Potter David. Henry VIII and Francis I
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60 chapter one
ambassador ‘how dangerous would be the alliance of a daughter of
England with a son of France already discontented, given various
claims which exist in abundance in the ancient quarrel of England
in Normandy and Guyenne.’ e Dauphin in particular was opposed
and these tensions inevitably rendered Francis’ policy in the matter
indecisive. He had for years counted on solving his problems with
the Emperor by the investiture of Orléans. Now things were not so
clear.
120
e talks dribbled on at York and, when the court returned to
London, neither side was willing to issue commissions to negotiate.
121
Paget let it be known that he thought the French only wanted an end
to the pension.
122
Norfolk’s authority, in any case, was on the wane
with the fall of his niece, Katherine Howard. His brother had already
been replaced as ambassador by a gure, in Paget, of evidently lower
status if greater grasp of aairs.
123
At the end of the year, Marillac was ordered to freeze the negotia-
tion on the argument that it was now obvious that the English only
wanted to make their prot from it elsewhere.
124
ere was ferment in
the French royal entourage around this time, with Tournon suering
a temporary fall from favour in January.
125
A treaty with Denmark
was signed on 29 November.
126
Morvilliers was despatched to Scotland
with the task (probably) of bringing it into this alliance. e increas-
ing likelihood that Francis’ envoys Rincon and Fregoso, had been
120
‘comme seroit suspecte l’alliance d’une lle d’Angleterre pour ung lz de
France desia mal content, pretendant plusieurs droitz, qui d’abondant pouroit pren-
dre l’ancienne querelle dud. Angleterre quant au pays de Normandye et Guyenne.’
Charles V to Marnol, 13 May 1542, HHSA, Frankreich fasz. 10, ‘Karl an Villey I–V,
fo. 39; Credence for Jaillon, 3 July 1542, ibid., fasz. 10, ‘Viley an Krl, V–VII 1542, fos.
49v–50r. See also D. Potter, ‘Politics and faction at the court of Francis I: the duch-
esse d’Etampes, Montmorency and the Dauphin Henri, French History, July 2007,
127–146.
121
Marillac to Francis, 26 Sept., 14 Nov. 1541, Kaulek, pp. 341–345, p. 356; Norfolk
to Henry VIII, 31 Oct. 1541, St.P., I, p. 688.
122
Marnol to Mary of Hungary, 26 Dec. 1541, HHSA., P.A. 41 fo. 23v.
123
On the crucial gure of Paget, see most recently A. Johnson, ‘William Paget and
the late Henrician Polity’ (Ph.D. thesis, Saint Andrews, 2003). is is more detailed
than S.R. Gammon, Statesman and Schemer. William First Lord Paget, Tudor Minister
(Newton Abbot, 1973).
124
Francis to Marillac, 1 Dec. 1541, Kaulek, p. 369.
125
Francois, Tournon, p. 187.
126
Correspondance de Matignon, p. 158; CAF, IV, 260, 12214; AE Mémoires et
documents, Danemark, 9, fo. 63; Mémoires du sieur Richer, ambassadeur pour les
rois François Ier et Henry II en Suède et en Danemarch, (Troyes, 1625), introduction;
Mémoires du sieur Richer, in N. Camusat, Mélanges historiques, fos. 1–3.
the road to war
61
murdered by the Emperor’s agents and the disaster of the Emperor’s
defeat at Algiers led to a heightened crisis. e Council in France was
in almost continuous session and the Imperial ambassador was still
reporting in March that the leading ministers were distracted by the
news of war, fearing blame for any failure.
127
ough things settled
down aer the rst week of January 1542, French dispositions for
the coming war with the Emperor were now clearer – alliances with
Cleves, Scotland, Denmark and Sweden – and had to accept a poten-
tially hostile England.
France had in eect undergone a severe diplomatic reverse revealed
by Henry’s change of attitude towards Chapuys late in 1541. Marillac
asked to be replaced by someone else who might save the situation. He
was not aware that the security of his communications had been com-
pletely compromised by his secretary, Jean de Hons, though the eects
were all too plain.
