Potter David. Henry VIII and Francis I

Подождите немного. Документ загружается.

90 chapter two

conspiracy. en, the Border administration was poor and not easily

amenable to the direction of central government. William Howard

specically asserted to Charles V’s envoy in France in September that

the meeting was to take place on the terms (‘à la dition’) Henry set.

e Imperial agent thought that the purpose of such a meeting was

to clarify Anglo-Scottish treaties but that James’ ‘ostension’ stemmed

from his awareness of the deterioration of Franco-Imperial relations.

Should they improve, all trace of Anglo-Scottish agreement would col-

lapse into conicts (‘ennuyez et fascheries’) as had been the case in the

past. Crucially, there is no real evidence that James V had ever agreed

to a personal meeting but for Henry to travel all the way to York on

the o-chance that James would turn up seems bizarre.

Francis’ protestations of innocence in engineering the failure of the

York meeting were contradicted by a detailed account of September

1541 by Cardinal Beaton, who was ambassador in France from July 1541

to August 1542. In this, the Cardinal transmitted Francis’ thanks

to James for not meeting Henry and promised to back him up if

invaded. Beaton had asked urgently for aid but at this point got little.

e French were ‘disparit’ about Henry in the event of war with

the Emperor, though he thought it unlikely there would be war in

1541. Nevertheless, despite the Constable’s fall, he assured James that

Francis would back him. Even Marguerite of Navarre had assured the

papal nuncio in France that 6000 landsknechts and 100,000 French

crowns would keep Henry busy with the Scots in the event of war.

Beaton’s letter is all the more signicant for the likelihood that it fell

into English hands.

Beaton also took trouble to cultivate the Duke of

Cleves but was complaining about his treatment at the French court

in January 1542

and Morvilliers’ mission to Scotland, kept as secret

as possible and on the pretext of condoling with James for the death

of his mother, seems to have been inconclusive.

Villey de Marnol to Charles V, 26 Sept. 1541, HHSA, Frankreich 9, berichte

Villey 1541, fo. 18v (duplicate ibid., P.A. 41, fo. 15). See E. Bonner, ‘e Genesis of

Henrys VIII’s ‘Rough Wooing’ of the Scots,’ Northern History, 33 (1997), 42–45 for a

full discussion of the evidence here.

Beaton to James V, 13 Sept. 1541, BL, Add. 19,401, fo. 35v (L&P, XVI, 1178);

Capodiferro to Farnese, 6 Aug. 1541, ANG III, p. 70 (L&P, XVI, 1079).

Capodiferro to Farnese, 11 Jan. 1542, ANG III, 49, p. 112; Cruser to Duke of

Cleves, 12 Oct. 1541, SAD Julich-Berg II, 1940, fo. 299v.

Chapuys to Charles V, 11 Dec. 1541, L&P, XVI, 1441.

scotland between england and france 91

ere was a great urry across Europe as Henry made threatening

moves against Scotland in the summer of 1542. Finally, he delivered

an unanswerable ultimatum that led, fortuitously, to total, if relatively

bloodless, victory over the Scots at Solway Moss on 22 November 1542

and the subsequent death of James V. How do we explain all this? As

it happened, James was cautious enough not to align himself openly

with the French anti-Imperial coalition of July 1542 and sent several

missions to his uncle.

English military preparations went ahead,

however. ere has been much debate about Henry VIII’s ultimate

objectives here. Was his strategy quite simply shaped by a determi-

nation to conquer Scotland? Pollard argued that Henry was exploit-

ing the conict in Europe to put into eect his imperialist plan of

annexing Scotland but the argument here is not clearly sustained, as

Scarisbrick pointed out. For him, conict with Scotland was a con-

sequence of Henry’s decision to go to war with France.

Elizabeth

Bonner has re-armed the idea that Henry had decided on war with

Scotland in 1541, partly because he wanted to extend his dominion of

the British Isles, continuing with the ideas of Cromwell, for instance,

rst sketched out in his 1523 speech and reected in the creation of

the kingdom of Ireland in 1541. She also suggests that Henry’s visit to

York was part of a plan to provoke Francis I into war by forcing him

to intervene on behalf of the Scots.

