Potter David. Henry VIII and Francis I
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290 chapter six
the Lord Deputie: howe it shuld cum to passe that our men distresed
sum of the cartes overnight and sum in the mornyng. Herin we wer soo
bolde of our horsemen as to make them tary in the felde all the night,
partely chacyng Monsieur de Bies, and d[istressing] the cartes and v[ict]
ualles, wherof they made an ende in the mornyng. [Herin] we kept the
grounde of the truth of that was doon, and facioned it with circums-
taunces mete for the same.
is account was distributed to ambassadors and was on its way to
Italy. e French King had commanded bonres to celebrate a victory
but then had to admit that it was not such a victory aer all ‘and soo
nowe the Frenchmen divide the hurte with us by ther own confes-
sion.’ Most people, Gardiner ruefully remarked, thought that shame
and infamy only hurt insofar as they were physically felt.
91
Clearly, the French fort was still in dire straits and minds began to
turn towards a full-scale renewal of war. A plan emerged to use the
French eet in conjunction with de Biez’ forces to re-supply the fort,
stay there for a week and then move on to Ardres.
92
is revictualing
was scheduled to take place at the end of February supported by 400
hommes d’armes, 5000 foot, 18 ships and 6 galleys, hastened by news
that an English army was soon to arrive. e cavalry would then be
stationed at Desvres, Samer and Etaples until the main French army
arrived at the end of March. e Rhinegrave would bring 24 ensigns of
Landsknechts to join the old bands, 6000 Gascons and 6000 pioneers
(as well as 4000 gypsies). Du Biez was to retire, ‘moche blamed for his
advice for the placyng of the ortresse,’ to be replaced by Taix. Plans
were active for a new fortied harbour at Etaples for galleys, to be
commanded by Salcedo, the governor of Hardelot.
93
e re-supply of
Outreau sems to have been carried out by sea to Portel early in March
and nothing could be done to stop it.
94
Surrey, who continued to skirmish with the Outreau garrison to the
end of his time as governor of Boulogne, argued that the preservation
of ‘this jewell shuld depende upon the successe of any there enter-
91
Council to Gardiner, irlby and Carne, 15 Jan. 1546, L&P, XXI, i, 65; Gardiner
to Paget, 27 Jan. 1546, Muller, Letters of Gardiner, pp. 227–228 (L&P, XXI, i, 128): the
nal remark: ‘si saxum in caput id vere malum est; pudor autem et infamia tantum
mali adferunt quantum senciatur, si non senciatur sunt ne mal quidem.’
92
Du Biez to Aumale, 3 Feb. 1546, Potter Du Biez, pp. 215–216.
93
Council of Boulogne to Privy Council, 20, 21 Feb. 1546, Nott, Howard, pp. 207,
209 (L&P, XXI, i, 250, 262).
94
Council of Boulogne to Privy Council, 9 March 1546, Nott, Howard, p. 217
(L&P, XXI, I, 364). is only mentions it in passing.
the war in france, 1545–1546 291
price but to be furnysshed of men and victuales of himsele, which
howe tyme, th’enemy and the visitacion [of] God may wast, the yere
past m[ay serve] you for a precedent.’
95
e appointment of Hertford
as Henry’s Lieutenant beyond the seas signalled a more determined
approach; the Earl had the calibre to take matters in hand and stop
the rot. e new English army, to be commanded by Hertford, was
well advanced in planning by this stage. 2000 foreign cavalry had been
maintained over the winter and Conrad Pennick had been commis-
sioned to bring 6000 landsknechts by the end of March. Gamboa’s
1300 Spaniards were being transported from Newcastle. is would,
in theory, produce and army of 16,000 English, 2000 Italians, 2000
Spaniards, 6000 Germans and 4000 horse. But in addition a navy of
40 ships of 800 tons, 25 others including galleys armed with artillery
amidships was to be available; there would be 16,000 sailors. Clearly
this would have been a very substantial force, comparable to that of
1544. e main objective was to establish the fort at Mont Lambert
(discussed below). Early in March, Henry approved a plan for a rst
camp beyond Guînes from where Hertford set out with a small troop
to Ambleteuse on 30 March. Here, the army oversaw the construction
of the rst phase of the Ambleteuse fort.
