Potter David. Henry VIII and Francis I

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280 chapter six

seems that du Biez had not neglected to site a battery down by the har-

bour, while according to English observers, the fort was going ahead

apace at the beginning of August.

Francis I and Annebault moved at the end of August with a large

army to Forest-Montier, near Rue, a position from which they could

oversee the works at Boulogne and decide what to do with his forces,

estimated by du Bellay at 12,000 lansquenets, 12,000 French foot, 6000

Italians, 4000 legionnaires, 1000–1200 hommes d’armes and 7–800

light horse; these gures are probably inated and certainly greater

than available to English intelligence.

It was at Forest-Montier that

the death of the King’s son, Orléans, took place (9 September), with all

its consequences for change in French policy; reconciliation with

the Emperor was now virtually impossible, while talk of a truce with

England receded (see chapter 9).

Meanwhile, according to du Bellay, du Biez, apparently alerted to

an English move from Calais, took the decision to take all available

forces across the Liane and camp on Mont Lambert (later called the

Boulogneberg fort) in order to cut the English road to Calais and

leaving 4000 men in the new fort. Perhaps he realised the hopeless-

ness of the fort-building operations and wanted to save his reputa-

tion by forcing the English to come to battle. Du Bellay criticised this

move on the grounds that it would expose the workmen at Outreau

to English attack and that an English attempt to revictual Boulogne

by land was unlikely in view of their inferiority in numbers. Boulogne

continued to be supplied readily by sea and it was this that posed the

real problem. He also asserted that Francis I himself had remarked

that du Biez was not so interested in recapturing Boulogne as retain-

ing an army in which he could command great lords and princes.

However, in view of the fact that Mont Lambert later became a cru-

cial part of the Boulogne defences, du Biez’ decision need not seem so

L&P, XX, i, 1160, 1197 (p. 582); XX, ii, 8, 200.

Estimate in du Bellay, IV, pp. 307–308. A detailed French spy report to the Eng-

lish, NA, SP68/15, fos. 72–73 (CSPF Edward VI, Calais papers, no. 161, ii –misdated

to 1548) gives 7–8000 Germans, 3000 Picards, 9 ensigns of old bands of Piedmont

(c. 3000), 4000 arrière-ban and 500 hommes d’armes. e date is revealed by the

King’s recent visit to Sénarpont (thus the end of August).

Du Bellay, Mémoires, IV, pp. 307–308. Alvarotti to Ercole II, 20 August 1545,

ASM, Francia B 21, fasc. 1, fo. 234 (decipher), presumably means Boulogneberg when

he reports: ‘intendendo per vero non essersi fatto ne principiato quel forte fra Bolgna

e Cales, di modo che da quella parte quelli di Bologna et di Cales vanno l’uno dall’altro

sena arme in dosso.’

the war in france, 1545–1546 281

eccentric. Du Bellay goes on to describe the skirmishing (between the

castle of Boulogne and the tour d’Ordre) between the English and the

young nobles like Enghien, Aumale, Nevers and La Trémoille, who

again ocked from Court to take part, in the best tradition of chivalric

action. is probably explains its inconclusiveness, as du Bellay explic-

itly states that ‘it must be understood that the English easily came

o best.’

e arrival of news in France that the English had at last got their

mercenaries near the borders of Champagne caused to Francis to

move eastwards to watch them. He le du Biez with instructions so

to devastate the Pale of Calais that, should the Germans get through,

they would nd no sustenance there.

In fact, the English-paid mer-

cenaries were on the verge of mutiny in Liège, but the English had

other supplies of mercenaries already at Calais and the commissaries

were told to persuade Reiemberg’s Germans to devastate the French

borders for a month and then return to Coblenz for payment; a hope-

less cause, of course.

e ensuing campaign around Calais and Boulogne is recorded by

du Bellay, Monluc and Elis Gruydd with diering emphases. e

plan to attack the low country of the Calais Pale (the terre d’Oye) had

been in place for some time since, on 27 August, du Biez wrote that

he would be ready to put it into eect as soon as de Taix arrived with

his ‘bandes.’

