Potter David. Henry VIII and Francis I

Подождите немного. Документ загружается.

320 chapter seven

progress of his talks with the princes.

Grignan also played an impor-

tant part in the raising of money for Fraisse’s activities.

Fraisse was an old hand at cloak-and-dagger work in Germany.

e main centres of his operations were western Germany and the

area around Bremen and Hamburg, French fears were well grounded.

Bucler and Mont, the English representatives at Frankfurt, were busy

in July and August negotiating with the Protestants for aid against the

French.

Unocial contacts with the Hessian captain Friedrich von

Reienberg were crucial. Reienberg had come to Nicholas Wotton at

Cologne in May, oering to raise twenty ensigns of foot and a thou-

sand horse.

Wotton had thought that Henry was likely to have little

use for them and recent experience with Landenberg did not prom-

ise well.

Reienberg’s oer, though, brought a speedy response from

England.

By June, he was summoned to England, and by the end

of the month the articles agreed with him had been signed, despite

Grignan to Fraisse, 6 and 8 Sept. 1545, Fraisse, pp. 74–75, 77–78; Fraisse to Grignan,

4 Sept. 1545, ibid., pp. 64–66.

Grignan to Fraisse, 8 Sept. 1545, ibid., pp. 77–78. Grignan to Mesnage, 19 Oct.

[1545], BnF, fr. 17890, fo. 157: ‘Monsieur, le Roy vous faict presentement une depeche

sur ce que vous verrez il sera besoing que incontinant vous envoyes queryr Pierre

Moucheron; ce que plusamplement en respondes aud. Seigneur et sur tout il

faut qu’il declare en quel temps ilz fournyront l’argent si n’estoyt ceste alarme des

lansquenetz.’

On Fraisse see the Introduction to Fraisse, and Pariset, Les Relations, passim and

p. 38, n. 28. He had been employed as an envoy to Denmark and Hesse in August

1543: CAF, IX, 34; Mémoires du sieur Richer (Paris, 1625), fos. 4–8; Mariotte, ‘Fran-

çois Ier,’ 234, no. 90. In April 1544 Richer was described as ‘craintif, et n’entendant

les aaires comme Fresses’ (Cottereau to Card. du Bellay, Scheurer, Correspondance

de Jean du Bellay III, p. 252). Fraisse had been involved in negotiations with England

in October 1544 (Fraisse to the Chancellor of Hesse, 4 Sept. 1545, Fraisse, pp. 66–68).

Royal instructions to him on the occasion of his mission to the Emperor in Octo-

ber 1544 to seek the latter’s mediation of a peace with England, see BnF, fr. 17888,

fos. 57–58.

ough his instructions do not survive among his papers, virtually all his cor-

respondence for the crucial period of August and September 1545 does and is printed

in Fraisse.

Bucler and Mont to Henry VIII, 5 Aug. 1545, NA SP1/205, fos. 87–88 (L&P, XX,

ii, 46). See the Excursus in Max Lenz (ed.), Briefwechsel Landgraf Philipps des Groß-

müthigen von Hessen mit Bucer, 2 vols (Leipzig, 1880–1887), II, pp. 358–362, and the

correspondence of Bucler and Mont with the Landgrave in SAM, Pol. Arch., 1801, fos.

99–101, 100, 141, 143–144 (May to July 1545).

Wotton to Paget, 9 May 1545, NA SP1/200, fos. 220–221 (L&P, XX, i, 693). On

Reienberg, see Redlich, e German Military Enterpriser, pp. 112–113.

For this, see the important letter of Christoph Haller to Maurice of Saxony,

Nov. 1544, in Brandenburg, Politische Korrespondenz, no. 635.

Reienberg to Henry VIII, 12 May 1545, NA SP1/201, fos. 32–33 (L&P, XX, i, 721).

france and england compete for troops 321

concerns about his youth and inexperience.