How much continuity is there between Cromwell’s thinking and the

initiative of 1542? e evidence is clearest when we consider diplo-

matic initiatives intended to assure Anglo-Scottish amity, for instance,

the Truce of October 1533 and the Treaty of Perpetual Peace of

11 May 1534. In February 1535, James had accepted the Order of

the Garter. Yet such démarches usually reected the state of Anglo-

French relations, which were unusually warm in those years. When

they cooled in 1536, David Beaton was on hand to advise James to

pursue a French rather than an English marriage alliance. Cromwell’s

objective, through the English expert of Scottish aairs, Ralph Sadler,

Henry VIII to James V, 8 Aug. 1542, L&P, XVII, 580; James to Henry, 20 Aug.

1542, ibid., 642; James V and Scottish Council to Liermonth, 20 Aug. 1542, ibid.,

nos. 643–644.

A.F. Pollard, Henry VIII (1902, 1930 edn), pp. 405–407; J.J. Scarisbrick, Henry

VIII (London, 1968), pp. 424–427.

E. Bonner, ‘e genesis of Henry VIII’s “Rough Wooing”,’ 36–53.

92 chapter two

was to separate James from the French alliance and from allegiance to

the Pope and this continued in 1540–1541.

It is indeed incontrovertible that Henry accompanied his serious

incursion into Scotland of September 1542 with a Declaration conteyn-

ing the iust causes . . . of this present warre with the Scottes that, while

it paid attention to James V’s failures as a neighbour and nephew,

developed into a lengthy compilation of ‘evidence’ for the suzerainty

of English kings over Scotland. e problem here is that, as Merriman

has pointed out, the research for the text was not ordered until early

October and the copies were not available until early November. It

seems, then, to be a post facto justication for the war rather than a

series of motives for it.

It is the case that the Anglo-Scottish border

was lawless and dicult to control from London. Putting a rm stamp

on it would be advantageous. A Consultation Paper of 5 November

1542 even suggested settlement of the problem by the annexation of

parts of the Lowlands up to the Firth of Forth but made abundantly

clear that the cost would be staggering, no less than near enough

£100,000 for a ‘main army’ for two months.

Again, though, these

ideas emerged only aer Henry had been compelled to do something

about the Borders in August 1542.

At this point it is essential to recapitulate the analysis oered here

in Chapter 1. Henry had not decided on war with France in 1541. e

international situation was still too unclear. Henry probably decided

on war with France in the Spring-Summer of 1542 but was denitely

in no hurry to precipitate it. So, a provocation of Scotland to war in

1541 did not make sense while the French were still not at war with

the Emperor and had spare capacity to help the Scots while Henry

had no secure ally abroad. Again, in 1542 a major military incursion

A.J. Slavin, Politics and Prot. A Study of Sir Ralph Sadler, 1507–1547 (Cam-

bridge, 1966), pp. 83–84.

Merriman, Rough Wooings, pp. 62–64.

‘A consulatacion for prosecucion of the warre agaynst Scotlande,’ NA SP1/174,

fos. 58–63 (old, 49–54) (L&P, XVII, 1034): if the king ‘entendeth tenlarge his frontiers

to the water of Fyeth’ to extend the kingdom of England’s frontiers ‘it shall thenne

be necessarye to use the force of a mayne armye at the begynneng of June next cum-

ming’ certain provisions must be made (detailed see Chapter 4). One the other hand

if Henry intended to show mercy to his nephew and ‘satise himself with a warre

gargareable wherewith to chastise the Scottes therby to cause them to knowe them-

selfes to thintent they maye for avoydeng further daungier submit themselfes’ only the

garrisons needed provision.

scotland between england and france 93

against Scotland did not make sense if, as seems highly likely, Henry

had already decided on war with France in the summer of 1542, except

as a necessary prelude to that war. Otherwise, Henry was exposing

himself to the danger of an ambitious campaign in the North before

his alliances in Europe were assured and before he knew what the

French would do. True, he could expect that the French would have

too much on their plate to intervene against him in 1542 but this state

of aairs would not last and the only sensible strategy in those circum-

stances was a swi and massive pre-emptive blow against the Scots;

this is precisely what Henry did not attempt.

For the Scots, who could not expect immediate French help while

the Anglo-French peace continued, Henry’s invasion was the result

of James V’s failure to break with Rome and reject his alliance with

France.