128
But the overall strategy of France (delaying the
start of war with the Emperor) demanded one more attempt to inveigle
Henry VIII into an alliance. e thinking within the French Council
as it debated the issue of peace or war with the Emperor was recorded
by du Bellay and is profoundly instructive. It was argued that Henry
had failed to come to the help of his old ally in 1536 and was even less
likely to do so now. It was likely that he continued to resent Charles V’s
welcome in France in 1539, he was ‘ulceré’ about the French mar-
riages of James V and the fortication of Ardres. But worst of all was
that Henry had been unable to entice Francis to ‘introduce change in
his kingdom in the state of religion’ Yet, it was argued, there was still
hope of getting him on side if only because of the ‘esteem he has for
the king’s person,’ the great honour he had always held him in and ‘the
small satisfaction he had had from the Emperor.’
129
127
Paget to Henry VIII, 7 Dec. 1541, St.P., VIII, p. 643; Marnol to Granvelle, 3 Mar.
1542, HHSA, Frankreich 9, ‘Villey an Karl I–V,’ fo. 37v: ‘sont assez distrait de ceste
oppinion de guerre, preveant le hazard et aussi qu’ilz seroient chargez du desordre.’
128
Marillac to Chabot, 17 Jan. 1542, Kaulek, pp. 384–385; Chapuys to Granvelle,
7 May 1542, L&P, XVII, 310. Vaissière, in his detailed study of Marillac’s embassy in
England, was unaware of this dimension because he had no access to Imperial archives
for the period. See P. de Vaissière, Charles de Marillac, ambassadeur et homme poli-
tique sous les règnes de François Ier, Henri II et François II, 1510–1560 (Paris, 1896),
pp. 42–65.
129
Du Bellay, Mémoires, IV, pp. 55–56: ‘muer en son royaume le faict et estat de
la religion,’ ‘l’estime qu’il avoit de la personne du Roy’ ‘le peu de contentement qu’il
avoit de l’Empereur.’
62 chapter one
Marillac, instead of being recalled, was told to take up his conversa-
tion with Norfolk again and even revive the plan, mooted in 1541, for
a meeting between the kings of England, France and Scotland. Chabot
and Marguerite of Navarre both expressed their backing and this
time, a written commission was sent.
130
In England, Marillac, Norfolk,
Southampton and Gardiner met for talks in March. Marillac was under
no more illusions than Chapuys about English motives (to up their
price with the Emperor) and saw Gardiner as ‘as good an imperial as
a bad Frenchman.’
131
Parallel accounts of these meetings make clear
that neither side was prepared to compromise on the crucial points.
Marillac’s only hope was to prolong the talks to stop England going
over to the Emperor; as it was, ‘these people do not have such a good
will as they say they have that this matter be brought to a success-
ful conclusion.’
132
While Chabot persuaded Francis to compromise on
Mary’s legitimacy, allowing the Act of Bastardisation to stand while
taking her as legitimate, the French still insisted the pensions must go
and that Henry must nance Orléans’ bid for Milan should Mary be
excluded from the succession.
133
By the end of April, Marillac’s only
solutions were to conclude a disadvantageous agreement, to tempo-
rise for thirty days or to put forward some new proposal.
134
Possibly
in response, Admiral Chabot, already a ‘speceall and secret worker’
in the talks, proposed a special embassy to England.
135
ere seems
to have been too much opposition among Francis’ other councillors,
from whom Chabot had tried to conceal the matter.
136
Tournon had
been away from court but had now returned. Paget continued to be
fêted at the French court. Marguerite of Navarre said that he ‘work-
ing hard for the marriage of Monsieur d’Orléans and the daughter of
130
Francis to Marillac, 24 Jan. 1542, Kaulek, p. 381; 11 March 1542, ibid., p. 387;
15 Feb. 1542, ibid., p. 389; full powers to Marillac, 10 Feb. 1542, Kaulek, p. 388, with
Mary as ‘lle légitime;’ Paget to Henry VIII, 26 Feb. 1542, St.P., VIII, pp. 660–665.
131
Marillac to Francis, 20 May 1542, Kaulek, p. 420: Gardiner ‘aussi bon impérial
que mauvais françoys.’
132
Marillac to Francis, 4 March 1542, Kaulek, pp. 390–394 at p. 393: ‘ceulx-cy n’ont
si grande volunté qu’ilz disoient avoir, que cest aaire soit conduict à bonne n.;’
Council to Paget, 3 March 1542, St.P., VIII, pp. 668–671 (his rst formal notication
of the talks, ostensibly at Henry’s command.)