Italian observers tended to the view that the army would

be led by Admiral d’Annebault and that its objective would be the

tour d’Ordre or Guînes. Others even suggested that he would seek out

means of negotiating with the English at Calais. Annebault le for the

fort on 10 September, accompanied by the prince of Mel, Maugiron

and Martin du Bellay, but by 18th had had to withdraw with a fever

and in fear of the plague.

All the same, as du Biez’s letter makes clear,

the objective of the expedition seems to have envisaged the terre d’Oye

from the start. It seems that 20,000 soldiers were le by Francis for this

purpose, consisting of gendarmerie, light horse, new French infantry

(under de Taix) and legionnaires. Du Biez’s army rst reconnoitred the

Du Bellay, Mémoires, IV, pp. 309–310, 312–314: ‘fault entendre que l’avantage

estoit grand pour l’Anglois.’

Du Bellay, Mémoires, IV, pp. 314–315.

Council to Fane and others, 19/20? Sept. 1545, L&P, XX, ii, 403.

Du Biez to Francis I, 27 Aug. 1545, Potter, Du Biez, p. 212.

Guidiccione to Farnese, 18, 22, 30 Sept. 1545, ANG, III, pp. 391, 392–393, 393–397.

282 chapter six

defensive works of the Pale, the ditches and block houses in particular

that marked the limits of the marsh land. e French seem to have

invaded the Pale by passing through the pays de Bredenarde around

19 September. Gruydd recollected being at Bootes bulwark, seeing

to the garrison and looking east to see the res burning in the low

country. On 20th, Cobham reported he had sent out a small force to

nd out where the French were encamped and which ‘cut o the tayle

of the rereward.’ e French were then encamped at ‘Seint Martyn’s

house’ (presumably the residence of Nicolas des Marquaiz, the peace

negotiator of 1544). Cobham thought their main intention was to

revictual Ardres ‘and in the meane tyme attempt some exploict (if they

shall suppose they maye doo convenyently) upon the low countre’ and

by 27th break up their army.

is proved complacent. e ‘low coun-

try’ of the terre d’Oye was a relatively lightly defended zone since the

English tended to expect and attack from Ardres. One of the block

houses was taken and the canals crossed. Brissac’s light horse defeated,

according to du Bellay, 2000 English (Monluc says 10 or 12 ensigns)

sent out from Calais. Du Bellay says they were defeated but, according

to Monluc, if these English had been attacked, Calais would have been

le defenceless; instead they were le to withdraw and Monluc implies

that the fault was that of du Biez. Both du Bellay and Monluc note the

onset of heavy rains and the lack of boats to cross the canals, which

forced the French to withdraw.

is battle, involving 8,000 English

soldiers – many, according to Elis Gruydd, merely ‘callow boys’ –

and 6000 foreign infantry and 2500 foreign cavalry, was, according to

the Welsh chronicler a display of remarkable military confusion, with

the foreign cavalry failing to come to the support of the infantry and

forcing a general retreat to Calais.

But the French were too slow to

take advantage of the poor tactics employed by Cobham that had le

Calais and Guînes unguarded. e commanders at Calais were too

timid to mount an eective counter-attack, a point made by Richard

Cobham to Council, 20 Sept. 1545, NA SP1/208, fo. 36 (L&P, XX, ii, 415). Eng-

lish documentation of this incursion is very thin.

Du Bellay, Mémoires, IV, pp. 316–318; Monluc, Commentaires, (ed. Courteault),

pp. 182–188 gives a much more vivid account particularly of the taking of the block

houses.

e Italian captains in Calais reported to Cobham that the asco resulted from

the failure of the Cleves cavalry, 1000 men, to come up in support (Report to Cobham,

signed by Pallavicino, Zabarelli, Moreni, Bologna and Marengo, BL Harl. 296, fo. 28

(L&P, XX, ii, 464).

the war in france, 1545–1546 283

Blount, who complained to Paget that ‘some of our captains do not

attend upon their charge but remain nightly in the town, leaving the

poor men (that is, the farmers of the Low Country) like sheep without

a shepherd.’

e French attack on the terre d’Oye was alarming and

humiliating; Cobham, of whom Gruydd had a low opinion, sought

to maximise the number of French dead (200) and minimise losses at

about 1000 marks. e Welshman estimated the burnings in the par-

ishes of Oudekerque (Vieille Eglise), Niewkerque (Nouvelle Eglise) and

Oekerque as seven farms worth £7000 each and 500 farmers’ houses

worth £100.

