Potter David. Henry VIII and Francis I
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110 chapter two
its harbour, the English army set o. Haddington and Dunbar were
destroyed on the way and attempts of Scottish troops under Home,
Seaton and Bothwell to block the way swept aside. Not even the small
English garrison le at Coldingham to repress Scottish raids could be
winkled out by feeble Scottish attempts.
In one sense, the campaign of May 1544 was a resounding success
in that it seriously intimidated the Scots and provided the necessary
space for the main royal campaign in France. It also destabilised the
regime by making it look militarily hopeless. Attempts to dislodge
Arran by coalitions of nobles were unsuccessful, though. e Queen
Dowager tried in May and again in November to depose Arran as
Governor by summoning partial meetings of the Estates but was out-
manoeuvred by the wily Arran; so a compromise between them was
eected. A major military beating had failed yet again to achieve a real
change in the government of Scotland. Lennox nally cut his losses
and le Scotland aer his representatives signed an ‘Indenture’ with
Henry VIII’s at Carlisle on 17 May whereby he and Glencairn agreed to
put Dumbarton and other fortresses in into English hands, promised
to ensure the marriage of the Queen and Edward and in return were
granted pensions and, in Lennox’s case, the hand of Henry’s niece,
Margaret Douglas. He arrived at Chester on 9 June and proceeded
to London, where he signed a treaty on 26th. In France, news of this
defection provoked fury and the arrest of Lennox’s younger brother,
John, sr. d’Aubigny.
90
One last complication was the declaration of war
against Scotland by Henry’s ally, the Emperor, on 7 May 1544, partly
as a response to Scottish privateering against English ships and the use
of Dutch ports such as Veere as a refuge.
91
e Anglo-Imperial treaty
of February 1543 had required each side to declare against ‘common
enemies’ but Charles had hitherto been reluctant to do this against
Scotland. Now, Henry VIII was pressing him hard. It was an act which
was to have all sorts of unintended consequences; the Scottish-Imperial
‘war,’ mainly a matter of privateering and conscations damaging in
particular to the Dutch herring sheries, dragged on long aer the
main Anglo-French conict and was not settled until 1550.
90
Bonner, ‘French reactions’ (1998), pp. 45–47.
91
L&P, XIX, i, 166, 318, 330, 381, 392.
scotland between england and france 111
Scottish Revenge, French Intervention, 1545
At the end of March 1544 David Paniter, the Queen Dowager’s secre-
tary and John Campbell of Lundy, her maître d’hôtel, were despatched
to France, probably to seek aid. Little is known about the details except
for Paniter’s arrival in Normandy at the end of April.
92
Despite the
arrival of a few French ships in May, which may have strengthened
the Dowager’s resolve to confront Arran, little real French aid was sent
and Paniter’s mission was a failure; no substantial aid was forthcoming
from France to Scotland in 1544 (obviously both England and France
had their eyes elsewhere). e disunity of the Scottish nobles was itself
a problem. Somerville reported at the end of 1544 that Paniter had
written that Francis I would only send aid if the young Queen were
married to the Dauphin’s young son, François. A French envoy (prob-
ably still La Brosse) had only oered fair words and no money because
of divisions in Scotland. Help would only be forthcoming when the
Scottish lords united.
93
is news was disconcerting enough to force
a rethink in the Scottish regime. An English spy reported early in
January that the Governor and Scottish Council had agreed to prom-
ise the Scottish Queen to France in return for help.
94
As for Paniter,
having spent months in France, he travelled on to Brussels in order to
negotiate Scottish inclusion in the Treaty of Crépy, a move strenuously
opposed by Henry VIII.
e misery was compounded by the English Marcher command-
ers such as Sir Ralph Eure, who followed up Hertford’s campaign
by launching a series of raids in June 1544 that led to the burning
of Jedburgh, Kelso and Dryburgh and the wasting of Teviotdale.
95
is, though, had the unforeseen eect of nally alienating one of
92
Mary Queen of Scots to Francis I, signed Arran, 31 March 1544, L&P, XIX, i, 268;
letter of Paniter from Caudebec, 22 April 1544, Scottish Correspondence, pp. 74–75:
‘we ar weill tane with as ony men can be.’ Five French ships were reported to have
arrived at St Andrews by Hertford. (Hertford to Henry VIII, 15 May 1544, Hamilton
Papers, II, p. 372). Paniter had long been in France and returned to Scotland with John
Hamilton of Paisley (Balcarres Papers, I, p. 93).