133
Instructions to Marillac, 13 March 1542, Kaulek, pp. 395–396.
134
Marillac to Francis, 13 April 1542, Kaulek, p. 409.
135
Council to Paget, 29 March 1542, NA, SP1/169, fos. 184–191. Paget had writ-
ten to Chabot ostensibly for merchants’ suits (Paget to Chabot, 9 March [1542], Plas
Newydd, Anglesey MSS, Box. 1, no. 19, fo. 34).
136
[Paget] to the Council, 19 April 1542, L&P, XVII, 254.
the road to war
63
England’ and the admiral’s secretary was to be sent to England.
137
At
this moment, with irrevocable decisions being taken in France for war
with the Emperor, Chabot seems to have been striving to maintain
peace with England. He was, though, in a precarious position. e
imperial ambassador in France reported that the Admiral:
is no longer certain and . . . assured and established in his credit and that
his authority depends on the support of Madame d’Estampes, who all
her life has been light and unstable. e Admiral has been told that
Madame d’Estampes has held long discussions with M. de Guise.
138
He had to guard against his enemies, should the talks fail and Marillac
not prevent the English from joining an imperial alliance. In late
April, Chabot turned all his powers of persuasion on William Paget
in deploying a subtle argument for an Anglo-French alliance. ough
Henry had been persuaded by his councillors to favour the Emperor,
what was that worth?
England is a kingdom perpetual and so is Fraunce. Our masters, their
children, the succession may reyne for ever. We be undir one clime and
of one complexion, we be at hande to one another.
Charles, on the other hand, headed an empire that would end with
his death and what was more ‘he careth not if freende, father and
all to gidre shuld sinke so as his insaciable desire to reigne might be
satised.’ Charles was now down; ‘therefore let us take him while he
is lowe before he take his breth.’ Paget was taken aback by all this but
not taken in. He accepted that Chabot was probably ‘none imperiall
and an utter enemy to Rome’ but realised he was ‘an old player’ at this
kind of game and that, so far, despite promises, no special envoy had
been sent to England.
139
Chabot opted for Marillac’s third alternative, a new proposal, and a
scheme was discussed for a joint Anglo-French attack on the Emperor,
137
Du Boys to duke of Cleves, 25 April 1542, SAD, Julich-Berg II, 1940, fos. 376v–
77r: Paget ‘brasse fort le mariage de monsr d’Orleans à la lle de l’Anglois.’
138
Marnol to Charles V, 2 May 1542, HHSA, Frankreich 10, ‘Villey an Karl, V–VII’
fo. 4r: ‘Ne se tient encores certain et . . . asseuré ou estably en son credit et que son
auctorité deppend de la seureté qui se peult prendre en Madame d’Estampes, qui toute
sa vie a esté legiere et instable, aussi que ledict Admiral est adverty que ladicte dame
d’Estampes a tenu long propoz avec Monsr de Guyse . . .’
139
Paget to Henry VIII, 22 April 1542, NA, SP1/170, fos. 23–33 at fos. 28–29 (L&P,
XVII, 263).
64 chapter one
both sides claiming it had been made by the other.
140
When Chabot
sent his secretary, Châteauneuf, to England, it was to stress Francis’
strong desire for an agreement and to oer new proposals. ese
demanded as a dowry for Mary the 1 million écus arrears of the pen-
sion (or 600,000 if not acceptable, the rest to be over 8 years). e
French would pay 300,000 for the life pension and possibility of a joint
campaign in the Netherlands mooted.
141
is was the high point of French hopes; Marillac was sorely dis-
appointed when he met Southampton, Gardiner and Wriothesley on
4 May 1542 (they were about to meet Chapuys – see p. 73). Henry,
perhaps deciding to bring the comedy to an end, was in the country,
would not meet the French ambassador and dismissed the proposals
at the outset. His councillors even told Châteauneuf to leave the room
during discussion because he could produce no letter of credence.
142
In eect, the attempt to prevent England from joining the Imperial
camp had failed. e Cleves representative in France noted the furious
negotiations and that ‘they hope here in this way to draw the English
into war against the Emperor. But I believe that he, the English [king]
will appear to go along as he is accustomed to do until he has seen the
king at war.’