It is true that the raid had little permanent result yet it is

remarkable, in view of the vulnerability of the Pale that it revealed, that

the Privy Council rapidly moved to reallocate the garrisons at Calais

on the very day the French were supposed to have withdrawn.

At the end of July, the English Council had decided on a re-inforce-

ment for Boulogne of 5000 men, despite countermanding the levies

from Surrey on 20 July.

ese, with 3000 of the Calais garrison and

2300 from that of Boulogne, were to face a French force of 12–13,000.

en a more ambitious plan emerged: once the emergency in the Isle of

Wight had passed, on 27 July 1000 soldiers were levied for Boulogne in

the City of London and were mustered on 4 August. ey took ship on

6th from Tower wharf and thence to Gravesend and Dover for the

crossing to Boulogne.

is evidently formed part of a new expedi-

tionary force that was being planned in England to defend Boulogne

against the French attack. At some time (which remains unclear)

the Duke of Suolk, who had had been involved in coastal defence,

was appointed Lieutenant-general of this force, with Surrey as cap-

tain of the Vanguard and Dorset of the rearguard. Suolk’s death on

22 August seems to have completely transformed this strategy; Cobham

and Wallop were recalled for ‘consultations’ with the Privy Council as

was Lisle about the sea battle.

Instead of an army of 12–15,000 men,

Elis Gruydd, Chronicle, ‘Boulogne and Calais from 1545 to 1550,’ pp. 29–32

(Gruydd dates the events on month later, 21–22 October); L&P, XX ii, 787. See also

Millar, Tudor Mercenaries, pp. 151–153.

Elis Gruydd, Chronicle, ‘Boulogne and Calais’ pp. 35–36.

Council to Cobham and the Council of Calais, 27 Sept. 1545, BL Harl. 283,

fo. 201 (L&P, XX, ii, 454).

Council to nobles and gentlemen of Surrey ‘that have the conducte of men,’

Portsmouth, 20 July 1545, SHC, LM 6729/10/8.

L&P, XX, i, 1303, 1304, 1321, 1322. Wriothesley, Chronicle, p. 159.

Paget to Norfolk, 25 Aug. 1545, NA SP1/206, fo. 156(219) (L&P, XX, ii, 209):

‘my lord of Su whose soul god pardon was appointed to have been Lieutenant for

284 chapter six

what was now envisaged was a return to a smaller operation based on

the 5000 that Surrey had already taken over, perhaps no more than

8000 men. John Gage had been on the Sussex coast reporting the

movements of the French eet in the narrow seas

and acting as liai-

son between his kinsman, the Admiral Lisle and the Council. He told

Lisle of Admiral d’Annebault’s movements out of the narrow seas and

transmitted Lisle’s news.

Aer the withdrawal of the French eet,

pressure on Boulogne continued and in September Gage was commis-

sioned to cross to Calais and thence to Boulogne to join Lisle ‘to reyse

the seige’ and ‘to dysease our ennymes.’

is was the ‘Armye Royall’

scheduled for the ‘defence of our towne of Bulloyne and repulse of our

ennemyes the Frenchemen’ for which the King called on supplies on

16 September.

at all this was a result of a declining French threat

seems unlikely, though English commanders may now have been more

condent about resistance.

e ailing Poynings, faced by a full-scale French royal army and

the eet o his coast with a force of 15,000 aboard, was not convinced

that the initial reinforcement plan would work. He died on 18 August,

though, and on 3 September Henry Howard, earl of Surrey was com-

missioned as deputy and had to make the best he could of the troop

allocation of 5000; his brief from the King as outlined by Paget, was

not to take risks.

