Potter David. Henry VIII and Francis I
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50 chapter one
the marriage.
67
William had to swallow this but it seems likely to have
propelled the duke into the arms of France.
In the course of the 1530s, France had established a complex network
of covert and open allies which was designed both to undermine the
Emperor and gain access to the all-important supplies of professional
German troops. In the later 1530s, prompted by Cromwell, Henry VIII
also entered this arena and the Cleves alliance was part of a strategy of
osetting Franco-Imperial collaboration. William embarked on a con-
nection with the Schmalkaldic League, later by marrying his younger
sister, Amelie, to the Elector of Saxony’s brother and participating in
the Diet of Hagenau in 1540 (the Elector John Frederick signed a treaty
with Cleves in February 1540).
68
e Prince Electors in general were
keen to settle the matter between William and the Emperor, while it
was in the interest of Charles V to isolate the duke from the Protestants
as much as possible. William, reluctant to trust the Emperor as he was,
had a dicult hand to play. Guelders gave him military resources and,
as Wotton reported ‘all though the cowntreys and townes of Geldres
be strong and wel fortifyed, yet the rest of his dominions is not, and
speciallye the Duchies of Juliers and Monte [Berg] . . . . besydes that
thEmperours powre and the Dukes be not lyke.’
69
Francis I had well understood the strategic importance of Guelders
and hoped to foster his contacts with the Protestant princes through
the Duke of Cleves.
70
e rejection of Anne of Cleves opened the way
for another French initiative, pushed in France by Mme d’Etampes and
her protégé Longueval, and as early as January 1540 William asked for
the hand of Francis’ niece Jeanne d’Albret. is was ultimately to form
a rm alliance. Just as Anne of Cleves was being divorced by Henry VIII,
Hermann Cruser and Martin van Rossem negotiated a defensive alli-
67
Henry VIII to Wotton, [June] 1540 BL Cotton, Vit. XXI, 201 (L&P, XV, 1735);
Wotton and Clerk to Henry VIII, 11 August 1540, St.P., VIII, p. 417 (L&P, XV, 970);
Karl Harst to William, 26 June 1540, K.W. Bouterwek, ‘Anna von Cleve, Gemahlin
Heinrichs VIII’ Zeitschri des bergischen Geschichtsvereins, 6 (1869), pp. 162–180.
68
e Diet of Hagenau had originally been called to arrange a peace between the
princes and the Emperor (see Francis I to the German princes, 15 May 1539, SAM,
1834, fo. 1).
69
Wotton to Henry VIII, 9, 15 April 1540, St.P., VIII, pp. 307, 312 (L&P, XV, 482,
519). Nijsten, In the Shadow of Burgundy, p. 400 points out the precocious adminstra-
tive development of the duchy of Guelders in the late middle ages.
70
J.-Y. Mariotte, ‘François Ier et la ligue de Schmalkalde,’ Schweizerische Zeitschri
für Geschichte, 16 (1966), 206–242, at 224; Heidrich, Der geldrische Erbfolgestreit, p. 48.
the road to war
51
ance between Francis and Duke William (June 1540)
71
and a proxy
marriage concluded in July.
72
Francis told Cruser that Wallop had
indicated Henry’s approval of the negotiation but we know that
Henry was immediately on the alert, warning Wallop to ‘sh out all
their purposes’ and sending Edward Carne rst to France and then
to Germany to explain his position on the divorce of Anne of Cleves
and get Francis to persuade William to accept his sister’s divorce.
73
In
July, when the English envoys rst opened Henry’s strategy to repu-
diate Anne, Francis, in a rare expression of exasperation, exclaimed:
‘Oh Jhesus, y lenveay’ (‘Oh God, he’s getting rid of her!’) and let out
a great sigh.
74
Francis was closely interested in the reasons for Anne’s
repudiation but treated Wallop and Carne’s suggestion that Henry
could help in his negotiations with William with contempt.
75
In fact,
neither Wallop nor Carne seem to have known at this point that the
Franco-Cleves alliance had been concluded, assuming that the Queen
of Navarre’s known objections had prevented it.
