Potter David. Henry VIII and Francis I

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CHAPTER THREE

ENGLAND AND THE WARS IN FLANDERS, 1542–1543

Edward Hall later commented of the year 1542 that ‘there was neither

perte peace, nor open warre betwene Englande and Fraunce,’ rela-

tions plagued by taking of ships and robbing of merchants.

Henry

VIII embarked on the maelstrom of European war with painful cau-

tion in 1542–1543; he had, aer all, received a shock in 1538–1539 and

had enough on his plate in Scotland. Added to this was the glaring

fact that the English had been out of the game eectively since 1523

and had still to measure themselves against the rapid developments

of fortications, battle tactics and armament since then. In 1542, on

the Scottish border, Norfolk had lamented the ‘small experience the

nobilitie of this armye hath,’ while the troops, he thought ‘know little

or no thing of the war.’

Not for nothing did John Wallop sum up his

experiences in Flanders at the end of 1543:

In all the warres I have ben in, I have not sene suche another tyme

for youghe to lerne, rst for our being before Landersey, and especyally

sithen thEmperours commyng, who brought wyth Hym horssemen and

footemen of all nations, as as Your Majesties men here might lerne and

choose what faschyon they lyeked best.

Landrecies was indeed a baptism of re and lessons had to be learned

fast.

While campaigns were planned in Scotland, preparations for war

for England on the Continent took the form at rst of observing of

ghting around the Calais Pale. Relations between France and the

Emperor worsened steadily in the early months of 1542 and formed

the essential context of Anglo-French relations on the continent. Local

English commanders and diplomats reported on the beginnings of war

in detail, knowing Henry’s intense interest in the conict. As has been

seen, English positions around Calais had been notably strengthened

and reinforced with troops during the war scare of 1541. In July 1542,

Hall, ed. Whibley, II, p. 341.

Norfolk to Council, 13 Oct. 1542, Hamilton Papers, I, nos. 209, 210, p. 267.

Wallop to Henry VIII, 14 Nov. 1543, St.P., IX, pp. 550–552 (L&P, XVIII, ii, 384).

england and the wars in flanders, 1542–1543 121

another thousand foot were sent into garrison at Calais, Hammes and

Guînes and another 500 promised for the latter.

Border Tensions

French positions had also been reinforced in and around Ardres since

1540 and there had been many minor disputes between England and

France in the early 1540s, including extradition matters, decades-old

cases of merchants, the Statute of Strangers and above all the bor-

der between English and French territory at Calais. Most of these

were invoked in the ordinary course of relations in order to annoy

or oset claims by the other side. Of all these, the border disputes

around the Calais Pale proved to be the most vexatious and replete

with opportunity. Henry had strengthened Calais in the late 1530s.

e French had begun a programme of rebuilding fortresses early in

1540, including in the north Boulogne, Montreuil and Ardres. ose

at Ardres were not entirely new (works had been planned as early

as 1521 and begun around 1530) proved to be the most controver-

sial. e English, a generation earlier, had objected to them on the

grounds that Ardres was a ‘full unmete place to defende the borders

of Pycardye,’ the implication being that it was directed only against the

English.

By the Autumn of 1540, serious disturbances were also tak-

ing place between Ardres and Guînes over a roughly triangular tract

of meadow called the Coswade in English and la Cauchoire in France.

It was claimed for pasture by the people of Ardres, who had a simple

wooden bridge onto it, but the English asserted it was part of the Pale

and broke down the bridge twice.

Marillac reported that the Calais

authorities were seeking a quarrel and that Wallop was deliberately

reporting it as evidence of English coolness.

Late in October, Wallop

had a long talk with Francis; there was already a willingness on both

Council to Wallop, 31 July 1542, L&P, XVII, 552; 3 Aug. 1542, ibid., 564.

See D. Grummitt, e Calais Garrison: War and Military Service in England,

1436–1558 (Woodbridge, 2008).

omas Ruthal to Wolsey, 1 Aug. 1521, BL Cotton, Calig. E III, fos. 51–52.