Despite this, he seems to have acted rapidly. On his

the levieng of the siege besides Boloyn, my lord of Surey to have had the vauntgarde,

my lord Marques the reregarde and my lord of Arundel marshal of the campe and my

lord of Su decessing[?] this lief saturday at aer none my lord marques and my lord

of Arundel discharged, and nowe also for as moche (as) my lord Poyninges is departed

this life upon this day seveninght, my lord Graye appointed to the charge of my lord of

Surey, who went over only with v M men according tothe rst appointement ordered

to be general of all the crewes at Guisnes being a goodly bande about viijM men . . . I

thinke that which shalbe don towards thenemyes shalbe attempted by him, the deputy

of Calays the lord Gray and Mr Wallopp.’

Suolk and others to Paget, Portsmouth, 2 and 3 Aug. 1545, L&P, XX, ii, 14, 24.

Lisle to Henry VIII, 12, 18, 21 Aug. 1545, L&P, XX, ii, 108, 158, 183. Letters of

Privy Council to Gage and Sussex justices, 11 Aug. APC, I, p. 226 (L&P, XX, ii, 94).

John Johnson to Anthony Cave, 12 Sept. 1545, NA SP1/212 fos. 220v–222r

(L&P, XX, ii, app. 43.21), B. Winchester, ‘Johnson Letters’ II, p. 402; same to Southwick,

13 Sept. 1545, NA SP1/212 fos. 222v–23r, ‘Johnson Letters’ II, p. 407.

Signet letters to C. Moore and J. Skinner, 16 Sept. 1545, SHC, LM 6729/13/4.

Council of Boulogne to Privy Council, 1 Aug. 1545, St.P., X, p. 547 (L&P, XX, ii,

8); L&P, XX, ii, 162, 163; Paget to Hertford, 13 Aug. 1545, L&P, XXI, ii, 118; appoint-

ment of Surrey, 3 Sept., L&P, XX, ii, 279, no. 8. Surrey had rst been nominated on

9 August, then Suolk, who died soon aer. Next, Grey, governor of Guînes. (Council

letters, BL Harl. 256 printed in Nott, Howard, appendix pp. lix–lxiv). Paget to Surrey,

25 Sept. 1545, L&P, XX, ii, App. 30.

the war in france, 1545–1546 285

Illustration 6 Map of the Boulonnais by Nicolas Nicolai (1558), Caletensium

et Bononiensium ditionis accurata delineatio descripta et edita a Nicolao

Nicolai reprinted in Abraham Ortelius, eatrum Orbis Terrarum (Antwerp,

1570), fo. 36 (‘Descripta & edita Nicolai Delphinate Parisiis 1558’).

286 chapter six

return to Boulogne, du Biez found that the English had attacked and

almost succeeded in taking Outreau. According to du Bellay, 7–8000

men, which would have been more or less the entire English garrison,

crossed over by night at low tide (with water up to their knees) to

attack Outreau, where the ramparts were still possible to scale with-

out ladders. Despite this, the French commander, ibault Rouault,

sr de Riou, an experienced if unsavoury commander, routinely kept

watch during the night and the French were well enough prepared

to ght o the attack.

e placing of the fort was a mistake in two

ways; too far away, it made the bombardment of the lower town at

Boulogne dicult, and it was dicult to supply from the sea. In fact,

though, the whole strategy of building a fort at all seems to have been

fundamentally ineective. Even when, several years later, the French

had an eective fort at the entrance to the harbour, they could still not

take Boulogne by force. Nevertheless, it could not be concealed that

the establishment of the Outreau fort was a severe setback for English

strategy in the Boulonnais.

Final Phase: Surrey and Hertford Face du Biez

e negotiations for an Anglo-French peace under Protestant or

Imperial mediation failed in December 1545. Surrey’s main preoc-

cupation over the winter was the isolation of the French fortress of

Outreau. is was garrisoned by new infantry companies from Taix’s

regiment, commanded by Riou, Dessé, Villefranche and Montmar

but the troops there were ravaged by plague.

Surrey took steps to

intercept convoys of supplies either by sea or through the forest of

Hardelot where a French base camp was established at Neufchâtel for

that purpose.

A French force was ambushed early in December and it

seems, also, as though there was a raid on shipping at Etaples, though

this is not well documented.

Surrey had put forward a strategy

Du Bellay, Mémoires, IV. pp. 318–319; Saint-Mauris to Charles V, October 1545,

AN K 1485, no. 106 (microlm). For his part in these skirmishes, see Monluc, Com-

mentaires (ed. Courteault), pp. 188–189.