96
Du Biez, who had himself
intended to seize Ambleteuse, was le at Hardelot and in the words of
Hall ‘durst not once come forth to set on our men, notwithstanding
his former preparacion and device.’
97
Du Biez, aer a brief recall to court which seemed to presage his fall
from favour, returned to concentrate on the fortications of Étaples.
98
ese had certainly become an object of English attentions. e port
had rapidly been turned into a major station for the French galley eet
and so it became one of the possible objectives of Hertford’s army. An
95
Surrey to Paget, 15 March 1546, NA SP1/215, fo. 89r (L&P, XXI, i, 394).
96
Paget to Mont, 25 Feb. 1525, St.P., XI, p. 59 (L&P, XXI, i, 272); Davell, Shao
and others to Cobham, Newcastle, 25 Feb. 1546, BL Harl. 282, fo. 353 (L&P, XXI, i,
274); Privy Council to Cobham, 8 March 1546, BL Harl. 282, fo. 357 (L&P, XXI, i,
355); commission of Hertford as lieutenant beyond the seas to invade France at dis-
cretion, 21 March 1546, L&P, XXI, i, 431; Hertford to Henry VIII, 30 March 1546,
L&P, XXI, i, 489.
97
Hall, ed. Whibley, II, p. 354.
98
Du Biez to Heilly, 2 April 1546, Potter, Du Biez, p. 217. A new galley harbour
was being constructed at Etaples in March 1546 and garrisoned by 6–7000 men (L&P,
XXI, i, 481); Hertford and others to Henry VIII, 21 April 1546, NA SP1/217, fo. 48r
(L&P, XXI, i, 636): ‘Monsr de Bees came yesternight to Estapes with ijc men of armes
and that he shall enjoie the rome and oce he before had.’
292 chapter six
Imperial agent reported these preparations in April.
99
English com-
manders reported at the start of April that it had been made too strong
by the work of 5 or 6000 pioneers and now had a massive citadel. e
French garrison was as large as the English force (spies reported 24
ensigns of Germans) and the wind might not serve the English eet
to bring up support. ey recommended action against Desvres and
Samer instead. Henry was not at rst pleased by this news and they
had to return to the plan, drawing up a list of ‘doubts’ which centred
on the weakness of the army in terms of numbers.
100
e landsknechts
of Conrad Penninck were now nearing Calais and Hertford had 500
German cavalry at his disposal. Lisle suggested the combined force
advance to Etaples to cut o supplies but eventually Henry was per-
suaded to allow his army to concentrate on Hardelot, Desvres and
Samer.
101
All the same, Hertford returned to the problem of Etaples,
which was obviously proving to be a major threat, and advised that,
should the current peace talks break down (and it was clear that the
French, like the English, were determined to negotiate ‘sword in
hand’),
102
the army, reinforced by a further 3000 men, should imme-
99
HHSA, P.A. 62, fos. 113–114: ‘Le Roy de France a deliberé de fortier ung port
appellé Estappes estans à deux lieues pres de Boulongne qui est entre led. Boulongne et
Ardres. Et icelluy faire profonder pour y mectre ses galleres avec vingt navires armees
pour avec icelles galleres et navires garder que l’Anglois ne renvituaille Boulongne du
coustel de lad. marine. Et du couste1 de terre il a deliberé de construyre cinq fortz,
l’ung en ung village entre Boulongne et Calaix pour garder que les Anglois ne puissent
venir ny assister ceulx dud. Boulongne, deux aultres desd. cinq fortz se construyront
sur la riviere qui serviront an que l’Anglois ne puisse passer oultre lad. riviere pour
addomager la Picardie.’ A smaller fort was to be built to guard that of Outreau, and
the h was an addition to Oultreau ‘de laquelle l’on baptra plus aisement Boulongne.’
is spy predicted an improbably massive attack on the Tour d’Ordre but sensibly
pointed out that ‘ilz ne feront l’amas de gens de guerre jusques ad ce qu’ilz verront
quel chemin prandra l’Empereur, doubtans fort qui ne leur face la guerre en Piedmont
ceste annee, et aussi quelle issue aura prins la diete de Reinsbourg.’