143
Francis ordered Marillac to discontinue talks, remark-
ing that ‘my son is of good enough house to nd a wife’ (‘mondit lz
est d’assez bonne maison pour trouver femme.’) Chabot had called the
talks ‘le dernier sacrament’ and sighed melancholy sighs.
144
For Paget,
140
‘e overtures made by thadmyrall in the conferences betwixt Mr Paget and
him,’ NA, SP1/170, fos. 46–47 (L&P, XVII, 269.4); ‘Double des propoz tenuz entre
monseigneur l’admiral et l’ambassadeur du roy d’Angleterre,’ Kaulek, pp. 411–412.
e Venetian ambassador thought an agreement on the cards (Dandolo to the Doge,
26 April 1542, BnF, it. 1715, p. 319).
141
Francis I, Instructions to G. Gellimard sr de Châteauneuf, 23 April 1542, Kaulek,
pp. 412–415.
142
Henry VIII to Southampton, Gardiner and Wriothesley, 1 May 1542, St.P., I,
pp. 728–732 (L&P, XVII, 286); Southampton, Gardiner and Wriothesley to Henry VIII,
5 May 1542, L&P, XVII, 297.
143
Cruser to Duke of Cleves, 1 May 1542, SAD, Julich-Berg II, 1940, fo. 328: ‘ilz
esperont icy que par ce ilz tireront l’Anglois à la guerre contre l’Empereur. Mais je
crois, il, l’Anglois, ne s’en meslera, mais que l’Anglois fera bon semblant comme il
accoustumé de faire jusques à ce qu’il aura mis le roy à la guerre.’ and 13 May 1542,
ibid., fos. 393–397 (Bers, p. 210): ‘Le roy eut nouvelles d’Angleterre, car le secretaire de
Monsr l’Admiral qui y estoit allé retourna apportant que l’Anglois faisoit le frit donnant
toutesfois esperance que le mariaige d’entre monsr d’Orleans et sa lle se pourra faire
quelque iour, ce qu’il falloit que l’Anglois gaigna aucuns de ses gens qu’il dict y estre fort
contraire, que entend bien par ce qu’il cherche longueur. L’empereur sollicite de l’avoir
avec rien ou bien peu, la ou le Roy demande pour monsr d’Orleans beaucoup.’
144
Marillac to Francis, 6 May 1542, Kaulek, pp. 417–419; Southampton et al. to
the road to war
65
in his customary vivid language, ‘these men here stande like a deere
upon a launde, and wote not well, me thinketh, which way to take.’
When asked what the king would do next, the common answer had
been ‘no men can tell, nor the King himself, until Neufchasteau cum
out of England.’
145
Now, they had their answer but the die was cast for
war with the Emperor in any case.
Just before war was declared by Francis on the Emperor on 12
July 1542, Paget, no doubt on orders, started to use positive words
to Cardinal du Bellay and Admiral Chabot.
146
Claude de L’Aubespine
was sent to England with a credence in Francis’ hand and long set of
instructions (maximising French military potential), justifying his war
in terms of the murder of Rincon and Fregoso and inviting Henry
to join Francis in a coalition with the Kings of Denmark, Sweden,
Scotland, the Dukes of Saxony, Cleves and Prussia. It was, of course,
a mere formality; L’Aubespine was kept waiting at Guildford while
Marillac was fully aware of Chapuys’ progress. Henry sourly reminded
Francis that such a war would open the way to the Turk, that he had
oered his mediation in the past but Francis had preferred to trust
the Bishop of Rome and that he could not enter any treaty he had not
seen; he could do nothing to prejudice his obligations to the Emperor.
Paget was told to cool war talk, though, by insisting that reinforce-
ments to Calais were purely defensive. Chapuys, through his spy on
Marillac’s sta, had a copy of Francis’s letter making clear that Paget
had initiated the move, but he was prepared to be indulgent; he was
now much more condent of Henry’s decision.
147
Henry VIII, 5 May 1542, St.P., I, pp. 732–740; same to same, ibid., IX, p. 17; Francis
to Marillac, 14 May 1542, Kaulek, pp. 419–420.
