Potter David. Henry VIII and Francis I

Подождите немного. Документ загружается.

270 chapter six

the local people had been storing their valuables in wartime since

1513.

e area to the south of Boulogne was most directly hit, both

by the English and the passage of French and Imperial troops. For

instance, the inhabitants of Berck, a shing village technically subject

to the Emperor but enclaved in French territory, reported that in 1544

they had had to abandon their homes for six months ‘as a result of the

pillage, abuse and oppression that the English and Irish committed

against them while encamped at Montreuil.’ 200 houses and some of

their boats had been destroyed. e Dauphin’s army had occupied the

village, cutting down fruit trees. en in summer 1545, when Francis

I assembled his army to recover Boulogne, the royal army’s French,

landsknechts and Italians stayed for three months. All this le 250

inhabitants out of 1800 and 20 houses out of 300.

Nearby Verton

suered attacks by French armies in 1542 and 1543 and then in 1544

by the English. e village was abandoned for nine months and, as at

Berck, they found 270 of their 300 houses burned by the Irish troops

of Henry VIII. en in 1545, as at Berck, the landsknechts came and

cut down their trees. As the inhabitants summed it up, ‘in present

lifetimes the village will never again be seen as it was before in quality

and value because some of the inhabitants were captured and killed by

the English, others dead of the plague and poverty and the rest forced

to beg their bread.’ At Merlimont, another shing village already

damaged in 1542–1543, the inhabitants were forced to pay contribu-

tions to the English siege army before Montreuil. Again, in 1545 there

were raids by both French and English.

All the other villages of

this region – Groiers, Saint-Aubin, Argoulles, Noyelles and Waben –

suered in the same way. e villages around érouanne and Ardres

reported severe losses both in 1543 and 1544. At Fauquembergues,

an army of 20,000 men camped for 12 days in 1543.

Elsewhere, vil-

lages suered devastation on the march of Wallop’s army to and from

Gruydd, in M.B. Davies (ed), ‘e enterprises of Paris and Boulogne,’ pp. 12–15.

AN J 1017 fo. 381r: ‘au moien des pillaiges, foulles et oppressions que faisoient

sur eulx les Anglois et Irlandois estans lors campez devant Monstroeul.’ Technically,

the English were able to attack this territory because it had been seized by way of

compensation for his losses in Flanders by the duke of Vendôme.

Ibid., fo. 384r: ‘de memoire d’homme l’on ne verra led. villaige en telle nature et

valleur qu’il estoit au paravant par ce que partie des habitans ont esté prins et occis par

les Anglois, les aultres mors de la peste et povreté et le reste des aultres sont constrains

mendier leur pain.’; 386r.

Ibid., fo. 458r–505r, villages of the bailliage of Saint-Omer, damage during the

march of the sr. de Buren to join the English in 1544.

the war in france, 1545–1546 271

Landrecies.

In fact, the whole of Artois was badly damaged as a result

of military operations in 1544. Adrien de Croy-Roeulx summed up

the state of destruction and famine at the end of 1544: ‘I never in my

life saw the people of Artois so desolate and in such despair as they

are now.’

From the start, neither side succeeded in establishing exclusive con-

trol over the estuary of the river Liane, which formed the harbour of

the town, and this created a stalemate dicult to break. We also have

to ask whether the English or the French were able in any sense to

control territory. e strategy of the English, for instance, seems to

have been to rely on fortresses which could be revictualed from the

sea. Was the inland territory of the Boulonnais possible to control

at all? Henry le 3000 men to hold Boulogne in October 1544. In

February 1545 there were 5000 in all the garrisons, in August 1545,

8065 but in February 1546 only 4400 (though there was a eld army

about to be deployed).

English military resources were stretched very

tightly in 1545. Faced by the French attack at Boulogne, Henry aimed

to send another 5000 men to Boulogne in July but commitments were

already great: he was having to put 1000 into Portsmouth, 2000 into

the Isle of Wight, 3000 into the eet and 2000 had already been sent

out to Calais and Boulogne. e new troops for Boulogne therefore

had to be raised in the eastern counties through Norfolk’s commis-

sion.