100
Lisle to Henry VIII, 1 April 1546, L&P, XXI, i, 507; Hertford and others to
Henry VIII, 3 April 1546, L&P, XXI, i, 529; Paget to Lisle, 3 April 1546, L&P, XXI,
i, 527, 527.II. A company of Albanian horse in Boulogne were able to raid as far as
Etaples and took the prisoners from whom the intelligence was derived (L&P, XXI,
i, 577).
101
Paget to Hertford and Lisle, 12 April 1546, L&P, XXI, i, 586; Pay for German
cavalry, 21 April 1546, BL Add. 5753, fos. 190–191 (L&P, XXI, i, 638); Lisle to Council,
18 April 1546, L&P, XXI, i, 622; Hertford to Henry VIII, 21 April 1546, ibid., XXI,
i, 636.
102
Lisle to Henry VIII, 26 April 1546, NA SP1/217, fo. 102r (L&P, XXI, i, 682):
‘either it shulde seame that the French Kyng wold have yt appere to entreate with
your maiestie with the sworde in hand as your highnes doth or elles he meanith to be
doyng by tymes in cace thynges prove not to his pleasure.’
the war in france, 1545–1546 293
diately attempt to take it. Henry approved the scheme, while opting to
use the soldiers aboard his ships who were dying of disease at sea.
103
Fighting continued around Boulogne and Calais even as the peace
negotiators began their work (see chapter 10). e garrison at Guînes
made a successful raid as far as Ardres in the middle of April and
Wallop even suggested an assault by Gamboa and his Spaniards. is
aroused some interest at home but the high command were sceptical
about this in view of the strength of the garrison and absence of siege
equipment. However, a successful raid was launched against a supply
column retreating to érouanne from Ardres in which 11 hommes
d’armes, 60 foot and 100 carts were taken.
104
Rather more serious was
a clash, again over revictualing for the French fort at Boulogne, on 25
April. e Albanian cavalry (captained by Cavaliere Tommaso Boa)
asked to lie in ambush for the supply train. ey were to attack a
body of French cavalry on Saint-Etienne and meanwhile Grey, now
lord Deputy, deployed the garrison in support at Pont-de-Bricque.
e Albanians retreated exhausted and so Ralph Ellerkar took the hill
with his light horse and sent for infantry support. e French supply
train now retreated through the forest of Hardelot and Ellerkar pur-
sued them towards Neuchâtel but was let down, according to English
accounts, by the Albanians. He was killed and several prominent o-
cers including the marshal of Boulogne were taken. e skirmish was a
minor disaster, quickly blamed by Paget on the Albanian and German
cavalry.
105
Du Biez remained in the eld until the conclusion of the peace.
French plans to attack, should the talks near Calais fail, were therefore
not needed and both sides began to concentrate on securing a strong
position for the next round, which, in the nature of compromise agree-
ments in the 16th century, could be a matter of a few months, or at
most a few years, away.
e ghting in the Boulonnais had been debilitating on both sides,
inconclusive yet inevitable given the strategic objectives of both sides.
It rendered the settlement of the peace treaty more dicult and also
103
Hertford and Lisle to Henry VIII, 28 April 1546, L&P, XXI, i, 693; Council to
Hertford and Lisle, April 1546, L&P, XXI, i, 707.
104
Hertford to Paget, 13 April, to Henry VIII, 17 April, Lisle to Council 1546, L&P,
XXI, i, 594, 612, 622.
105
Lisle to Henry VIII, 26 April, Grey to Hertford, 26 April 1546, L&P, XXI, i, 682,
683. Lisle was amazed that Ellerkar, a man of experience, had taken this bait. Paget to
Petre, 28 April 1546, L&P, XXI, i, 691.
