Potter David. Henry VIII and Francis I
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260 chapter five
Sir Anthony Browne meeting the King at Saint-Inglevert and then of
the camp at Marquise.
246
Banners were ubiquitous. Many of the troops were in Henry’s per-
sonal colours of blue and yellow.
247
Landenberg’s gave his cavalry and
infantry ensigns ‘of white and green, and red crosses.’ Cavalry standards
bore the King’s arms in the middle of the cross. He thought these were
the King’s colours, and said that ‘if he had had time, all the horsemen
should have been in the colours of the King’s Majesty’s battle.’
248
e impresario for all this was omas Cawarden, a gentleman of
the privy chamber but, crucially, Master of the Tents and also (from
1545) of the Revels. Cawarden was immensely experienced in the con-
struction of temporary buildings for ceremonies and performances at
court as also for the vast array of tents for the use of the King and his
entourage, tents so vividly portrayed in the Cowdray frescoes.
249
In
May, he paid Anthony Totto (alias Antonio del Anunziato, d. 1554),
sergeant painter,
250
£20 for the painting of coats of arms on the King’s
tents, including 150 6-foot square ‘vanes’ with hatchments in gold and
colours and 36 hatchments ‘of an elle square of the kinges armes with
beastes crowned, the garter and the kings worde in ne golde and
other colours.’
251
Two other serjeant painters, Bartholommeo Penni
(brother of Luca) and the Frenchman Nicholas Lezard/Lisory (d. 1571),
painted imitation jasper and marble walls for the king’s great wooden
house built at Whitefriars.
252
is edice (displayed prominently in the
246
‘e order how the King’s Majesty departed out of the town of Calleys’ Friday,
25 July, dated 12 Oct 1544, BL Calig. E. IV., f. 57, Rymer, Foedera 2nd ed. XV, p. 52,
3rd ed. VI, pp. 120–121. (L&P, XIX, ii, 424).
247
Gruydd, in M.B. Davies ed, ‘Enterprises of Paris and Boulogne’ p. 10; Narra-
tive of the French campaign, L&P, XIX, ii, 424. Henry had ordered ‘12 drummers and
12 fers, of the best, to be employed in these wars’ from his agents in Germany in June
(Council to Fane and Wyndebank 12 June 1544, L&P, XIX, i, 682).
248
Fane and Wyndebank to the Council, Aachen, 16 June 1544, L&P, XIX, i, 716.
249
‘Skilfull and delyghtinge in matters of devise’ (H. Colvin, History of the King’s
Works, IV, part ii, (London, 1982), p. 93).
250
Toto was the son of Nunziato d’Antonio di Domenico, a jobbing painter of Flor-
ence who was best known as a ‘bombardiere’ or pyrotechnician. Antonio (or Toto) del
Nunziata came to England with Torrigiani in 1519 and stayed. He is known to have
painted pictures for Henry VIII none of which have been identied but is best known
as an heraldic painter (L.A. Waldman, Se bene era dipintore di fantocci. Nunziata
d’Antonio, Painter, Pyrotechnician and Bombardier of Florence (forthcoming).
251
SHC, LM/1892/1 and 1893, bill for £20, 31 May 1545; Folger Shakespeare Library,
Loseley MSS, Lb. 261: ‘delyveryd at the Charterhouse for thuse of the kynges highness
tentes and pavilions’ 12 July 1544, £42.
252
SHC, LM/127; Folger SL, Loseley MSS, Lb. 258.
an unequal contest? 261
Cowdray frescoes) seems to have combined features of a wooden
house and tent, since it had deal ‘mastes’ 58’ long and 2’1” thick at
the base and deal oorboards 28’×16”. It was known as ‘e Kinges
lodging of Tymber for the warres’ and was under construction at
least from 15 April 1544 but probably started as early as July 1543.
is may be the same as the ‘tymbre house’ ‘all of yrre paynted and
gylded’ with a tower at each corner and ‘covered with whyte
Illustration 5 e King’s tents (two details from 2 and 3).
