Potter David. Henry VIII and Francis I
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140 chapter three
himself (who, of course had had his diculties with Henry) was anx-
ious to put on a good show and at the end of the campaign, declared
that his only wish was for a ‘mery loke of his highnes when his plesure
shalbe that I may repeire unto his presence.’
95
1500 men had been sent over to Calais before the declaration of
war but Wallop decided to take 3–400 of the best men from the Calais
garrison in place of a similar number of the new dra (he was always
concerned to have ‘tall men’ about him); pioneers and labourers were
also draed. e force as ultimately constructed stood at 5000 foot
(including 2500 from the Calais garrison) and 600 horse, many of the
‘northern horsemen’ from the Borders, who did particularly well (see
chapter 4). is force (which looks so meagre in 16th century mili-
tary terms) was comparable to the army which Henry V brought to
Agincourt in 1415. ese could hope to operate with a similar num-
ber of Habsburg troops under du Roeulx.
96
But what was their objec-
tive to be? Du Roeulx was still pressing for the Montreuil plan but
English envoys thought his troops too few and the French royal army
too threatening.
97
Objectives were still not nalised in the middle of
July, du Roeulx arguing for Montreuil but Mary of Hungary pressing
for help on the Hainault front, while Wallop himself even suggested a
raid on the lower town of Boulogne.
98
Not until 4 August did Wallop
report talk in the Burgundian camp of concentrating on a siege of
Landrecies, a project to which Henry only gave his grudging assent
on the 10th.
99
At all events, Francis’ withdrawal from Hainault released a sub-
stantial force under Vendôme to deal with the Anglo-Burgundian
threat. From Guise, the King sent Vendôme to Doullens with the
95
Charles V to Chapuys, 22 Oct. 1543, L&P, XVIII, ii, 293; Wallop to Paget,
28 Nov. 1543, NA SP1/182, fos. 124–5(133–4) (L&P, XVIII, ii, 438).
96
Wallop to the Council, 28 June 1543, L&P, XVIII, i, 786; L&P, XVIII, i, 831,
832.
97
Memorandum on possible objectives of a joint force, 31 May 1543, L&P, XVIII,
i, 619, ii. T. Seymour and N. Wotton to Henry VIII, 5 July 1543, St.P., IX,487 (L&P,
XVIII, I, 822); du Roeulx to Mary of Hungary, 23 July 1543, AGR, Audience, 119,
fo. 22: the plan to surprise Montreuil ‘n’estoit sinon en cas que les enemis se fussent
du tout rethirez. Et est lad. entrepinse ung des vrais moiens pour les bien estonner.’
98
Wallop to Council, 13 July 1543, L&P, XVIII, i, 882; Mary of Hungary to Chapuys,
20 July 1542, L&P, XVIII, i, 925. Du Roeulx was unable to meet Wallop at Saint-Omer
in mid-July as a result of illness (which seems to have plagued him throughout these
years). To Mary of Hungary, Douai, 13 July 1543, AGR, Audience, 119, fo. 20.
99
Wallop et al. to Henry VIII, 4 Aug. 1543, St.P., IX, p. 460 (L&P, XVIII, ii, 12);
Henry VIII to Wallop et al., 10 Aug. 1543, L&P, XVIII, ii, 22.
england and the wars in flanders, 1542–1543 141
task of shadowing the English forces which were gradually approach-
ing under Wallop’s command and had then reached Béthune. e
Prince of Mel was placed in command at Guise with enough light to
horse to cover Landrecies under Brissac’s command, while Heilly was
despatched to Montreuil to reinforce it against an imminent attack
with perhaps as many as 2000 foot.
100
e campaign started on 23 July with some satisfying incendiar-
ism in French territory. Wallop’s force crossed the frontier and thrust
towards Marquise through the territory of Fiennes, burning the castle
there and the abbey of Beaulieu.
101
Men were detached to burn Rinxent
castle and the castle and abbey of Licques before part of the garrison
of Calais was sent home via Bouquehault. Wallop plays down the cut-
ting to pieces of some of the raiders of his avant-garde by du Biez’
gens d’armes, mentioning only ve prisoners, yet the event seems to
have generated a celebratory chanson, which was rapidly printed at
Rouen in conjunction with the account of a French naval success.