(Appendix 11)

Could numbers in the range of 4–8000, with the garrisons of Calais

and Guînes have been able to control the territory? e answer is

probably yes, though only if unchallenged; how far the garrisons

operated outside their bases is questionable. e French could not be

prevented from penetrating between Boulogne and Calais when they

had sucient military power, at least until the construction of a seri-

ous scheme of fortication. roughout 1545–1546, for instance, the

captain of Samer, Jean de Roquetun, and his men were able to ‘annoy’

the English moving between Calais and Boulogne.

E.g. Sauemont in the bailliage of Arras, ibid., fo. 31v.

Du Roeulx to Mary of Hungary, 21 Oct. 1544, AGR, Audience, 119, fo. 41v: ‘je

ne veys jamais en ma vie le peuple d’Artois si desolé et desesperé qu’il est ad ceste

heure.’

L&P, XX, i, 8 (?) 26 Feb. 1545; XX, ii, 200 (23 Aug. 1545); XXI, i, 300 (Feb. 1546).

Council to Norfolk, 26, 31 July 1545, BL Harl. 6989, fo. 137, 138.

Hertford to Henry VIII, 30 March 1546, L&P, XXI, i, 489. Roquetun was a mem-

ber of du Biez’ company and later captain of Fiennes.

272 chapter six

Military Confrontation in France

Aer the failure of the Dauphin’s initial attempt to recapture Boulogne

by surprise, the onset of winter and a breakdown in supplies required

the withdrawal of the main French army, though Marshal du Biez was

le at Montreuil with his French and Italian ‘bandes’ to watch the

English and observe their building at the Tour d’Ordre.

e Marshal,

however, was forced into activity by the King’s impatience to recover

Boulogne and a scheme emerged by December 1544 for the building

of a fort which would dominate the harbour there and for which the

Court promised 4000 extra men.

e English naturally expected the

French to attempt to recover Boulogne, though their assumption that

this attempt would take place during the following summer did not

deter immediate and frenetic work on the re-fortications. Moreover,

at the end of January the high command in the city was reorganised;

the experienced omas Poynings was now King’s lieutenant (replacing

Lisle), with omas Wyatt and omas Palmer serving under him.

Advancing rst to Hubécourt early in January with 8000 men and

4000 pioneers, du Biez initially attempted to achieve surprise by con-

cealing his intention to build a fort, but from the outset his plans

began to go awry. Du Bellay reports continual rain while, as usual,

money for the newly-raised men was slow to arrive and both wood

and construction workers were in short supply.

In fact, the diculty

of nding reliable workers proved an almost insurmountable problem

to both sides in these years. e English experienced great problems in

pressing men into service for their own large-scale works at Boulogne

and, early in 1546, the French even tried to compel gypsies to such

Du Bellay, Mémoires, IV, pp. 280–281; du Biez to Francis I, 1 Jan. 1545, Potter,

Du Biez, no. 206.

Letter-patent of Francis I to Matignon, 12 Dec. 1544, Correspondance . . . Matignon,

p. 109.

Instructions to Hertford, L&P, XX, i, 121 Lisle’s service was now necessary at sea so

Poynings was appointed as he ‘hath ben longest acquaynted in the warres with the French-

men uppon the frontyers, and best knoweth their natures, and speketh also their language,

which is a thing very necessary for our service’ (St.P. X, p. 252, L&P, XX, i, 121).

Du Bellay, Mémoires, IV, p. 280; Du Biez to Francis I, 1 Jan. 1545, Potter, Du

Biez, no. 206; Francis I to Matignon, 10 Jan. 1545, Correspondance de Matignon,

no. CLXIV: he is raising 8–10,000 men ‘en Picardie, pour executer quelque entreprise’;

an Imperial intelligence report of 6 February puts the French force at 6–8000 foot

plus cavalry (L&P, XX, i, 619), Italian reports 10,000 foot, both French and Italian

(B. de Medici to Cosimo I, 9, 11 Feb. 1545, ASF, Mediceo, f. 4590, fo. 96r, 98v. Lack

of food was already encouraging Italians to desert to the English.

the war in france, 1545–1546 273

works, on the principle, perhaps, that, if they were to be expelled, they

might as well be put to good use rst.