In July, Reienberg was

busy obtaining from Vaughan in Antwerp the money for which he had

letters of credit from the English government.

e relative speed with which these negotiations were pushed

through between May and July 1545 shows the anxiety of the English to

get the mercenaries moving. In July also, the Fleming Claes Taphoren

was despatched on a mission from Bois-le-Duc to Bremen to negoti-

ate with the cavalry commanders Peter of Guelders and Eytel Wol

of Goetenberch to bring men to join Reienberg.

English objectives

for these these troops changed with the strategic situation. At the

beginning the aim may have been to transport the Germans direct to

Boulogne but by September, a diversionary operation in Champagne,

in order to draw French troops away from Boulogne, had become

the objective.

e French seem to have been fully aware of this and

took measures accordingly. Already concerned in April about levies by

Peter of Guelders, they were even more disturbed in May by news that

Hamburg was about to supply England with ships.

From July 1545

there were reports that troops were being assembled by the Duke of

Cleves, 12,000 infantry and 2000 horse, for service with the English

at Boulogne. Duke William was thought to be hostile to France as a

result of the collapse of his marriage alliance with Jeanne d’Albret. By

Philip of Hesse to Henry VIII, 14 June 1545, NA SP1/202, fos. 66–67 (L&P,

XX, i, 947): the Landgrave grants his permission for the raising of twenty ensigns of

foot and 1,000 horse. Articles with Reienberg, NA SP1/203, fos. 15–18 (L&P, XX, i,

1079). Henry VIII to Philip of Hesse, 4 July 1545, NA SP1/203, fos. 15–18 (L&P, XX,

i, 1079).

Stephen Vaughan: to Paget, 21 July, NA SP1/204, fos. 82–83; to Paget, 24 July,

NA SP1/204, fos. 127–128; to Paget and Wriothesley, 30 July, NA SP1/204, fos. 151–

152 (L&P, XX, i, 1239, 1266, 1299, 1316, 1317).

Council to commissioners, 30 Aug. 1545, BL, Add.MS 5753, fo. 162; for Tapho-

ren’s expenses, 2 July–4 Aug. 1545, ibid. fos. 163–169 (L&P, XX, ii, 249).

Council to the English commissioners, Sept. 1545, NA SP1/208, fos. 12–19. e

reason was given that ‘undoubtedly the Frenchmen, being advertised of your entre-

price, have sent from their campe which lyeth not far from Boulloyn a good bande

of thorsmen and sum fotemen . . . for the let of that entreprise which you should have

executed and that is to destroye the cuntrey three or four days journey allaboutes:

fo. 14r–v (L&P, XX, ii, 403). Martin du Bellay, who is exceptionally reliable at this

point, being employed by the King in various duties around Boulogne, says that the

King, on receiving news of the approach of the Germans, removed to La Fère to

strengthen the defences there: see du Bellay, Mémoires, IV, pp. 314–315.

e King had received news that Peter of Guelders was raising 4,000 foot for the

King of England in north Germany: see Francis I to Mesnage, 24 Apr. 1545, BnF, fr.

17890, fo. 62v. e King’s reaction had been to order the arrest of the Hamburg ships

in French ports, but the news turned out to be no more than unfounded rumour: see

Francis I to Mesnage, 6 May 1545, ibid. fo. 60v.

322 chapter seven

September, this estimate was revised to 6,500 foot and 2,000 horse, but

the threat was still enough for an agent to be despatched with 4000

écus to buy them o.

Fraisse was sent in response to Reienberg’s activities; despatched

late in July, he got to Cologne early in August. From there, despite

English attempts to waylay him, he went on to Andernach, four

leagues from Coblenz and two from Reienberg’s muster-ground at

Sayn.

From there, held up by illness, he announced his arrival to

the Landgrave and Elector Palatine. Next day, getting to Sayn with

diculty, he discussed the likely plan of the muster with some cap-

tains there. He decided that, since Hesse was short of supplies any-

way, the best way to stop the passage of the troops was to block the

route through the archbishopric of Trier. en, aer another visit to

Cologne, he travelled back up the Rhine to Coblenz, which he thought

the place ‘most suitable from where to nd out what is happening,

being on two great rivers and in the midst of all these princes we

have dealings with.’ Aer just a night there, though, he pressed on to

Trier, where he put three requests to the Archbishop: rst, to republish

the Emperor’s edict of neutrality; second, to send horsemen, even at

French expense, to prevent the passage of the levies through his terri-

tory; and last, to ask his allies for help. At rst the Archbishop prevari-

cated, alleging illness and the absence of his advisors, but eventually

seems to have agreed.