76
e Cleves alliance also had implications for French court poli-
tics. William’s ambassador in France reported in October 1540 that
Montmorency and du Bellay were seeking alliance in Germany through
the Duke of Württemberg ‘to in that way get back into favour, to my
lord’s ruin.’ Frotté, Marguerite’s secretary, insisted that their main aim
was to prevent the Cleves marriage from taking place and advised the
duke to put o demands by the Schmalkaldic princes that he openly
declare himself a Protestant, arguing that it would prevent his mar-
riage. A year later, the friends of the duke in France were listed as
Tournon, Admiral Chabot, Chancellor Poyet, Annebault, the chan-
cellor of Alençon and Mme d’Etampes, ‘qui est entierement pour
71
Francis I’s commission to conclude an alliance with Cleves, Ribier, I, 529.
72
Cruser to William, Paris, 23 July 1540, SAD, Julich-Berg II, 1940, fos. 97–110;
Heidrich, Der geldrische Erbfolgestreit, pp. 45–56.
73
Cruser to William, 23 July 1540, SAD, Julich-Berg II, 1940, fo. 97v (‘die konigin
von Navarren Frotté an ons laten te weten dat die engelischen hedden alle ire geschee
dem Connestable ontdect;’ Henry VIII to Wallop, 22 June 1540, St.P., VIII, 362 (L&P,
XV, 801).
74
Wallop and Carne to Henry, 10 July 1540, St.P., VIII, 387 (L&P, XV, 870).
75
Wallop said to Francis that ‘yf the duke of Cleves take this matier wel according
to reason, he shuld fynd your majestie redy to further his aaires, specially in his sute
here . . . He answered rowndly therunto, that he woold doo therin, as he shuld see cause
whie and no other wise, and therwith he departed.’ Wallop and Carne to Henry, 15
July 1540, NA, SP1/161, fos. 105–111 (L&P, XV, 890).
76
Wallop and Carne to Henry VIII, 23 July 1540, St.P., VIII, p. 400– (L&P, XV, 904).
52 chapter one
monseigneur.’
77
More equivocal, of course, was Marguerite of Navarre,
intensely reluctant that the marriage of William and her daughter
should proceed but still keen to encourage a Protestant alliance; nor
was the promotion of the Cleves alliance to be understood in France
as sympathy for Protestantism any more than the domination of the
court by anti-Protestant gures such as Tournon and d’Annebault
excluded their support for an alliance with the princes.
78
All the same,
Marguerite, trying to convince the Cleves ambassador of her good will,
hinted at the ill will of those around the king (‘la méchanceté d’aucuns
d’entour du roy,’ meaning Tournon and Poyet, who had obviously
shied their ground).
79
In December 1540, Barnabé de Voré, French
envoy to the princes, sent a promise to her from the Landgrave of
Hesse and Elector of Saxony not to abandon the Duke of Cleves but
it is not clear whether he was working for or against the Protestants.
He reported that, as for the princes’ views on the Emperor, ‘it is not
possible to stir and ename them against him more than they are’ yet
within weeks there were signs of defection by the Landgrave to the
Emperor and despite Marguerite’s writing to him to encourage his
loyalty to the French alliance, he signed an agreement with Charles
at Regensburg in June 1541. John Frederick of Saxony was more
steadfast.
80
e rejection of Anne of Cleves certainly had massive implications:
it suggested that Henry was no longer so committed to an anti-Impe-
rial stance but it also claried the French position as chief patron of
the (rather uncontrollable) Duke of Cleves. A papal nuncio (Poggio)
even suggested that now was the time to reduce Henry to obedience
and that, with the Cleves marriage out of the way, Charles V would be
77
Advis from Frotté, Oct. 1540, SAD, Julich-Berg II, 1940, fos. 158–159; Cruser
to Chancellor of Cleves, 9 Oct. 1540, 11 Oct. 1541, SAD, Julich-Berg II, 1940, fos.
165–166: ‘pour par cela rentrer en leur credit et ruine de monseigneur.’
78
Report of H. von der Planitz to John Frederick of Saxony, March 1541, G. Mentz,
Johann Friedrich der Grossmütige, 3 vols. (Jena, 1903–1908), II, pp. 347–349; Mariotte,
p. 228.
79
Cruser to William, 16 Jan. 1541. SAD, Julich-Berg II, fo. 174 (Bers, p. 107).
