Potter David. Henry VIII and Francis I

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310 chapter seven

and the approaching Franco-Imperial war had produced a good mar-

ket for troops.

e eect of the Emperor’s personal campaign in 1544

was to make the position of German captains rather more dicult, as

they could contract for defence of France but not for direct confronta-

tion with their feudal superior. Only a few remained in French service

during the war, though they were crucial for the French war eort.

The Landenberg Fiasco: Henry VIII’s Quest for

Mercenaries, 1544

While the French crown quickly recognized that the legions would

be inadequate in serious warfare and continued to rely overwhelm-

ingly on mercenaries, England under Henry VIII found this a di-

cult course to take, if only because of the expense and complexity of

the recruitment process. With her very intermittent participation in

European warfare, England arrived rather late in the eld of raising

professionals abroad. As has been seen, Henry relied heavily for his

limited campaigns in France on semi-feudal recruitment, but it is also

clear that England, like many other European countries, experienced

the need to produce an eective native infantry. Attempts to raise a

well-trained and reliable militia were, though, still rudimentary.

One

historian has pointed out that the Tudors used mercenaries and auxil-

iaries from 1485 onwards, but until the renewal of war with France in

1543 little serious thought had been given to the mercenary market.

Contract with van Rossem, Oct. 1541, Bers, pp. 160–163; Longueval to Serrant,

May 1542, ibid., pp. 216–217.

For the problems posed in 1542 for mercenary captains by the Franco-Imperial

war, see the report of Paget, Lyons, 31 July 1542, L&P, XVII, 554, and the report

of Cruser to the Duke of Cleves, 1 May 1542, SAD, Julich-Berg II, 1940, fo. 382v.

e muster rolls for lansquenets are extensively preserved for 1543: BnF, fr. 25791,

nos. 386–387, 424, 431, 434, 447 (von Deben’s troops under the Count of Altembourg);

nos. 428, 435–436, 446 (Reckerodt’s regiment); nos. 426–427 (Rognac’s regiment).

ere are fewer rolls for 1544, and they indicate that Italian and Swiss formations

were relied on more in that campaign. French sources on the army facing Charles V

at Jalons are poor: see F. Lot, Recherches sur les eectifs, pp. 102–103. An ocial act,

BnF Clair[ambault] 330, no. 7599, simply lists ‘les lansquenets’ in the avant-garde.

J. Goring, ‘e Military Obligations of the English People’, and C.G. Cruick-

shank, Army Royal: An Account of Henry VIII’s Invasion of France, 1513 (Oxford,

1969). On mercenaries in particular, see G.J. Millar, Tudor Mercenaries and Auxilia-

ries, 1485–1547 (Charlottesville, 1980) is fairly full on the events of 1544, but does not

cover 1545–1546 in depth.

See ibid., pp. 26–48. Henry VIII sent omas Seymour to Vienna in 1542, with

france and england compete for troops 311

From then on, however, Henry turned his attention to the acquisition

of a substantial band of mercenaries to reinforce the army committed

for the joint campaign with the Emperor in 1544.

Even before he declared war on France in June 1543, Henry VIII

was negotiating in Germany for professional troops to bolster his

armies. He realised, as did all major European powers, that there could

be no eective army without professional mercenaries. From 1540, a

royal ‘servant’ had been retained (presumably by Cromwell) in the

person of Georg von Heideck, a follower of the Elector Palatine with

lands near Hagenau, to report on events in Germany. While on mis-

sion in Cleves, Nicholas Wotton was careful to observe movements

of landsknechts, list their commanders and speculate about whether

they were being raised by France.

In July 1542, omas Seymour

was negotiating at Vienna with mercenary captains and Henry told

them that he would have need of them early in the following year. In

December 1542 Henry ordered Seymour to meet Heideck and Ludwig

von Fleckenstein at Nuremburg to ask if they could come to Calais

to serve against the French. ey readily promised 6000 landsknechts

and 3000 horse but were adamant that they needed a month to raise

them. Nor could they serve against the Emperor since their overlord

in Alsace was the King of the Romans. Despite Seymour’s disgruntle-

ment, this was an ambitious timetable. In any case, Henry decided to

decline their oer of service, while paying them 100 and 200 crowns

respectively for their expenses.

Interestingly the routes they proposed

coincided almost exactly with those used in following years, while

Fleckenstein emerged as a notable commander in French service.