From Coblenz, Fraisse began to exploit French inuence with the

Rhineland princes and raise the spectre of a threat to the civil peace

of the Empire. Hesse was in a dicult position. Bing, the Chancellor,

denied Fraisse’s allegations, but tried to assert that the Landgrave, as a

neutral, could allow his subjects to serve France or England.

In fact,

Gherardino to Farnese, 29 July 1545; Guidiccione to same, 4 Aug. 1545; same to

same, 30 Sept. 1545, ANG, III, pp. 382, 384, 397.

Fraisse to Grignan, 14 Sept. 1545, Fraisse, pp. 83–89, esp.p. 88; to Francis I,

undated [Sept. 1545], ibid., pp. 63–64. Heideck had proposed to make his muster-

ground the Coblenz area in 1543: Seymour to Henry VIII, 29 Dec. 1542, St.P., IX,

p. 254.

Fraisse to Longueval, 1 Sept. 1545, Fraisse, p. 53: ‘le plus propre pour de toutes

cestes entendre ce qu’il se faict, estant sus deux grosses rivieres et au mylieu de tous

ces princes desquelz nous avyons aaire.’

See Fraisse to the Landgrave, 17 Aug. 1545, SAM, Pol. Arch., 1836, fo. 29; cf.

also Fraisse to Bing, same date, ibid., fo. 30; Bing to Fraisse, 21 Aug. 1545, Fraisse,

pp. 48–49. On Fraisse’s strategy at this time, see Pariset, Les Relations, p. 42.

france and england compete for troops 323

Hesse was trying to have the best of both worlds.

e main aim of the

Protestants remained to reconcile the adversaries, not to declare for

one or the other, and Bing oered his master’s services as mediator.

Fraisse was not satised with this, especially when another request to

Bing at least to delay Reienberg as long as possible met with another

equivocal reply;

but he probably realized that Philip’s growing hostil-

ity to Henry of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel would discourage him from

allowing troops to go abroad. French policy was designed, for this rea-

son, to stir up trouble between them (‘entretenir ce divorse entre led.

duc de Brunsvig et le landgrave’). Both Hesse and Brunswick were

anxious for the support of France, and in fact the Brunswick war was

to come to its climax with the capture of Henry by Philip’s forces at

Northeim on 21 October.

Fraisse’s dealings with the Elector Palatine

were simpler and a request for a delay to possible troop movements

accepted.

e Palatine, though his nephew the Palsgrave Philip was

Reienberg had to have the Landgrave’s permission: cf. Philip to Henry VIII,

14 June 1545, NA SP1/202, fos. 66–67 (L&P, XX, i, 947); Philip of Hesse to Reienberg,

[11] Sept. 1545, SAM, Pol. Arch., 1801, fo. 93r–v, dra; Reienberg to Philip of Hesse,

14 Sept. 1545, ibid., fos. 91–92. While the Landgrave’s correspondence with Henry VIII

is decidedly anti-French in tone (Philip to Henry VIII, 24 Aug. 1545, NA SP1/206,

fos. 217–218 (L&P, XX, ii, 207), he took care to send the Schmalkaldic diplomat,

Dr Ulrich Chelius, to France to deny that he favoured Reienberg’s recruitment campaign:

Pol. Corr., III, no. 645.

When Bruno, one of the Protestant mediators, reported French suspicions that

the Evangelical princes were aiding the levy, he admitted that he had tried to assuage

these suspicions in order to safeguard the peace negotiations. Nothing indicated better

the intense embarrassment caused to Protestant diplomacy by the troop-recruitment:

Bruno to Jakob Sturm, 21 Sept. 1545, Pol. Corr., IV, no. 1.