102
One of the English prisoners told the French that the English intended
to attack Montreuil or Ardres. is had, of course, been discussed but
by now the English were committed to joining du Roeulx in Artois
for a joint attack on the French to the south. Du Roeulx wanted to
hurry on Wallop’s army but had been ambiguous about the attack
on Fiennes, which belonged to Mme. d’Egmont and was under his
safeguard. On the other hand, he thought it would be better for the
English to march through French rather than Imperial territory; he
could not have it both ways.
103
At Licques on 25th, the English were
100
Wallop to Council, 27 July, 2 Aug. 1543 L&P, XVIII, i, 960; ii, 5; Francis I to
Heilly and Vervins, 22 July 1543, BM Amiens MS 1150, no. 2.
101
Beaulieu (canton Ferques, Pas-de-C) e itinerary of the army to 4 August is
printed in Richard Turpyn, e Chronicle of Calais in the Reigns of Henry VII and
Henry VIII to 1540, ed. J.G. Nichols (Camden Society, XXXV, 1846), p. 211–, where
many names are distorted, to which can be added Wallop’s despatches of 31 July, 11,
12 Aug. 1543 (L&P, XVIII, i, 979, XVIII, ii, 35, 43).
102
Chanson nouvelle faicte et compose de la prinse des Angloys qui furent amenez
à Ardres in La prise et deaicte des Angloys par les Bretons repr. in A. de Montai-
glon, Recueil des poésies françoises des XV
e
et XVI
e
siècles, 13 vols. (Paris, 1855–1878),
VII, pp. 201–203. Du Biez, 23 July, Potter, Du Biez, no. 187; Wallop to Council, 27,
31 July 1543, St.P., IX, pp. 452, 457 (L&P, XVIII, i, 960), Licques had been garrisoned
by the Burgundians in April and described then as a strong place (Du Roeulx to Wal-
lop, 17 April 1543, L&P, XVIII, i, 412). e number of cavalry is unclear at this stage;
estimates vary.
103
Du Roeulx to Mary of Hungary, 23 July 1543, AGR, Audience, 119, fo. 22: ‘J’ay
encoires escript pour faire haster les Engles . . . qu’il valloit mieulx prendre leur chemin
sur le pays des enemis que sur le pays de l’Empereur.’ He was, with the English,
142 chapter three
joined by 2000 Burgundian foot and 300 horse and the joint force went
on to burn the town and castle of Alquines. Saturday 28th was spent
in camp at Hallines, near Saint-Omer. On 29th, they passed within
two miles of érouanne, where they skirmished with the garrison
and there took place a remarkable and, at rst sight, archaic event.
Wallop challenged his old friend Villebon, governor of the place, to
a tournament for the sake of their ladies, which took place the next
day. Vendôme was reported already assembling substantial forces
near érouanne but du Roeulx thought ‘when they see the English
go forward, they will withdraw most of their men.’
104
enceforth, the
English force was shepherded through Burgundian territory. Camping
the night by a ruined castle at ‘Lyoters’ they reached Allouagne near
Béthune the next day. Wallop linked up with du Roeulx at Arras on
6 August (where the English were entertained ‘verrey chierfullye’) and
was joined by a small contingent of 500 horse and 1300 foot.
105
ey
were at Marquion near Cambrai on 10th and then swung north-east of
Cambrai to Haspres on 12th. ese days gave du Roeulx time enough
to size up his allies. He in fact developed a rather high opinion of the
English army but one that was tempered by a degree of realism about
their experience and stamina in fast moving campaigns:
ey should not be relied upon except for a siege or a battle, for it is
not possible to set them to make an enterprise against the enemy since
they can only travel two leagues a day, and even when they manage
three Artois leagues in a day, they need a day’s rest. But they must be
employed somewhere, otherwise they will return home.
106
‘fort assez pour Monsr. de Vendomme’ but needed more artillery (ibid., 4 Aug. 1543,
fo. 26).
104
Du Roeulx to Mary of Hungary, Arras, 3 Aug. 1543, AGR, Audience, 119,
fo. 24: ‘quand ilz voirront les Anglois passé oultre qu’ilz rethireront la plus part de
leurs gens.’