As the French operations got under way, an Italian captain, Paolo

Orsini, predicted disaster because of the scoured state of Picardy, which

had now been fought over for three successive years.

To the problems

of providing fodder was now added the ruination of the dray horses by

muddy roads and overwork. is in itself slowed down the transport

of the necessary wood from the forest of Hardelot. Du Biez himself

reported to the King that the lack of progress was to be explained:

Both because of the bad weather, which is incredible, and because of our

shortage of horses and supplies for them, for which we have received no

help from Normandy.

Not even y hangings had been sucient to halt the disintegration

of the construction force by abscondment and arrears of payment had

aggravated the soldiers’ ill-temper at dear food and poor conditions.

e result of these delays was that du Biez had not had the time

eectively to fortify his position on the hill facing Boulogne when, on

5 February, the Earl of Hertford attacked in force. With du Biez nar-

rowly escaping capture, the rout would have been worse, according to

du Bellay, had not Captain Villefranche rallied the retreating French.

Italian mercenary captains put the French losses as high – over 1000

dead and four pieces of artillery lost – and recriminations ensued

between du Biez and the Italians, who claimed that they had rescued

their own artillery in the retreat, while du Biez accused them of lying.

Council of Boulogne to Privy Council, 21 Feb. 1546. See also Monluc’s comment

on du Biez’s problems in September: ‘car tous les pioniers l’avoient laissé, s’estans

dérobés, comme c’est l’ordinaire de ceste canaille, qui ne veille sur eulx.’ Commen-

taires (ed. Ruble), II, p. 81.

Alvarotti to Ercole II,? Jan. 1545, ASM, Francia B 20, fasc. 3, pp. 75–76: Orsini

thought that insucient arrangements had been made to feed the French army ‘per

esser tutte quelle frontiere, et tutti quelle luochi frusti, et consumati d’ogni interno che

tien per fermo che totto lo exercito che passara di la, debba morirsi de fame, perche

dalla prima provisione in fuori la quale si tiene che sea gagliarda, non li faranno piu.’

Orsini listed French forces as 300 Italians formerly in the Emperor’s service and

12,000 French (Picards and Normans – presumably legionnaires).

Du Biez to Francis I, 3 Feb. 1545, Potter, Du Biez, no. 207: ‘Tant pour l’indisposicion

du temps, quy est incroyable, que pour la necessité que nous avons desdictz chevaulx

et vivres pour iceulx, dont n’avons esté nullement secourus de Normandye.’

Henry VIII, instructions to Wotton, L&P, XX, I, 146, p. 68: French mutineers

desert for lack of wages and victuals.

Alvarotti to Ercole II, 10. Feb. 1545: ‘che sono certa vij m fanti che erano presso

Bologna si sono retirati a Monteruol con qualche poco danno, perche pare che sia

sopragionto novagente dell’isola d’Inghilterra’; 11 Feb. 1545: ‘con perdita di piu di

274 chapter six

Henry VIII exulted in this victory, which he claimed had been won by

5000 against 14,000 French. e wine captured from du Biez’s baggage

was swily sent o to Wotton in the Low Countries to sample.

French

condence in their Italian soldiers was shaken.

e French had failed in their objective of building a fort from which

to bombard Boulogne and were in a confused state. Captain Girolamo

da Modena, ensign under Count Berlinghieri, describing the battle and

its consequences, conrmed by the engineer Antonio Mellone, that an

opportunity for a greater English victory had been on oer:

If the English had pressed on and crossed the bridge, where there was

a small guard, they had broken the whole French force and pillaged

Montreuil so gaining control of the whole of Picardy, because all the

French men who had been in camp here had been withdrawn from

Montreuil and other places.

French forces were now reduced to 900 Italians, 2000 landsknechts

and Picard foot and 1000 cavalry, all in garrison.