262 chapter five
plate . . . sylyd withyn with paste worke, paynted, wyndowes of horne.’
It is shown in two of the Cowdray frescoes.
253
Cawarden (‘Mr Carden’) was in charge of an extensive sta as well
as of a reserve of both tents and wooden ‘houses’ for the royal house-
hold at Boulogne in 1544. From his papers, we learn that 2696 men
could be housed in 30 ‘rownde howses’ and 108 ‘rues.’ A list of the
tents for the king’s camp made on 18 July 1544 assembles 132 ‘hales’
(open tents mainly for horses), 72 round houses, 8 ‘roufes without
howses,’ 62 ‘tresentes,’ 49 hatchments, 12 partitions plus stakes and
waggons. ere were ‘hales’ for Dr. Butts to treat the wounded and
another as a ‘house of relief’ for the royal guard.
254
e oce of Tents
continued to be responsible for the accommodation of English armies
on campaign aer 1544; Hertford’s army in 1546 needed extensive
shelter in the eld and this was provided by Cawarden’s department.
255
When the earl of Hertford went to France as lieutenant general
of the King’s army in 1546, he found himself without even the basic
royal banner and ag of Saint George and had to send twice to Sadler
in England to retrieve these from the Great Wardrobe. Paget had
already spoken to Cawarden, obviously the man in charge of such
equipment.
256
Hertford also drew on the services of the King’s tents for
this campaign.
257
At the lowest level of service, display was still important. If we fol-
low the Essex gentleman omas Josselyn, we nd that he was alerted
in March 1544 to be ‘in a redynesse’ at one day’s notice and given a
253
Folger SL, Loseley MSS, Lb. 3, check book for work on the timber lodging,
15 April–22 June 1544: this indicates the vast logistical problem of transporting mate-
rials from Wapping and Anthony Knyvett’s house at Ratcly to Whitefriars; SHC
LM/11, book of wages for work on the King’s new tent of timber, July 1543–March 1544.
SHC LM/59/110.
254
SHC, LM/59/91 (‘An estimate what the howses wyll holde’); LM/59/101.
LM/24/1–28; LM 5/5; LN 8/1 and 2; LM/10 (payments by Southwell to the oce of
Tents, 1 July–2 Aug. 1544). LM/14 payments for the building of pavilions, 5 weeks to
15 July 1544. Inventory of tents, 1544, LM/59/141.
255
Warrants from Hertford for Harrington, war treasurer, to pay John Bridges,
Yeoman of the Tents, June 1546, SHC, LM/59/4–7.
256
Hertford to Paget, 27 March 1546, NA SP1/216, fo. 2r (L&P, XXI, i, 471): ‘I
hartely requyre you to give ordre for the sending hither with diligence a banner of
the Kinges Majestes armes and an other of St George to be had from Mr Sadleyr out
of the Great Wardrobe.’ Paget added a note to a repeated demand by Hertford on
21 April: ‘Mr Carden, God comfort him, was spoken unto in it.’ (NA SP1/217, fo. 49r
(L&P, XXI, i, 637).
257
Hertford, orders to Harrington, treasurer of the army, April–June 1546, SHC,
LM/59/4–7.
an unequal contest? 263
schedule by the Sheri which specied that every soldier should have
a coat of blue cloth ‘aer suche ashion as all footemens cotes be made
here at London,’ to be ‘garded’ with red, also in the London manner.
e le sleeve was to be ‘trymed’ with the Captain’s own choice though
no kind of badge was to be allowed. e men were to provide their
own hose, the right red and the le blue with a broad strip of red on
the outside le leg from the ‘stockes’ down. Every man was to have a
cap to go under his sallett (helmet) of the kind available from William
the capper of Ludgate as 8d. each.
258
It is dicult to know how seri-
ously to take this order, which reads rather like a boarding-school list,
and whether it applied solely to Essex is also unclear. Josselyn was
relatively rich and inuential, brother in law of John Gates, his wife
Dorothy connected to the household of the Queen and his brother
placed in the royal household as Serjeant of the Pantry. In fact omas,
in response to the Sheri’s warning, had declared that he had 20 men
ready at one hour’s notice, including 6 able bowmen and 7 able bill-
men; he in fact provided 20 foot soldiers for the Vanguard to serve at
Montreuil.