Fraisse to Bing, 29 Aug. 1545, Fraisse, pp. 66–68 (for the original of this, see

SAM, Pol.Arch., 1836, fos. 38–39; Fraisse dates this wrongly as 4 Sept. 1545). Bing to

Fraisse, n.d., reply to above, SAM, Pol.Arch., 1801, fo. 42, dra. See also Bing to Fraisse,

3 Sept. 1545, where he makes it clear that Hesse was more worried about the assembly

of men by Brunswick and wanted to know whether the French had anything to do

with it: ibid., fo. 37, dra.

Fraisse to Longueval, 1 Sept, 1545, Fraisse, pp. 53–55; Fraisse to Cardinal du Bel-

lay, 3 Sept. 1545, ibid., pp. 59–60. Similar fears were expressed by Philip’s envoys at

the Diet at Frankfurt early in 1546: F. Küch, Politisches Archiv des Landgrafen Philipp

des Großmütigen von Hessen 2 vols (Leipzig, 1904–1910), I, 527. See S. Issleib, ‘Philipp

von Hessen, H. von Braunschweig und M. von Sachsen, 1541–1547,’ Jahrbuch des

Geschichtsvereins für das Herzogtum Braunschweig, 2 (1903), 1–80.

Grignan to Fraisse, Brussels, 8 Sept. 1545, Fraisse, pp. 77–78; Fraisse to the

Palatine, 2 Sept. 1545, ibid., pp. 56–57; Fraisse to the Palatine, 13 Sept. 1545, ibid.,

pp. 82–83. Concerning the Palatine’s defeat of 200 landsknechts, see also the Palatine

to Fraisse, 19 Sept. 1545, ibid., p. 102. Mont at Frankfurt was aware of Fraisse’s nego-

tiations and admitted that the Palatine had turned back some soldiers: Bucler and

Mont to Henry VIII, 15 Sept. 1545, St.P., X, pp. 588–590.

324 chapter seven

oering his services to England, was a much closer French ally than

the Landgrave, and the French expected more of him in their inter-

est.

On Francis I’s instructions, Fraisse also took care to foster French

relations with the archbishops of Trier and Cologne.

ese ecclesi-

astical princes, especially, were in need of strong support and would

prove useful.

It was clear by this time that diplomatic pressure on the princes

would not be enough. In his report of 1 September to Longueval,

Governor of Champagne, Fraisse outlined his task: the frustration of

Reienberg’s levy at Coblenz, a town then subject to the Archbishop

of Trier, in the county of Sayn and in Limburg and the various lands

subject to the Landgrave of Hesse. e Palatine had already done his

duty (‘très bien faict son debvoir’), and both archbishops had prom-

ised not to allow the soldiers through their lands. He had not conned

his attention to the Rhine, and had already sent to Frankfurt to require

the cessation of the levies in that area. He had told the authorities at

Frankfurt that it would be strange if they were to defy the Imperial

edicts and declare themselves against the Emperor, all for ‘for a for-

eign ruler from whom they could expect nothing.’

French concern

with English inuence among the German princes is thus seen in

the policy of depicting England as a useless ally. Fraisse, though, was

as concerned about the levies in north Germany under Brunswick’s

nephew, Duke Franz of Lauenburg. Brunswick had oered to take up

men around Bremen to avoid their entering English services but the

Landgrave was anxious to convince the French that Brunswick was a

double-dealer and had oered Lauenburg’s services to Henry VIII.

Philip Duke of Bavaria, to Henry VIII, 6 Sept. 1545, NA SP1/207, fo. 105 (L&P, XX,

ii, 317); Cardinal of Ferrara to Ercole II, 16 Mar. 1546, p. 2, ASM, Casa e Stato, Carteg-

gio tre Principi Estensi, 1360/147, passage in cipher.