John Wallop, the commander of the English Landrecies expedition,

established a list of captains, especially of Cleves horsemen, who were

willing to serve, including one Gymynyck from the region of Cologne,

already an English pensioner, described as ‘a very honest man.’ Cavalry

letters to Baron ab Heideck: see St.P., IX, 73. In August 1542 Henry was hoping that

Heideck would lead his troops to Calais early in the new year and Seymour was also

told to look into the mercenary market (ibid., p. 139). Heideck was the elder brother

of a mercenary in French service (ibid., VIII, 640, IX,.101) under his cousin Count

Fürstenberg, a phenomenon paralleled by the Rhinegrave in the later 1540s whose

brother was in English service. See Potter, ‘Les Allemands et les armées françaises,’ 3.

Wotton to Henry VIII, 4, 16 April, 25 May 1541, St.P., VIII, pp. 548, 570 (L&P,

XVI, 687, 731, 862).

Instructions to Seymour, 12 Dec. 1542, St.P., IX, pp. 231–233; Henry VIII to

Seymour, 14 Jan. 1543, L&P, XVIII, i, 42.

312 chapter seven

from the lower Rhine duchies had been very prominent in the rst

phase of the war and was to continue to be so. Count Albrecht III

of Mansfeld, commander of landsknechts in north Germany, and

Alessandro Gonzaga had also oered their services, but Wallop’s view

of the Italians was that ‘it is evyll medling with theym, having had good

experience therof this yere.’

In the event, Henry’s experiences with

mercenary captains during the Boulogne campaign were bleak. e

King had needed to nd mercenaries to strengthen his English troops

to the contingent of 42,000 agreed with the Emperor for their com-

mon campaign; in March 1544 this was planned to include 8,000 high

German foot and 4,000 German horse. In practice, Henry raised only

an English army of 32–33,000 and 4,000 auxiliaries from the Emperor

led by Buren; 4,000 mercenary foot were to be provided by Christo

von Landenberg zu Schramberg and extra cavalry drawn from a num-

ber of lesser captains.

Money always posed a problem in the relations between ‘warlords’

like Henry VIII and Francis I and the German colonels they hired,

because a certain amount of credit was oen involved. In 1544, assem-

blies of men were going on all over Germany in the early months of

the year, agents from the major powers hovering and ready to do deals.

An assembly in Holstein, ostensibly for the French, had to be coun-

tered by the Habsburgs.

Nicholas Wotton found himself embarrassed

by lack of cash in March 1544, when he was nding it dicult to enlist

captains who would serve for as little as Landenberg.

e colonel

would receive his Bestallung, or contract, and then hired as many cap-

tains as he thought he would need to raise the stipulated number of

men. Either credit would be advanced by the captains, or they received

money in advance from ther colonel to recruit men under licence (the

Werbepatente).

Guarantee of payment was therefore crucial as costs

were substantial. For England, the monthly pay of 6,000 foot and 1,000

Wallop to Paget, 26 Oct. 1543, NA SP1/182, fo. 40 (L&P, XVIII, ii, 310); to

Henry VIII, 14 Nov. 1543, St.P., ix, 550–552; to Council, n.d.[Nov. 1543], NA SP1/182,

fo. 98 (L&P, XVIII, ii, 385): ‘as touching the Clevoys horssemen, the kinges Majesty

can lack none.’ One troop of 1000 horse was oered in 1542 to France, commanded

by Dietrich Hoen, lord of Horsen. Others were commanded by Jobst II count of Hoya

(Bers, Die Allianz, pp. 219–220).

Army plan drawn up in French, spring 1544, NA SP1/184, fo. 228 (L&P, XIX, i,

273[5]). Landenberg/Landsberg himself was from the area round Zurich.

Mary of Hungary to Chapuys, 14 Feb. 1544, L&P, XIX, i, 111.

Wotton to Paget, 19 March 1544, NA SP1/184, fo. 4 (L&P, XIX, i, 217).

Redlich, e German Military Enterpriser, pp. 40–41.

france and england compete for troops 313

horse was calculated at £8,216 7s. 3d. in March 1544; landsknechts

would receive 12s. 4d. p.m., but there would be 10 per cent double

pays, while the 37s. received by the cavalry was doubled for ‘barded’

horse.

Francis I was probably right to dismiss the seriousness of these

negotiations. Heideck, who had seemed a reliable agent in 1543, was

preoccupied by serving his master, Count Palatine Otto Heinrich of

Neuburg.