When the Scots knew the scale of the military operations

directed against them, they oered peace talks through commissioners

to meet at York. Henry told Chapuys in condence in late September

that he thought there would be no war as the Scots had already oered

reparations and return of prisoners. He also claimed they had oered

an alliance not to include France. James had even oered to come to

meet him in London.

ere was obviously a degree of bravado here

but it certainly made sense for Henry to try to achieve his objectives

without full-scale war.

The Anglo-Scottish War, 1542–1543

e initial English project was for a border war that would teach

Scottish raiders a lesson at a moment when Henry was preparing to

come out openly in favour of the Emperor. From the start, though, it

was not clear what Henry’s or English objectives were. Robert Bowes

was told to get his force ready on 28 July because of the continu-

ation of Scottish raids.

Marillac thought that the Scottish raids on

4 or 5 villages were a provocation but that the situation was made

worse because of English suspicions of a treaty linking the Scots and

James V to Paul III. 9 Nov. 152, BL Royal MSS, 18 (L&P, XVII, 1060); Beaton to

Pope Paul III, 10 Nov. 1542, A. iener, Vetera Monumenta Hibernorum et Scotorum

(Rome, 1864), 613 (L&P, XVII, 1072).

Chapuys to Mary of Hungary, 27 Sept. 1542, L&P, XVII, 852.

Instructions for Bowes, 28 July 1542, St.P., V, pp. 205 (L&P, XVII, 540).

94 chapter two

the French. He reported massive mobilisation on 22 August and

that the English blamed the French for setting on the Scots.

While

Rutland, sent to Berwick as Warden with 5–6000 men, was commis-

sioned to negotiate and not to attack unless the Scots attacked rst,

the Wardens of the Marches were empowered to take revenge for any

attack. Nevertheless, the tone of correspondence seems to be one of

wait-and-see: if the Scots attacked with a main army, then the for-

tresses at Berwick, Norham and Carlisle were to be put in a state of

defence; battle was not to be risked until further decision from the

King.

Exchanges continued with James V through his ambassador,

James Liermonth in which Henry purported to accept his nephew’s

good will but blamed incursions into English territory on the ‘yvell

disposed myndes and counsailours’ of the Scottish King.

A day aer

that letter was written, on 24 August 1542, Bowes was nally ordered

into Scotland but his force was routed at Haddon Rig near Kelso. As a

raid in force it was a disastrous failure since Bowes divided his troops

and was beleaguered by faster-moving and smaller detachments. He

lost about 1000 men.

is defeat could not simply be ignored, however preposterously

it was ‘spun’ for French consumption.

At the end of August Henry

furiously ordered a ‘main army’ to invade Scotland under the com-

mand of the Duke of Norfolk. Southampton was to have the vanguard

(‘vaward’) with 4000 men, Norfolk the battle with 5000 and Rutland,

hitherto Lord Warden, the rearguard with perhaps another 4000. With

cavalry of around 2000 and the 6000 to be le under Suolk’s com-

mand as the new Warden, there were around 20,000 men, as Ridpath

claimed, though half of the Warden’s men would be ‘borderers’ rather

Marillac to Francis I, 1 Aug. 1542, Kaulek, p. 441 (L&P, XVII, 559); Marillac to

Francis I, 23 Aug. 1542, Kaulek, p. 454 (L&P, XVII, 654).

Henry VIII, instruction to the Wardens, 7 Aug. 1542, L&P, XVII, 574; Intruc-

tions to Rutland, early Aug., ibid, no. 577; Henry VIII to Rutland and his council,

22 Aug. 1542, Hamilton Papers I, no. 123 (L&P, XVII, 650).

James V to Henry VIII and to Leirmonth, 20 Aug. 1542, L&P, XVII, 642, 643.

Henry VIII to James V, 23 Aug. 1543, BL Add. 50825, fo. 1 (L&P, XVII, 653).

G. Phillips, e Anglo-Scots Wars, 1513–1550: A Military History (Woodbridge,

1999), p. 148.

Council to Paget, 2 Sept. [1542], BL Cotton, E IV, fo. 147: ‘[the] Scottes have

been a little busied [and have] taken certain of our men prisoners.’ Henry explicitly

ordered the subsequent invasion to go ahead so that ‘the dishonour [of Bowes’ defeat]

be in some parte purged’ and, crucially, that it should not be said that the English

army in the North, though greater in numbers ‘durst not abide tencountre with the

Scottes.’ (Henry VIII to Commissioners in North, 9 Oct. 1542, Hamilton Papers, I,

p. 261).

scotland between england and france 95

than men in pay.