105
For a good narrative of the campaign, the report of Ralph Eure, commander
of the northern horse, to omas Fisher, for the attention of Hertford during
his brief tenure as Lord Admiral, September–Oct. 1542, Longleat House, SE/IV/13,
fos. 84–86 (HMC, Bath MSS, IV, pp. 87–89). Eure joined Wallop’s army on 6 August
and reports du Roeulx bringing 500 horse and 1300 foot on 9 August and then Aer-
schot on 12th with 2000 horse and 2500 foot (Spaniards). On 22nd they were joined
by 2500 Germans.
106
Du Roeulx to Mary of Hungary, Arras, 4 Aug. 1543, AGR, Audience, 119, fo. 26v:
‘Ne se fault poinct attendre de soy en aidier s’il n’est pour ung siege ou pour la bataille,
car de leur faire entreprinse contre les ennemis n’est possible, car ilz ne poeuvent faire
que deux lieues par jour, et encoires quandt ilz ont faict trois lieues d’Arthois en ung
jour, il fault qu’ilz se repozent l’aultre. Sy se fault il de les employer quelque part,
aultrement faict à craindre qu’ilz s’en retourneroient.’
england and the wars in flanders, 1542–1543 143
He procured letters of encouragement from the Regent at which
Wallop and Seymour seemed pleased (‘tresioieulx’) and reiterated:
eir army is a very ne one since it contains so many horse and foot.
But they must be quickly put to work, for besides being reluctant to keep
the eld for very long, there are already many sick.
e Burgundian commander, anxious to get on well with the English,
made it clear to Wallop that he had ordered the German landsknechts
at his disposal to come to the help of the English on their own terri-
tory and hoped that the English would do the same. e weather, still
dire, delayed the departure from Marquion.
107
Eure’s report puts the
Burgundian contingent by 22 August at 6300 foot and 2500 horse.
Wallop reported the combined Anglo-Burgundian force at 12,500 foot
and 2500 horse, though Seymour, who had been to Brussels for dis-
cussions with the Regent, thought the Burgundians were lacking 2000
foot and 500 horse. A new camp was formed at Solesmes and hopes
raised that Landrecies could be taken by surprise and, if not, to fortify
a camp.
108
Ralph Eure describes skirmishing with the French from 21st
and news of the imminent arrival of large French forces.
109
By 22nd,
a new camp with better access to forage was found at Englefontaine,
to the north of Landrecies.
110
Wallop tells us something about English
techniques of encampment. When the duke of Aerschot inspected, he
was surprised that it was ‘infermed’ as he had read in the chronicles
(Froissart?). e Emperor himself admired the defences of the English
camp, which consisted of a wagon lager defended by a ditch a pike and
a half outside it.
e capture of Landrecies in June had been an opportunistic suc-
cess characteristic of French military strategy in the period. ough
Francis had sworn to conquer Artois, he, or his advisers, had seized
the opportunity to strike at a weakly fortied position in Hainault and
107
Du Roeulx to Mary of Hungary, camp of Marquion, 9, 10 Aug. 1543, AGR,
Audience, 119, fos. 30, 32: ‘Leur bande est fort belle pour ce qu’elle contient tant
de cheval que de piedt. Mais il fault hatter de les mectre en oeuvre, car oultre ce
qu’ilz ne sont poinct volluntiers long temps aux champs, il y en a desia tout plain de
mallades.’
108
Wallop to Henry VIII, 13 August 1543, Seymour to Henry VIII, 18 Aug. 1543,
L&P, XVIII, ii, 43, 55; Wallop et al. to Henry VIII, 13 Aug., 21 Oct. 1543 St.P., IX,
473, 522 (L&P, XVIII, ii, 43, 291).
109
Eure’s letter, Longleat MSS, SE/IV, fos. 84–86 (HMC, Bath MSS, IV, p. 88).
110
Wallop to Henry VIII, 22 Aug. 1543, St.P., IX, 481 (L&P, XVIII, ii, 65).
144 chapter three
render it virtually impregnable.
111
At the end of July, the King retired
to Guise, seeing Landrecies now in a state of defence and the Imperial
forces beginning to concentrate. La Lande with his 200 horse and 1000
foot of the Picard legion was le in command, though since he was
in ill health, d’Essé replaced him.