80
Voré to Marguerite, Speyer, 25 Dec. 1540, V.-L. Saulnier, ‘Recherches sur la cor-
respondence de Marguerite de Navarre’ Bibliothèque d’Humanisme et Renaissance 33
(1971), 34 (1972), nos. 820–821: ‘il n’est possible de les animer et enamer à l’encontre
de luy plus qu’ilz sont;’ Marguerite to Landgrave, 4 Feb. 1541, in support of Morelet
du Museau’s mission. Ibid., nos. 822–821; Landgrave to Marguerite, 20 Feb. 1541,
ibid., nos. 828–1.
the road to war
53
more inclined to Henry’s alliance.
81
For his part, the rejection of Anne
rendered Henry liable to suspicion over the negotiations between
France and his former brother-in-law and he ordered Wotton, his
envoy in Cleves, to be vigilant about the duke’s proposed journey to
France.
82
It was reported at the French court that the Emperor had
said that Francis, in making his alliance with Cleves, was seeking to
protect the duke from the Emperor but that he would make harsh
war against the duke and would see whether Francis would help him.
Francis aected not to believe this but declared ‘foy de gentilhomme’
that, if it were true, Charles would nd that ‘I am the duke of Cleves’
friend and will give such support to him that the Emperor was never
so bogged down with.’
83
In the Spring of 1541, there was much talk of plans to re-unite
Henry and Anne. Chapuys was sceptical, saying that Henry never took
back a discarded wife, but Marguerite of Navarre was interested in the
idea and passed some of Marillac’s despatches to the duke of Cleves to
encourage him.
84
In November of that year, with Katherine Howard
under arrest, Marillac returned to the possibility of Anne’s being taken
back. is, he thought ‘would be far the easiest means to make the
alliance you desire and furthermore a good and rm league against
the Emperor,’ especially as Anne was ‘more attractive than ever’ (‘plus
belle qu’elle fut oncques’) and generally popular. Francis approved of
this plan, though was sceptical whether Henry would marry again.
85
As
late as January 1542, Francis was assuring William that he was using
his ambassador in England to promote Anne’s interests.
86
For his
part, Duke William sent messages to Henry’s councillors asking them
to intervene to get Henry to take his sister back.
87
Not surprisingly,
81
Poggio, 13 July 1540, L&P, XV, 888.
82
Henry VIII to Wotton, 3 Oct. 1540 L&P, XV, 116.
83
Cruser to Chancellor of Cleves, 1 Sept. 1540, SAD, Julich-Berg II, 1940, fo. 145:
‘je suys amy du duc de Cleves et luy monstreray tel secours qu’il ne fut oncques sy
empesché.’
84
Marillac to Marguerite, 29 Oct. 1541, SAD, Julich-Berg II, 1940, fo. 343; Marillac
to Marguerite, 17 Jan. 1542, Kaulek, pp. 381–383.
85
Marillac to Francis, 11 Nov. 1541, Kaulek, pp. 353–354 (L&P, XVI, 1332): ‘seroit
moyen d’aultant plus aysé de faire l’aliance que désirez et daventaige bonne et forte
ligue contre l’empereur;’ Francis to Marillac, 23 Nov. 1541, Kaulek, p. 368 (L&P, XVI,
1372).
86
C. du Boys to Duke of Cleves, 12 Jan. 1542, SAD, Julich-Berg II, fos. 370–371.
87
Southampton and Cranmer to Henry VIII, 12, 13 Dec. 1541, St.P., I, pp. 714,
717 (L&P, XVI, 1449).
54 chapter one
the Emperor was determined there should be no such reconciliation
and pressed his envoy to get Henry promise not to help the Duke of
Cleves.
88
e Cleves-Albret marriage did not take place immediately because
of the opposition of the bride’s parents, Henri d’Albret and Marguerite
of Navarre. Nicholas Wotton, informed his master in April 1541 that
William had been summoned to France for the marriage and the
Wotton would not be allowed to accompany him; he thought it sur-
prising that William had expressed no desire that Henry be informed.
Henry ordered William Howard to watch his doings closely.
89
Duke
William travelled secretly and with a small party through the Ardennes
to avoid being waylaid. Wotton reported that opinion in the duke’s ter-
ritories was favourable to the marriage, though his absence deplored.