259
Heralds remained an essential component of war,
260
both for formal
declarations such as that attempted by Henry in June 1543 by Garter
King of Arms, Sir Christopher Barker, and for routine communica-
tions since they oen possessed language skills. Norfolk ordered pay-
ments for Richmond Herald, Rougedragon poursuivant and their
servants for travelling to Dover in June 1544.
261
William Harvey,
Bluemantle Poursuivant, had been sent to Speyer in April 1544 with
Council letters for the negotiations with Landenberg.
262
He succeeded
to the place of the deceased Richard Radclie, Somerset herald, in July
1545. Hammes Poursuivant, Edmund Atkinson, who was active in
errands to and from the Low Countries in 1543–1544, was promoted
as Bluemantle and Paget asked Norfolk (as Earl Marshal of course)
258
NA SP1/187, fo. 64(70) (L&P, XIX, i, 440).
259
Muster book: NA SP1/184, fo. 86(106); Vanguard: L&P, XIX, i, 274.
260
See Francis ynne (Lancaster Herald), ‘A Discourse of the Dutye and Oce
of an Hearaulde of Armes’ (1605), in T. Hearne, A Collection of Curious Discourses
(Oxford, 1720).
261
BL Add. 11320, f. 39. (L&P, XIX, i, 632) Norfolk: warrant (5 June 1544) to
Harington to pay Richmond herald his conduct money from London to Dover,
60 miles at 4d., and Rougedragon pursuivant the same at 2d., their three servants at
1/2d. each and coats for the three servants at 4s.
262
Vaughan to Paget, 22 April 1544, L&P, XIX, i, 380.
264 chapter five
to promote one of his servants to the place of Hammes, ‘a prety
fellow . . . that spekyth French well well and late and understandyth
also Italyen and Spanysh.’ is may have been the Nicholas Tubman
actually appointed.
263
Christopher Barker had been Richmond Herald
before his promotion. His successor in that post, Gilbert Dethick, was
employed extensively in messages to the Scots during the 1544 cam-
paign and was sent to northern Germany in 1545 to convey Henry’s
answer to an oer of service by the count of Oldenburg.
264
Payments for troop movements in April 1544 include those for
1 herald, 1 poursuivant and 4 trumpets to be transferred to the Emperor
for service against France.
265
Formal arrangements were made for each
of the corps of the Army Royal to have suitable heralds attached: for
the Battle, Garter and Clarencieulx kings of arms, for the Vanguard
and Rearguard Wyndsore and Somerset heralds and Portcullis, Bluemantle,
Risebank, Hammes and Guînes pursuivants, paid at the rate of 6s a
day for Kings of Arms, heralds at 4s, poursuivants 2s and servants at
6d.
266
Trumpets were routine messengers between enemies in the eld
and between commanders and their colleagues. Norfolk complained
about a ‘slothful’ trumpet who had taken 10 hours in a message to
Etaples, 5 miles away. Nevertheless, they were ubiquitous in the eld.
267
When Norfolk sent York Herald (Bartholomew Butler) to summon
Montreuil to surrender in July 1544, marshal du Biez courteously
gave him him gold and silver surcoat, venison and wine for the duke
‘to make merry as if to welcome him to the country.’ His message was
of commendations to Norfolk, whom he was bound to honour espe-
cially as his siege of Hesdin in 1522 ‘was the cause of his rising to his
present ascendancy.’ Du Biez wished him good hunting during the
ne weather.
268
We know rather less about the Heralds in the French and Imperial
camps. We have seen that François de Phallaix, Toison d’Or king of
arms, was deputed to declare war alongside Garter in 1543 and sent by
Charles to obtain Henry’s terms for peace in September 1544.
269
France,
263
Paget to Norfolk, 17 July 1545, BL Harl. 6989, fo. 136 (L&P, XX, i, 1210).