BnF, fr. 25973, no. 554, 558, 562. Du Bellay, Mémoires, IV, pp. 326–327.

Letter from Heilly dated at the camp of Neufchastel to Francis I, 23 Oct. 1545,

Amiens, SAP, Ch. Heilly, 57, no. 5.

Surrey, 4 Dec. 1545, L&P, XX, ii, 929 (Nott, Howard, I, pp. 181–186); Du Bellay,

Mémoires IV, pp. 327–328 (misdated). On mentions of the Etaples raid, see Paget to

the war in france, 1545–1546 287

of starving out the French fort but had been told to put it on hold

until the outcome of peace talks were known. Once these had failed,

Surrey was empowered to ‘geve order for the warres’ early in January.

He reported that two approaches were necessary: to ensure the safe

arrival of supplies to Boulogne by sea and to reduce the French fort

before it became impossible to take. Both purposes could be assured

by the establishment of a camp near the fort with trenches; this may be

assumed to be somewhere around Saint-Etienne, in the trenches used

in 1544. is could oversee supplies from le Portel as well as besiege

Outreau. In his view, half an army would be necessary to assure its

full supply and the weather was not suitable for this. If the plan went

forward, the fort could be starved out before the campaigning season

began.

Everything therefore turned on du Biez’ ability to supply his

men in Outreau.

On the basis of his condence that the French would be unable to

revictual their fort, Surrey seems to have been taken by surprise on

7 January.

Advancing from Montreuil, du Biez attempted to run in

his convoy under cover of an army of 3000 foot and 400 horse. What

happened will remain a matter of doubt, as both opposing command-

ers, anxious to save their reputations, claimed the victory. We also have

two contrasting accounts by du Martin du Bellay and Elis Gruydd,

with some observations by Monluc. Du Bellay (no admirer of du Biez)

says that the marshal, aware that supplies in Outreau were running

short, assembled a force of 50 hommes d’armes, the Rhinegrave’s regi-

ment of 4000 landsknechts and 200 arquebusiers. When he advanced

from Montreuil, he was confronted by Surrey at Saint-Etienne-au-

Mont with 6000 men. Despite being outnumbered, he advanced and

the battle was ‘long et furieux.’ Finally the English were forced to

retreat with the loss of 7–800 and 140–160 prisoners. Surrey only just

escaped. Monluc, on hearsay, adds that du Biez, did an ‘acte de vail-

lant homme’ when, with his cavalry in ight, he dismounted and took

up a pike to lead the infantry (not surprisingly, Monluc calls him ‘ce

Petre, 5 Dec. 1545, ibid., XXI, ii, 945; Instructions to omas Clere, n.d. 1545, ibid.,

XX, ii, 245; Council to Gardiner et al., 15 Jan. 1546, L&P, XXI, i, 65.

Henry VIII to Surrey, 29 Dec. 1545, L&P, XX, ii1052; Surrey to Henry VIII,

5 Jan. 1546, and annexe containing the military plan, NA SP1/213, fos. 24–28 (ibid.,

XXI, i, 18). Du Bellay also records an outbreak of plague at the French fort at this

time, Mémoires, IV, p. 326.

Council of Boulogne to Henry VIII, 8 Jan. 1546, L&P, XXI, i, 33.

288 chapter six

vieux chevalier’ as he was at this time about seventy).

Gruydd puts

the French force at 10,000 and criticises Surrey for not waiting for

troops from Calais, wanting hog the glory to himself at a time when

the English garrisons were in a bad way through lack of food and

pay. e English cavalry under Ellerkar advanced on the French and

attacked the waggon train, destroying the food. However, they could

not withstand the main force of the French infantry, mainly Germans.