L&P, XV, 373, 408, 529, 795–796; Potter, Renaissance France at War; M. Cabal and

N. Faucherre, Ardres Place Forte (Ardres, ACHA, 1990); M. Cabal, Ardres au XVI

siècle

(Ardres, ACHA, 1995).

Francis to Marillac, 7 Oct. 1541, Kaulek, 228 (L&P, XVI, 130); Wallop to Henry

VIII, 11 Oct. 1541, St.P., VIII, p. 443 (L&P, XVI, 144).

Maillac, 21 Oct. 1541, Kaulek 235 (L&P, XVI, 183).

122 chapter three

sides for the matter not to get out of hand and to settle it through

negotiation and this was agreed by Francis late in November.

ere

was initial dispute over the terms of these talks and the persons to be

involved; the English for instance objected to Oudart du Biez, gover-

nor of Boulogne, as too closely involved but Henry accepted in the end

that he was honourable and tractable. e technical expert would be

a maître des requêtes, Imbert de Saveuse.

Henry appointed the earl

of Hertford and Edward Carne.

When the talks (well documented

on both sides) began at Campe on the border in March, they rapidly

became bogged down in detailed assertions based on treaties as far

back as Brétigny and would obviously get nowhere. Hertford thought

that the French were simply prevaricating until they could nish the

works at Ardres (which included the construction of a ooded moat).

All that could be achieved was to pass the matter back to their masters,

which meant that the problem would depend on the state of Anglo-

French relations generally.

In April 1541, the talks were overtaken by the war fever that per-

vaded the frontier; already in February the authorities in Calais were

well aware from spies that the French were mobilising infantry in the

villages of Picardy.

Wallop, forgiven whatever oence he had given,

was despatched to oversee the works at Guînes and keep an eye on

the French. ere he quickly reported that the French evidently feared

war and were furiously stocking the granaries of Ardres with supplies.

roughout April and May of 1541 his spies reported movements

of French troops around and beyond the Somme. Early in June, one

reported an army of 15,000 men assembling near Abbeville but these

were quickly discounted as garrison troops. For the moment, local

French commanders like Oudart du Biez, showed themselves amena-

ble and the duke of Vendôme, when he came to the frontier, invited

Wallop to a meeting. By July, though, aggravation had returned to

Wallop to Henry VIII, 27 Oct. 1541, St.P., VIII, 460 (L&P, XVI, 204); Francis I

Marillac, 24 Nov. 1541, Kaulek, 245 (L&P, XVI, 289).

Wallop to Henry VIII, 24 dec. 1541, St.P., VIII, 497 (L&P, XVI, 350); Marillac to

Francis, 12 Jan. 1541, Kaulek, 287 (L&P, XVI, 459).

Henry VIII to Wallop, 2 Jan. 1541, St.P., VIII, 509 (L&P, XVI, 427).

French procès-verbal, translation, L&P, XVI, 637; for the English correspon-

dence, Longleat MSS, SE/I/13, fos. 130–190 (HMC, Bath MSS, IV, pp. 16–28, espe-

cially the letter of 8 Feb. 1541, pp. 18–20).

Hertford to Fitzwilliam, 16 Feb. 1541, Longleat House, SE /I/13, fo. 180 (HMC

Bath MSS, IV, pp. 22–23).

england and the wars in flanders, 1542–1543 123

the matter of who had the right to cut the grass in the Cowswade.

Meanwhile, Guînes was, according to Wallop, set up with ‘princely

workes’ and Ardres with new ramparts and three bastions.

ere was another round of fortication at Ardres during the war

scare of the summer of 1542

and, with war between France and the

Emperor, the Calais Pale could not fail to be drawn in or remain neu-

tral. Burgundian soldiers used the Pale (as they had in previous wars)

as a refuge and French commanders, especially du Biez, were always

tempted to pursue them to the gates of the towns, claiming this was

the normal practice of war. When such violations happened the air

was thick with mutual recriminations.