294 chapter six
demanded from both sides (but especially the English) and enormous
investment in terms of fortication and naval establishment. e
treaty of June 1546 simply preserved the status quo at Boulogne. For
France, the ghting had absorbed the attention of the government for
18 months, with a result that little was done elsewhere.
Digging In: French and English Fortifications
around Boulogne
Henry VIII himself took a close interest in the refortication of
Boulogne aer its capitulation.
106
It was perhaps for this purpose that
the recently exhibited panorama of the town from the north-west
heights above it was drawn. is shows the town with ruined walls and
stretched from the ‘Master of the Horse’s camp’ (later Boulogneberg)
towards the port and was probably made for Henry as a basis for the
décor of a chamber at Whitehall.
107
At the same time (September 1544)
Henry appointed John Rogers ‘surveyor of all the fortications and
works’ at Boulogne with a sta of master mason, master carpenter,
chief smith and clerk of works. Shortly aerwards, omas Palmer,
treasurer of Guînes castle, was appointed to oversee the harbour works,
which may indicate that Henry was wary of trusting one man. As time
went on, though, his condence in Rogers outweighed his suspicions
and Rogers was given charge of works throughout the Boulonnais,
planning the work on a meticulous basis and with remarkable plans
that owed much to the rapid development of scaled maps in the rst
half of the century.
108
Rogers oen diered from his aristocratic supe-
riors but was usually backed by the King. Paget thought him ‘playn
and blunt, which must be borne withall as long as he is well meanyng
and myndith the service of the Kinges Majesty.’
109
ere is no doubt
that the trust reposed in Rogers by Henry VIII gave him an unusual
degree of authority until the king’s death; he gave little heed to the
sensitivities of his social superiors and controlled the work on nine
building projects by summer 1546.
110
106
L&P, XIX, ii, 424.
107
BL Cotton Aug. I, ii, 116. S. Doran (ed.), Henry VIII Man and Monarch (British
Library, 2009), no. 237, p. 238.
108
L.R. Shelby, John Rogers, Tudor Military Engineer (Oxford, 1967), p. 55.
109
[Paget] to Surrey, 8 March 1546, NA SP1/215, fo. 35v (L&P, XXI, i, 356).
110
Shelby, Roger, pp. 86–91.
the war in france, 1545–1546 295
In the 1552 summary of expenditure on the wars 1543–1550
(Appendix 8) we nd that £122,696 had been allocated to the Boulonnais
for works in that period, with £47,166 allocated from January 1545 to
the end of Henry’s reign. is by any measure was a substantial sum
and should be compared with the £27,457 allocated to Scotland for the
same period, though far short of the £181,197 that had been spent on
fortication in England between March 1539 and January 1547 and
£120,675 on Calais and Guînes (where major new works were being
built).
111
e explanation is in one sense simple; the necessary works
to hold on to Boulogne were inevitably very costly but could not be
considered as vital as the defence of Calais and the English coast. e
fundamental problem, as Shelby has shown, was how to secure a town
that was, at rst at least, eectively isolated and had to rely on rein-
forcement from the sea. is demanded work on the harbour and on
outlying works to protect the town on the northern and eastern side.
In the town itself, the lower part was poorly fortied and the garrison
scarcely sucient to hold it, as the ‘Camisado’ had shown in October
1544.
112
e costs of the various works was also itemised from 1545
down to their surrender in 1550:
Boulogne (high and low) with outworks 82,474.13.4
Old Man (Tour d’Ordre) 12,350.5.6
Boulemberg 5,147.6.4
New Haven (Ambleteuse) 15,731.7.5
Blackness 7,051.10.10
e main problem at Boulogne itself was that the opposite side of the
Liane from the town had not been held. ere were obvious reasons
for this, since an outlying garrison there could only be backed up with
diculty during the building of any fortress. Henry realised this costly
mistake himself and ordered the south bank and the hill of Outreau to
be occupied; nothing was done.
113
Henry had commanded a ‘bastilion’
to be built on the other side of the river to command the harbour but
111
NA SP10/15 no. 11, fos. 18–29 (see Appendix 8) the Calendar of State papers,
Domestic series, of the Reign of Edward VI, ed. C.S. Knighton (London, 1992), pp.
