Potter David. Henry VIII and Francis I
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300 chapter six
of the best on thisside.’ Indeed it was he who suggested changing the
name of the place from ‘Hamultu’ to ‘the New Haven in Boloynoys’ on
the argument that ‘the owld name was not perfetly knowen.’ omas
Wyatt even went so far as to lobby for the captaincy though it eventu-
ally fell to lord Stourton.
129
On 18/19 April orders went out to supply
this emplacement.
130
Henry himself sent a plan for a fort with ve bas-
tions, though the local experts questioned whether the ground would
serve for it. ey ultimately decided four was better (Rogers produced
a plan for a basically triangular fort with a fourth, smaller, bastion on
the side facing the harbour.)
131
Henry again rejected this, so at the end
of April Rogers produced a plan for a ve-angle fort and a barrage
across the river Slack completed by another bastion. Work began on
the site well before nal plans were decided, ground being cleared in
the rst week of April, every company of 100 men responsible for 100
feet of rampart. Bedrock proved not to be dicult to work.
132
e fort
was to occupy the emplacement of the existing village. Shelby’s ‘Plan
D’ shows some remarkable features and is not by Rogers. It shows
some evidence for Italian inuence on the internal layout of the fort
as well as for the construction of a ne harbour by the use of sluice
gates in the barrage across the river ending in a sort of ravelin, itself
surrounded by ditches. e design of the bastions is highly original,
combining round artillery platforms (paralleled at Château Trompette
at Bordeaux) with angle bastions in which the ‘ears’ bend inwards and
form part of a fausse braie. is variant was not constructed but is
close to Rogers’ nal plan for the ve-angled fortress. Shelby’s ‘Plan C’
is by Rogers and represents a rationalised version of Plan D. On a hill
slightly to the south of the main fort, the English also constructed an
earthwork fortress referred to as ‘Sellacq’ by the French aer the river.
e plan was drawn up in April 1546 for ‘a bulwark newly to be made
uppon a hill nere this forte.’ Modern archaeology shows it to have
been a quadrangular fort with angle bastions. At all events, the works
129
Hertford to Paget, 3 April 1546, NA SP1/216, fo. 103 (L&P, XXI, i, 530); Wyatt
to Paget, 13 April 1546, L&P, XXI, i, 595. On the name, there was real confusion at the
time. Lisle thought it called ‘Hable estue’ in old French because the haven was round
like a tennis ball. (Lisle to Paget, 7 April 1546, St.P., I, p. 841 (L&P, XXI, i, 563).
130
Documents on the foundation of the camp and fortress: L&P, XXI, i, 520, 595,
619, 700; APC, I, 390 (18 April); Proc. 19 April (L&P, XXI, i, 626).
131
Lisle to Henry VIII, 1 April 1546, L&P, XXI, i, 507.
132
Lee to Paget, 8 April 1546, L&P, XXI, i, 574.
the war in france, 1545–1546 301
at Ambleteuse were well advanced by February 1547, though the port
works, barrage and ravelin were probably never constructed.
133
e other major work was at cap Gris Nez, the ‘Blackness fort.’
is was begun later and only the cellars were in being by February
1547. Here again, a harbour was envisaged by Rogers, who persuaded
Hertford that a port in this position would ‘do more service for keep-
ing the narrow seas than all your havens on this side.’ is proved
too expensive. He designed the main structure as a quadrilateral fort
with angle bastions. No contemporary plans exist
134
but this building
has been the subject a serious archaeological study since its listing as
a protected site in 1988. is has revealed a substantial masonry struc-
ture with four angle bastions. In fact, the plan is remarkably complete
and the archaeology has revealed much about the internal layout of
the structure.
135
One of the problems for this fort was supply. Despite
plans to make a naval base of it, there was no harbour and so it had
to be supplied by land; this raised constant problems into the reign of
Edward VI.