He himself felt more isolated than ever and the Duke’s councillors ‘have
kepte all theyr doinges as secrett from me as they cowde.’ Nevetheless,
he was able to discover the complicated return route of the Duke and
the fact that Francis had sent a thousand horse with him.
90
As Anglo-French relations deteriorated, the Cleves alliance became
ever more strategically important for France. e Cleves marriage,
when it took place at Châtellerault in June 1541, signalled the end
of Montmorency’s favour. It was awkward that a pamphlet appeared
in France at the start of 1542, which attacked Henry’s repudiation of
Anne and impugned his honour. e authorship was attributed to
Givry, lieutenant-general of Champagne, captain of the guard and
close to Admiral Chabot. Tackled on this, the French king was clearly
embarrassed and promised to suppress the book but denied that the
Duke of Cleves knew anything about it. It was a matter of folly, he
asserted, at a time when it was possible Henry might still take Anne
back.
91
Morvilliers, passing through London on his way to Scotland in
88
Charles V to Chapuys, 26 Jan., 3 May 1542, L&P, XVII, 293.
89
Wotton to Henry VIII, 22 April 1541, L&P, XVI, 748; Henry VIII to Howard, 27
April 1541, St.P., VIII, p. 553 (L&P, XVI, 761).
90
Wotton to Henry VIII, 13 June, 8 July 1541, BL Cotton, Vit. B XXI, fo. 215, St.P.,
VIII, p. 584 (L&P, XVI, 902, 980); Cruser to Chancellor Ghogreve, 25 March 1541,
SAD, Julich-Berg II, 1940, fos. 209–210 (Bers, pp. 110–111); Frotté to Cruser, Mont-
morillon, 8 July [1541], SAD, Julich-Berg II, 1940, fo. 167. On this period in general,
see Ficaro, ‘Nicholas Wotton’ p. 70.
91
Paget to Henry VIII, 26 Feb. 1542, NA, SP1/169, fos. 34–40 (L&P, XVII, 128): ‘it
wer a folie of him and specially now at this time for mens aections do alter and the
lady Anne is yet of age to bear children and albeit the wynde hath bene contrarie it
may some time turne.’ (fos. 35v/41v).
the road to war
55
December 1541, had praised the Duke to the skies, as well as the Elector
of Saxony. Francis was even prepared to send William’s ambassador
to him to the Worms Reichstag at the end of 1541 to make his case
with the princes.
92
All the same, there was a y in the ointment for the
duke of Cleves. His prospective bride clearly had no wish to join him
and William was made painfully aware of this and of the opposition
of the King and Queen of Navarre by April 1542.
93
Provoked by an
invention of Paget’s that he had heard Cleves and the Emperor were
likely to come to terms, Chabot muttered that, before Jeanne was sent
to Düsseldorf, the duke would have to do Francis ‘sum good service.’
94
is was exactly what was being planned by Longueval, sent to Cleves
in May 1542 in conjunction with the marshal of Guelders, Martin
van Rossem (described by Wotton as ‘the best capteyn & manne of
warre that is yn all these partyes’). He had been retained by Francis
as Hauptman in October 1541 and the duke empowered to raise men
anywhere he chose for the King. William seems to have had cold feet
about war in May 1542, advised by his councillors not to stand out
against the Empire, and had to be persuaded by pressure from Rossem
and Longueval.
95
So war between France and the Emperor was fol-
lowed in July by an open declaration between Charles V and the Duke
of Cleves.
96
Pulling Back from the Brink (1541–1542)
It seems that neither Henry nor Francis really wanted war in the spring
of 1541 but that a momentum, compounded of rumour and real suspi-
cions, nearly brought it about. Marillac, who had a real contempt for
tavern news,
97
put it cogently:
92
Chapuys to Charles V, 11 Dec. 1541, L&P, XVI, 1441; Francis I, instructions to
Herman Cruser, 8 Oct. 1541, SAD, Julich-Berg II, 1940, fos. 301–302, decipher.
93
Cruser to the Chancellor of Julich, last April 1542, and to Duke, 1 May 1542,
SAD, Julich-Berg II, 1940, fos. 379–381, 382–386.