As early as March 1544, Gymynick absconded with his

advance, but the main problems concerned Landenberg. e latter had

agreed to provide 4,000 foot and 1,000 horse, but when he arrived at

Aachen he proceeded to haggle furiously over his conditions of service

(including, crucially, the rate of exchange to be used for the orin).

Stephen Vaughan was in a quandary because, with musters scheduled

both in Imperial and Netherlands territory, he could not easily assem-

ble enough coin of dierent kinds and he had to pacify Landenberg’s

rages about having assembled his men without means to pay them.

Eventually, with Aachen established as the muster-place and the date

20 June, Vaughan actually paid over (through letters of exchange with

Sorer of Frankfurt) conduct money of 16,000 . to Landenberg and

10,000 to Sickingen.

At the start of May, Vaughan recommended that

muster commissioners be appointed ‘that be men of skyll and suche

as know both horse and armour and to warne them to have vigilant

yee to them at theyr mustryng for there wolbe made many craye

shyes.’

is proved to be an understatement. e muster was little

short of a calamity for the English. e Regent of the Netherlands

had expected them to be directed from Aachen through Hainault

Calculation of wages, probably for Landenberg’s force of 6,000 foot and 1,000

horse, NA SP1/184, fo. 24 (L&P, XIX, i, 247). Buren’s articles of service, 8 Apr. 1544:

with 2,000 foot in companies of 400, each including 50–60 arquebusiers, 30 halberdiers

and the rest pikes, see NA SP1/185, fos. 142–143 (L&P, XIX, i, 308.2), article 4 on pay.

Payments were usually accounted in Flemish money. e orin of 20 patards/stivers

emish was then worth 3s. 1d. st., the philippus of 25 patards was 3s. 2d. e French

écu was worth 38 stivers and the daller 28 stivers. e relation of pounds sterling to

the Flemish pound (money of account) was 15:19. us the English crown was worth

6s. 8d. . and 5s. 0d. st.

Wotton, 19 March 1544, L&P, XIX, i, 216.

Vaughan to Henry VIII, 13 April 1544, L&P, XIX, i, 328.

Vaughan to Paget, 22 April 1544, L&P, XIX, i, 380. ere was a problem of los-

ing money by exchange. Of £12,900 received by Chamberlain in May to pay Germans

only £2419 arrived in ducats. e rest in angels etc. had to be exchanged with the loss

of at 6d in every angel (L&P, XIX, i, 583).

Vaughan to Paget, 2 May 1544, NA SP1/187 fo. 73(82)v (L&P, XIX, i, 457). L&P,

XIX, i, 583.2, a paper on possible combinations of muster commissioners.

314 chapter seven

towards Aire.

e muster commissioners, Fane and Windebank,

were impressed by Landenberg when they rst met him, though he

seemed cagey about details of his men.

Seeing that he had the whip

hand, Landenberg increased his terms to the point of demanding sub-

stantially more than the Emperor paid his landsknechts. In the end, so

fearful were the English commissioners that they had to ee the camp

and Stephen Vaughan was threatened with death. e main reason

for all this was that England simply did not yet have the advantages of

proximity and the network of acquaintance necessary to play the mar-

ket successfully. Mansfeld, for instance, was thought to be ‘too distant’

for eective negotiations. William Paget, in close touch with all these

dealings, remarked that the German captains ‘like merchantes make

their markettes nowe with your Majeste and others for it is their fayre

tyme.’

At this point Henry decided to write o the £9,266 that he had

already paid Landenberg without any eective service from his infan-

try, though his cavalry captains were invited to join Henry’s forces

independently.

When negotiations between Wotton and Hans von

Commission by Mary of Hungary, 29 May 1544, BL Add. 28593, fo. 323 (L&P,

XIX, i, 600).

Fane and Wyndebank to Council, 2 June 1544, L&P, XIX, i, 618.