136
Blackness fort thus completes our understanding of the
fortication strategy of the English government in the Boulonnais.
Curiously, we know much less about the strategy behind the analo-
gous French fortications in Boulonnais during this period at Outreau,
Saint Etienne and le Portel. Rather less documentation for these is
available than for the English works, though we have important nar-
rative sources and some plans. e French wanted to control entry to
the harbour either by stationing a eet o it or by of blocking it. One
of the more strange ideas of 1545 was for an underwater bar, made of
several pillars bound together by iron, to be sunk at the entrance to the
harbour to make it impossible for ships to get in or out.
137
133
Shelby, pp. 75–83; L&P, L&P, XXI, i, 394, 471, 472, 507, 565; esp. Hertford to
Henry VIII, 27 April 1546, NA SP1/217 fo. 114r (L&P, XXI, i, 686); Stourton to Som-
erset, 18 Feb. 1547, CSPF Edward VI, pp. 305–306. Méreau, no. 43, pp. 24–28.
134
Shelby, pp. 83–85; L&P, XXI, i, 1159.
135
Germain Mocquot, ‘Un ouvrage fortié du seizième siècle en Boulonnais: le fort
du Cap Gris Nez,’ Bulletin des amis du fort d’Ambleteuse 42 (1987).
136
E.g. report of Stourton, 4 Feb. 1547; ‘thrugh want of an havin,’ SP68/13, fo. 16v
(CSPF Edward VI, Calais Papers, no. 8); John Rogers to Somerset, 27 March 1547,
SP68/14, fo. 12 (ibid., no. 86): ‘yt is almost unposyble to make sodenlye onny such har-
bor.’ Rogers even later proposed cutting o the fort from the land by a vast ditch.
137
Alvarotti to Ercole II, 9 June 1545, ASM Francia, B 21, fo. 185 (deciph.): ‘dis-
egna inoltre Sua Maestà di fabricare in una nave 3 overo 4 pilastri di preda ben ligati
et rmati con arpesi et cateni di ferro et questa condurla nella boccha del porto di
Bologna et fondarla, et a questo modo fare come ci dire uno scoglio dentro adesso
porto, accio non possino uscire quelli di dentro et meno venire dentro di quelli di
302 chapter six
e main French work, started abortively in January 1545 and
denitively in the August of that year, was the fort of Outreau, on the
most prominent hill on the opposite side of the river from Boulogne,
precisely the area that Henry VIII had ordered occupied in October
1544. Marshal du Biez was later criticised severely for the siting of this,
has been seen, but certain strategic constraints applied. e only way a
fortress could be started on the south bank of the river was for the most
dominant topographical feature to be occupied. Otherwise the work-
men could not be defended. A fort constructed nearer the entrance to
the harbour would be impossible to defend from bombardment dur-
ing its construction Furthermore, before the construction of the fort
at Mont-Saint-Etienne, works at Outreau and in its area were always
subject to intervention from the garrison of Boulogne.
e most detailed account of the construction of the Outreau fort
is that of Martin du Bellay, who was sent by Francis to report on
progress. Du Bellay was generally hostile to du Biez and this needs
to be borne in mind, but the details are informative. According to
him, Francis decided on the building of a fort while at Romorantin
in late April. Its objective was ‘to hold the garrison of Boulogne in
such subjection that they should have no means to cross the water
into his country, similarly by building at the promontory opposite
the Tour d’Ordre, to impede the entry of ships into the harbour.’ He
reports that du Biez had promised Francis that the fort would be ready
in the middle of August. Du Bellay found little progress. It had not
been placed on the point opposite the Tour d’Ordre but on the hill of
Outreau and so could not impede entrance to the harbour. As we have
seen, a report of the French movements in mid-July indicated that,
when the German troops pitched their artillery on the slope opposite
the town (protected by mounds), they could easily shoot as far as the
market-place of the Old Town.