As an illustration of the prob-

lem: in 1541 the Master of the Saint-Inglevert hospice (to the English

‘Sandingeld’ and a mile within the Pale) claimed to know nothing

of how he held his lands. Taxed with his ignorance, asserted ‘I am

newtrall, and in token therof, I bere the crosse keys in tyme of warre,

and the collation therof I had of the bishop of Rome, whiche enyoying

for my lief I care for no more.’ reatened with the appointment of

another and better subject of Henry, he insisted ‘my house stondeth

so that I must please both parties, or els be ondoon.’ It was a frequent

dilemma on the Anglo-French frontier.

On his side, Oudart du Biez

had been contemplating incursions into the Pale but was restrained by

the French government.

Letters of John Wallop, April 1541, 14 April, 19 April, 26 April, 3 June, 22 June,

26 June, 30 June 1541, L&P, XVI, 718, 725, 739, 759, 889, 917, 929, 944.

Wallop to Chancellor, 26 July 1541, NA SP1/166, fo. 141r (L&P, XVI, 1036):

work at Ardres had been scaled down ‘the rampire totally made within the towne

and gardable’ ‘all theire fortfying at this present there ys owtwa[rd] making of three

bulwarkes.’ Vendôme, 17 April 1541, BnF fr. 20521, fos. 33–34; Potter, Du Biez,

pp. 155–159.

Wallop to Council, 17 Sept. 1542, NA SP1/173, fos. 30–31 (L&P, XVII, 801).

Aair of the captain of Fiennes: Council of Calais to Henry VIII, 17 Oct. 1542,

NA SP1/173, fos. 247–248 (L&P, XVI, 959); Potter, Du Biez, pp. 164–167 (correspon-

dence with Maltravers, Grey and Wallop, October 1542). For worsening relations,

especially with Ardres, Wallop and Poynings to Council, 30 Jan. 1543, NA SP1/175,

fo. 116 (L&P, XVIII, i, 97).

Longleat MSS, SE/I, fo. 133r–v (HMC Bath MSS, IV, p. 17). Peter Bredwell, then

Master, made a full deposition of the house’s status (NA, SP1/243, fo. 4 (L&P, Add. I,

ii, no. 1441, the date given in L&P, 1539, is wrong and it is more likely 1556).

Wallop to Council, 19 Sept. 1542, L&P, XVII, 809, 26 Sept. 1542, NA SP1/173,

fos. 64–65 (L&P, XVII, 849); du Biez to Wallop, 26 Sept., 6 Oct. 1542, Potter, Du Biez,

pp. 162–164.

124 chapter three

Watching from the Sidelines (June 1542–June 1543)

Henry undoubtedly saw himself as a knowledgeable strategist. At a

crucial stage of negotiations with the Emperor in December 1541, he

held forth at length to Chapuys (who was also able to score points o

him) on the weaknesses of the Emperor’s policy, the danger posed by

French negotiations in Germany and the threat to Flanders. is was

high-level sparring.

Not content with a harebrained scheme for his

ships to raid in Orkney and Shetland in September 1542 that had to

be gently set aside by his military advisers,

he was not sparing with

his detailed recommendations for Imperial armies.

In June 1542,

he received Chapuys in his nightgown at Hampton Court in order to

treat him to a display of his wisdom on international aairs. He passed

on news from Paget about French concerted strategy with Cleves and

threats to the Low Countries from France and Denmark. He recom-

mended a defensive policy in Milan and conciliation with the Duke of

Cleves by oering him one of the Emperor’s daughters. Henry liked to

show o the range of his knowledge but the obvious intent was to exag-

gerate the Emperor’s problems and thereby maximise his negotiating

power.

In July he sent Chapuys a map to warn of the Danish threat

to the islands of Flielandt and Texel at the mouth of the Amsterdam

channel. He thought the Queen of Hungary should mount artillery

and earthworks there. Chapuys concluded that this must have been a

plan mooted when Henry was an ally of the Duke of Cleves in 1540.