93
E. Lodge, Illustrations of British History 3 vols. (1838 edn), I, pp. 50–55 (L&P,
XIX, ii, 709.2): ‘Mr. David Paniter sent a writing to the Governor, saying that the King
of France wills the marriage of the Queen’s Grace to the Dauphin’s son; and if that
were not granted he believed there should be no help nor supply come out of France.’
Lodge misdated this to Sept. 1543.
94
Hamilton Papers II, no. 394, pp. 535–538; L&P, XX, i, 5.
95
See ‘e Late Expedition in Scotland,’ pp. 48–51.
112 chapter two
Henry VIII’s crucial allies, Angus, whose lands had been wasted; thus,
Angus joined up with Arran, when a new English border raid was
mounted by Eure with a number of Scots allies early in 1545. e
Scots had assembled a force of no more than 2500 but the English
border force had become careless and on 17 February, returning from
Teviotdale, was caught in an ambush by the Scots at Ancrum Moor.
e Scots allies turned against the English in the middle of the battle
and the English force was cut to pieces. Eure and Layton, captain of
Norham, were killed along with 800 others and 1000 taken prisoner.
is was the context in which Henry sent orders for two Italian engi-
neers, Scala and da Bergamo, to design fortications (which they did
in the trace italienne style) at Tynemouth. In the event, these were not
built.
96
ough only a skirmish, the defeat caused panic on the English
borders and put heart into the Scottish regime. In addition, Scotland
now stood higher on the agenda of the French monarchy, freed from
the Imperial war by the Treaty of Crépy, as it prepared for a major
showdown with England in 1545. Scotland therefore took its place
in the scheme of the vast confrontation on land and sea between
Francis and Henry that dominated the year 1545. e main strate-
gic purpose for France was to draw English troops away from Calais
and Boulogne in order to make Francis’ plan to recapture the latter
easier. An experienced French agent, La Croix, seems to have got to
Scotland in February. George Douglas reported that he had brought
40,000 écus (a sum similar to that in 1543). Word spread that a French
force of 6000 men was on its way with 400,000 écus.
97
An army was
indeed under preparation in France under Jacques Montgommery de
Lorges.
98
is was thought by Habsburg agents in February to consist
of 14,000 French infantry and 8000 landsknechts as well as Spaniards
96
Phillips, Anglo-Scots Wars, pp. 170–171. On the arrival of this news in France:
G. Bertono to Bernardo de Medici, Brest, 26 March 1545, ASF, Principato, Francia 1
(lza. 4590), fo. 208, arrival of a Scots ship from Dumbarton that set on on 12 March.
e pamphlet La defaicte des Anglois par les Ecossois faicte le Jour de Jeudi Sainct
dernier, et la grande bataille entre Barbe-Rousse et des galleres et carraques de l’empereur
qui venoint pour avitailler Nice (Rouen, s.n., 1544) has sometimes been linked to this
battle but the context of Barbarossa’s siege of Nice may place it at Easter 1543. On
the Tynemouth plan, see BL Cotton, Aug. I, ii, 7 and M. Merriman, ‘Italian military
engineers in Britain in the 1540s,’ in S. Tyacke (ed.), English Map-making 1500–1650:
Historical Essays (London, 1983), pp. 57–67.
97
Douglas to Henry VIII, 15 Feb. 1545, St.P., V, p. 411 (L&P, XX, i, 202).
98
Merriman, Rough Wooings, p. 160.
scotland between england and france 113
and Swiss, to be commanded by Admiral d’Annebault.
99
e reality,
though, proved very dierent. In April Francis seems to have oered
the recently-arrived Scottish ambassador, John Hay, 2500 foot, 700
horse, 200,000 écus and munitions and that the Admiral would make
his way to Scotland with 40 galleys. Hay told the Venetians that he
did not believe the French King would do much and that, if France
le the Scots in the lurch they would make peace with the English.
100
Nevertheless, preparations at Dieppe and Brest went ahead, prob-
ably drawing some Italian troops from the Boulonnais, in May.