94
Paget to Henry VIII, 22 April 1542, NA, SP1/170, fo. 27r ( L&P, XVII, 263).
95
Serrant to Chabot, May 1542, Bers, p. 227.
96
Wotton to Henry VIII, 2 April 1541, NA, SP1/165, fo. 97v (L&P, XVI, 748); Paget
to Henry VIII, 15 May, 20 June 1542 L&P, XVII, 328, 418); Wallop to Council, 7 July
1542 (L&P, XVII, 464); Bers, Die Allianz, pp. 160–163; C. du Boys to Duke of Cleves,
31 Oct. 1541, SAD Julich-Berg II, 1940, fo. 316r (deciph).
97
Marillac, 12 Mar. 1541, L&P, XV, 334.
56 chapter one
A courier from the court who, as is usual with such people, speaking
speculatively, has spread the rumour throughout this country that it is
held for certain in France that war will be launched soon against the
English. By such means, my lord, it can happen sometimes that, as a
result of such reports, preparations are made by each side for their secu-
rity and in the end for some trivial reason those who think they have
the advantage attack roundly those over whom they think they have the
advantage.
98
Francis told Marillac to insist that he had no intention of inciting the
king of Scotland to attack.
99
At the end of April, Marillac was treated
to a series of protestations by the Council, led by Norfolk, that English
reinforcements at Calais were purely defensive and undertaken in the
light of similar French moves. Naturally, he was pleased but suspected
the reason was fear of rebellion in the north of England.
100
For his part,
Howard, who reported Francis’s action to suppress rumours of war,
was under instruction to make the same case in France.
101
is was welcome to the French. Marillac was instructed to respond
positively but cautiously to Norfolk’s proposal:
But in making such approaches you must do so with such delicacy that
he [Norfolk] may in no way know that it comes from me and in addition
you must hand over nothing in writing on your side or speak in front
of witnesses.
102
98
Marillac to Montmorency, 27 April 1541, Kaulek, pp. 294–295 (L&P, XVI, 763):
‘Ung courrier venant de la court, lequel, ainsi que le plus souvent telles gens parlent
à l’adventure, a semé par tout ce pays qu’on tenoit pour chose assurée en France
qu’on entameroit bientost la guerre aux Anglois et par telz moyens, monseigneur, il
peult advenir aucunesfoys que les préparatifz estans faictz au moyen de ces rapports
d’ung costé et d’aultre pour se tenir chacun sur ses gardes, à la n soubs prétexte de
quelque légière occasion ceulx qui pensent avoir l’adventaige viennent à s’attaquer à
bon escient à ceulx qu’ilz estiment leurs inférieurs.’
99
Marillac to Francis, 19 April 1541, Kaulek, 290 (L&P, XVI, 737).
100
Marillac to Francis and Montmorency, 30 April 1541, Kaulek, 293–5, (L&P,
XVI, 769, 770).
101
Howard to Henry VIII, 19 April 1541, St.P., VIII, 551 (L&P, XVI, 740); Dan-
dolo to Doge, 20 April 1541: ‘della bona volunta del quale [Henry VIII] pero il suo
ambassatore ha fatto con Soa Christianissima Maestà tutto quelli piu ampli ucii che
si possono desiderare.’ (BnF, it. 1715, fo. 81).
102
Francis I to Marillac, 6 May 1541, Kaulek, pp. 300–301: ‘Mais il est requis qu’en
tenant ces parolles ce soit avecques tel regard et dextérité qu’il [Norfolk] ne puisse
aulcunement penser ne congnoistre que cela vienne de moy et avecq ce n’en bâillerez
riens par escript de vostre part ny n’en parlerez devant aulcun tesmoing ‘ Marillac to
Francis, 22 May, ibid., pp. 305–308.
the road to war
57
Clearly, the danger remained that the English might use evidence of
this exchange to increase their clout with the Emperor. However, the
fact that Marillac was reporting the defensive nature of English military
preparations and Henry’s own conrmation of Norfolk’s words helped.