During the ghting at Landrecies, he studied the plans sent him by

Wallop and gave forth the benet of his opinion about the building of

mounds from which to bombard the town; the Imperial commanders

Chapuys to Mary of Hungary, 30 Dec. 1541, L&P, XVI, 1482.

Henry had made the suggestion on 29 September. On October 2, his men in the

North wearily reported that they had diligently examined the proposal ‘and nowe by

credible relation understonde that the Isle of Shotlande is so far distant, and the tyme of

the yere so far gon, that noman dar go thither this tyme.’ Pentland Firth ‘is rekened the

most daungerous place of all Christendom.’ As for Orkney, it was also ‘very daunger-

ouse and full of rockes,’ nothing to be pillaged ‘saulve otes, and little other grayne, the

pople lyveng their most by sshe.’ (Hamilton Papers, I, pp. 240, 246–247).

E.g. in discussions with Chapuys, Chapuys to Mary of Hungary, 27 Sept. 1542,

L&P, XVII, 852: Chapuys actually asks Henry for his tactical advice and the king says

the Imperial army should press on from Yvoy to Mézières, laying waste the country

and not stopping before fortresses or moving further into France, where the French

might cut o their retreat.

Chapuys to Mary of Hungary, 30 June 1542, L&P, XVII, app. 22, p. 730.

Same to same, 16, 19, 20 July 1542, ibid., app. 29, 30, 31.

england and the wars in flanders, 1542–1543 125

on the spot, no doubt unwilling to oend him, praised some of this

advice though shelved the rest.

For their part, Imperial commanders were eager to draw the English

into the conict at the earliest moment and suggested joint operations;

the importance of these contacts is that they sketched out early ver-

sions of common war strategies developed in 1543–1544. e count

of Epinoy, who had served Henry at érouanne and in 1523, oered

his services again with 500 horse, while his son-in-law Adrien de Croy,

count du Roeulx, Grand Master of Flanders and Governor of Artois,

invited any Englishmen in Calais who wanted to see the wars to enlist

with the Emperor. ere was undoubtedly a supply of these. Later in

the year, we nd a troop of Burgundians with 50 or 60 English involved

in a raid on the French village of Louches (south of Ardres). Wallop

described most of those taken prisoner by the French as ‘the worst

sort of rascall’ he had seen, though two were ‘tawle men’ whom he

took into the Guînes garrison (the rest were consigned to the French

galleys). ose English killed had been mostly ‘proper men.’

When

Chapuys was at Saint-Omer during June 1542, he met du Roeulx,

who suggested that, with 4000 English foot and cavalry from Artois,

he could take Montreuil within the next two months before it could

be strengthened. It would then follow that supplies to Boulogne and

érouanne would be blocked and they would surrender.

Wallop

found these plans enticing and Henry instructed him to contact du

Roeulx (‘a right Burgoynyon, true man to his master and a friend to

England’) to nd out how many men he could supply.

Wallop met

du Roeulx quietly at his residence at Ruminghem and discussed a plan

to take not only Montreuil but Le Crotoy and Saint-Valéry, followed

Paget to Wallop, 16 Oct. 1543, NA SP1/182, fos. 18–22 (L&P, XVIII, ii, 280);

Wallop to Paget, 22 Oct. 1543, St.P., IX, 527 (L&P, XVIII, ii, 293).

Wallop to Cheyney, 15 June 1542, NA SP1/171, fo. 29 (L&P, XVII, 405); François

de Melun count of Epinoy to Wallop, 9 June, ibid. 405, ii; L&P, XVII, 536, 541 (letters

of Roeulx, 26 July, Wallop, 28 July); Wallop to Council, 20 Nov. 1542, NA SP1/174

fo. 130v (L&P, XVII, 1106).

Chapuys to Charles V, 30 June 1542, L&P, XVII, app. 22, p. 734. Chapuys

thought this was a good way to get Henry involved in the war and it is a point that

king included in his Instructions to irlby of 1 July St.P., IX, 68 (L&P, XVII, 447).