101
On
15 May, Hay reported from Brest that Lorges’ troops were ready, ships
from Le Croisic expected imminently and a eet from Bordeaux on
the way. He listed the support as 2500 foot (including 300 arquebus-
iers), Scots men at arms and archers of the royal guard, asserting it was
the ‘fairrest support come this vc yer in Scotland.’ Moulins, Lorges’
lieutenant was sent on ahead to prepare the landing and supply for
horses and departure was set for 31 May.
102
An English eet was sta-
tioned o Cornwall to intercept him and despite some losses on the
way, the eet, piloted by sailors from Le Croisic and commanded by
René de Château-Chalon,
103
arrived at Dumbarton on 4 June, battered
by heavy seas.
104
As the French had hoped, the threat to the northern
99
Intelligence sent from France by Saint-Mauris, L&P, XX, i, 619 (dated there the
end of April 1545, but should be 6 February, the day aer the King le Fontaineb-
leau). On 3 Feb. Francis I had sent a commission to the governors of Normandy
to raise levies partly to pay for the army and ships he was preparing for Scotland
(L.-H. Labande, Correspondance de Joachim de Matignon, Paris, 1914, p. 114).
100
Hay was a nephew of Beaton and a frequent envoy abroad. He had written to
the Queen Dowager on 10 March (Balcarres Papers, I, p. 136). Spy report from France,
c. 30 April 1545, L&P, XX, i, 619; Alvarotti to Ercole II, 12 March 1545, ASM, Fran-
cia B 20, fasc. 4, p. 73 (75 decipher): ‘che non crede che Sua Maestà ne faccia nulla,
et che è certissimo, se lei abbandona che loro per non soccomber, si accordaranno
con Inglesi, et poi seranno maggiori inimici di Francia.’ Conrmed by Saint-Mauris,
31 March 1545, L&P, XX, i, p. 203.
101
Poynings, 4 May 1545, L&P, XX, I, 654.
102
John Hay to Marie de Lorraine, 15 May 1545; Arran to same, 30 May 1545,
Scottish Correspondence, pp. 136–138, 139–140; Lorges to same, Brest, 18 May 1545,
Balcarres Papers, I, pp. 110–111.
103
Bernardo de Medici to duke of Florence, Romorantin, 8–22 April, A. Desjar-
dins, Négociations diplomatiques de la France avec la Toscane, 6 vols. (1859–86), III,
pp. 153–154. Exemption from taxes for the sailors of Croisic for their services, 2 April
1546 (C. De La Roncière, Histoire de la marine française, 5 vols. (1899–1920), III,
p. 411 aer AD Loire-Inférieure, B, mandements royaux, 3 fo. 7v).
104
A Diurnal of Remarkable Occurents that have Passed within the Country of Scot-
land since the Death of King James the Fourth till the year M.D.LXXV. From a Manu-
script of the Sixteenth Century, in the Possession of Sir John Maxwell of Pollock, Baronet
114 chapter two
border drew English troops away from the Continent and forced
Henry to bring in mercenaries.
105
Lorges, however, achieved very little, possibly because the Scottish
leadership was so indecisive. On 28 June the Scottish Council met
in Edinburgh and, in view of the French King’s showing himself a
‘gret and tender friend’ to the Queen, summoned all those who
owed military service to be ready in arms at Roslin Muir by 28 July.
106
Meanwhile the troops, artillery and munitions brought by Lorges were
dragged slowly in poor weather to Edinburgh. A unusually complete
range of musters taken in Scotland for this force, commanded overall
by the sr. de Saint-Germain under Lorges as King’s Lieutenant, indi-
cates 8 companies of around the usual 300 men, two of the companies
amalgamated at the end of the year, possibly through losses. ere
were almost exactly 2500 men plus two companies of 50/60 mounted
arquebusiers.
107
Lorges had declared before the Scottish Estates that he was ready
to invade England but the subsequent campaign was curiously feeble.
e Franco-Scottish army encamped on the Tweed opposite Wark
castle from 9 to 13 August and actually crossed the river to burn some
villages but when Lorges pressed for a full invasion of English terri-
tory, Arran and his Council refused on the grounds that there was not
enough artillery.
108
Hertford was responsible for revenging this attack and thought
carefully about his strategy.