Francis I to Fraisse, 3 Sept. 1545, Fraisse, pp. 57–58, making clear the importance

attached by the court of the good disposition of the ecclesiastical Electors.

e archbishops of Mainz and Trier were frequently reported ill in the autumn

of 1545 (e.g. Fraisse to Francis I, 3 Sept. 1545, Fraisse, pp. 59–60), while Cologne was,

of course, under threat from the Emperor and Pope for the reformation of his diocese:

Archbishop of Cologne to Henry VIII, 26 Sept. 1545, L&P, XX, ii, 450;. M. Deckers,

Hermann von Wied, Erzbischof und Kurfürst von Köln (Cologne, 1840).

Fraisse to Longueval, 1 Sept. 1545, Fraisse, pp. 53–55: ‘ung prince estranger, duquel

ilz ne peuvent rien espérer.’

Francis I to Fraisse, 3 Sept. 1545, Fraisse, p. 58; Fraisse to Francis I, 4 Sept., ibid.,

pp. 61–62. Bucler and Mont to Henry VIII, 15 Sept. 1545, St.P., X, pp. 588–590.

france and england compete for troops 325

From September 1545 onwards, especially in north Germany, Fraisse

was working closely with Captain Henrick Hacfort,

a Guelders mer-

cenary who regularly served the King of France until his desertion

to England in 1548.

Francis I’s instructions when he joined Fraisse

ordered that:

You will confer together on how he can best be used to my advantage,

chiey for breaking up these assemblies, if it can be done, and if it can-

not he will take steps to entice away some of the captains and their men.

But my main objective, and the most needful, is to break them up.

is proved a far more complex problem than the Francis imagined.

Fraisse was short of cash. While he was reluctant to put his master

to great expense, buying o some of the mercenaries would require

money. Simply recruiting them without muster would also damage

the King’s reputation. So, he wrote to Grignan for money; the latter

had already stressed that the break-up of the English levy was a ‘grand

Hacfort was born about 1516 or 1517 at Nymegen in Gelderland and lived aer

his marriage in 1541 at Forcht. He was thus a subject of the Emperor aer 1543.

Arrested at Arnhem for failure to take the oath in March 1546, his replies to the

articles put to him furnish interesting information on his activities as a captain for

Philip of Hesse during the Brunswick war: cf. HHSA, P.A. 71, fos. 186–192. He seems

to have worked at the same time for Philip and the King of France: see his corre-

spondence with the Landgrave in SAM, Pol. Arch., 752, fos. 4–27, especially Philip’s

commission to him to raise four ensigns, 8 Oct. 1545, fo. 12. He seems to have served

the French consistently until his arrival in England in March 1548 with the Regent

Mary’s permission to command 3,000 horse.

In 1545, he admitted that he had oered his services to Francis I against the Eng-

lish, but that nothing had come of this. is was certainly a lie, as the Queen of Hun-

gary remarked – ‘il semble notoirement que ledit Hacfort en tout ne dit verité’ – and

as is shown by the Fraisse correspondence. Fraisse, he claimed, had rst approached

him at Bois-le-duc and had asked him to recruit men for France, but again nothing

had come of this. He was in France presenting his services in August 1545, when he

was asked to go and join Fraisse at Coblenz: ‘Confession et Responce faite par Henry

Hackfort,’ HHSA, P.A. 71, fos. 189r–90v, letter of Mary of Hungary to Charles V,

23 Mar. 1546.

Francis I to Fraisse, 3 Sept. 1545, Fraisse, pp. 57–58: ‘Vous adviserés tous ensem-

ble en quoy il se pourra employer pour le bien de mes aaires, et principallement à

rompre ces assemblées, si faire se peult, et là où il ne se pourroyt faire, il mectra peyne

d’en retirer une partye des capitaines de leurs gens. Mais le principal de mon intention

et le plus necessaire seroyt de les pouvoir rompre.’