Attention in the frontier war shied to Ardres, now almost isolated

in English-controlled territory. Shortly aer the English attack on du

Biez’ forces, the Marshal reported the loss of the outlying tower at

Autingues, near Ardres.

ough he minimised the shame by noting

the great number of cannon-shots required to enforce the surrender

of its small garrison, we learn from Italian sources that the French

had just not thought to fortify it and that the garrison of Ardres was

mille huomini, perche questi di Bologna con un’grosso socorso che le era venuto

dal’isola uscirno fuori . . . et ancho perche molti Italiani del campo francese erano gia

passati nel campo di la’; 6 March: captain Melone armed that the French lost four

cannons and that the defeat had been spurred by the ight of ‘le quatro insegne che

erano all guardia del ponte’ forcing 2500 men (Italians, Picards and Gascons) and

35 horse to retire. ASM Francia B 20, fasc. 4, fos. 7–10, 11–12, 46. B. de Medici to

Cosimo I, 11 feb. 1545, ASF, Med. f. 4590 fo. 99. Du Bellay, Mémoires, IV, p. 280, says

Surrey was the leader of the English attack, confusing this with the battle of January

1546. Carne reports the English leader as Hertford (Carne to Paget, 10 Feb. 1545,

L&P, XX, i, 170; Council to Shrewsbury, 12 Feb. 1545 ibid., XX, i, 180, giving French

losses as 6–700.

Wriothesley, Chronicle, p. 152; Wotton to Paget, 10 Feb. 1545, L&P, XX, i, 169).

Alvarotti to Ercole II, 14 March 1545, ASM Francia, B 20, fasc. 4, fo. 82v: du Biez

had been heard to accuse the Italians of being the ones who had lost their artillery.

Alvarotti to Ercole II, 14 March 1545: ‘Se Inglese spingevano inanti, et passavano

il ponte ove erano per guardia quelle poche compagnie, che rompevano del tutto le

gente francese, et piglianavo Monterulo et erano patroni di tutto la Picardia perche

tutte le genti de Francesi che erano quivi in campa qua erano tratti di Monteruolo et

delli altri suoi luochi.’

Du Biez to Francis I, 19 Feb. 1545, Potter, Du Biez, no. 210.

the war in france, 1545–1546 275

reduced and poorly supplied.

e direct route from French territory

to Ardres was now cut. February saw du Biez preoccupied with Ardres,

planning a muster of men at érouanne who could use the cover of

Imperial territory to run supplies into the town by night, during the

period of full moon. e King, hearing du Biez’ account of the fall

of Autingues, was not disheartened since the road from érouanne

was still open and the loss of the direct route ‘cannot stop you, with

the force I have given you from putting supplies into Ardres in such

quantity that I shall be able to rest assured.’

Du Biez was still con-

dent that Ardres could be revictualled and Vendôme was at Abbeville

ready to move men to erouanne.

But by mid-March the marshal

had sent his half-brother to court to report an alarming build-up of

English pressure against Ardres. So desperate was the situation, that

Enghien and Taix were ordered to lead the young gentlemen of the

Court (always anxious to seek action) to re-enforce du Biez, much to

the contempt of the Italian captains on the spot.

Ardres was in fact

relieved by the despatch of Dampierre.

As a result of a joint expedi-

tion from Montreuil and erouanne in early May, by the middle of

that month Count Berlinghieri at last got through and resupplied the

Alvarotti, 14 March 1545: captain Melone reported only 300 men foot and 450

‘some’ of supplies. e English had prevented further supplies from getting in (ASM

Francia, B 20 fasc. 4, fo. 82r–v of decipher). B. de Medici to Cosimo I, 14 March 1545,

ASF, Med. f. 4590, fos. 123v–124r: the English were threatening to cut Ardres o

completely.

Francis I to du Biez, 23 Feb. 1545, Potter, Du Biez: ‘ne poura empescher à la force

que je vous laisse que vous ne mettez vivres dedens Ardres en telle habondance que

j’auray occasion d’en demourer en repos.’

C. de Riart to deputy of Calais, 2 march 1545, BL Harleian 288, fo. 90 (L&P,

XXI, i, 296).