Millar, Tudor Mercenaries, pp. 76–81. Cottereau to Card. du Bellay, 5 Apr. 1544,

Scheurer, Correspondance de Jean du Bellay, III, no. 633, p. 253: ‘Le Roy ne crainct

point ses ennemys . . . et combien qu’il luy ait parlé du Landeberg, toutesfois il ne croit

que le roy d’Angleterre face rien contre luy pour des raisons que sçavez.’ Paget to

Henry VIII, Antwerp, 8 June 1544, NA SP1/188, fos. 75–77 (L&P, XIX, i, 648): Fane

and Windebank ‘stande in dred of their lyves whenne they be amonge them, and sayth

that the Almaynes sweare that if Mr Vaughan had bene with them they woold have

hewen him all to peces.’ R. Fane to Council, 25 June 1544, NA SP1/189, fos. 98–107

(L&P, XIX, i, 76); Windebank and Fane to Paget, 16 July 1544, NA SP1/190, fo. 66

(L&P, XIX, i, 926). [Fane] to Landenberg’s captains, 26 June 1544, NA SP1/189,

fo. 120 (L&P, XIX, i, 788). e Regent of the Netherlands was complaining about

the non-payment by Henry of Landenberg’s troops since they proceeded to rampage

their way through the Emperor’s lands. See Instruction of Mary of Hungary to d’Eyck,

1 July 1544, HHSA, P.A. 55, fos. 192–193; and the Instruction to Jean de Waudripont,

26 June 1545, ibid. Scepperus to Fane, Liège, 6 July 1544, NA SP1/189, fo. 215 (L&P,

XIX, i, 857): requiring the payment of Landenberg’s men ‘y joinct que lesdicts gens

pourroient facillement tirer en France, comme aussi c’est une chose de tout temps

accoustumee de payer retour aux gens de guerre.’

For Landenberg’s receipts for advance cash as ‘primarius capitaneus’ for 16,000

., 13 April 1544, L&P, XIX, i, 328(2); as ‘Obrister über zwelf hundert Pferdt und

zehen Feindlein Landsknecht . . . das ich von höchstgedachten K.M. Kreigscommissar-

ien Reinharten Weidenbanks unde Rae Fains meinen leiben herrn und frundten . . . in

gold pfangen habe,’ see BL, Add.MS 5753, fos. 182 (4,000 cr.), 183 (1,000 cr.), 184

(6,113 cr.), 185 (2,000 cr.), 10–15 June 1544 (L&P, XIX, i, 726). See ibid., fos. 180–181,

payments to captains of Landenberg’s 4,000 foot at Aachen, 4 June 1544 ‘to be rebated

owt of there munthes wages.’

france and england compete for troops 315

Sickingen at Speyer for 1,000 heavy cavalry fell through, only Mathies

Leuchtmacher brought any substantial numbers of cavalry to Henry’s

army of invasion, and then with some diculty because of the heavy

demands for men in north Germany. Otherwise, the army included

small detachments of many other origins, including two companies of

Spaniards as well as Buren’s force.

In addition, it is likely that the muster commissioners appointed

in 1544 were inexperienced. e major English diplomats in the eld:

Paget, Wotton and Mont, were able to co-ordinate information, but

much of the burden fell on omas Palmer and omas Chamberlain,

with Stephen Vaughan handling the provision of cash and Ralph Fane,

Richard Windebank, Francis Hall, omas Averey, Edward Vaughan,

John Brende, John Brygantyn (or Brigenden) and John Dymoke act-

ing as muster commisioners for German troops from 1544 to 1550.

Stephen Vaughan had had long diplomatic and nancial experience in

the Netherlands, and Chamberlain had spent time there as governor of

the English merchants at Antwerp. None of the rest had much diplo-

matic experience, though many of them came from the milieu of the

Calais garrison. Hall and Windebank were military men based there.

Fane was a gentleman of Kent, a soldier knighted at Boulogne and

distinguished in Scotland in 1547 who was later executed as a partisan

of Protector Somerset. Brende, who sometimes used the alias William

Watson on foreign missions, was a military expert whose friendship with

Paget got him, too, into diculties in 1552.

Much of the negotiation

Leuchtmacher to Chamberlain, 21 June 1544, NA SP1/189, fos. 8–9 (L&P, XIX,

i, 753): ‘tout le pays de Brunswycke et la ville de Godtleer et la ville de Bremes et plu-

sieurs contes et ducs et aultres grans singners quy prendent journellement et amassent

gros nombres de gens de cheval et à piedt en telle maniere que nulles gendarmes ne à

peydt ne à cheval ne puelent paser par les villes à cause qu’il son tenus comme serré.’