112
Prodigious eorts were put into
temporary fortications to strengthen its old walls (presumably mainly
earthen bastions). Wallop in September reported that ‘the frenche king
had employed greate tyme and chardge, aswell in the forticacion of
the same, so that it was in as moche reputacion as was the towne of
Turin in Pyemont.’
113
Francis le Vendôme in command at Guise (with
the job of protecting Landrecies) and this gave du Roeulx the chance
to form the regular siege which was to drag on until November.
Francis, before he divided his army at the end of August, is reported
to have had 40,000 foot and 7000 horse twenty miles from Landrecies.
114
Around mid-September in the French camp it was reported that the
Emperor was approaching with 30,000 men and that the English and
Burgundians already at Landrecies were starting the siege ‘on the side
beyond the stream towards the forest’ though had got no further than
within a cannon-shot of the walls and the garrison had given good
account of itself.
115
e skirmishing which took place in the middle of
August around Landrecies is well known from the pen of Martin du
Bellay, though certain important points are absent from his picture.
116
e Emperor’s forces joined Wallop at Quesnoye-le-comte (around
13th) and it was around the 20th that word came through that the
French King’s own forces were moving o east into Champagne. e
King had le Mel with Brissac’s light horse some 200 of which were
heard to have been le at an abbey near Landrecies. e Emperor’s
troops were commanded by Philippe II de Croy duke of Aerschot and
111
Francis I to Heilly, camp of Landrecies, 27 June 1543, Pierpoint Morgan: order
to sleight the fortications of Maubeuge.
112
Du Bellay, Mémoires, IV, pp. 143–144.
113
Wallop to Henry VIII, 25 Sept. 1543, NA SP1/181, fo. 152v (L&P, XVIII, ii,
218).
114
e gures were reported by French captains to the English at rst as 36,000
men and then 47,000 (Eure to Fisher/Hertford, Sept. 1543, Longleat SE/IV, fo. 85r).
115
Vervins to Heilly, St. Quentin, 17 Sept. 1543, Amiens, SAP, Ch. Heilly, 60, no. 1:
‘du costé de là l’eauwe vers la forest.’
116
Du Bellay, Mémoires IV, pp. 144–147; Wallop to Henry VIII, camp at Haspres,
13 Aug. 1543 (L&P, XVIII, ii, 43); intercepted letter of Marini to Annebault and
Orléans, 16, 17 Nov. 1543, Brussels, AGR, Audience, 99 (Lettres des Seigneurs, II),
fos. 365, 362.
england and the wars in flanders, 1542–1543 145
his second cousin du Roeulx. omas Seymour, ever the acid com-
mentator, thought Aerschot ‘no manne of warre’ for his carelessness
about intelligence and thought him ‘forward’ in nothing. Even worse,
‘there doth not appeare no great good wyll’ between the cousins. He
declared he would rather serve three years under du Roeulx than three
months under Aerschot.
117
e Anglo-Burgundian command decided
that M. de Licques (Aerschot’s brother) should fall upon the French
light horse while the main force under Aerschot, du Roeulx and
Wallop pressed on to enter the country between Cateau-Cambrésis
and Bohain. is was Vendôme’s castle, in a countryside, as Wallop
described it, full of strong villages and great churches. is force had
just got to work pillaging and burning when Licques fell back on them
in panic, having been defeated, as du Bellay has it, when the light horse
escaped and managed to bring up French re-inforcements from the
prince of Mel. Wallop conrms that and adds that Licques lost most
of his 800 infantry. What should have been a simple mopping up aair
had thus turned to a shameful reverse and forced the main forces to
retreat from Bohain.
118
Vendôme, in his despatch to the King adds
further explanation:
e dukes of Aerschot and du Roeulx marched to Busigny near Bohain
and there stopped and sent 200 horse before them, which passed
through Bohain wood and, reaching the plain on this side pillaged a vil-
lage named Fresnoy and sent 20 men towards my camp to see if I had
wind of them. ey found I had, to the extent I was already mounted up
with all your gendarmerie that you le me as well as the infantry already
issuing from the camp, with the sieur d’Estrées in front of me with my
company, which they then realised. ey ordered a retreat to Busigny
where they had le their troop and passing through Bohain wood, were
pressed so hard by the peasants of Bohain in support of Estrées that they
were forced to leave their booty.