138
e problem seems to have been that
this was unsuitable as a place for a permanent fort. Du Biez explained
that the lack of water at the point and the winds made working there
impossible. Du Bellay thought that he had relied too heavily on the
fuori, perche se questi di fuori voranno venire in Bologna, veniranno a rompere come
in uno scoglio.’
138
Du Bellay, Mémoires, IV, p. 283: ‘tenir ceux de Boulongne en telle subjection
qu’ils n’eussent moyen de passer deça l’eau en ses pais, et semblablement le faisant sur
la poincte vis à vis de la tour d’Ordre, empescher à coups de canon que navires ne peu-
ssent entrer dedans le havre.’ Paget to Norfolk, 17 July 1545, BL Harl. 6989, fo. 136.
the war in france, 1545–1546 303
Italian soldier and engineer Antonio Mellone. It is in fact the case that
Mellone, a frequent informant of the Ferrarese ambassador, had been
instructed by the King as early as February 1545 to construct the fort.
139
Du Biez was relying on the king’s engineer. Mellone had planned a
pentagonal fort with ve bastions. In order to nish it quickly, he had
planned the bastions, ramparts and ditches to be 40 feet wide and 18
feet deep, the ramparts only to consist of a parapet in view of the fact
that the structure was on a hill top. Du Bellay’s view was that he had
got his measures wrong, particularly in forgetting the slopes (talus) of
the bastions so that the bastions were too small for the mounting of
artillery. Within, there was only room to accommodate 5–600 men,
not 5000. So it became necessary to ll up the ditches while cutting
down masses of trees in the forest of Hardelot to hold up the rampart.
Two months’ work had been wasted. Du Bellay made his report to
the King but du Biez sent another messenger with the report that the
work would be nished in a week. A spy for the English at the end of
August adds to this picture the fact that the water supply at Outreau
had proved dicult and that there were 4 ensigns of the old bands
under de Taix already in garrison.
140
Visual evidence is provided by
two Italian plans. One is damaged, probably made during the build-
ing of the fort, which indicates a rampart of 20 feet in thickness and
that one of the bastions (all shown as with orillons) had collapsed
once and was weak. e other is a large-scale plan of the fortresses of
Boulogne and Outreau but which is primarily designed as a detailed
plan of the French fort and which gives the names of the bastions and
their measurements by 1547. is shows distinctly elongated bastions
with orillons marked as 80 feet (‘piedi’) deep and with counter-scarps
10–12 feet thick.
141
is is much the most detailed plan to survive. Also
useful is a plan of the French works drawn up probably in August
139
Alvarotti to Ercole II, 5 Feb. 1545, ASM, Francia, B 20: the King had told Mel-
lone that he decided to build a fort ‘presso Bologna alla marina per victare il smontare
di qua a Inglesi, e per questo eetto se ne a andato a quella volta.’ An Antonio Melloni
wrote a military treatise c. 1560, Particelli e fragmenti (Venice, 1598). e adviser
on the abortive construction in January 1545 was described by an imperial report as
Venetian (L&P, XX, i, 619).
140
Du Bellay, Mémoires, IV, pp. 283, 305–308; NA SP68/15, fo. 72v (CSPF Edward
VI, Calais Papers, 161, ii).
141
BL Cotton, Caligula E II, fo. 271r; Cotton, Aug. I, ii, no. 67, Suppl. 10, damaged
in one corner.
304 chapter six
1545 (Shelby’s Survey I of Boulogne), though probably not by Rogers.
142
is shows the fort surrounded by the camps of du Biez, the Germans
and the Picards (as described by Paget in July). On the bastions: ‘ise
outher three bowlwarkes be not yet so forwards nor yet so fortyed
as thouther . . . from one bowllwark to thouther is a Cxliii passe. e
Sircuit of every bowlwark is Ccxlviii passes.’
143
is is completed by
Rogers’ Survey II, probably drawn up for Hertford in June 1546, show-
ing much the same design for the fort and also now a quadrangular
fortress at Saint-Etienne.