109
As in the previous year, he did not want
to waste an army simply by conducting a grand raid and was now
developing a vision of permanently dominating the Lowlands through
a network of strongholds. So, with the help of Richard Lee and some
(Edinburgh, 1833). pp. 39–40, gives the arrival date as 31 May but this would seem
unlikely if the eet had sailed on 31 May. On the other hand, Hertford in Newcastle
had heard of their arrival on 4 June (L&P, XX, i, p. 486); the eet was described as
‘lately arrived’ in 7 June (ibid, XX, i, 887, 909).
105
Chronicle of King Henry VIII . . . Written in Spanish by an Unknown Hand, trans.
M.A. Hume (London, 1889)[hereaer, Spanish Chronicle], pp. 123–127; Millar, Tudor
Mercenaries, pp. 133–136.
106
Register of the Privy Council of Scotland, 1545–1625 ed. J. Hill and D. Masson,
14 vols. (Edinburgh, 1877–1898); [RPCS] I, p. 3; Acts of the Parliament of Scotland, ed.
T. omson, C. Innes, 12 vols. (Edinburgh, 1814–1875) [hereaer APS], II, pp. 595–
596.
107
BnF, fr. 25793, nos. 532–545, 553 and BL Add. Ch. 13, 302.
108
G. Ridpath, e Border History of England and Scotland, p. 381.
109
L&P, XX, ii, 347, 400, 456, 533, 633.
scotland between england and france 115
Italians, he drew up a scheme for fortifying the ruins of Kelso abbey
in order to hold down Teviotdale. Greeted with enthusiasm at rst by
Henry VIII, the plan was dismissed by the Council as impracticable
and the site unsuitable, so all that could be done was mount a brief, if
ferocious counter-raid across the frontier. On 9 September Hertford
crossed the border near Coldingham with an army of 16,000 (includ-
ing 3000 border horse and 1000 men-at-arms). e force, which
included a host of mercenaries, was similar to the amphibious army of
1544. e English devastated Merse and Teviodale, burning yet again
Jedburgh, Dryburgh, Melrose and Kelso, where the abbey was reduced
by artillery and the garrison put to the sword.
110
How far the presence of the Franco-Scottish army deterred a more
ambitious invasion is dicult to say. e season was already too far
advanced for much else. Beaton told Francis I that there simply had not
been enough time to confront the English, despite Lorges’ assembling
his men and calling for action. e army had just been withdrawn
and the English had only stayed 8 days.
111
Hertford observed that the
reasons for Scottish failure were a mixture of internal divisions (Arran
and Angus were back at each other’s throats) and the prevalence of
plague which, as elsewhere, was rife throughout north England and
Scotland at the time. Most townsmen, he reported, were dead of it and
he at least hints that the three years of campaigning in the North had
made food supplies scarce and that there was a connection.
112
Plague
had already been reported in Scotland in July.
113
A dicult return journey in bad weather awaited the French forces.
Lorges did not get back until February. John Hay, who accompa-
nied him and La Brosse, reported that they had arrived at Dieppe via
the Straits of Dover on 12 February without seeing any other ships.
114
Ominously, he reported none of their other ships had yet arrived.
Elis Gruydd reported that some of the Scots who were recalled in
110
Ibid., p. 382. Phillips, Anglo-Scots Wars, pp. 172–174. S. Haynes & W. Murdin,
Collection of State Papers . . . le by William Cecil, Lord Burghley (London, 1740–1759),
I, p. 53 contains an exhaustive list of all places pillaged by Hertford’s army, 287 in all,
including 16 castles and 243 villages, between 8 and 23 Sept. 1545.
111
Cardinal Beaton to Francis I, 5 Oct. 1545, BL Egerton 2805 (L&P, XX, ii, 525).
112
Hertford to Paget, 5 Oct. 1545, St.P., V, p. 539 (L&P, XX, ii, 524).
113
Fenix (Captain Borthwick) to Suolk or Paget, Antwerp, 21 July 1545, L&P,
XX, i, 1240; Diurnal of Occurents, p. 39; RPCS, I, p. 5.
114
Hay to Marie de Lorraine, Dieppe, 14 Feb. 1546, Scottish Correspondence,
pp. 158–159.