Alvarotti to Ercole II, 20 March 1545: ‘che Anglesi facevano les trenziere intorno

di Ardes, pero che se Sua Maestà non la soccoreva tosto che portava gran pericolo:

Sua Maestà ha expedito subito a chiamar Monsr d’Anghiun et Monsr de es et sotto

il governo loro disegna di mandar quello maggior numero che contra di questi gio-

veni et camerieri che sono in Corte . . . Me dice Melun che quando siano 800 overo

1000 che serano tutto il mondo et la maggior parte di essi inexperti, di modo che

per questo rispetto, et perche Inglesi all impresa di Ardres sono 1200 bravi cavalli et

vj m fanti . . .’ he expects no good result. (ASM Francia, B 20, fasc. 4, fo. 111 (deci-

pher); 21 March 1545: English now reported to be 10,000 foot 1200 ‘bravi cavalli’ and

that ‘si vi andaranno questi gioveni della corte, che si ragiona, che morirano o tutti, o

la maggior parte, perche Inglesi combatteno et non stimano presento il moror.’ (ibid.,

fo. 116 (decipher).

Du Biez to Francis I, 30 March 1545, Potter, Du Biez, no. 214; Alvarotti to Ercole

II, 15 April 1545, ASM Francia, B 20, fasc. 4, fo. 75 (decipher); Chapuys to Bave,

19 May, CSP Spain VIII, no. 54 (L&P, XXI, i, 771).

276 chapter six

place, opposed only by a screen of y English horsemen.

Claude de

Clermont, sr. de Dampierre, an excessively brave commander perhaps,

was unlucky at Ardres. Early in June, he led a sortie against the English

and lost 100 foot and 20 horse. Finally, he was killed in September in

what became known as the ‘windmill skirmish.’

e success at Ardres was a welcome development in the war for

the French, for the English had just managed to recapture Hardelot,

a castle a few miles south of Boulogne, which commanded the route

from Montreuil. In March, du Biez had asserted that more money was

needed for its repair aer the English had taken it in 1544 but that it

could not be retaken. is, though, is exactly what happened in May

when the castle, ‘an ‘evil neighbour’ to the English, garrisoned by 96

men, surrendered easily at a time when French forces in the area were

weak. An English garrison of similar number was stationed there.

ere were broader aspects to the struggle in the Boulonnais.

1545 was the year in which the English and French were competing

vigorously for the services of German mercenaries (see chapter 7).

Already, as we have seen, a grand strategy of a three-pronged attack

on England was being discussed early in 1545.

Du Biez reported to

his master in February that the English were expecting reinforcements

from Germany in order to attack the French base at Montreuil,

while

the French were obviously in the same market. Both sides had used

Alvarotti to Ercole II, 8 May, 1 June 1545, ASM, Francia, B 20, fasc. 4, fo. 147,

deciph, fo. 170, deciph: ‘et non vi ha havuto una diculta al mondo, comparvero solo

50 cavalli de inimici.’

Alvarotti to Ercole II, 9 June 1545, ASM, Francia, B 21, fasc. 1, fos. 182–186 (deci-

pher 185v); 22 September 1545, ibid., fasc. 2, fo. 61, ‘la scaramuzza del molino’ Council

to Hertford, 5 Sept. 1545, St.P., V, p. 508: Grey and Surrey, having arranged to meet by

the river on 2 Sept. ‘the alarum was given, whereupon the Lord Grey retourning tooke

order for the saveguard of his men . . . and anon . . . the horsemen of Guynes entered in

to skarmuche the thennemy, wher was slayn Monsieur de Dampierre captayne of Arde,

and many other to the number of 100 and above.’ For the story of the transport home

of his decaying body and the mishaps on the way, see royal letters of remission for Jean

de Vizean, sr. de Trueil, his maître d’hôtel, Jan. 1546, AN JJ 257B, no. 26, fo. 8r–v.

Du Biez to Francis I, 30 March, Potter, Du Biez, no. 214; Poynings was appointed

its captain (Poynings to Henry VIII, 11 May 1545, L&P, XXI, i, 708). Hardelot

remained in English hands until the French advance in July 1545. e French began

to rebuild it and it again became an ‘evil neighbour’ (Poynings to Henry VIII, 13 July

1545, L&P, XX, i, 1187). B.-J. obois, Le château de Hardelot (Montreuil-sur-Mer

(1905), pp. 73–4.