144
Saint-Etienne had certainly been started in the spring of 1546 and
so was exempt from the prohibition of the peace treaty against starting
new fortications. It was crucial to prevent English military action to
cut o Outreau by crossing the river at Pont-de-Bricque. Two other
works were more controversial. ese were forts at Le Portel, crucial
for securing the supply of Outreau by sea, and another at the point
later called fort Châtillon. e latter was a triangular bastioned work
as is shown in Rogers’ ‘Survey III’ probably drawn up in the summer
of 1546. ese were thrown down by an English expedition on Grey’s
initiative on 5 September 1546 and the tacit approval of Henry.
145
As has been noted, Etaples had received a massive programme of
fortications by April 1546 and had become central to French strategy.
Hertford and Lisle judged in April that:
ere is not the like of yt uppon . . . all thisside of the mouth of the Seane
lyke to kepe subiect tholl countrey of Boullenoyes, without whych also
your enemyes could not revictuall neyther Ardres, Hardelowe nor the
newe fort neither to have any armye in the eld without thassistence of
emperours low countryes
It had also been equipped with a citadel.
146
Both sides channelled formidable energies and signicant treasure
into the fortication of their positions around Boulogne. For this rea-
son, perhaps, the ghting remained inconclusive and despite the objec-
tives of the two Kings, settlement could only be made elsewhere.
142
Shelby, pp. 98–99. It is not easy to reconcile some of the details with the Italian
plan just discussed.
143
BL Cotton, Aug. I, Suppl. 5, Shelby, p. 173.
144
BL Cotton, Aug. I, ii, 77; Shelby, p. 173.
145
Shelby, pp. 105–106.
146
Hertford and Lisle to Henry VIII, 28 April 1546, NA SP1/217 fo. 125r (L&P, i, 693).
CHAPTER SEVEN
FRANCE AND ENGLAND COMPETE FOR TROOPS:
THE MERCENARY MARKET, 1543–1546
e Almaynes, who be accompted among all nacions
the ower of the world for good orders of footemen
1
Neither England nor France could ght the war with their own troops
alone; both needed access to the market for professional troops that
was overwhelmingly concentrated in the German territories of the
Empire. France was well used to drawing on German, Italian and
Swiss troops for its armies.
2
Henry, as we have seen, wrote into his
agreement with the Emperor in 1543 a provision for making up part
the army by troops from Germany and the Low Countries. Historians
have oen stressed the importance of mercenaries in European war-
fare of the sixteenth century. As both infantry and cavalry, it is plain
that they were the professional soldiers needed by every army to stien
its attack capability.
3
It was normal to lament reliance on such for-
eign troops. In 1545, having to cope with the aermath of a disastrous
attempt at recruitment, Stephen Gardiner thought peace the best way
to ‘to eskape the thrawldam to such noughty mennes service.’ At the
end of the war, William Paget, aer a particularly dire performance by
foreign cavalry at Boulogne, lamented that:
every tyme [they] leave us in the durt, sumtyme thalmaynes and sum-
tymes the Albanoys. I besech God direct all thinges so as for this tyme
1
Description by omas Audley in his ‘Order for the warres,’ BL Harl. 309, fo. 6r.
2
D. Potter, Renaissance France at War pp. 124–151.
3
See C. Oman, e Art of War in the Sixteenth Century (London, 1937), and other
basic surveys: J.R. Hale, War and Society in Renaissance Europe, 1450–1620 (Lon-
don, 1985), pp. 146–152; A. Corvisier, Armies and Society in Europe, 1494–1789
(trans. Indiana, 1979). M. Mallett, Mercenaries and their Masters: Warfare in Renais-
sance Italy (London, 1974), argues that the condottiere had become an increasingly
stable and aristocratic, as well as professional, force in Italian warfare. On internal
landsknecht organization: H.M. Möller, Das Regiment der Landsknechte (1976);
F. Redlich, e German Military Enterpriser and his Workforce (2 vols., Wiesbaden,
1964–1965).