116 chapter two
January 1546 travelled via Flanders, 200 of them too sick to leave
hospitals at Bruges. Gruydd reported that the survivors swore they
would never return to Scotland because of the bad climate and the
brutishness of the people. ey claimed they had been attacked by
the Scottish borderers, who killed many of them ‘chiey for food for
men and beasts of which there was a great scarcity, especially aer
the English burned Lothian.’ e story seems to have come through
some of the gentlemen who shortly aer ended up at Boulogne.
115
For
some of Lorges’ soldiers, the journey was even longer. e sr. de
Feuillon, of the Tonnerois had served as ensign to captain de Gauge
in Saint-Germain’s regiment of foot on the expedition. Feuillon’s ship
was hit by a storm and wrecked on the coast of Norway. In April he
and his men had managed in a pitiable state to reach Denmark, where
‘the cold weather here is worse for a very long time.’ He had to helped
by the French ambassador, Richer, to get sustenance from Christian
III until the weather improved.
116
Lorges rode rapidly to report to Francis at Saint-Germain on 14 Feb-
ruary. At the start of March, La Brosse was reporting arrangements
for the transfer of more money to the Queen Dowager in order to
oil the political works in Scotland by more pension payments. Two
new envoys, d’Oysel and Mandosse, were scheduled to return with
this and the Dauphin wrote a letter of encouragement.
117
Scottish poli-
tics were about to be convulsed, though, by two new developments:
the assassination of Cardinal Beaton, pillar of the French alliance, at
Saint Andrews on 29 May1546 and the signature of the Anglo-French
peace treaty on 7 June (see chapter 10). Naturally, Beaton’s murder
further complicated the political-military situation in Scotland, since
it was widely understood that Henry VIII had encouraged it and had
indeed rewarded the conspirators. A long siege of some of the assas-
sins in Saint Andrews castle began.
118
is, followed rapidly by the
115
M.B. Davies (ed.), ‘Boulogne and Calais from 1545 to 1559,’ Bulletin of the Fac-
ulty of Arts of Fouad I University, Cairo, 12 (1950), 43–44.
116
Mémoires du sieur Richer, in Camusat, Mélanges historiques, fo. 16r–v: ‘les froi-
dures qui sont icy les plus grandes qu’on ne les veit de long temps.’
117
Guidiccione, 17 Feb. 1546, ANG, III, p. 426; La Brosse to Marie de Loraine,
Paris, 3, 10 March 1546, Balcarres Papers, I, pp. 123–127; Dauphin to Marie de
Lorraine, 4 March 1546, NLS Adv. MS 29.2. 1 fo. 40 (Miscellany of the Maitland Club,
I, ii, pp. 212–213) (L&P, XXI, i, 329).
118
Saint-Mauris, L&P, XXI, i, p. 603.
scotland between england and france 117
Anglo-French peace, raised the problem of how to respond. e treaty
required Henry to undertake no new oensive against the Scots. e
Scottish Parliament met on 14 August to discuss the terms of the com-
prehension of the kingdom in the peace and raised all sorts of objec-
tions concerning what seemed like the unwillingness of English border
governors to observe the peace, the failure to release prisoners and
the sheltering of Beaton’s murderers in England.
119
e acceptance of
the peace by the Governor was therefore hedged with qualications.
120
It is the case that attempts were made on both sides, encouraged by
France, to refrain from actions on the frontier which would infringe
the peace.
121
Preparations in England to aid the anti-Beaton rebels
holding out at Saint Andrews aggravated the situation and these prob-
lems remained unresolved when Paniter and Adam Otterburn came
to London in November to press for the ratication and protest at
violations of the peace terms (see chapter 11). Odet de Selve wrote to
Paget on 18 November that the Scots envoys had informed him that
Henry had sent soldiers and ships to land at Saint Andrews in support
of the rebels, ‘which would be an open declaration against the Scots
and thus a contravention of an article in the treaty.’
122
It was perhaps
annoyance at this challenge that led Henry a few days later to treat
the Scottish ambassadors to a ferocious tongue-lashing, threatening
more war. Not surprisingly, Paniter and Otterburn started pressing the
French ambassador for more help, while in Scotland the Privy Council
formulated a new request for aid of 200,000 écus, artillery and troops
to be in Scotland by 15 February.