Henry VIII to Wallop, 15 July 1542, St.P., IX, 90 (L&P, XVII, 496). Wallop on

16 Aug. 1542 described du Roeulx as ‘an honest man, and as mete to serve his master

in the warres for his good undrestanding and knowledge, as any I do knowe of his

degree, and can very well sett a nombre of men in ordre from one thowsand unto ten

and upwards hardely to be amendyd.’ NA SP1/172, fo. 109v (L&P, XVII, 632).

126 chapter three

by sieges of Boulogne, Ardres, érouanne and Hesdin. Wallop, who

knew him from the wars of the early 1520s, thought he spoke ‘nothing

like a Frencheman, for all that he spekyth is de bona de’ but he had

to press him to deliver his commission and get a precise answer. Du

Roeulx was sure he could raise 7–800 horse and 6000 foot in a week

along with eight light artillery pieces. He doubtless had a bee in his

bonnet about Montreuil (the Burgundians had successfully besieged

the town in 1537 aer all) but also oered persuasive advice which

proved inuential in English planning:

In case he make any warre in Fraunce, that he do not as his Majestie

hathe ben wont to do: that is to saye, to invade the cuntre, and so seeke

for battayle, being but a tyme lost, for the frenchemen wol abide none,

nor geve, onlesse it be for there advantaige, saying thereby to seke to

gett some holdes and to kepe them and so increase upon them litle

and litle.

All the same, the existing neutrality of England demanded restraint.

Henry told Chapuys in September that he had to ght the Scots,

who had attacked him, and that in any case the threat to the Nether-

lands had faded. He said his commission to discuss joint operations

had been ignored.

Henry had responded to du Roeulx’s schemes

by approving the raising of some private volunteers but pressed him

to take measures for the defence of his own country. Henry’s ‘secret

inclination’ was to help the Low Countries but this provided nothing

tangible, as du Roeulx quickly realised. e French took border for-

tresses and it was too late to do anything.

ese were now seriously

under threat.

French and Burgundians both feared each other and were short of

men and money. ere had been a French plot hatched for the duke

of Vendôme to take Bapaume by surprise in March, though nothing

came of this. However, men and troops were always in short sup-

ply on the Burgundian frontier and, on top of that, the weather was

unusually bad, so this provided an opportunity for the French. It was

reported by Burgundian spies that ‘the French are determined to make

Wallop to Council, 20 July 1542, NA SP1/171, fo. 147v, St.P., IX, 92 (L&P, XVII,

519) and Du Roeulx’s articles, ibid., 519, ii.

Chapuys to Charles V, 9 Sept. 1542, L&P, XVII, 759.

Council to Wallop, 10 Aug. 1542, St.P., IX, 119 (L&P, XVII, 594); to Chapuys,

10 Aug. 1542, St.P., IX, 122 (L&P, XVII, 595); Chapuys to du Roeulx, 10 Aug. 1542,

L&P, XVII, 597; du Roeulx to Wallop, 12 Aug. 1542, L&P, XVII, 614; Council to

Wallop, 13 Aug. 1542, St.P., IX, 129 (L&P, XVII, 618).

england and the wars in flanders, 1542–1543 127

war on all fronts’ and the northern legions were on notice to march.

On his side, Du Biez took measures for the security of Ardres. As

Wallop put it, ‘the frenchemen mistrusteth much themperours warris

and specially concernyng the said town of the Arde for this parties of

the Realme, fering therewith that the Kinges Majeste will joyne with

him.’

omas Barnaby, an experienced agent in France, reported to

Wallop that the French ‘be in a greate fere and that he percevid of all

Picardie alonge, and howe Monsieur du Bies cowde scantly hide the

same, saieng if war shulde cum the wer redy to answer therunto with

a galyard sprite.’

Indeed, du Biez, with 10,000 men under his com-

mand, was joined at Amiens by Vendôme with more men and a store

of artillery.