119
117
omas Seymour to Henry VIII, 18 Aug. 1543, NA SP1/181, fo. 42r (L&P,
XVIII, ii, 15).
118
Du Bellay, Mémoires IV, pp. 148–149; Wallop to Council, Quesnoye, 28 Aug.
L&P, XVIII, ii, 92. Eure gives a vivid description of the combat which does not hide
that it was a disaster (Longleat, SE/IV, fo. 85v, HMC, Bath MSS, IV, pp. 88–89).
119
Vendôme to Francis I, 16 Aug. 1543, BnF, fr. 20521, fos. 30–31: ‘ont marché
lesd. duc d’Ascot et du Rieux jusques à Buzgryes [Busigny] aupres led. Bohaing et
là se sont arrestez et envoye ij
c
chevaulx devant eulx lesquelz ont passé les boys dud.
Bohains et venuz jusques en la plaine de deca, pillant ung village nomme Fresney
[Fresnoy-le-Grand], et envoye xx desd . . . . . vers mon camp pour veoir ou entendre si
j’avoye alarme d’eux. Et ilz ont trouvé que oy, de sorte que j’estoye ja à cheval avec
toute vostre gendarmerie qu’il vous a pleu me laisser et les gens de pied semblablement
146 chapter three
e rst stage of the siege of Landrecies was thus a humiliating reverse
for the Anglo-Burgundian army. It was compounded by a dangerous
mutiny between the Emperor’s landsknechts and Wallop’s men. e
Germans in any case were, as usual, disgruntled about their pay and, as
Wallop noted, were prone to cry for ‘gelt’ when not paid. e English
in the camp had attacked the Germans during Wallop’s absence and
on his return he found both sides drawn up in a square, refusing to
back down. It took all the nesse of the commanders. Du Roeulx got
them to retire on signal but even then the German commander came
into the English camp and nearly exchanged re with Wallop’s men.
Had things gone wrong, the whole expedition would have been ruined
but the German colonel was eventually induced to apologise.
120
Meanwhile, du Biez, who had been to see Francis I for new instruc-
tions, was operating around Doullens aiming to damage the enemy
while the siege of Landrecies remained undecided. Heilly was sent to
fortify strongholds which would threaten Arras, in the course of this
burning a swathe of villages with their churches and the harvest stored
in them. Espinac was withdrawn from Ardres (where La Rochepot’s
company remained) to accompany du Biez in a successful attack on
the castle of Avesnes-le-comte and the villages around it. He had to
withdraw because his infantry, the bands of Boulonnais men under
Vervins’ command, were ordered by the King to join Vendôme fur-
ther east. A typical remark from du Biez, which may indeed reect
the desperate shortage of men in the Netherlands, was that with 200
gens d’armes and 3000 foot, he could have taken all the strongholds
as far as Arras.
121
Du Biez le Crequi with his own company at Doullens and moved
(via Hesdin and Montreuil) to revictual érouanne, at the request of
Villebon. Heilly was le at Boulogne in order to continue the revict-
ualling and undertake an enterprise against the English, probably a
estant ja sortiz du camp et le sieur d’Estrees devant moy avec ma compagnye, dequel
ilz ont congoissance et de moy semblablement, et l’un d’eulx que les a fait retirer vers
led. Bouzgryes où ilz avoient laisse leurd. troppe passans par les boys dud. Bohaing, où
ilz ont esté pressez de telle sorte par les paissans dud. Bohaing à la faveur dud. sieur
d’Estrees, qu’ilz ont esté contrains laisser leur butin.’
120
Wallop to Council, 28 Aug. 1543, L&P, XVIII, ii, 92; Wallop to Henry VIII,
10 Oct. 1543 NA SP1/182, fo. 3v (L&P, XVIII, ii, 266): the Germans ‘have cryed for
gelt these iiij or v daies not being yet paied, wol not passe over the water to lye in the
new trenche tyll they have gelt.’
121
Potter, Du Biez, no. 188.
england and the wars in flanders, 1542–1543 147
scheme put forward by Gilbert de La Fayette, abbé of Saint-Josse, to
break the dikes in the county of Guînes. is, though, misred because
there were not enough men to maintain the ground for three high
tides.