145
Paget to Henry VIII, 15 May 1542, St.P., IX, pp. 26–38 (the bishop of Agde’s
mission to Portugal had also failed).
146
Paget to Henry VIII, 9 July 1542, St.P., IX, p. 75 (L&P, XVII, 479); Council to
Paget, 23 [July 1542], BL Cotton, E III, fo. 43: Henry’s ‘pleasure is in [ca]ce you shal
chaunce to commen with thadmyral of thamytie you shal of yourself tel him that
you marvayl they consider not that m[atier] of the pencion and make some honest
me[ane] and divise for the satisfaction of it.’
147
Instructions to L’Aubespine, 8 July 1542, Kaulek, p. 431 (L&P, XVII, 470, 513,
518). Chapuys to Mary of Hungary, 19 July 1542, L&P, XVII, 513. Henry to Francis,
23 July 1542, St.P., IX, no. 748. e Venetian ambassador was pessimistic (to the
Doge, 11 June 1542, BnF, it. 1715, p. 362). Da iene to the duke of Ferrara, Lyons,
15 Aug. 1542 ASM, Francia, B 18, p. 2: Report on L’Aubespine’s mission. Henry had
shown scepticism about French oers ‘dimonstrando non sicurare solto della amicitia
ne confederatione con lo Imperatore.’ (passage in cipher undeciphered); Marillac to
L’Aubespine, 28 Aug. 1542, BnF, fr. 6621, fo. 153.
66 chapter one
‘To make the worlde newe again:’ Henry and the Emperor
e strategic problems between Henry and the Emperor were funda-
mentally dierent from those with France. e personal relations of the
monarchs were poor and the facts of Henry’s repudiation of Catherine
of Aragon and Break with Rome massive stumbling blocks. Habsburg
diplomacy ruthlessly sought to exploit the dierences between Henry
and Francis.
148
On the other hand, as one adviser pointed out to Henry
in 1536 ‘there is nother debt nor dominion between them in question.’
149
As has been seen, the arrival of the Emperor in France in December
1539 was a moment of alarm for England and the very closeness of the
trading relations between England and the Emperor’s Low Countries
could always provide cause for dispute. ere were some contrary
indications, though. omas Wyatt, disposed on the whole to favour
Charles over Francis, in a series of acute observations over the winter,
reported the opinion of some in France that the Emperor was just
stringing them along. A little later, he saw the meeting in terms of the
‘necessite of th’emperour and the conestable,’ Charles unable to reach
the Low Countries through Italy, while Montmorency ‘ahorrythe from
the warre or that himselle is ryche, desiryng his plesure and ese.’
He was not under any illusions but preferred to push his sickly mas-
ter toward an imperial alliance rather than show ‘desperation’ about
it. At the time of the Brancetour incident he noted in Charles ‘his
lowder voyce, his ernester looke and specially his imperious fashon in
his woordes.’
150
Yet in April 1540, the French ambassador at Venice
reported a view that, unable to reach an agreement with Francis,
Charles:
Unable to avoid war, wished to join with the King of England, even
though this was against the Christian name, and also against the Pope,
because if he did not do so, eventually the [French] King would.
148
For example, Chapuys to Hannart, 4 March 1535/6, HHSA, Frankreich, Varia
4, fo. 107r (deciph): ‘les aaires entre ceulx cy et les Francois ne sont clers et pource
est se temps de pescher pendant que l’eaue est troublé.’
149
Paper on foreign policy, 1536, BL Cotton. Vitellius, B XIV, 12 (L&P, X, 1254),
very damaged.
150
Wyatt, 2 Dec. 1539, 25 Dec., 7 Jan. 1540, Muir, Letters of Sir omas Wyatt, pp.
100, 110, 127. With Bonner, 30 Dec. 1539, BL Harl. 282, fo. 155.
the road to war
67
ey thus expected a ‘cruelle guerre.’
151
News of Cromwell’s fall,
though not greeted so gushingly by Charles as by Francis
152
was nev-
ertheless welcome in the Low Countries, since it helped to undermine
the Anglo-Cleves negotiations. e new ambassador who replaced
omas Wyatt in May/June, Richard Pate, archdeacon of Lincoln, was
enthusiastic about a renewal of the Burgundian alliance. Early in July,
he delightedly reported from Bruges:
I do thincke that there is not an embassadour in this courte that bele-
vithe not that there is an amytie betwingte owr soveraigne Lord the
kinges maiestie and themperour that makith them all as I am informed
to tremble: as for my parte I woolde it shoulde no lesse succede in verie
dede then they feare the lyklyhode of the same.