Undated Intelligence from France, 1545, CSP Spain, VIII, no. 115 (L&P, XX, I,

619).

Du Biez to Francis I, 19 Feb. 1545, Potter, Du Biez, no. 210 warrant for payment

to mercenaries, 29 Jan. 1545, L&P, XX, i, 111.

the war in france, 1545–1546 277

German landsknechts in the previous year and now Francis I had

commissioned the Rhingrave and the Hessian Captain Reckerodt to

raise 6000 men for service in Picardy.

e English were both unlucky

and incompetent in their negotiations and allowed themselves to be

out-manoeuvred by French envoys, both at the Imperial Court and

in the recruiting-ground of the Rhineland. On the other hand, the

arrival of the considerable body of Germans for French service seems

to have tipped the fortunes of war decidedly against the English at

Boulogne.

In his survey of military needs early in the summer of 1545, Paget

thought that:

At Boulloyn, the have victails and men ynoughe, and ther is delivred to

the Treasorer 16000£ for the same, and Mr Lee hath commaundement,

on your behalf, to send 300 pyoners thither more.

But French forces were becoming formidable, on paper at least. e gen-

darmerie companies of Vendôme, the Constable, du Biez, La Rochepot,

Villebon, Heilly and Dampierre had already been ordered into posi-

tion in Picardy early in March, the hommes d’armes summoned to

the colours in neighbouring provinces. In April, Francis summoned to

their garrisons the Norman companies of Estouteville, Montpensier,

Annebault, Boutieres, Curton and La Meilleraye and in June the com-

panies of the Dauphin, Orléans, Boisy, Maugiron, Brissac, La Roche

du Maine and Escars were summoned from Languedoc to Picardy. e

royal army was reforming.

French infantry companies were also being

assembled. Four companies were initially directed from Normandy

and Brittany to Honeur but were then redirected to Abbeville for the

land army. ese companies were those of Kerrouen, La Moyenne,

Renouard and Saultrice; Kerrouen’s (from Brittany) directed via the

étapes set up for the naval troops.

Du Bellay recalled that the army

was to consist of 15,000 landsknechts under the Rhinegrave, Reckerodt

Francis I to du Biez, 23 Feb. 1545, Potter, Du Biez, no. 211 Du Bellay, Mémoires,

IV, pp. 280–281; Potter, ‘Les Allemands et les armées françaises’ p. 4.

An Imperial report in June 1545 noted serious problems with the landsknechts

who had arrived in Champagne and were disorderly. ey would not march from

Noyon until they were paid (L&P, XX, i, 1036).

e State of thinges, as well within the Realme, as at Calays, and Boullon, and the

Marches, St.P.I, ii, no. CCXI, corrected by Paget.

Francis I to Matignon, 3 March, 10 April, 21 June 1545, Correspondance de Mati-

gnon pp. 114–115, nos. CLXX, CLXXIII, CLXXXIII.

Francis I to Matignon, 2 May, 18 June 1545, ibid., nos. CLXXIV, CLXXIX.

278 chapter six

and Ludovic, 10,000 French from Gascony and Languedoc, all under

the command of marshal du Biez.

Once the landsknechts had arrived,

the order went out for du Biez to recommence work on the fort oppo-

site Boulogne, adequate to accommodate 4–5000 men and command

entry into the harbour. According to du Bellay, this formed part of a

wider strategy decided in May 1545 to hem in Boulogne by land and

sea and then proceed to an attack on Guînes in order to put pressure

on Calais and the terre d’Oye. e King intended to be present him-

self. is time construction workers, carts and horses were in plenti-

ful supply and the weather smiled on French eorts.

But subsequent

events tell a dierent story.

For a start, the forces allocated to Picardy were simply not in

place quickly enough. As late as 2 July, Francis I was deploring this

dilatoriness:

Of all the gendarmerie I had ordered for Picardy, only a hundred horse-

men are to be found at the moment, at which I have very great cause to

be discontented with the chiefs and captains, since the hour approaches

to start work on the fort I wish to build before Boulogne.