122
Du Biez and Vervins then marched east to rejoin Vendôme at
Saint-Quentin, where they received orders to be ready to join the King
(with his military household, gendarmerie and 12,000 Swiss) in case
the expected major attack on Landrecies materialised (du Biez had le
his tents and equipment at Montreuil and had to send for them). It
was their job to watch over Landrecies while the King was still occu-
pied in Luxemburg since the French also believed a major attack on
Péronne and Saint-Quentin likely. eir forces were substantial; a spy
report put them at 400 gens d’armes and the 3000 Boulonnais infan-
try, while 12,000 Swiss were on their way. However, the King thought
the threat so great that he was believed to have ordered the devasta-
tion of the land around Péronne and Saint-Quentin along the lines of
Provence in 1536.
123
By mid-September the siege camp was established at Fontaine-
au-bois a little to the west of Landrecies and then moved closer to
the town. e artillery was steadily battering the fortications from
the trenches but the siege was still not complete since the French
could send out a wagon train.
124
e Emperor was eagerly awaited but
Charles had been pre-occupied with the business of conquering the
territories of the duke of Cleves until the rst week of September. But
his forces were now gradually being sent south to join the English and
Burgundians already around Landrecies. Vervins reported from the
French supporting force that
e Emperor approaches with a good force of 28 or 30,000 men to come
to Landrecies. e English and Burgundians who were there make their
approach from beyond the river near the forest.
122
Ibid. nos. 188, 190, 191. On Heilly’s enterprise, Vervins to Heilly, 17 Sept. 1543,
Amiens, SAP, Ch. Heilly, 60, no. 1: ‘ne faisant doubte que les eussez bien frotez.’ See
also Fouquesolles to Heilly, 29 Sept. 1543, Amiens SAP, Ch. Heilly 57, no. 59: ‘les
Engles nous ont esté fort doulx depuis que les aves sy mal traités.’ Trial of du Biez:
BnF, Dupuy 474, fo. 36r ‘l’an mil vc xliij le sr. de Fouquesolles et le sr. de Hely ayans
la bande du mareschal du Biez et quelques aultres gens de guerre y allerent de nuyct
et rompre quelques digues dont yssue grande quantité d’eaue, mais cela ne porte dom-
maige car il failloit attendre trois marez.’
123
Potter, Du Biez, no. 191; Wallop et al. to Henry VIII, camp of Landrecies,
14 Sept. 1543, L&P, XVIII, ii, 187.
124
Wallop to Henry VIII and Council, 14, 15 Sept. 1543, L&P, XVIII, ii, 187, 189.
148 chapter three
Vendôme and du Biez again moved to the forward headquarters at
Guise and sent as many gens d’armes as they could get into the town
before the noose tightened.
125
e campaign around Landrecies proved to be protracted and
the four months’ term for English employment was running out.
126
Francis I was back in the area of Follembray and Coucy by 25
September, determined to do all he could to hold on to Landrecies.
127
e Emperor saw its recapture as essential, but his arrival at the camp
was much delayed by a severe attack of gout. Ferdinando de Gonzaga,
the Emperor’s chief commander, arrived at the camp on 23rd with
a proposition to march on Guise (the forward headquarters of the
French) in order to dishearten the garrison of Landrecies, cut it o
from supplies and draw the French King into battle. Wallop was
sceptical about the value of diverting men from the siege itself but
Gonzaga decided to press on with a powerful Imperial force (perhaps
over 20,000) leaving the English army and some new Frisian reinforce-
ments at the siege. In fact, Guise proved an impossible objective and
the Imperial forces suered a mauling, so the Emperor ordered con-
centration on Landrecies.
128
e English term of service, though, was
running out. e third month was due to expire on 12 October and
there was barely enough pay for the third month. Wallop reported
that his men for the most part were ‘veray poore and few or none of
theym have any greate store of money, victualz be dere, clothes wax
thyn, and cold wether encreseath.’ More pay was needed by the end
of October.
129
e Emperor, of course, wanted Wallop’s army to stay
as long as possible and, on his arrival at the camp, went out of his
125
Vervins to Heilly, 17 Sept. 1543, information from Captain Lalande’s man:
‘l’Empereur vient pardeça aveucq une bonne force de xxviij ou xxx mil hommes pour
venir à Landrecy. Les Angloys et Bourguignons qui y estoient font leur approches du
costé delà l’eawe vers la forest.’