264
L&P, XIX, i, 159, 162, 173; Council to Richmond Herald, 26 May 1545, L&P,
XX, i, 814.
265
L&P, XIX, i, 368.
266
Appointment of Heralds, 9 June 1544, BL Add. 11,320. f. 89v (L&P, XIX, i, 651).
267
Norfolk to Council, 18 Sept. 1544 L&P, XIX, ii, 248.
268
Gruydd. ‘Enterprises of Paris and Boulogne’ ed. M.B. Davies, p. 19.
269
L&P, XIX, ii, 181.2.
an unequal contest? 265
besides the King of Arms Montjoie Saint-Denis, employed some
thirty heralds, many inherited from the apanage principalities and an
unknown number of poursuivants (e.g. Montpensier).
270
Guyenne
Herald (François Maillard), who had been employed an interpreter
for French diplomats in Germany, was newly appointed as a Herald
when he was sent to the Imperial court in spring 1544.
271
ere seems little reason to minimise the extent of the English military
eort in the middle of the 1540s; it was in many ways a prodigious
eort of will. How eective was it? e answer rather depends on an
understanding of objectives. Judged against the grand strategic objec-
tives laid out in 1543, the returns were minimal and counter-productive.
Nor could any English army face a main French army in the eld.
On the other hand, Henry VIII had made some useful acquisitions in
France and embarked on an ambitious programme in Scotland even if
as a side-issue. e English had demonstrated the power of their artil-
lery but only a limited capacity for siege warfare. Henry had amplied
his bargaining power vis-à-vis his fellow monarchs but at the risk of
returning to the isolation he had found himself in during 1539–1540.
e eort required for all this tested the Tudor monarchy to its limits.
270
See C. Parry, Les hérauts d’armes à l’époque moderne (Paris, 2005).
271
L&P, XIX, i, 132, 134, 137.
CHAPTER SIX
THE WAR IN FRANCE, 1545–1546
Owr commune inemy sall have this symmer handis
foulle.
1
The Renewal of War around Boulogne, 1545
e year 1545, rather than seeing a running down of the war, saw
both sides prepared to throw the dice again; conict was racheted
up on several fronts. is was also the rst year since 1492 in which
England found itself locked in conict with France (and Scotland)
without the help of allies, this time, though, beleaguered on several
fronts. e capacity of the Tudor state to deploy its power was tested
to the limit. e Council informed Wotton in December 1544 that
‘the Kinges Majestie doubteth not but that the French King this somer
next ensuyng will employe the uttermoste of his power tattempt the
recovery of Boulloyn’ and in particular ‘by see for thannoyaunce of
his highnes and his subgectz.’ Such intelligence was both accurate and
daunting.
2
e Welsh soldier Elis Gruydd recalled that Francis had in
the meantime sought to ‘put enough hemp on the King of England’s
dista to keep him busy until the summer came.’
3
e French were
likely to take the initiative; Henry VIII held Boulogne and to some
extent the advantage in Scotland and the only way to disturb the sta-
tus quo was for France to attack. Such an attack had to take place on
several fronts. In early February 1545, intelligence sent to the Emperor
reported a French plan to continue the war with England in three
theatres: the rst at Boulogne itself, where a fort was planned to stop
the English garrison dominating the country to the south; the second in
Scotland with an army under Enghien, the victor of Ceresole; and the
1
Letter of John Hay to the Queen Dowager of Scotland, 15 May 1545, Balcarres
Papers, I, p. 137.
2
Council to Wotton, [17 Dec. 1544], NA SP1/195, fo. 235 (L&P, XIX, ii, 752).
3
Elis Gruydd, Chronicle, extract in M.B. Davies, ‘Boulogne and Calais from 1545
to 1550,’ Bulletin of the Faculty of Arts of Fouad I University, Cairo, XII, i (19509), p. 4.
the war in france, 1545–1546 267
third a naval campaign from Normandy attacking England directly.