258–263 has a useful summary though there are some mistakes which require con-
sultation of the original.
112
e clasic study is P. Héliot, ‘Les fortications de Boulogne sous l’occupation
anglaise (1544–1550), Revue du Nord, 40 (1958), 5–38, which should be read in con-
junction with Shelby, John Rogers: Tudor Military Engineer.
113
L&P, XIX, ii, 352.
296 chapter six
Norfolk and Suolk had been anxious to leave and not risk the French
counter-attack. Henry was outraged:
Yett if you my lordes of Norfolk and pryvie seall had reamayned your
selfes uppon the topp of the hill of the other side of the water and yet
my lord of Suolk encamped abowt the Old Man you shuld both have
byn hable to have defendyd the haven and basse Bulleyn and also have
letten the frenshe from making of any other bastelian there.
114
e same day Norfolk and his colleagues conrmed that Lee, Rogers
and the others thought such a construction impossible before the win-
ter adding that they were not very experienced. Henry, unsurprisingly,
thought they should have waited for his opinion ‘for that knowledge
that they have lerned only at our hand.’
115
More amenable was the site of the Roman lighthouse, the Tour
d’Ordre (Old Man), where Palmer was called in and the initial earth
and wood emplacements for cannon ready in early December. is
initially took the form of a circular parapet (see Rogers’ Survey I). By
Spring 1545 this had developed into a triangular structure with cur-
tain, angle bastions and ditches, again constructed of earth, described
by Martin du Bellay as ‘un fort de terre bien anqué.’ Palmer in March
1546 described a structure which includes three ‘bulwarks’ and a
‘mount,’ the ditches being 50 feet wide and 11 foot deep. e rampart
was nished, 9 foot high and 50 foot thick. In April 1546, the ‘ank-
ers’ were redesigned. Only aer 1547 were any masonry works added.
116
e Tour d’Ordre was crucial in that it was the only vantage point
from which English artillery could command the harbour.
As for Boulogne itself, the upper town, obviously the strong point,
had received new circular bastions in the early 16th century (the tours
Notre-Dame and Française), some of which are visible on the 1544
view, equipped with the King’s salamander device. e same plan
also reveals an éperon (horseshoe-shaped artillery emplacement) and
fausse-brayes had been constructed throughout. Work on restoring
114
Norfolk and others to Henry VIII, 5 Oct. 1544, Nott, Works . . . of Surrey, appen-
dix no. xvii (L&P, XIX, ii, 353); Council to Norfolk and others, 5 Oct. 1544, NA
SP1/193, fo. 28 (L&P, XIX, ii, 352).
115
Henry VIII to Norfolk and others, . . . Oct. 1544, NA SP1/193, fos. 69v–70r (L&P,
XIX, ii, 383).
116
Shelby, Rogers, p. 61, plates 19, 20, 21. To these may be added the early 17th
century plans of Boulogne in BL 21,117, fos. 5, 22. Du Bellay, Mémoires, IV, p. 318.
Palmer to Henry VIII, 25 March [1546], Hateld, Cecil MSS, 150, fos. 18–19; Hertford
and others to Henry VIII, 7 April 1546, L&P, XXI, i, 565.
the war in france, 1545–1546 297
this system was quite slow but urgent attention was given to the cor-
ner of the town where the castle was located and which had proved
vulnerable. Here Rogers constructed an extensive earthen bastion (the
Green Bulwark), sixty feet in depth, which enveloped the castle and a
section of the curtain wall. Otherwise, an extensive network of earthen
artillery emplacements was added outside the walls. In July 1545, artil-
lery could be mounted on such emplacements at the Tour Gayette and
the porte des Degrés to beat French emplacements on the other side
of the river.