306 chapter seven
we leave to have non of them and against the next tyme to be able to
have a gret force of our own horsemen.
4
Nevertheless, infantry (landsknechts) and light horse drawn mainly
from the Empire but also from Italy and the Balkans were essential to
all armies.
is chapter will concentrate mainly on German mercenaries if
only because the survival of substantial French, English and German
sources for the engagement of mercenaries from the Empire in the
mid-1540s allows an examination in depth of how the two countries
competed for the services of military professionals. It also throws light
on the practical processes of recruitment and on the interaction of war
and diplomacy in the period. Yet it should be obvious that similar
problems bedevilled the market in other troops as well. As we have
seen, the duke of Albuquerque, a favourite of Henry’s, accompanied
him in 1544 with a mounted retinue. A small corps of Spaniards, 450
men, served in 1544 and was then augmented in 1545 by another
700 under Pedro de Gamboa as marshal of the camp. ese served at
Boulogne, Portsmouth and Scotland in 1545 and Ambleteuse in 1546.
An anonymous Spanish chronicler insisted on Henry’s high regard
for them but on their quarrelsomeness.
5
During the ghting of 1545,
Poynings was eager to entice the disgruntled Italians in French service
but the coming of peace in 1546 opened the way for both Spaniards
and Italians to be enticed into the army being prepared by the Emperor
against the German Protestants.
6
e duel that took place on 15 July
1546 at Fontainebleau between Julian Romero and Antonio Mora, two
Spanish captains in Henry’s service, proved an embarrassment for the
recent peace between the kingdoms. Romero accused Mora of betray-
ing his oath to Henry. His victory was gratifying to Henry but did not
derail the peace.
7
4
Gardiner to Paget, 7 Nov. 1545, Muller, Letters, p. 180 (L&P, XX, ii, 749); Paget
to Petre, 28 April 1546, NA SP1/217, fo. 121r (L&P, XXI, i, 691).
5
Hume (ed.), Chronicle . . . written in Spanish, pp. 100–131.
6
Poynings to Henry VIII, 4 May 1545, L&P, XX, i, 654; count Berlinguero, com-
mander of the Italians in French service in Boulonnais, came to court at this time
to threaten that, either his men should be paid or sent back to Italy. Otherwise they
would defect to the English. 1800 out of 2000 remained unpaid (Alvarotti to Ercole
II, 1 June 1545, ASM, Francia, B 21, fasc. 1, p. 170 (172 decipher). Selve to Francis I,
8 July 1546, Lefèvre-Pontalis, no. 5, p. 9.
7
Selve to Francis I, 4, 18 July 1546, Lefèvre-Pontalis, no. 1, 10. Knyvet to Henry VIII,
17 July 1546, St.P., XI, pp. 239–245; Brantôme, ‘Discours sur le duels’ in Oeuvres
completes, ed.L. Lalanne, 11 vols. (Paris, 1864–1882).
france and england compete for troops 307
In the celebrated case of Ludovico da l’Armi we have a clear enough
instance of how easily a government could be taken in by a plausible
operator who promised a supply of seasoned troops.
8
Da l’Armi came
to the royal camp at Boulogne in 1544 to oer his services and was
sent back to Venice to gather men.
9
at he was a turbulent and violent
conspirator, under suspicion by both the Venetian and Papal govern-
ments, did not impede the issue of a royal commission and the money
to raise 6000 men in Venetian territory (at a time when the market was
brimming with unemployed condottiere). Fleeing Venice in the sum-
mer of 1545, he saw some ghting at Boulogne and then returned to
Venice to participate in a shadowy scheme to create an Anglo-French-
Venetian alliance at the end of 1546. Only Henry VIII’s death allowed
him to be arrested and beheaded at Venice in 1547. Da l’Armi had
also tried to seduce the followers of the Strozzis from French service
in January 1545 and Francis ordered his representative at Rome to ask
the duke of Ferrara to arrest him and send him to Rome.