In mid-May, Norfolk reminded Marillac of the failure of his embassy
in February 1540 as a result of Francis’ vain trust in the Emperor. e
French ambassador seized on this and, as instructed, spoke unocially
of his master’s inclination to an understanding and that if Norfolk
could think of a plan to promote understanding, he would pass on any
proposal to his master. Norfolk promised to report to the king secretly
without the knowledge of his fellow councillors and recalled how they
had pressed Henry to make war in 1540. is was a classic negotiat-
ing tactic but nonetheless useful. He came back next day to ask for
more information and said he had been unable to speak to the King.
e whole exchange is redolent of Henry’s suspicious mind. Marillac
advised a cautious response in the light of past English behaviour and
the fact that they were unlikely to go to war in 1541.
103
How serious was this English proposal? It is inconceivable that
Norfolk was not acting on instructions or that his colleagues knew
nothing of what he was doing. Indeed, he was corresponding with
the king about it in October.
104
As we shall see, Gardiner was at the
Emperor’s court to solicit an alliance, so Henry was weighing up the
possibilities of two alliances. e existence of these talks, which Chapuys
only discovered through his spy on Marillac’s sta in October, put a
road-block in the way of an imperial alliance, though Chapuys thought
the Anglo-French talks would not succeed.
105
In the summer of 1541,
Henry was preoccupied by the problem of the Scots, who could not be
le to make mayhem in case of war (see chapter 2).
For their part, the French responded favourably to Norfolk’s oers,
as might be expected. Chapuys, erroneously, thought France eager for
war with England in April–May 1541. It was a view reected in reports
by the Imperial ambassador in France about the eagerness for war with
England on the part of French nobles and princes, such as the Guises,
103
Ibid., p. 308.
104
On 11 June, Norfolk came to see Marillac for a ‘secret’ talk at 2 pm accompanied
by 100 men in the middle of London (Kaulek, p. 314); Norfolk to Henry VIII, 31 Oct.
1541, St.P., I, p. 688 (L&P, XVI, 1304).
105
Calendar of Letters, Despatches and State Papers Relating to the Negotiations
Between England and Spain, Preserved in the Archives at Simancas and Elsewhere
(1485–1558), ed. G.A. Bergenroth, P. de Gayangos, M.A.S. Hume, R. Tyler, 13 vols.
(London, 1862–1954) [CSP Spain] VI, I, p. 167, p. 196.
58 chapter one
who were opposed to Mme d’Etampes.
106
Despite the war scare, it did
not make sense for France to attack Henry at this time, as the Venetian
ambassador pointed out.
107
ere were also struggles for favour going
on around Francis. Montmorency, who had gone on corresponding
with Marillac up to the spring of 1541, was about to be publicly humil-
iated and exiled from court (14 June). Mme d’Etampes and her friends
(including Admiral Chabot, now restored to favour) were in the ascen-
dant.
108
It is likely that Chabot, though not an unequivocal admirer
of Henry VIII, would have favoured any move towards England and
by August 1541 he was the King’s ministre-favori.
109
Tournon and
Annebault joined the dominant group as did secretary Breton. e
main point was to secure at least the neutrality of England in the event
of the coming war with the Emperor and for this reason oers by the
Emperor were rejected for fear of prejudicing relations with potential
allies. is was the crucial moment when the decision was probably
taken in France to prepare for war with the Emperor.
110
So, when Norfolk renewed his oers in May 1541, Francis ordered
Marillac cautiously to oer the marriage of Orléans to the Lady Mary,
with the cessation of the pensions as a dowry, a plan which had been
mooted at Calais in 1532, when Chabot had been present.
111
Indeed,
Marillac was instructed to tell the English that Chabot was ‘someone
who has always greatly desired and worked to maintain the king of
England and me . . . in the continuance of the good and perfect friend-
ship we have.’
112
Norfolk tried to push things along by stressing that
Henry was about to leave for the North and that Chapuys had received
instruction to negotiate with his master (which was true). Marillac,
still suspecting the ‘venom’ of a plan just to use French oers as a
bargaining counter with the Emperor, played along but still refused
106
Chapuys to Charles V, 17 May 1541, L&P, XVI, 835; Saint-Vincent to Mary of
Hungary, 7 May 1541 1541, HHSA, P.A. 41, fos. 46–49.
107
Dandolo to the Doge, 10 April 1541, BnF, it. 1715, fo. 71r–v.