117
In the south-west corner of the lower town, a completely new cita-
del was started in July 1545, built of stone, in order to secure the arse-
nal, the harbour and to be proof against French bombardment. Paget
reported in July 1545 that the German troops on the other side of the
river ‘have been very busy of late in shotyng to a bulwark of stone in
building at the south west side of the basse towne but our men have
nevertheless nished theyr work, for now thenglishmen have lerned
to contemne the gonne shot.’
118
Otherwise, the ramparts of the lower
town, extremely vulnerable, remained incomplete. Clement’s bulwark,
in the south-east corner, was still not nished in 1549. Still, stone ram-
parts were started to connect these constructions and to link them with
the high town.
119
e commanders at Boulogne reported that the new
‘braye’ from the Tower Gate to the stone bastion in the lower town
was hardly started and could not be completed in 1546; nor could the
works connecting the Tour d’Ordre and the lower town. A further part
of this network was started under Rogers’ direction in the summer
of 1545. is was the Young Man (to the French ‘le Jardin’), another
triangular fort, half-way between the Tour d’Ordre and the Citadel.
is went ahead slowly and was still being adjusted in early 1547. It
was built of brick and prevented the Tour d’Ordre being isolated from
the town as well as commanding the harbour. Surrey was to describe it
as a ‘cavillere’ over the harbour but by March 1546 observed that the
work there was ‘dampned and in place therof an other worke devised
of more travail and chardge, and as me seemethe of morre daungier
and lesse defence.’ It is clear from the works agenda of April 1546 that
117
Shelby, Rogers, pp. 64–66; Paget to Norfolk, 17 July 1545, BL Harl. 6989, fo. 136
in describing this artillery, calls the Porte des Degrés as the ‘Bulloyn gate of the upper
towne.’
118
Paget to Norfolk, 17 July 1545, BL, Harl. 6989, fo. 136 (L&P, XX, i, 1210).
119
Shelby, pp. 66–68.
298 chapter six
the nature of this redesign had not been decided. Some time in 1545,
an outer ditch was started to protect all these works.
120
e harbour
also needed to be protected from bombardment and the citadel had
incorporated a stone jetty, 300 feet long, 16 wide and 26 high, for this
purpose. is was suggested in September 1545 and largely completed
by April 1546. It was only aer 1547 that another stone (fortied) mole
was added on the other side of the harbour, partly to prevent silting
but party to act as a fortication. is was the Dunette, a remarkable
construction which much impressed the French.
121
Inland from Boulogne, the Master of the Horse’s Camp from the
siege (on what is now called Mont Lambert) was garrisoned. Du Biez
had occupied the position during the great crisis of the summer of
1545 and not until Spring of 1546 did Lord Grey decide to turn this
into a fortress to counter the one being built on the other side of the
river at Saint-Etienne by the French. He ordered Rogers to draw up
a plan for what would be called Bullemberg or Boulogneberg but,
though Rogers was optimistic that he would have it nished in June
(it was well laid out with ditches by then), it was still in an indefen-
sible state by the time the peace treaty was signed and the issue of its
completion became acrimonious.
122
e fort was an earthen one, with
four angle bastions.
123
ere is no detailed plan but a memorandum
about what was needed there in 1547 declared that it was still not
‘made upp according to the platte’ and was exposed to enemy action.
e circuit of the bastions was 600 feet and each bastion needed 100
men. e report called for a ‘bastilion’ on the top of the hill between
120
e Young Man and the Old Man are shown on the Italian plan, BL Cotton,
Aug. I, ii, no. 67, suppl. 10 but bear little relation to the plans as shown in Rogers’
drawing. is may well be the earliest phase. On the Young Man, Surrey to Paget,
15 March 1546, NA SP1/215, fo. 88r (L&P, XXI, i, 394); on lack of progress, Council
of Boulogne to Privy Council, 29 March 1546, L&P, XXI, I, 481. Hertford and others
to Henry VIII, 7 April 1546, L&P, XXI, i, 565.
121
Shelby, pp. 70–73. On the jetty or mole, see Council letter, 8 Sept. 1545, APC, I,
p. (L&P, XX, ii, 323); Hertford and others to Henry VIII, 7 April, 26 June 1546,
L&P, XXI, i, 565, 1159. For a large-scale drawing of the Dunette, BL Harleian Roll,
E.E. 14 (reproduced in A. de Rosny, Album historique du Boulonnais,(Neuville-sous-
Montreuil, 1892), pl. XVII.