Norfolk would be unlikely to have more than

14,000 men at his disposal. e Scots continued to seek negotiations

and the Duke was empowered to negotiate with them at York from

18 September. Considering the assembly of a ‘main army’ was under

way, most of the terms oered in Henry VIII’s instructions show some

restraint, even though he was wary of the negotiations being spun out

in view of the lateness of the season: Henry demanded the release of

English prisoners, the surrender of rebels and traitors, withdrawal from

encroachments on English territory. However, his demand that nei-

ther side aid any other prince and come to each other’s aid if invaded

struck directly at the Franco-Scottish alliance and reveals Henry’s true

preoccupation: to remove the Scots’ threat before his own war with

France began. For the Scots to give way on this, though, would have

been a real capitulation.

When talks began, though the English, led

by Norfolk, were tough in their approach, the Scots showed readiness

to agree except that they needed to consult King James on the ques-

tion of the French alliance and they thought the demands for highly-

placed hostages unlikely to be accepted. All the same, Norfolk and his

colleagues thought they had behaved ‘unfeynidlye.’

Henry was now

insisting on James coming to see him in London before Christmas,

though seems to have agreed that the new terms of the Anglo-Scottish

treaty could be discussed then. Norfolk and his colleagues put this to

the Scots on 27 September and on 29th Henry seemed to be prepared

to accept the terms that all prisoners would be returned immediately;

James would come to London and the ambassadors would remain as

pledges.

On 5 October it became clear, though, that severe divisions

within James V’s council would make it impossible to agree to a meet-

ing with Henry in London and the negotiation was broken o.

Suolk’s 6000, half borderers, half men of Lincolnshire and his tenants in

Warwickshire (Hamilton Papers, I, pp. 203–204); Norfolk’s 5000 of the battle, (ibid.,

p. 243); Southampton’s 4000 (ibid., p. 268); G. Ridpath, e Border-History of England

and Scotland deduced from the earliest times to the union of two crowns (Edinburgh/

Berwick, 1776), p. 538.

Henry VIII’s instructions to Norfolk, 12 Sept. 1542, Hamilton Papers, I, no. 158,

pp. 190–197.

Norfolk, Southampton, Tunstall and Browne to Henry VIII, 19 Sept. 1542, Ham-

ilton Papers, I, no. 167, pp. 207–210.

Henry VIII to Norfolk et al., 22 Sept. 1542, Hamilton Papers, I, no. 175; Norfolk

et al. to Henry VIII, 27 Sept. 1542, ibid., no. 181; Henry VIII to Norfolk et al., 29 Sept.

1542, ibid., no. 189.

Commissioners to Henry VIII, 5 Oct. 1542, Hamilton Papers, I, no. 197, pp. 249–

252.

96 chapter two

Unfortunately for Henry, his army under Norfolk’s command did not

prosper, despite the Duke’s close attention to planning. Southampton’s

letters present a litany of misery about supplies (perhaps aggravated

by his poor health) and Norfolk warned about the fast approach of

the ‘ill tyme of the yere,’ so much earlier in the North. At the end of

September the King seemed to accept that the dearth of supplies and

the lateness of the season would make a full scale operation impos-

sible. A devastating border raid would be an alternative.

e start

of the campaign was put o rst from 6 October to 11th and then to

15th.

ere were also command problems. On 15 October William

Fitzwilliam, Earl of Southampton died on the expedition. Edward

Seymour earl of Hertford was sent north on 16th to replace him in

command of the vanguard. e military expedition that began on

23 October was ill-fated. e army was not a well-organised force and

the invasion of Scotland projected from Berwick little more than a raid

towards Roxburgh (burning Kelso abbey). en supplies ran out and

Norfolk had to withdraw.

is poor showing enraged the King and

Henry ordered the leadership of the army, once the supply shortages

were sorted out, to return at the start of November.