Ellerkar reported that that the French were too strong and that the

English (still strung out in line of march) must take to the trenches

that he been constructed by the French a year before. e Welshman

declares that Surrey treated his men with contempt in driving them

forward to battle. Exchanges of gunre on both sides were followed by

the ight of the main body of the English foot and the death of 22 of

their captains. Gruydd adds the telling point that, when Surrey histri-

onically called on Sir John Bridges and others to run him through with

their swords for the shame, a common soldier told him to turn back

on the enemy who ‘would would nish him o quickly enough.’ On

their shamefaced return to Boulogne that night, the English leaders set

about constructing a story for the king which would put the blame on

some of the lesser captains.

is is indeed borne out by the report

of the battle by the Council of Boulogne, which claimed breathtak-

ingly that ‘ther was no defaulte in the rulers, nor lacke of courage to

be geven them, but an humour that sometyme raigneth in Englisshe

men.’ Surrey and his colleagues insisted that the bulk of the enemy’s

supply train had been intercepted but that the English infantry had

panicked.

e most likely explanation is that du Biez’ German mer-

cenaries crushed the English infantry opposing them at the village

of Saint-Etienne and inicted severe losses while the English cavalry

broke up the French supply train and prevented an adequate revictual-

ing of the fort. Du Biez obviously put the best interpretation on the

encounters in the letters reporting the battle and was told by the king

that ‘never was master more contented with servant as I am with you.’

In a long account sent (strangely) to Montmorency, he gives his own

account. He tells us that he could not wait for reinforcements that

were on the way because of the state of the fort. He therefore moved

Du Bellay, Mémoires, IV, pp. 328–329; Monluc (ed. Courteault), p. 190.

Elis Gruydd, Chronicle, ‘Boulogne and Calais’, pp. 39–43.

Council of Boulogne to Henry VIII, 8 Jan. 1546, St.P., XI, pp. 3–5 (L&P, XXI,

i, 33).

the war in france, 1545–1546 289

up with about 50 hommes d’armes, 3000 landsknechts and 600 men

from the garrisons. e battle at Saint-Etienne was taken on because

du Biez could not retreat and keep his supply train safe. Two thousand

(out of 6000) English foot were slain but

e enemy horsemen, seeing their infantry defeated, took to ight near

the place where our supply train was marching, where they pillaged

some of the supplies.

e English claimed that only 20 carts had been allowed to enter the

fort. So, whereas at rst the French Court rejoiced, it later claimed that

the battle had been a draw. On the other hand, Surrey’s reputation

inevitably suered and this hastened his replacement as Lieutenant at

Boulogne.

Reports of this battle suggest a formidable aptitude for news man-

agement on both sides. Both magnied the enemy’s numbers and min-

imised their own.

On 15 January, the English Privy Council wrote to

Gardiner and others in the Low Countries that, in view of the fact that

the French might try to misrepresent what had happened, the true g-

ures were 180 English and 600 French killed. Of 70 supply wagons, all

but 10 had been destroyed. e loss of seven or eight English captains

was caused by their excessive courage. e French would be expected

to turn this into a great victory because they captured some battle

standards. When he received this, Gardiner got to work to produce a

public account that magnied English successes: ‘I con[cluded] that

[I never] had in my lief [in so s]mall a matier soo good a chaunce.’ A

news report was prepared – called a Vrai Reaporte etc. – and, together

with the Imperial councillor de Praet, Gardiner edited it appropriately;

A[nd w]e made our men, retourning from Bolen with myrth a[nd re]

joyse, to ha[ve] doon a [feate of war] with soo lytel losse, being noon [of

any note] slain . . . Oone thing sumwhat troubled us in the tale sent from

Francis I to du Biez, 11 Jan. 1546: ‘jamais maître ne se contenta plus de serviteur

que je fais de vous.’; du Biez to Aumale, 14 Jan. 1546, Du Biez to Montmorency,

14 Jan. 1546: ‘veoyant lesdictz ennemys gens de cheval leurs gens de pied desfaictz, se

mirent en fuytte du costé par où marchoit nostre charrroy ou ilz rompirent quelques

vivres,’ Potter, Du Biez, pp. 213–215.

See the slightly menacing tone of Paget to Surrey, 18 Jan. 1546, L&P, XXI, i, 81:

the king is ready to understand, there is always fortune of war, but why has he not

heard more? Surrey was recalled on a pretext on 21 March, at the time of Hertford’s

appointment (L&P, XXI, i, 433).

On the distribution of news to the papal nuncio in France, see Guidiccione to

Farnese, 16 Jan. 1546, ANG, III, pp. 420–421.