122
L&P, XXI, i, 1016, 1017, 1472; ii, 731; Nicholas Arnold was sent to have charge
of the fort in July 1546 (APC, I, p. 465).
123
Shelby, pp. 73–75 Hertford reported in June 1546 that the French, before their
departure had ‘begonne a forte at Saincte Estiens aer the same sorte and fassion of
the master of thorse campe.’ NA SP1/220, fo. 141(144)v (L&P, XXI, i, 1074).
the war in france, 1545–1546 299
Boulogneberg and Pont-de-Bricque to prevent the French from cut-
ting of water supplies, which had been a problem.
124
By 1546, English land communications with Calais had to be
secured and this was done by two new fortresses on the coast. e
one at Ambleteuse was not begun until the Spring of 1546 but was
one of Rogers’ major enterprises (several plans by him of it survive).
125
Little is heard of the ‘New haven’ (as it was then called) until the start
of 1546. Elis Gruydd recalled (in perhaps a garbled form) that at rst
it was the French who had intended to seize Ambleteuse (‘Tempylton’)
and cap Gris Nez in order to create a port for galleys all year round
and so dominate the Narrow Seas. But Henry, hearing of this, sent a
force to occupy these places.
126
Surrey thought that, divided by two
rivers and six miles distant, it could ‘hardly let attempts against this
town by an enemy that has his country at his back.’
127
At all events,
by the beginning of April 1546 a military camp had been established
there and there was discussion of its value (Hertford at rst seemed
to think little of it) and it was surveyed by omas Wyatt and Rogers
on 27 March, when they were not optimistic about the idea of creat-
ing an extra harbour for English supplies. However, the actual haven
as it stood in 1546 had never been managed and there is some doubt
whether any large vessels other than ‘rowbarges’ could have used it.
128
Hertford quickly changed his mind; on 3 April he declared himself
‘dayly more and more in love with yt and trust to see the same one
124
‘Necessary thynges [so that] this peace may be [defended if] it shalbe besieged’
SHC, LM/1329/193. See also the related report by Nicholas Arnold, NA SP68/15,
fo. 159 (CSPF Edward VI, Calais Papers, no. 165). Arnold was bemoaning the state of
Boulogneberg in Jan. 1547 (to Paget, 21 Jan. 1547, L&P, XXI, ii, 731) and submitted a
devastating statement of its neglect in November 1548, NA, SP68/15, fos. 86–95.
125
Crucial to any study of Ambleteuse is the survey by Jacques Méreau, ‘Les forti-
cations anglaises d’Ambleteuse,’ Bulletin des amis du fort d’Ambleteuse 43 (1988) and
idem, ‘Les fortications anglaises d’Ambleteuse. Hypothèses de reconstitution’ ibid.,
44 (1988). I am grateful to M. Daniel Leunens for drawing my attention to this.
126
Elis Gruydd, Chronicle, ‘Boulogne and Calais from 1545 to 1550,’ Bulletin of
the Faculty of Arts of Fouad I University, Cairo, XII, p. 44. e same point was made
by Hall, ed. Whibley, II, pp. 353–354.
127
Surrey to Paget, 15 March 1546, NA SP1/215, fo. 89 (L&P, XXI, i, 394).
128
Hertford observed on his arrival in France that sacks of supplies being embarked
at Dover could probably not be o-loaded at Ambleteuse because of the neep tide.
He was awaiting that moment before visiting it to estimate its problems (to Paget,
23 March 1546, to Cobham and Paget, 25 March L&P, XXI, i, 449, 459). His verdict
aer Wyatt had inspected the harbour was pessimistic (to Paget, 27 March 1546, ibid.,
XXI, i, 471) but Wyatt and Rogers themselves reported that the harbour was one
fathom deep at the worst tide (to Hertford, 27 March 1546, L&P, XXI, I, 472).