Ships were already being assembled from the Mediterranean galley
eet and it the western ports, though the problem was that, at this
point the English were stronger at sea. For this, 3 million lt. was being
raised in taxation. At the same time, illness continued to take its toll
on the rulers. Francis was again severely ill from the probable eects of
venereal disease, which had a devastating eect and le him prostrate
for several weeks at Fontainebleau; so planning and action inevitably
passed into the hands of his minister-favourite Annebault and other
chief advisers.
4
Royal letters sent out to demand contributions from the French
walled towns in February 1545 for the 3 million lt. declared that the
enemies of 1544 had been thrown back by stout defence (‘la force et
resistance de nostre royaume’) and that Boulogne would still have
been held had its commanders shown enough spirit. Only the King of
England, who had rejected reasonable peace terms, remained in arms
against France. us, it was necessary to expel him from France and
carry the war to him (‘nous eorcer à gecter en ses pays la guerre.’)
e King therefore projected a large army in the Boulonnais and a
powerful eet to invade England.
5
e decision to renew war was thus
4
Intelligence report sent by Saint-Mauris, CSP Spain Cal. VIII, no. 115, pp. 217–
230 (L&P, XX, i, 619), wrongly dated to August. e CSP Spain (Simancas Estado 641)
gives details of the illness which L&P, omits: ‘for a long time past, the commencement
of his indisposition being a slow fever that he caught . . . lasting on one occasion for
ve days. . . . it was discovered that he had a gathering under the lower parts, which
distressed and weakened him so much that he could not stand, and he had to keep his
bed. For the cure of this gathering the most expert doctors and surgeons of Paris were
summoned. Aer purging the King they applied a cautery to the abcess, in order to
open and destroy it. is treatment was continued until the abcess broke: but instead
of discharging in one place only, as they expected, it broke out in three, in very dan-
gerous positions: and there is at present no assurance that he will live. He has even
fallen into extreme fainting and exhaustion, but he has always retained consciousness
and still does so. . . . As the abcesses did not discharge properly, the physicians have
applied three fresh cauteries, and this has caused three issues, whence infected matter
ows in great abundance. In order the better to recover from his malady, the King
has commenced a course of Chinese wood [sandalwood], which his physicians say he
must continue for 20 days. All the medical men are of opinion the malady proceeds
from “the French sickness” . . . e King expects to be able shortly to go into the country
in a litter, going rst towards Blois and thence to his native place, Cognac.’ e cutting
of the abcess took place on 7 Jan. (Desjardins, Négociations . . . Toscane, III, p. 142). See
Knecht, Renaissance Warrior, p. 495.
5
Registres des délibérations du bureau de la ville de Paris, ed. F. Bonnardot, A.
Tuety, P. Guérin, (Paris, 1883–1886) [hereaer Registres . . . Paris] III, pp. 47–49, royal
letters, 22 Feb. 1545 to prévôt de Paris.
268 chapter six
made in principle as early as February 1545, despite peace negotiations.
Detailed planning seems to have taken place at Romorantin in the sec-
ond half of April.
6
Both sides employed networks of agents to observe
what was happening on the other side. For the English these oper-
ated mainly out of Calais along well established lines; the lord Deputy
and governors of Guînes and Boulogne received regular reports from
agents in France.
7
ere were a few Frenchmen who entered English
service, though whether they could oer much is unclear. L’Artigue, as
we shall see (chapter 8), probably contributed the galley programme.
Jean de Fontenay, sr. de Berteville (more properly, Bretteville) was
probably a Norman gentleman acting as a double agent. He seems
to have ed France in 1545 when his family had been under a cloud,
had fought at Landrecies and Saint-Dizier and was to do so at Pinkie
in 1547. Already, at the end of 1546 he was oering his services to
the French ambassador.
8
Less is known about French intelligence net-
works, though they must have existed. In October 1545, the Antwerp
merchant Pierre Moucheron (most famous for the magnicent family
portrait in the Rijksmuseum) was commissioned by the French ambas-
sador in the Low Countries to report weekly on English aairs: num-
bers of troops, how well paid, whether they were stationed at harbours,
foreign mercenaries, whether the people were heavily burdened with
taxes, public opinion about the keeping of Boulogne, the state of food
supplies and war munitions, passage of troops to Calais and Boulogne,
number of ships maintained. Quite a tall order but really the kind of
questions any state needed to know. Moucheron then proceeded to
report on English troops.