e poor showing of the main English army was oset by the

fortuitous destruction of another Scottish army at Solway Moss on

24 November by local English border forces under Wharton. A certain

amount of luck was involved in all this. James V’s main army, raised

to confront Norfolk, had disbanded on his retreat but the king was

able to raise a new force from the retinues of the nobility and was anx-

ious to exploit the advantage. e result was a large-scale raid into the

‘debateable land’ of the west march. It was never intended as a serious

invasion of England and the number of casualties (apart from the loss

of horses) not great. It has even been argued that Solway Moss was

little more than a brawl. But the battle fought along the river Esk was

a political disaster for James V in that a signicant number of great

Scottish nobles – including Cassillis, Maxwell, Fleming, Gray, Oliphant

and Somerville – were captured and Henry VIII was encouraged to

Letters of Southampton, 19, 21, 27 Sept. 1542, Hamilton papers, I, nos. 166, 173,

185; Norfolk et al. to Council, 27 Sept., ibid., no. 182; Henry VIII to Norfolk et al.,

29 Sept. 1542, ibid., no. 189.

Norfolk’s mandate, Hamilton Papers, I, pp. 226–227; Commissioners to Henry

VIII, 2 Oct. 542, ibid., I, no. 193, p. 246.

G. Phillips, e Anglo-Scots Wars, pp. 149–150.

scotland between england and france 97

believe that he now had the whip hand.

James died at Falkland on

14 December. His daughter Mary had been born on 8th. e Scottish

prisoners were made much of when they arrived in London. Hertford

brought them in and on 21 December John Gage accompanied the

leading prisoners suitably arrayed through streets of London ‘ridinge

afore them alone’ from the Tower to Westminster for their reception

in Star Chamber and allocation to custody.

Whether Henry’s discontent with the main expedition was oset

by the victory at Solway Moss and the death of James V is dicult to

say. At all events Henry and his agents had to confront the situation

in Scotland; the fate of the newly-born Mary Stuart alone was crucial

if only because of her position in the English succession. It was quickly

apparent that her marriage to Henry’s son was vital to English secu-

rity. ere is little doubt that, in the eyes of foreign observers, Henry

was optimistic about what he called his ‘greate aayre of Scotland’

during the early months of 1543.

As the news of Solway Moss and of

the death of James V came in (it was not yet clear whether the young

child Mary had survived), Chapuys reported that Henry and his coun-

cillors were very distracted with business. e news was plainly the

spur to frantic activity. e King, while exploiting his victory modestly

and treating his prisoners well, was likely to follow the opportunity

in Scotland to the end and it was this that concerned Chapuys. e

ambassador naturally feared that grander projects in Scotland would

divert Henry from the joint attack on France projected in the dra

Anglo-Imperial treaty.

At Christmas 1542, a Scottish ship was being tted out in Dieppe

for war, including 16–20 men of Dieppe in its crew ‘utterly geven to do

Englishemen displeasure more promptly and violently than the Scottes

theselves.’ Two other Scottish ‘tall ships’ – the Lion and the Mary

Willoughby under John Barton Scottish vice-admiral, were haunting

the Norman coast, some Scots trying to board an English ship.

ese

were the ships observed by Henry VIII to be hovering for the English

Bordeaux eet and in whose absence an English squadron under Lisle

For two modern accounts, see Merriman, Rough Wooings, pp. 77–82; G. Phillips,

Anglo-Scots Wars, pp. 150–153.

Wriothesley, Chronicle, I, p. 139.

Henry VIII to Lisle, 8 Jan. 1543, Hamilton papers, I, 363 (L&P, XVIII, i, 19).

Chapuys to Charles V, 15 Jan. 1543, L&P, XVIII, i, 43.

Intelligence from Normandy, 1 Jan. 1543, NA SP1/175, fo. 33–34 (L&P, XVIII,

i, 40.2).

98 chapter two

could intercept the Scots merchant eet o Campfer and block the

Firth of Forth. Unless argent action were taken Henry told his men

in the North, Scottish aairs ‘may turn to our great displeasure and

incommodity.’

e other side of Henry’s approach was the diplomatic one.

Formally, as soon as James was dead, a truce between England and

Scotland came into eect.