153
e self-proclaimed pro-English lord of Berghen insisted that the
Emperor ‘so entierlie loved you as was not possible more’ and hoped
‘that the families of Inglond and Burgundie shuld indure and continue
frindes against all adversaries for ever as in al entreprises hitherto it
had byn faithfully proved.’
154
In July 1540, Eustace Chapuys returned to England as ambassador,
replacing a highly ineective stop-gap. Charles de Marillac thought him
unwelcome both to Henry and Norfolk and he was certainly dogged
by ill health but at least he was a more experienced observer that his
predecessor, Maijoris.
155
e two ambassadors resided in neighbouring
houses on the river at Stepney and liked to score points o each other.
It was Chapuys’ corruption of Marillac’s, secretary, Jean de Hons,
156
151
G. Pellicier to Montmorency, Venice, 19 April 1540, Ribier, I, p. 520: ‘Ne
pouuant éuiter qu’il y eût guerre, se vouloit vnir auec le Roy d’Angleterre, encore que
ce soit contre le nom Chrestien, & aussi contre le Pape: pour ce qu’en ne le faisant, en
tout éuenement le Roy le feroit.’
152
Pate to Norfolk, 16 June 1540, St.P., VIII, 355 (L&P, XV, 794); for Granvelle’s report
of Cromwell’s words in the scaold, Selve to Montmorency, the Hague, 10 Aug. 1540,
A. Tausserat-Radel (ed.), Correspondance de Guillaume Pellicier à Venise (1540–1542),
2 vols. (Paris, 1899), II, p. 636.
153
Pate to Norfolk, Bruges, 9 July 1540, NA, SP1/161, fo. 72 (L&P, XV, 864).
154
Pate to Henry VIII, 31 July 1540, NA, SP1/161, fo. 209 (L&P, XV, 931).
155
L&P, XV, 885; Marillac to Montmorency, 29 July 1540, Kaulek, p. 207 (L&P,
XV, 926).
156
His identity is conrmed by Chapuys to Granvelle, 7 May 1542, L&P, XVII,
310. He seems to have had contacts in Artois and sought a prebend at Arras for his
brother Charles, then a student at Orléans. Chapuys was unsparing with his payments.
e mystery is how de Hons was able to nd the time to copy out so many ciphered
despatches of his master.
68 chapter one
though, that proved the high point of a real diplomatic dual. is had
massive signicance in that it gave the Imperial ambassador the crucial
edge over his competitor. Chapuys, on the surface amiable enough,
told Marillac that, at his much delayed rst audience, Henry ‘waited to
see if he would raise anything else, and seeing that he would not, they
stood there looking at each other . . . and the king was dismayed.’
157
e despatch of Gardiner and Knyvett on a grand (if poorly docu-
mented) embassy to Charles in November was a signicant develop-
ment. It mystied the outside world, Chapuys included, though we
know that Wallop was supposed to report developments to Gardiner.
e Emperor’s letter of thanks was entirely non-committal.
158
Marillac
thought its purpose similar to that of Norfolk to France earlier in the
year (to disturb the Franco-Imperial relationship) and there may be
something in this, even though his assessment of English fears was a
year out of date.
159
All the same, Charles’ envoy in France was clear
in April that the Emperor should not too obviously strengthen his
frontier with France at a time both England and France were fortifying
against each other, otherwise ‘this would give credence in this court
to the idea that the King of England would undertake nothing with-
out the understanding and assistance of the Emperor.’
160
e French
envoy to the Emperor marvelled that Gardiner could be spared from
the Council table so long in view of the fact that he had as much
‘authority’ with the King as Cromwell.
161
Chapuys, who did not see Henry aer he presented his credentials
until December 1540 and was kept largely starved of news from the
Imperial court, thought the Gardiner mission was simply designed to
alarm the French and bring them to better terms. In his eventual audi-
157
Georges de Selve to Constable, 10 Aug. 1540, Tausserat-Radel, Pellicier, II,
p. 638: Chapuys ‘attendist veoir s’il luy parleroit d’aultre chose, et voyant que non, ilz
demeurèrent se regardant l’ung l’aultre et . . . en fust esbahy ledict roy.’