9
e military confrontation by land between the French and English
armies aer 1544 necessarily revolved around Boulogne and can be
described in terms of three main crises. First came the moves, unsuc-
cessful, made by the French to establish a fortress to confront the
English in the early weeks of 1545. Next came the part played in the
6
According to du Bellay, Mémoires, IV, p. 282.
7
A typical example: Report by John Irish, trumpeter of Calais, March 1546, NA
SP1/216, fos. 3–4 (L&P, XXI, i, 471(2)).
8
L&P, XX, ii, 1016 (21 Dec. 1545); 1030; XXI, ii, 29; XXI, ii, 480, 518. For his activi-
ties in the 1550s, see E.H. Harbison, ‘French intrigue at the court of Queen Mary,’
Am.Hist.Rev. 45, iii (1940), 533–551, at p. 540–542. F.A. de La Chesnaye des Bois,
Dictionnaire de la noblesse, 15 vols. (1770–1786) VI, p. 510.
9
Instruction au sr. de Bolle, BnF fr. 17889, fos. 70–73. e identity of Bolle with
Moucheron is revealed in Mesnage’s journal, fr. 17889, fo. 125, 128. Letter of Moucheron,
fo. 32.
the war in france, 1545–1546 269
Boulonnais campaign as part of the overall grand strategy of confron-
tation initiated in July and lasting until September: the building of the
Outreau fort, the attack on the low country of Calais, the terre d’Oye,
and the naval campaign in the Channel. Finally there were the some-
what smaller-scale battles of January 1546. A climax was reached in
French attempts to tie down the English by implanting a new fortress
in July and August 1545. en, as France strove to prevent Henry VIII’s
plan to raise mercenaries in Germany under colonel Reienberg and
defeat the English in the Channel, the French King ordered a diver-
sionary attack on the Calais Pale under marshal du Biez.
10
e fact that
all this was happening while peace talks were under way is arresting.
e lesson that Henry aected to draw was that it was up to the French
to make the oers, since they had attacked him on his own land and
his resources were still adequate for defence. Paget also remarked that
the talks had had the eect of cooling the eorts of the French in the
construction of forts around Boulogne.
11
e war in the Boulonnais, which continued for twenty months aer
the fall of Boulogne and the Franco-Imperial peace, was essentially
positional. Both sides committed themselves heavily to large-scale
fortications which could only be taken by isolation and starvation.
e war consisted mainly of attempts to create or break blockades
of strategic places and both sides proved, because of logistical and
organisational problems, unable to succeed in their primary aims. As
had been the case since 1543, both sides used the Emperor’s territory
to secure their loot or as a base from which to attack the other. is
was regarded as normal though everyone protested about it. Francis I
claimed that self-styled ‘wild Englishmen’ (‘ceulx qui se font appeller
Anglois sauvaiges’) constantly used the Emperor’s territory as a base of
operations, whereas, of course, the French had never done so.
12
e impact of such ghting on the local population was predictably
intense. In France, the burden of war was felt both in taxes and in
direct enemy operations for several years. Norfolk’s march to Montreuil
revealed one of the commonest stratagems of the people of the area,
vaults or caves carved in the rock near the village of Alquines, where
10
Du Bellay, IV, pp. 314–321; Monluc, Commentaires, pp. 182–188; On all this,
see below chapter 7 and D. Potter, ‘e international mercenary market in the six-
teenth century: Anglo-French competition in Germany, 1543–1550’ English Historical
Review, 440 (1996), 24–58.
11
Van der Del and Scepperus, 21 Aug. 1545, CSP Spain, VIII, pp. 237, 239.
12
Memorandum of Mesnage, 1 Dec. 1545, BnF, fr. 17889, fos. 88–89; Francis I, rec.
10 Dec. 1545, BnF, fr. 17889, fo. 106v.