123
It looked as though virtually noth-
ing had changed in the north despite the new peace treaty. Nicholas
Wotton told Saint-Mauris at Paris in March 1547 that, though the
French were pressing for the acceptance of the Scottish ratication of
the treaty, the Scots were being so aggressive at sea that there was no
reason to do so. On the one hand, Paniter and Otterburn attended the
119
APS, II, pp. 473–474.
120
Letters of acceptance by James Hamilton Earl of Arran as Governor, 17 Aug.
1546, National Archives of Scotland, Treaties with France, SP 7, no. 32.
121
Merriman, Rough Wooings, pp. 218–219.
122
Ibid., pp. 220–221; Selve to Paget, 18 Nov. 1546, NA SP1/226, fo. 117 (L&P,
XXI, ii, 415): ‘qui seroyt une manifeste ouverture contre lesdictz Escossoys et par ainsy
contravention à ung article du traicté’ RPCS, I, pp. 54–55.
123
Selve to Francis I, 25 Nov. 1546, J. Lefebvre-Pontalis (ed.), Correspondance poli-
tique de Odet de Selve, (Paris, 1888), pp. 60–61.
118 chapter two
coronation of Edward VI and on the other the great Scottish ship, the
Lyon had been taken.
124
e French government was, though, in a complicated situation.
In his instructions to Christophe Richer, ambassador in Denmark, of
November 1546, Francis showed he had no condence that Henry
would full his commitments in the treaty and declared himself will-
ing to assist in the negotiation of a marriage between the young Queen
and Christian III’s heir, a proposal that had rst been put forward by
the Protestant envoys in November 1545 (see chapter 9). It seems clear
that Francis was still hoping to draw Scotland and Denmark together
into an alliance.
125
On the other hand (see chapter 11), Francis was also
trying to draw Henry VIII into a grand alliance against the Emperor
and the two demands were to a degree incompatible. is in a way
underlines the ambiguous and half-hearted attitude to Scottish aairs
in France during part of this period. It is the case that a naval force
was being prepared at Dieppe and Le Havre in February–March 1547
but the objective was not clear to outsiders and may not have been
decided before the death of Francis I.
126
It seems unlikely that a seri-
ous expedition was being prepared in France in response to Scottish
requests before the death of Francis I.
What is the overall signicance of the struggle for Scotland during
these years? It demanded a semi-permanent and growing English mili-
tary presence of the Scottish border from 1541 onwards that in some
ways further militarised the frontier. at frontier had to be controlled
in order for Henry VIII to prosecute his plans in France but it became
a theatre of war that absorbed ever more resources. at the Tudor
state was able to sustain this burden while prosecuting full-scale war
against France is remarkable. In comparison with the Scottish armies
pitched against them, the forces of Henry VIII were seriously mod-
ernised, brisling with pike and shot, well equipped with artillery.
127
Hertford had shown the England was able to project its power through
ambitious amphibious operations. Only when a stiening of French
124
Saint-Mauris to Charles V, 17 March 1547, HHSA, Frankreich 14, Berichte S-M
an Karl, 1547, III, fos. 51v–43r.
125
N. Camusat, Mémoires du sieur Richer (Paris, 1625) in idem., Mélanges histo-
riques (Paris, 1644), fo. 15v; Francis I to Richer, c. Nov. Dec. 1546, Ribier, Lettres et
Memoires d’Estat, I, p. 606.
126
Saint-Mauris to Charles V, 12 March 1547, HHSA, Frankreich 14, Berichte S-M
an Karl, 1547, III, fos. 31v–32r.
127
G. Phillips, Anglo-Scots Wars, pp. 175–177.
scotland between england and france 119
troops was despatched was there much hope of serious resistance
(though this was only to be fully eective aer 1547).
128
e Scottish
wars fortuitously opened up the vision of a unication of the two king-
doms in 1543 that was in eect swept away by French intervention and
the alienating brutality of English methods. Scotland was divided both
in terms of personal ambition and, increasingly, in terms of religion
but the lesson learned in the mid-1540s was that the primary threat
came from England and had to be resisted. In the Scottish Parliament
that met in October 1545 which conscated the lands of Lennox for
treason, it was declared ‘that now in tyme of weir na scotisman sall sitt
under the assurance of the Inglisman.’
129
128
M.L. Bush, e Government Policy of Protector Somerset (Montreal, 1975),
pp. 7–39.
129
APS, II, p. 460.