Here Hacfort’s account is informative: ‘luy furent donnees lettres de par icelluy

seigneur Roy au seigneur de Frez lors estant aud. Covelens lesquelles il luy présenta;

et declaira icelluy seigneur de Frez à Hackfort le contenu d’icelles lettres, disant que

s’il fut venu deux ou trois jours plus tost il l’eust mis en venure pour détourner et

rompre lad. assemblée s’il eult peu, conforme à l’intention dud. Roy de France, mais

qu’il venoit trop tard pour ce que lesd. gens de guerre avoient fait serement au Roy

d’Angleterre ung jour devant.: HHSA, P.A. 71, fo. 190r.

326 chapter seven

conséquence’ for the King’s service.

e King told Longueval that

he had ordered Grignan to send 2,000 écus from the Netherlands to

add to the 2,000 to be sent by Longueval himself. He added a cau-

tion, however, that one of these two sums was to be kept in reserve

and the other spent only on the best ensigns or, as Longueval put it,

for emergencies (‘sous l’extrême necessité’). Fraisse himself thought it

wise to promise the King that he would only use the money in matters

of great importance.

e English commissioners who were so ably outwitted by Fraisse

were omas Averey and omas Chamberlain, joined by Sir Ralph

Fane and Francis Hall from Calais. eir commission was not dated

until the 21 August, by which time Reienberg had already sent over

his lieutenant, Leuchtmacher, to enquire why they were so late and

beg that they be sent over as soon as possible, considering all sorts

of problems would arise from delay and Germany stirred up against

them.

eir instructions give the commissioners powers to extend

the payment of the troops even if not needed. is was in response to

an urgent request from Reienberg, who feared the loss of his reputa-

tion otherwise. A separate levy of 2,000 men under John Dymoke in

north Germany was delayed, and the commissioners were authorized

to take on 2,000 ‘speceall good men undre the leading of a notable

captayne,’ raised ‘by thappointment of Reienberg.’

ey arrived at

Antwerp on the 24th, and spent some time with Vaughan, dealing

with their money and – incidentally – complaining to the Council that

their funds would be less than the amount necessary.

On the 26th,

Hall arrived at Antwerp to request from the Queen-Regent a pass-

port or at least letters of recommendation. Both requests were refused,

though permission was granted for the commissioners themselves to

Fraisse to Francis I, 14 Sept. 1545, Fraisse, pp. 89–93; 4 Sept. 1545, ibid., pp. 61–62.

Extract of a letter of Francis I to Longueval and Longueval’s covering note to

Fraisse, 14 Sept. 1545, ibid., p. 100. Fraisse to Francis I, 21 Sept. 1545, ibid., pp. 117–118.

BL, Add. MS 6362, no. 5 (dra in Paget’s hand); Reienberg to Paget, 19 Aug.

1545, NA SP1/206, fo. 37(43) (L&P, XX, ii, 172): ‘quod inde mali, quod damni instaret,

quod denique malae famae totam Germaniam (ex hoc) adversus nos incendet.’ Hall to

Paget, 29 Aug. 1545, ibid. 245.

e Council to the commissioners, 30 Aug. 1545, BL, Add. MS 5753, fos. 147–

148 (L&P, XX, ii, 248), recd. Andernach, 11 Sept. Dymoke to Paget, 31 Aug. 1545,

ibid. 259.

Fane, Chamberlain and Averey to Paget, 27 Aug. 1545, NA SP1/207, fos. 20–23

(L&P, XX, ii, 234).

france and england compete for troops 327

cross Imperial territory.

e refusal may well have taken place aer

the Emperor’s interview with Mesnage.

e English did not reach Cologne until 4 September, when they

heard Reienberg’s complaints about French interference.

ey say

little of their stay there, which we know from Fraisse’s correspondence

to have been rather unsuccessful, and they le by boat up the Rhine

for Andernach, where they arrived on the 8th. ey decided to make

their headquarters there, as Coblenz was in the territory of the pro-

French Archbishop of Trier, and it was at Andernach that Reienberg

showed them his troops quartered in the neighbouring villages on the

east bank. ere, too, they learned of French intrigues against them,

but they still hoped to take the muster on the 14th.

is was the sig-

nal to Fraisse to step up his activities, and he promised to do all in his

in his power to frustrate them.