10
France and the Mercenary Market
France had long experience in raising troops in the territories of the
Empire which enabled Francis to recruit professionals easily in times
of emergency. e relative weakness of native French infantry for-
mations led the French crown from the late eenth century to rely
increasingly on German lansquenets (landsknechts) and, regularly
from 1515, on Swiss pikes for its crack troops.
11
One result of this
8
E. Harrison, ‘Henry VIII’s gangster: the aair of Ludovico da l’Armi,’ Journal of
Modern History, 15, iv (1943), 265–274.
9
Heads of an agreement of Ludovico da L’Armi of Bologna, Count Bernardo di
Santo Bonifazio of Verona, Philipp Pino of Lucca with Henry VIII, Plas Newydd,
Anglesey MSS, Box 1, no. 24 (fos. 41–44).
10
Alvarotti to Ercole II, 11 Jan. 1545, ASM, Francia, B 20, fasc. 3, p. 39: ‘M. Ludovico
dalle Armi che hora si trova nei servitii del Re d’Inghilterra con lx angelotti al mese
di provisione, che sono dicono questi, lxxxx scudi, ha scritto une lettera qui à un
capitano Martino Toscano, huomo di questi Strozzi, et tenuto persona di credito,
esortandolo di voler partirsi dalli servitii di Francia et andar al servitii di Inghilterra,
che lo farà riconoscer et ben trattare’ adding that he was about to go to Venice to raise
men. e count of Mirandola told Francis I that he thought da l’Armi would not be
able to raise men in Papal or Imprial territory (ibid., 25 Jan. 1545, p. 69 (decipher).
Alvarotti, 24 March 1545, ibid., B 20 fsc. 4, p. 126v.
11
On the development of the French mercenary network and its conditions of ser-
vice, see D. Potter, Renaissance France at War, pp. 131–143; idem., ‘Les Allemands
et les armées françaises au XVI
e
siècle. Jean-Philippe Rhingrave, chef de lansquenets:
308 chapter seven
was the development of an exceptionally well-attuned diplomatic net-
work in the Empire that was used by France both for the negotiation
of alliances and for the maintenance of links necessary to the raising
of troops. Ambassadors oen doubled as high-level secret agents for
troop recruitment. ere was still a desire to create a more reliable
French infantry, partly, at least, under the inuence of the prevailing
nostrum, more oen honoured in the breach, that reliance on for-
eign troops was dangerous. e idea culminated in the creation of
the ‘legions’ of 1534. Yet, for various reasons, these did not solve the
problem, and mercenaries remained central to French infantry recruit-
ment: from 1500, lansquenets formed important components of all
major French armies and the French crown was experienced in deal-
ing with them.
Sometimes these mercenaries were commanded in eect by a single
chief like Wilhelm von Fürstenberg (especially in the Piedmont cam-
paigns of 1536–1537), but this brought its own problems: Wilhelm
proved dicult to manage.
12
In its extensive use of German troops in
the 1540s, France relied on a number of dierent colonels. A large levy
of lansquenets had been planned for 1542, possibly as many as 21,000,
but the war in Hungary meant that the best men had been recruited
for that campaign, though Francis I, in his propaganda, claimed that
he could call upon German troops at need.