Ten of the 23 major Scottish prisoners in

the Tower – including Glencairn, Cassillis, Maxwell, Fleming, Gray,

Somerville – agreed in December 1542 to collaborate with English pol-

icy. ese, along with the exiled Earl of Angus and his brother, held

lands concentrated south of the Forth. On 10 January, before return-

ing to Scotland, they signed articles agreeing to ensure that the young

Queen Mary should marry prince Edward and that, if she died, Henry

would take the government of Scotland into his own hands. When the

‘Assured Lords’ returned to Scotland and met the new Governor, in

eect regent, James Earl of Arran, they might have seemed a threat to

him but in fact he was able to use them to set aside and then arrest

Cardinal Beaton, then his great rival for power. Arran seemed to be

gravitating into the camp of those who wished to reform the Church

in Scotland and aligning himself with Henry’s objectives seemed to

serve his purpose.

Henry’s trusted Scottish expert, Sadler, arrived in Scotland on

18 March to nd a Governor apparently receptive to idea of Church

reform and fresh from a successful meeting of the Scottish Parliament.

e ambassador sent to London for copies of the English Bible and

the acts of Parliament by which Henry had broken with Rome.

is

can only have conrmed Henry in his view that he had been given

a heaven-sent opportunity to neutralise the Scottish threat to his

wider plans. e subsequent negotiations in London over the details

of the Anglo-Scottish treaty concerned particularly the maintenance

of Scottish independence and separate institutions in the event of

a dynastic union. A stumbling block was the refusal of the Scottish

commissioners to abandon the French alliance or declare war against

France. ey also insisted on Arran’s position as Governor until the

Henry VIII to Lisle, 8 Jan. 1543 L&P, XVIII, i, 19.

Prolonged until the conclusion of a treaty in July 1543, L&P, XVIII, i, 54, 173,

239, 251, 269, 436.

Merriman, Rough Wooings, pp. 111–115.

Sadler, 1 April 1543, L&P, XVIII, i, 348.

scotland between england and france 99

majority of the Queen and that she should be kept in Scotland until

the age of eight, with her marriage to Edward at the age of twelve. e

arrival of Glencairn and George Douglas aided compromise and agree-

ment reached by mid-May that included the giving of hostages. When

the terms were brought back to Edinburgh early in June, a restricted

meeting the ree Estates approved them and the terms were sent

back for agreement by commissioners at Greenwich on 1 July in the

form of the peace treaty and a related marriage treaty. is generated

some optimism for English control of Scotland while Henry was at

war with France, yet curiously Henry did not ratify the treaty as far

as we can tell.

is may reect his uncertainty about the viability of

the treaties.

e problem with all this was that Arran’s strategy depended on

a minority of the Scottish nobility and was thus inherently unstable.

Arran could by no means control either the Lords of the Articles or

the Council, which were fairly evenly balanced between pro- and anti-

English factions. Beaton was now also no longer in custody and likely

to be a powerful inuence against the pro-English policy, while the

arrival of Arran’s bastard half-brother from France brought his inu-

ence to bear against any further religious changes.

In the course of July

and August, the pro-English cause collapsed as some of the Assured

Lords defected and a series of popular uprisings led by lords close to

Beaton sought to gain control of the baby Queen. A Bond was signed

by a group of clerics, earls, lords and lairds to oppose misgovernment

on 24 July. Mary was transferred to Stirling and Arran openly came to

terms with Beaton in September.

Arran, who had no illusions about

Henry VIII’s power, was reported as declaring in the Council that ‘I

thinke and take it best by fare words and promises, with concluding of

this peas, to deferre and put over the danger that might otherwise fall

upon us.’

How do we explain the failure of English policy in 1543?

Rymer, Foedera VI, pp. 93–95 (L&P, XVIII, i, 804); M.H. Merriman, ‘e Assured

Scots,’ Scottish Historical Review, 1968, pp. 10–34. e point about the absence of

ratication was made by E. Bonner, ‘French reactions to the Rough Wooings of Mary

Queen of Scots’ Journal of the Sydney Society for Scottish History, 6 (1998) (1998),

332–333.

John Hamilton, abbot of Paisley, ‘of the cast of France and the Cardinal’s greatt

friend’ Hamilton Papers, I, p. 520, I, p. 142 (L&P, XVIII, i, 425, p. 250).

Bond: Hamilton Papers, I, pp. 630–632. On all this see Merriman, Rough Woo-

ings, pp. 121–128.

Parr, 6 July 1543, Hamilton papers, I, 555 (L&P, XVIII, i, 827).