Information obtained from an English

agent by his secretary nally convinced him that the levy was for the

English,

though news sent by Grignan suggested that the money for

pay had been late in leaving Antwerp.

When Fraisse arrived at Cologne, he was able to persuade the mag-

istrates of the city to prevent artillery and munitions from being sent

to Reienberg’s camp, despite the appeals of the English commission-

ers to the close trade links with England. He was even able to report

optimistically of the English enterprise that ‘without outcome, it will

Hall to Paget, 29 Aug. 1545, NA SP1/207, fos. 38–41 (L&P, XX, ii, 245).

Mémoire of Mesnage [to the Admiral?], Aug. 1545, dra, BnF, fr. 17888, fos. 125–

126. It seems, in fact, that the Queen of Hungary actually sent to Francis I some

kind of guarantee that she would not allow German troops to cross the Netherlands

to serve the English: see Francis I to Mary of Hungary, n.d. [late 1545], HHSA,

P.A. 69, fo. 36.

English commissioners to Paget, 4 Sept. 1545, NA SP1/207, fos. 91–92

(L&P, XX, ii, 298); Reienberg to the English commissioners, 4 Sept. 1545, NA

SP1/209, fo. 93r: ‘ea nocte qua ego vobiscum eram, de meis trecenti equites et prope-

modum mille milites pedestres de alia mea cohorte recesserunt, quod ab instinctu et

per insidias inimicorum factum esse non est dubium.’

e English commissioners to the Council, Andernach, 11 Sept. 1545, NA

SP1/207, fo. 149r: ‘owre hoste in thys town told us that the Frenche Kynge before our

cumyng had a Commissary hyere, whyche now (he saithe) is att Covelyns, spyinge,

entysynge and doing whatt he can to lette and hynddyr thys the Kynnggis Majestis

enterpryse’ (L&P, XX, ii, 352).

Fraisse to Francis I, 4 Sept. 1545, Fraisse, pp. 61–62.

Mont to Paget, 5 Sept. 1545, NA SP1/207, fos. 102–104 (L&P, XX, ii, 310).

Gode to Fraisse, 5 Sept. 1545, Fraisse, pp. 70–71; Gode to Fraisse, 7 Sept. 1545, ibid.,

pp. 72–74.

Grignan to Fraisse, 8 Sept. 1545, ibid., pp. 77–78. See Grignan’s enquiry to

Mesnage, 19 Oct. 1545, BnF, fr. 17890, fo. 157.

328 chapter seven

put your enemy to great expense.’

While at Cologne, Fraisse again

contacted the Protestant princes to persuade them to abandon their

connections with the English. is was the moment he chose to put

pressure on the Landgrave by pointing out that, though Chancellor

Bing had said his master wished to remain neutral, Fraisse would have

to inform Francis of rumours that the Landgrave was not truly neutral

between France and England. Fraisse was convinced that Reienberg,

for one, wanted to identify the cause of England with that of the

Evangelical Princes and warned Bing of the dangers of this, especially

as some men were trying to turn the King against the Landgrave and

his allies.

Fraisse had some reason for satisfaction; he had already

seen his cultivation of the Palatine bear fruit in that prince’s defeat of

200 landsknechts crossing his territory.

Communications between England and Germany were necessarily

slow and secrecy caused misunderstandings. Henry’s agent, Christo

Mont, at Coblenz early in September, still thought Reienberg’s levy

might be for the French, and his mind was not set at rest until he

had talked to Reienberg himself.

Fraisse was also confused at rst

about the real nature of the levy. He had observed the slowing down

of the musters and heard that Reienberg had called for support from

the neighbouring towns for common defence and maintenance of the

Gospel. He could see no reason why Henry VIII should delay the levy

as matters stood at Boulogne. Yet the day before, he had written to

Longueval that it was sure they were being raised for Henry VIII. No

wonder he would write to Cardinal du Bellay: ‘To sum up, everything

is full of doubt and if there ever were a time to try something in this

country it is now.’ However, by 3 September he was quite certain of

Reienberg’s intentions and wrote to the King that ‘he is revealed by

his preparations.’ Nevertheless he suspected that, with war likely in

north Germany, Reienberg’s men would eventually be turned by the

Landgrave against his enemies there.