13
In 1543 there were at
least three German regiments (probably of eight ensigns each) in
French service on the north-east frontier under Reckerodt, von Deben
and Rognac. e outbreak of the Franco-Imperial war in 1542 was
accompanied by a proclamation (Recess of Regensburg) in the Empire
against service with France against the Emperor or the Empire. e
penalty was to be conscation of goods, exile of families and ultimately
execution on return. French terms on oer to a number of captains in
1541 were (1) service to the King against all princes except the Empire
étude suivie de sa correspondance en France, 1548–1566,’ Francia XX, 2 (1993), 1–20,
and esp. XXI, 2 (1994), 1–63. For French problems with infantry formations, see
P. Contamine, ‘Naissance de l’infanterie française (milieu XV
e
–milieu XVI
e
siècle,’ in
Quatrième centenaire de la bataille de Coutras. Colloque de 1987 (??place, 1989), pp. 63–88.
12
J.V. Wagner, Graf Wilhelm von Fürstenberg, 1491–1549, und die politisch-geis-
tigen Mächte seiner Zeit (Stuttgart, 1966). R. Peter, ‘Les lansquenets dans les armées
du roi. Le capitaine général Guillaume de Fürstenberg,’ in Charles-Quint, le Rhin et la
France (Strasbourg, 1973), pp. 95–109.
13
Instruction of Francis I for Claude de L’Aubespine, 9 July 1542, HHSA, P.C. 223
fos. 54–55, copy; transcript, NA, PRO 31/18/3/1, pp. 599–601; imperfect summary in
L&P, XVII, 517.
france and england compete for troops 309
(2) payment by French ocials as hitherto, (3) one month’s warn-
ing for assembly and (4) six months’ warning before departure from
service. Van Rossem’s terms of service were to serve the King ‘even
against the Emperor, though not against the Holy Empire and the duke
of Cleves.’
14
e penalties against service against the Emperor were dra-
conian but usually ineective. Cornelius Schepper, councillor to Mary
of Hungary reected on this in 1542. He saw the reasons in a failure to
name the guilty individuals or carry conscations into eect as a result
of princely intervention. Most importantly, Francis had always prom-
ised his employees that he would never make peace with the Emperor
without making terms for them, a promise he had always observed.
15
Fürstenberg, the most prominent German commander for France
in the 1530s, had his lands in Swabia conscated by the Emperor for
‘treason’ against the Holy Empire and given to his brother in 1537. It
was therefore necessary for Francis I to compensate him with property
in France.
16
Fürstenberg was turbulent and fell foul of court intrigue in
France; he le French service in 1539. Aer a brief attempt to return
to French service in 1542, he oered his services to Charles V and led
a force to attempt the recapture of Luxemburg in the summer of 1543.
He even oered his services to Henry VIII; a pension was oered and
a dra contract for 4000 landsknechts was drawn up. In fact, during
the campaign of 1544 he led 8000 men for the Emperor but was cap-
tured and imprisoned in the Bastille, only released by an enormous
ransom, to which the Emperor did not contribute.
17
e approach of
war in 1542 involved a frenetic quest for landsknechts in Germany.
Van Rossem was commissioned to raise a regiment of 10,000 men and
given an annual pension of 2000 écus. e French agent La Croix was
active in recruiting men in Danish territory for Van Rossem’s army,
described as a ne force because long established (‘pour avoir esté
longuement ensemble.’) Longueval noted that the wars in Hungary
14
Paget to Henry VIII, 7 Dec. 1541, St.P., VIII, p. 639 (L&P, XVI, 1427); Bers, Die
Allianz, p. 161: ‘mesmes contre l’empereur, réservé le Sainct Empire et monseigneur
le duc de Cleves.’
15
Schepper, memorandum for the Regent, 29 Jan. 1542, Bers, Die Allianz Frankreich-
Kleve, pp. 185–186.
16
Peter, ‘Les lansquenets,’ p. 101.
17
Peter, ‘Les lansquenets,’ p. 103 and note 14; du Bellay, Mémoires, IV, p. 193. Dra
contract with Henry VIII, L&P, XXI, i, 581 (should be dated 1544, XIX, ii, p. 447);
contract for 8000 men, 1544, ibid., no. 581.2. Fürstenberg’s correspondence with Mary
of Hungary, AGR, Audience, 1610(1).