See also receipts for payments of 31,000 philippus to Clevois and north German cav-

alry captains for the Boulogne campaign, Oct. 1544, BL, Add.MS 5753, fos. 170–178,

(L&P, XIX, ii, 401). BL, Add. 5753, fo. 186, payment in prest of £50 to Leuchtmacher,

29 Oct. 1544. L. MacMahon, ‘e English Invasion of France, 1544,’ pp. 49–61.

Chamberlain’s list of money paid and Paget’s dra list of the muster commis-

sioners, May 1544, NA SP1/188, fos. 7–9 (L&P, XIX, i, 583) assigns Palmer, Vane

and Chamberlain to Buren and Leuchtmacher, S. and E. Vaughan and Windebank to

Landenberg. Chamberlain became ambassador in the Low Countries under Edward VI;

on Vaughan, see W.C. Richardson, Stephen Vaughan, Financial Agent of Henry VIII

(Baton Rouge, 1953); on Windebank, see muster of Calais garrison, 1533, in Chronicle

of Calais, ed. J.G. Nicholls (Camden Soc., 1846) p. 137 – he went on to be deputy of

Guînes and member of the council of Boulogne. omas Averey and Edward Vaughan

were both royal pensioners. Brende, MP for etford in 1547, was mainly engaged in

the North and Scotland as fortication expert and muster master: S.T.Bindo (ed.),

e House of Commons, 1509–1558 (London, 1982), I. 492–494. His alias as Watson is

316 chapter seven

with the captains seems to have been done in French or Latin, but

we know that Fane had to use an interpreter in dealing with the lin-

guistically gied Netherlands minister, President Schore ‘forasmyche

as I have matter to saye to yowe and have not sucient langage to

declare the same unto yowe.’ ough they were all familiar with the

Low Countries, only Vaughan seems to have had any extensive deal-

ings in Germany before this time.

The Anglo-French Duel in Germany, 1545

Despite the problems of the Boulogne campaign, the year 1545 saw

England more seriously involved in the market for mercenaries. e

splenetic old Welsh soldier of Calais, Elis Gruydd, scarcely exagger-

ated when he recorded that the army around Calais in the summer of

1545 included

many depraved brutish foreign soldiers from all nations under the

sun – Welsh, English, Cornish, Irish, Manx, Scots, Spaniards, Gascons,

Portingals, Italians, Arbannoises, Greeks, Turks, Tartars, Almains, Germans,

Burgundians, Flemings who had come there from the French king who

was very angry with them for going to have a good time under the king

of England who by nature was too hospitable to foreigners.

It is plain that Henry’s unsatisfactory experiences in 1543–1544 had

not discouraged him from looking again to Germany in 1545, as the

clear from the instructions of Dec. 1547 in SP 68/1, pp. 310–313. Brygantyn, step-

son of Edward North, Chancellor of Augmentations, was envoy to Germany under

Edward VI and MP for Huntingdon in 1558 (ibid., p. 496).

Fane to the Council, 25 June 1544, NA SP1/189, fo. 103v (L&P, XIX, i, 776): ‘why

sayde le seigneur Score, how shall then the quenys majeste understande yowe ?’ Ralph

Fane is described in the quittances of the German captains, June-Oct. 1544, as one of

the ‘höchtsgedachten K.M. Kriegs Commissarien’ (BL, Add. MS 5753, fo. 183 etc.). He

was knighted by Henry on 30 Sept. 1544. Francis Hall was controller of Calais and

had some part in abortive peace negotiations with Saint-Martin in 1544. Brende was a

Latin scholar who had already carried out minor missions in Italy and Germany in the

early 1540s: see H. Davis, ‘John Brende: Soldier and Translator,’ Huntington Library

Quarterly i (1937), 421–426.

Much-quoted extract from Gruydd’s chronicle, in Davies, ‘Boulogne and Calais

from 1545 to 1550,’ 14–15. In fact, the account kept by Sir omas Chaloner, clerk

of the Privy Council, for payments to foreign soldiers and diplomats, 17 May 1545–

2 Feb. 1551, NA, E 351/43, indicates not only Germans but, especially among the

cavalry in 1549, Italians, Hungarians, Albanians and Spaniards. e Albanians, com-

manded by Petro Sanga, were almost certainly Christian refugees from the Adriatic

coast who had settled in Italy from the late eenth century.

france and england compete for troops 317

renewal of active campaigning with France became likely. e failure

of this renewed quest for mercenaries can be followed in detail from

the angle of the English, French and German princes. e situation in

1545 certainly attracted France and England to Germany as source for

ghting men. Henry VIII built on his small Spanish contingent of 1544.