158
Chapuys to Mary of Hungary, 5 Dec. 1540, L&P, XVI, 314; Henry VIII to
Wallop, 8 Dec. 1540, St.P., VIII, 496 (L&P, XVI, 318); Charles V to Henry VIII, 27
Dec. 1540, St.P., VIII, 507 (L&P, XVI, 358).
159
Marillac to Francis, 16 Nov. 1540, Kaulek, p. 241 (L&P, XVI, 269): ‘car tout
homme de quelque jugement peut congnoistre que ceulx-cy, pour cuyder avoir oensé
tout le monde, se deent de tous hommes vivans, craignant les les princes chrétiens se
viennent quelque jour à joindre pour d’ung commun accord faire la vengeance . . .’
160
Saint-Vincent to Mary of Hungary, 13 April 1541, HHSA, Frankreich fasz. 9,
‘St Vincent an Marie, 1541,’ fos. 7–8: ‘l’opinion seroit conrmez qu’on a en ceste court
que led. Roy d’Angleterre ne feroit riens entreprendre sans l’intelligence et assistence
de l’Empereur.’
161
Pate to Gardiner and Knyvet, 1 Dec. 1540 St.P., VIII, 489 (L&P, XVI, 308).
the road to war
69
ence, Henry shamelessly harped on the theme of the dangers posed
to Charles by Francis’ alliances.
162
Gardiner, who delayed his arrival
at the Emperor’s court and did not meet him until Christmas 1540
(Charles had not wanted him to follow him to Germany) did indeed
follow the Emperor to Regensburg for the meeting of the Reichstag
which was designed to open reconciliation talks between Catholics and
Protestants. Gardiner, it seems, was determined to shi English policy
towards an Imperial alliance and had Henry’s backing. In June 1541
we learn that the English envoys had been asking for a treaty of closer
friendship with the Emperor, to be made within 6, 8 or 10 months on
condition that neither should make any alliance to the prejudice of the
other in that time. Charles had agreed and on 11 June Henry made
the same promise before Chapuys in the Council.
163
e period would
expire in April 1542. Fortunately, a rarely preserved set of instructions
to Gardiner and Knyvet at this time reveals much of Henry’s reaction.
In his narration of Chapuys’ audience, conducted condentially out
of earshot of his councillors, the King records the ambassador’s joy
at the prospect for further amity and excuses for having done so little
hitherto (mainly because of his health and weariness). But Henry was
bothered that Chapuys made no mention of the terms of six or eight
months discussed by Gardiner and that he raised the Emperor’s wish
to negotiate a settlement between Henry and the Pope. Granvelle told
a papal nuncio, Poggio, that Gardiner had made oers but had been
unreceptive to Granvelle’s reproaches concerning the divorce and
the Break with Rome; he insisted he could not risk his life by raising
Granvelle’s suggestion of a reconciliation with Rome. It may be that
Granvelle was telling Poggio what he wanted to hear, though there is
some stray evidence to indicate that Henry had been informed of this
oer. Gardiner also probably received, via Contarini, a letter from the
Pope and it is inconceivable that Henry knew nothing of this.
164
In
fact, in his instructions, Henry reiterated testily that ‘we had gyven
commaundment to you . . . to declare that the matyer of Rome should
162
Marillac to Montmorency, 22 Dec. 1540, Kaulek, p. 250 (L&P, XVI, 244);
Chapuys to Charles V, 23 Dec. 1540, L&P, XVI, 347; G. de Selve to Montmorency, 8
Sept. 1540, Tausserat-Radel, Pellicier, II, p. 649.
163
Chapuys to Mary of Hungary, 18 June 1541, L&P, XVI, 910.
164
Poggio, 19 Feb. 1541, L&P, XVI, 548. It is interesting that Cromwell, as for the
French, was ‘the cause of all the evil’ here. See also L&P, XVI, 870. e aair of the
Pope’s letter raised problems with Knyvet, see later depositions in John Foxe, Acts and
Monuments, ed. J. Pratt, 8 vols. (n.p. 1877) VI, pp. 165–168.