Fraisse to Francis I, 9 Sept. 1545, Fraisse, p. 78; Fraisse to Francis I, 14 Sept. 1545,

ibid., p. 90: ‘sans eect, elle mectera vostre ennemy en grande despence.’

Fraisse to Bing, 18 Sept. 1545, SAM, Pol.Arch., 1836, fos. 38–39; Philip of Hesse

to Jakob Sturm, 20 Sept. 1545, Pol.Corr, III, no. 603.

Mont to Paget, 5 Sept. 1545, NA SP1/207, fos. 102–103; Bucler and Mont to

Henry VIII, 15 Sept. 1545, St.P., X, pp. 588–590.

Fraisse to the Palatine, 2 Sept. 1545, Fraisse, pp. 56–57: Reienberg’s call ‘pour

la défense et conservation de leur pays’ and ‘pour l’entretènement de la parole de

Dieu.’; to Longueval, 1 Sept. 1545, ibid., pp. 53–55: ‘il n’y a rien plus asseuré qu’ilz

france and england compete for troops 329

Fraisse seems to have had little respect for his adversaries when he

reported:

I know nothing of the aairs of this world if this is not the maddest and

most poorly led enterprise ever attempted if they have no assurance of

passage through the Emperor’s lands, which at the moment is not so

easily done.

Elsewhere he compares the levy to ‘the poets’ tale of people in hell

drawing water with a sieve.’

Fortune, he thought, had been over-kind

to the English commissioners; as they were landing near Andernach,

they had only just escaped capture with all their money. For this rea-

son, they had gone straight to the camp and so had, to some extent,

placed themselves in the power of the mercenaries. Yet Fraisse himself

was increasingly in danger; by the middle of September he was threat-

ened within the walls of Coblenz itself. e mercenary leaders told

the burgomaster that, if Fraisse stayed there longer, they would treat

the town as an enemy and all its dependent villages would suer. is

naturally placed a town which wanted to remain on good terms with

France in a dicult position, though aer the burgomaster’s initial

request, no attempt seems to have been made to dislodge the French

envoy before his departure early in October.

100

e long-delayed movement of the German levies immediately

alerted Fraisse and caused him to move in pursuit. By the 26th, the

crossing of the Rhine had been completed with twenty ensigns of foot

(lacking 500 or 600 men), 1,000 of Reienberg’s horse and 540 of

Eytel Wolf’s. eir column set out for Rheinbach, in the archbishop-

ric of Cologne, via Breisach.

101

Evidently, they had taken the northern

route, which Fraisse had seen as the only alternative to the southern

ont esté retenus au nom du roy d’Angleterre.’; to Cardinal du Bellay, 3 Sept., ibid.,

pp. 59–60: ‘Somme, tout est plein de suspeçons, et si jamais il a esté besoing dex-

trement manyer quelque chose en ce pays, c’est à ceste heure.’; to Francis I, 3 Sept.

1545, ibid., pp. 58–59: Reienberg, ‘son appareil le descouvre.’

Fraisse to Grignan, 14 Sept. 1545, ibid., p. 88: ‘Je n’entends rien aux aaires de ce

monde ou c’est la plus folle et la plus mal conduicte entreprise qui fust jamais faicte,

s’ilz n’ont assurance de passer sans aulcung empechement par le pays de l’empereur

qui n’est pas encore à cette saison bien facile.’

Fraisse to Francis I, 26 Sept. 1545, ibid., p. 123: ‘ce que les poètes feignent de

celles qui aux enfers puisent l’eau avecques un crible.’

100

Fraisse to Francis I, 14 Sept. 1545, ibid., p. 93.

101

Hall to Paget, 28 Sept. 1545, NA SP1/208, fos. 96–97 (L&P, XX, ii, 468). English

commissioners to the Council, 29 Sept. 1545, NA SP1/208, fos. 100–103.