War between France and the Emperor was formally declared on

30 July 1542.

e French plan of war involved an attack on two fronts:

in the Pyrenees against Perpignan under the nominal command of the

Dauphin and against Luxemburg under that of the duke of Orléans. It

was aimed to attack the latter from the south in concert with a thrust

by the army that had been raised in Cleves and Guelders since late

1541 and commanded by Longueval and Marten van Rossem, the

‘marshal of Guelders.’ Plans had involved a thrust towards the disaf-

fected city of Ghent, still in a poor state of defence, and Antwerp.

Rossem’s strategy was to attack the Burgundian Netherlands through

the many points of entry that existed and use France as his ultimate

retreat. Rossem, though, was dicult to manage and frequently called

for more troops and pay.

e French thought him over-optimistic

about leaving strongholds behind him for such a campaign but in

Wallop to the Council, 25 Mar. 1542, NA SP1/169, fo. 173 (L&P, XVII, 199). On

the assembly of French troops in May: the gendarmerie was mustered and, though

no infantry was available, the legions could raise 8–10,000 men in 4 days. reats to

Bapaume, La Montoire and Bourbourg were identied (du Roeulx to Mary of Hun-

gary, 19 May, 6 June, 2 July 1542, Audience, 119, fos. 3, 7, 10: ‘les Francois sont deli-

berez de faire la guerre par tous costés.’

Wallop to Southampton, 6 June 1542, L&P, XVII, 381; there was at this time

already a plan for the English and Burgundians to attack Montreuil together (G.J. Miller,

Tudor Mercenaries and Auxiliaries 1485–1547 (Charlottesville, 1980), p. 56) Du Roeulx

to Mary of Hungary, 6 June 1542, AGR, Audience 119, fo. 7.

Wallop to Henry VIII, 10 June 1542, NA SP1/171, fo. 8 (L&P, XVII, 393).

Spy report, NA SP1/171, fo. 153 (L&P, XVII, 519 (3)).

A. Courtois, ‘ Manifestes de François Ier, Charles-Quint et Henry VIII,’ Bull. Soc.

Acad, de la Morinie, 2 (1853), 46–55. Some sources give 10 July.

Reports of Serrant to Francis I, 25 Feb., 11 April, 15 May, 4 June 1542 (Bers,

Die Allianz, pp. 190–194, 197–199, 211–215, 234–236). On Rossem’s campaign, see

Heidrich, Der geldrische Erbfolgestreit, pp. 57–58.

128 chapter three

August, he and Longueval were able to bring their force before the

walls of Antwerp (though lacking artillery to batter it). e army then

moved on the join the army under Orléans in Luxemburg.

Initial

gains, though, were lost there.

Of more immediate interest to the English was the ghting in

Picardy. Chapuys passed on the anxiety of the Regent’s government,

with the Netherlands under attack, for English help.

Du Roeulx

warned Wallop that Vendôme had a force of 15,000 foot and 500 horse

aiming to attack Arras or Béthune. ough he continued to assemble

materiel for the joint campaign with the English, it was clear that he

did not have enough men to defend Artois.

Vendôme received orders

from the king to form a ‘camp volant’ and destroy the small forts and

castles around érouanne which threatened the supply route from

Ardres, notably La Montoire and Tournehem.

e duke marched

north from Amiens to érouanne and pitched his camp rst before

Tournehem on 6 August.

From the start, the English were intensely

interested in the campaign. Two English lieutenants of Wallop heard

the news direct at M. de Torcy’s table:

how that the vj of August the dewke of Vandome came before a little

castell called Eperleck, wherin entred iijc bourgonyons footemen which

were comyng to Tornaham. ey wold not rendre the same, wherfore

at the last they were all slayne. Another lyk castell called Frolland did at

the fyrst render them selfes and were taken to mercy.

is was the usual savage opening of a campaign to ensure quick

surrenders later. e same witnesses went on to Vendôme’s camp at

Tournehem:

Where we found the Dewke of Vandome accompanied with the Count

de Bryan, monsieur du Bies, the bisshop of Terrewen, who was very

warlyke apareled, and with dyvers other noblemen they were in a hows

nere unto the town gate of Torneham on Saynt Omers syde.