In 1545 he rst appointed Pedro de Gamboa ‘Master of the Camp’ over

all Spaniards in his service, but these troops, mainly demi-lances and

mounted arquebusiers sometimes of ‘Burgundian’ or Netherlandish

origins, were quarrelsome.

For solid foreign infantry, Germans were

still the best bet. e Emperor was now neutral between France and

England and, despite some noises, made no real eort to interrupt

the recruitment of mercenaries in the Empire, though the English still

needed his licence for their recruits to pass through the Netherlands.

For the English in particular, it was easier to draw troops from Germany

than, say, from Italy, as ‘conduct money’ would be cheaper.

For both French and English, military conict drove their approach

to Germany. For the German princes who controlled the main sources

of supply, the question was strategic: how to assure allies for the com-

ing struggle with the Emperor. e days of the early 1540s, when the

princes still felt able to spurn French approaches, were now gone. Two

issues were therefore intertwined: the intense diplomatic and intel-

ligence struggle between France and England in Germany, and the

problems of the Schmalkaldic League which led the princes repeatedly

to seek pacication between their potential allies. e major land objec-

tive for both countries was the defence or capture of Boulogne and this

required both a supply of mercenaries and the obstruction of access

to them by the enemy.

France was also again employing lansquenets

in 1545 on a large scale, many of them raised by the Rhinegrave, the

current favourite French military entrepreneur. Martin du Bellay

On Spaniards in Henry’s service, see M.A.S. Hume (ed.), Chronicle of King Henry VIII

of England . . . Written in Spanish (London, 1889), pp. 112–214 passim. e Spanish

captains, who tended to command bands of horse and arquebusiers, were exception-

ally quarrelsome. Brende in 1548, from experience in Scotland, argued that they were

‘chardgeable’ and ill-furnished, prone to deceit and should not be allowed to com-

mand both horse and foot: see J. Bain et al., Calendar of Papers Relating to Scotland

and Mary Queen of Scots, 1547–1603 12 vols (Edinburgh, 1898–1952) [hereaer Cal-

endar Scotland], I, no. 336.

While England was negotiating with Maurice of Saxony in October–November

1544, France was probably doing the same in January 1545. See Philip of Hesse to

Maurice of Saxony, 17 Jan. 1545, in E. Brandenburg (ed.), Politische Korrespondenz des

Herzogs und Kurfürsten Moritz von Sachsen 4 vols (Leipzig, 1900–1904), II, no. 643.

318 chapter seven

mentions that there were as many landsknechts employed in the siege

of Boulogne as French infantry and other sources reveal something

about the problems in paying them and getting them to Picardy from

Champagne.

England, though, had a much tougher struggle, not

helped by the equivocal attitude of the German princes.

In the Spring of 1545, Francis I told his envoys in Germany to per-

suade his allies to work to ‘block the King of England’s enterprise so

that they do not allow him to draw any help from Germany contrary

to his [Francis’] interests.’

e Worms Reichstag in the Spring of

1545 saw French envoys hard at work. Louis Adhémar de Grignan,

one of the main French experts on the intricacies of German aairs,

was there ostensibly to observe the assembly and talk to the Emperor’s

ministers; in reality he was under orders to negotiate with the Duke of

Bavaria and to stir up the fears of the Protestant envoys.

In fact, the

rst despatch received by Grignan and his colleagues Bassefontaine

and Mesnage was mainly concerned with talk of English activities

amongst the German princes and rumours that Maurice of Saxony

was preparing to enter English service. Mesnage, as resident ambas-

sador to the Emperor, complained to Charles about the activities of

Maurice, du Roeulx and Martin van Rossem, who were thought to be

raising men for England; he added for good measure complaints that

the English were drawing supplies from the Netherlands. Charles was

Du Bellay, Mémoires, IV, pp. 307–308. Potter, ‘Les Allemands et les armées fran-

çaises au XVIe siècle,’ p. 4.

J.-D. Pariset, Les Relations entre la France et l’Allemagne au milieu du XVI

siècle

(Strasbourg, 1981); H. Duchhardt and E. Schmitt (ed.), Deutschland und Frankre-

ich in der frühen Neuzeit (Munich, 1987); J.-Y Mariotte, ‘François Ier et la Ligue de

Schmalkalde,’ 232–233, 234, n. 91; and R. McEntegart, Henry VIII, the League of

Schmalkalden (Woodbridge, 2002).