108
Saint-Vincent to Mary of Hungary, 7 May 1541, HHSA P.A. 41, fo. 47r: ‘N’y a
personne du conseil, du moings s’il veult regner, qui ose parler au Roy de chose petite
ou grande, s’il ne scet premierement que madame le trouvera bon.’
109
Capodiferro to Cardinal Farnese, 6 Aug. 1541, ANG III, 29, p. 71.
110
Francis to Marillac, 9 Aug. 1541, Kaulek, p. 325.
111
Francis to Marillac, 2 June 141, Kaulek, p. 311. Chabot himself was managing the
negotiation in August (ibid., p. 331); Chabot to Marillac, 28 Aug. 1541, ibid., p. 333.
112
Francis I to Marillac, 9 Aug. 1541, Kaulek, p. 352: Chabot ‘est personnaige qui
a tousjours grandement désiré et poursuivy d’entretenir ledit roy d’Angleterre et
moy . . . en la continuation de la bonne et parfaicte amytié qui y est.’
the road to war
59
to commit Francis.
113
By the time he received orders to put forward a
marriage proposal unocially, Henry had le for the North. He had
in any case grasped the cardinal point that Henry would never agree
to Mary’s legitimation or that her rights to the throne could be passed
to a foreigner.
114
Marillac was the only ambassador to follow Henry to Lincoln in
August, the negotiations no doubt proving a useful pretext for observ-
ing what was for the French the very disturbing project for Henry’s
meeting with James V. At Lincoln, Marillac and Norfolk delicately
circled around the marriage project, Norfolk promising that legitimi-
sation was not a problem. English unease at the prospect of a foreign
king was still all too obvious, however.
115
For his part, Francis was still
insistent that the pensions be abolished as part of the deal and that
James V be fully included in any treaty.
116
At the same time, the bishop
of Agde was being sent to Portugal to ask for the Infanta’s hand (a
match favoured by Queen Léonor) and knowledge of this was passed
on to Chapuys in England.
117
When William Paget, the ambassador
who had replaced Howard in September 1541, heard about this, he
asked how many brides Francis proposed to give to Orléans.
118
Henry
was visibly shaken when he learned of the Portuguese negotiation
from Chapuys.
119
Charles V’s representatives made sure that the dangers of aggran-
dising Orléans were fully understood, including the revival of the
old appanage problem. e Dauphin was warned by the Imperial
113
Marillac to Francis, 14 June 1541, Kaulek, p. 313.
114
Francis to Marillac, 30 June 1541, Kaulek, p. 319.
115
Marillac to Francis, 12 Aug. 1541, Kaulek, pp. 326–327; same to same, 26 Sept.
1541, ibid., p. 344. Chapuys also thought that those in power in France saw the danger
of agrandising Orléans too much (CSP Spain VI, i, 196, 199).
116
Francis to Marillac, 28 August 1541, Kaulek, pp. 331, 332–333; same, 17 Sept.
1541, ibid., p. 340 (Francis’ anxiety about the succession since the Dauphin as yet had
no children. He instructed Marillac to enquire about Mary’s health.
117
Marnol to Charles V, 3 Nov. 1541, HHSA, Frankreich fasz. 9, ‘Villey an Karl,
1541,’ fo. 57; Chapuys to Mary of Hungary, 30 Dec. 1541, L&P, XVI, 1482; Francis to
Leonor, March 1542; Leonor to Charles V, 1542, HHSA Frankreich, Varia, Nachtrag,
fasz. 5, fos. 18–19, 160–161, on bp of Agde’s mission.
118
Dandolo to the Doge, 26 March 1542, BnF, it. 1715, p. 300: ‘dimando a questa
Maestà uno di questi giorni quanto moglie che volea dare a Monsignore Oriliens.’ No
mention was made in Paget’s instructions about marriage negotiations, but that was
understandable given wariness of putting anything on paper (St.P., VIII, 611; L&P,
XVI, 1198) Cruser reported from Tournus in October ‘du mariage Monsr d’Orleans et
de la lle l’Anglois on n’en a plus ouy parler.’ (SAD Julich-Berg II, 1940, fo. 194r.)
119
Chapuys to Mary of Hungary, 30 Dec. 1541, L&P, XVI, 1482.