126
Seymour to Henry VIII, 10 Sept. 1543, L&P, XVIII, ii, 167.
127
Potter, Du Biez, no. 191. On Francis I’s rapid movements, L&P, XVIII, ii, 218,
242.
128
Wallop to Henry VIII, 25 Sept. 1543, L&P, XVIII, ii, 218; Potter, Du Biez,
no. 192; Charles V to Aerschot and du Roeulx, 9 Oct. 1543, L&P, XVIII, ii, 264;
Wallop to Henry VIII, 10 Oct. 1543, ibid., no. 266. François de Bourbon-Estouteville
reported a sharp defeat of the Imperial light horse at Guise and the capture of many
members of the Emperor’s household, including Francesco d’Este, brother of the Duke
of Ferrara (to Matignon, 10 Oct. 1545, Correspondance de Matignon, no. CXXXII,
p. 84); Arcona to same, 10 Oct., ibid., no. CXXXIII, p. 85.
129
Wallop et al. to Council, 10 Oct. 1543, NA SP1/182, fos. 11–13 (L&P, XVIII,
ii, 267).
england and the wars in flanders, 1542–1543 149
way to praise the turn-out of his allies. It was accepted by the English
that they would stay as long as the Emperor paid them (in advance,
as was the English tradition). ere was obviously little hope of this
and Charles successfully pressed his case in England for an extension.
Henry’s council agreed to an extra 20 days.
130
e Emperor nally arrived at the Landrecies siege camp on 19
October and a new camp was prepared for what was hoped would
be the coming battle – to be the great show-down. e old towers
remaining of the medieval castle had been bombarded but now min-
ing began under the new bastion in front of it. Wallop thought the
town could not hold out beyond the end of October, which would
have suited his terms of service, and that the trenches had completely
cut o access. One ominous sign was that the Germans’ mines had
ooded because of the heavy rain.
131
By now skirmishing had become
virtually continuous with the French relieving forces and small rein-
forcements of supplies and men were got into the town despite the
siege.
132
Aer reconnoitring by Saint-Pol, Annebault and du Biez, the
French army was now dug in at a fortied camp at Cateau-Cambrésis.
It may be that Imperial strategy was to draw the French to a deci-
sive battle, though this was a high risk. e Emperor’s forces (includ-
ing the English) were about 40,000 foot and 8,000 horse, while the
French claimed though with what reliability is dicult to say, 50,000
foot and 15,000 horse.
133
e French order of battle was for Saint-Pol
(Vendôme’s brother) to take the vanguard, the King and the Dauphin
with their Swiss the battle, and Vendôme the rearguard.
134
e climax came in the rst few days of November. With the com-
plete French army so close, battle must have seemed inevitable, so it
was a desperate throw to plan a full assault on the town (2000 Italians,
2000 Spaniards, 2000 Germans and 1200 English), aer a ferocious
130
Charles V to Wallop, 6 Oct. 1543 L&P, XVIII, ii, 258; same to Henry VIII,
21 Oct. 1543, St.P., IX, 526 (L&P, XVIII, ii, 292); Wallop to Charles V, 24 Oct. 1543
(ibid., no. 300); Paget to Wallop, 16 Oct. 1543 NA SP1/182, fo. 20v (L&P, XVIII, ii,
280): ‘for thenglishmen youe may say be wont to be payd alwayes theyr wages for a
moneth before’; Wallop to Henry VIII, 25 Oct. 1543, L&P, XVIII, ii, 304; Council to
Bonner and Bryan, 2 November 1543, St.P., IX, 532 (L&P, XVIII, ii, 331).
131
Wallop to Paget, 22, 26 Oct. 1543, St.P., IX, 527 (L&P, XVIII, ii, 293, 310).
132
Wallop and Bryan to Henry VIII, 29 Oct. 1543 St.P., IX, 530 (L&P, XVIII, ii,
320); Du Bellay, Mémoires, IV, pp. 177–185.
133
L&P, XVIII, ii, 321, 2 ‘Pour le jour de la bataille’; Du Bellay, Mémoires IV,
pp. 176–177.
134
Du Bellay, Mémoires, IV, pp. 178–179.