Du Biez assured the King that the fort would be completed by the

middle of August and the court le for Normandy to observe the naval

campaign planned against the English in the Channel during the summer.

Almost immediately, problems of command began to aect French

plans: the Germans refused to sit by protecting the construction work-

ers, as they had been ordered, while du Biez had problems nding

seamen to man the covering ships.

roughout his account of these

campaigns, Martin du Bellay is hostile to du Biez, condemning his

faulty decisions. In fact, it seems dicult to condemn the Marshal for

lack of drive or courage and the subsequent mess looks more like the

result of the usual administrative confusion.

Du Bellay, Mémoires, IV, p. 284.

Du Bellay, Mémoires, IV, pp. 282–284.

Francis I to Vendôme, 2 July 1545, BnF, Fontanieu 254, fo. 168; BN fr. (Béthune

8535), fo. 110: ‘de toute la gendarmerye que j’avoys ordonné pour la Picardie, il ne

s’y retrouve pas à ceste heure cent hommes à cheval, de quoy j’ai merveilleusement

grant occasion d’estre mal content des chefs et cappitaines d’autant qu’estant l’heure

venue qu’il fault commencer à frapper à l’oeuvre du fort que je veulx faire devant

Boulloigne.’

Francis I to Matignon, 26 July 1545, Correspondance de Matignon, p. 127.

the war in france, 1545–1546 279

Du Biez arrived with his main forces – 16,000 foot and 6–700 horse –

on the 6th July. For the moment the English were too weak to attack

this force while it was still in the open without encampments. English

chroniclers were impressed. Hall recorded that a French army had

20,000 men and that, although they could not defeat the English gar-

rison, they managed to start the building of their new fort.

e inter-

relatedness of the problems at Boulogne and in the Channel is revealed

by Paget’s and the Council’s despatches from Portsmouth. Paget was

concerned both with defence against the French eet and with the

looming crisis at Boulogne when he reported the establishment of

three French camps: of 400 cavalry on the ‘hill towards the see,’ 6000

Germans with artillery on the ‘slant of the hill’ leading from Montreuil

and 4000 French and 800 Italians around Pont-de-Bricque, where they

were busy building a bulwark. By the end of July, they reported the

French fortress as so threatening ‘as if the same be not taken from

them in tyme the commodite of the haven is lyke to be taken from’

the English.

When Martin du Bellay, who was sent by Francis to

inspect progress, arrived in the middle of August he found the fort

still incomplete and, in his opinion, sited in the wrong place, on the

hill of Outreau instead of at the entrance to the river Liane, control-

ling the harbour. Du Bellay, attacked the inuence of the Italian engi-

neer, Antonio Mellone, in this decision, though it is likely that du Biez

took the decision himself in opposition to Mellone’s opinion. Du Biez

in fact told du Bellay that the riverside site was impossible; it lacked

water and was inhospitable. When Monluc arrived from Le Havre

with his Gascon troops, the curtain-walls facing Pont de Bricque were

still unnished and du Biez ordered his soldiers (in vain) to take a

hand with pick and shovel. Finally Monluc (as he claims) led his men

by example into the works creating a happy stakhanovite atmosphere

with songs and sucient food to get the work done.

Moreover, it

Poynings to Henry VIII, 6 July 1545, L&P, XX, i, 1122; Hall, ed. Whibley, p. 351,

Hall got the date of the advent of French forces (7 June) wrong. Wriothesley recorded

it as ‘about’ 5 July (Chronicle, p. 156).

Paget to Norfolk, 17 July 1545, BL Harl. 6989, fo. 136 (L&P, XX, i, 1210); Council

to Norfolk, 26 July 1545, ibid., 6989, fo. 137 (L&P. XX, i, 1276).

Du Bellay, Mémoires, IV, pp. 305–306. Monluc was rather more sympathetic to

du Biez’s position, pointing up the usual diculties with construction workers ‘comme

c’est l’ordinaire de ceste canaille qui ne veille sur eulx.’ (Commentaires, ed.Courteault,

pp. 179–181; ed. de Ruble II, p. 81). Inevitably, Monluc uses this as a lesson on how

to get soldiers to work willingly by showing a good example.