Longueval to duke of Orléans, 22 Aug. 1542, Bers, pp. 269–271.

Chapuys to Mary of Hungary, 2 Aug. 1542, L&P, XVII, app. 34.

Du Roeulx to Wallop, 7 Aug. 1542, L&P, XVII, 576.

Du Roeulx to Wallop, 24 July 1542, L&P, XVII, 528; Francis I to Marillac,

10 Aug. 1542, Kaulek, no. 434; [S. Picotté] Chronique du roy Françoys, premier de ce

nom, ed. G. Guirey (Paris, 1860), p. 389.

Chronique, p. 390; BnF Clair. 50, fo. 7345.

Declaration of Palmer and Audley, NA SP1/172, fo. 32 (L&P, XVII, 575).

england and the wars in flanders, 1542–1543 129

e town had quickly surrendered on the 8th, largely taken by sur-

prise.

As du Biez reported:

e garrison within this place have done a lot for us and little for

themselves in thus surrendering it. I believe that our speedy and brisk

approach frightened them.

e French were eager to keep the English neutral. Torcy, lieutenant

of Vendôme’s company, who was deputed to keep the English, par-

ticularly Wallop, sweet, visited him and insisted that the French would

do all they could to respect English territory. He professed not to be

surprised that so many English troops were sent over to Calais in the

circumstances.

Wallop sent men to make enquiries about Tournehem

and was received cordially by Vendôme; this enabled them to make

a fairly good estimate of the French army: 8000 foot (mainly legions)

and 2000 horse.

Vendôme was widely expected to move on to the old castle of La

Montoire (nr Nielles-les-Ardres) and du Roeulx, the Imperial com-

mander, held himself ready to protect it. Vendôme’s attitude was

supercially insouciant, suggesting he would besiege the place closely

and oer battle if the garrison came out.

So, leaving du Biez at

Tournehem, he moved to La Montoire, issuing a challenge to du

Roeulx. His plan was to overthrow as many of the church towers

in the pays de Bredenarde as possible. is was eectively done, La

Montoire blown up, Bredenarde ‘sore spoiled’ and the Burgundian

forces severely mauled. Du Roeulx was resigned and his resources too

small.

In fact, except for a half-hearted pursuit of du Roeulx, this was

Vendôme to Montmorency, Tournehem, 9 Aug. 1542, BnF, fr. 2974, fo. 6; same

to Wallop, 9 Aug. 1542, NA SP1/172, fo. 53.

Du Biez to Montmorency, 9 Aug. 1542, Potter, Du Biez, no. 157: ‘eulx qui estoi-

ent dedans ceste place ont beaucoup faict pour cestedicte compaignye et peu pour

eulx de l’avoir ainsi rendue. Et croy que la dilligence et vefve aproche que nous avons

faicte d’eulx les a espouventy.’

Wallop to the Council, 29 July, 6 Aug. 1542, L&P, XVII, 519, 573.

Wallop to Council, 8 Aug. 1542, L&P, XVII, 582.

Vendôme to Montmorency, 9 Aug. 1542, BnF, fr. 2974, fo. 6: ‘J’ay deliberé ne

laisser d’executer mon entreprinse pour luy ne sa force, mais me loger si près du luy,

que s’il a envye de me combattre, je luy en donneray l’occasion.’

Wallop to Council, 9, 11 Aug. 1542, L&P, XVII, 587, 606; Maltravers to Wallop,

12 Aug. 1542, ibid., 612; Maltravers to Henry VIII, 14 Aug. 1542, ibid., 624; Saint-Pol

to Montmorency, 20 Aug. 1542, BnF, fr. 2997, fo. 100; Du Biez to Montmorency,

9 Aug. 1542, Potter, Du Biez, no. 157; du Roeulx to Wallop, 15 Aug. 1542, L&P,

XVII, 628; Wallop to Council, 16 Aug. 1542 L&P, XVII, 632. ere was some question

of restoring La Montoire in 1544, or at least of stopping the neighbouring people