Annebault to Jean du Bellay, 16 March [1545], Scheurer (ed. ), Correspondance,

III, p. 294: ‘empescher l’entreprise du roy d’Angleterre à ce qu’ils ne permettent qu’il

puisse à l’encontre de luy tirer de la Germanie aucun secours.’

Letter of credence of Francis I to Strasbourg for Grignan, 15 Mar. 1545, in

O. Winckelmann, Politische Correspondenz der Stadt Strassburg im Zeitalter der

Reformation Urkunden und Akten der Stadt Strassburg, series 2 (Strasburg, 1882–

1892) [hereaer Pol. Corr.), III, no. 59; and Sleidan to Jakob Sturm, 13 Apr. 1545, in

H. Baumgarten (ed.), Sleidans Briefwechsel (Strassburg, 1881), no. 22. e best infor-

mation on this mission is contained in Bassefontaine’s Diplomatic Journal, part of

which was printed by Louis Paris in his Négociations, lettres et pièces diverses relatives

au règne de François II tirées du portefeuille de Sébastien de L’Aubespine, évêque de

Limoges (Paris, 1841). Some of the documents from the same archive for 1545–1546

were published in J.-D. Pariset, ‘La France et les princes allemands. Documents et

commentaires, 1545–1557,’ Francia, x (1982), 229–301.

france and england compete for troops 319

just evasive.

e other envoys were told to ask the Reichstag ‘to tell

duke Maurice to leave o such an enterprise in view of the fact the

English King has sent no procuration to accept his comprehension

in the treaty by the Emperor.’

Grignan was also to stress the small

prot to be gained from an English alliance. e French, then, faced

two problems: the English might possibly obtain the troops necessary

for their summer operations, and they might even try to supplant the

French as the traditional patrons of some German princes. All this

posed a threat to France and great eorts were made to frustrate the

English, master-minded by Jean des Monstiers, seigneur du Fraisse.

Fraisse was sent to Germany in late July 1545. Grignan, was again

at the Imperial court from August and seems to have been acting as

director of operations while Mesnage busied himself with the talks

being held under the Emperor’s mediation. Grignan passed intelli-

gence to Fraisse, advising him on the general strategy of his activi-

ties, and introduced him to the Landgrave of Hesse.

It was Grignan

who pointed out the essential fact that the Anglo-French talks in the

Netherlands could be used to sow doubt in Germany and so diminish

the number of troops likely to enter English service. It was Grignan,

too, who made clear the French policy of setting the Landgrave and

the Duke of Brunswick against each other in order to restrict troop-

raising opportunities. Fraisse in turn kept Grignan informed of the

A mémoire of Mesnage’s complaints, with the Emperor’s replies in the margin,

was sent to St Mauris, Imperial ambassador in France. is is to be found among the

St Mauris papers at Besançon and was printed in C. Weiss (ed.), Papiers d’état du

cardinal de Granvelle, III, 104. On the role of Mesnage in this period, see D. Potter,

‘Foreign Policy in the Age of the Reformation: French Involvement in the Schmalkaldic

War, 1544–1547,’ Historical Journal x (1977), 525–544.

‘de voulloir admonester ledit duc Morice de laisser telle entreprise, attendu que

ledit Anglois n’a envoyé aucune procuration pour accepter la compréhension qui a

esté faicte de luy par l’empereur.’ Francis I to Grignan etc., 19 Apr. 1545, copied

into Bassefontaine’s Journal, in Paris, Négotiations, pp. viii–ix. For the attitude of the

Protestants to Maurice and help to the belligerents, see Phillip of Hesse to Maurice of

Saxony, 17 Jan. 1545, Brandenburg, Politische Korrespondenz, no. 643, and Maurice to

Philip, 2 Feb. 1545, ibid., no. 646.

Grignan to Fraisse, 21 Aug. 1545, in J. des Monstiers Mérinville, Un évêque

ambassadeur au XVIe siecle: Jean des Monstiers, seigneur du Fraisse, évêque de Bayonne

(Limoges, 1895 [hereaer Fraisse]), p. 47; Grignan to Landgrave, 10 Aug. 1545, SAM,

Politisches Archiv des Landgrafen Philipps des Großmütigen [hereaer SAM, Pol.

Arch.], 1836, fo. 27.