveed no better than they deserve. Even this is only true when an absolute majority has chosen the govement or policies in question; we shall see that this is rarely the case when there are three or more alteatives to choose from.
Binary Voting Procedures
Multi-option Voting Systems
Bentham’s Utilitarianism
Fair Division
Arbitration & Bargaining
The word `democracy’ has been used to describe many different political systems, which often yield wildly different outcomes. The simple rule of `decision by majority’ can be made complicated in several ways:
Granting veto power to some participants (e.g. the permanent members of the UN Security Council or the President of the United States), possibly subject to `override’ by a sufficiently large majority of another body (e.g. the United States Senate). .
Requiring a majority by two different measures (e.g. in a federal system, a constitutional ammendment might require the support of a majority of the population and a majority of states/provinces).
Giving different `weight’ to different voters (e.g. different shareholders in a publically traded corporation, or different states in the European Union).
Forcing voters to vote in `blocs’ (e.g. political parties)
First, we will consider the simplest kind of democratic decision-making: that between two alteatives. Nevertheless, we will see that aforementioned complications engender many surprising phenomena.
Strictly speaking, democracy only insures that the majority will be goveed no better than they deserve; the rest of us will also be goveed no better than they deserve. Even this is only true when an absolute majority has chosen the govement or policies in question; we shall see that this is rarely the case when there are three or more alteatives to choose from.
Binary Voting Procedures
Multi-option Voting Systems
Bentham’s Utilitarianism
Fair Division
Arbitration & Bargaining