Potter David. Henry VIII and Francis I
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30 introduction
to it.
133
Its existence, though, led the way to the more widely dissemi-
nated French Littleton of 1576 by Claude de Sainliens and to the rst
great monument to Anglo-French lexicography, Randall Cotgrave’s
dictionary of 1611.
134
Lord Berners, later deputy of Calais, was in France in 1492 and
again in 1514–1515. He spent much of his leisure time translating two
works from French to English, Froissart (1523–1525) and Huon de
Bordeaux (c. 1530). Much of the early translation work from French
to English in the era of Caxton had been of chivalric romances and
this vogue continued, though with an increasing appetite for practical
manuals, for example cookery.
135
is was largely the result of the fact
that, in this period as much later, France was seen as the source of
good taste in cooking and wine by the English upper classes, as well
as of deportment and dancing (Barclay appended a translated French
treatise on dance to his French manual of 1521).
136
Mockery of the
aping of French fashions was well established by the time of omas
More’s well-known Epigrammata of 1518.
137
In 1488, Robert Gaguin called for what we now call détente between
England and France:
Let’s let sleeping dogs lie.
Let the English be English;
e Frenchman be himself;
Let them be good neighbours;
Peace is made; let us forget
e noise and clamour of war.
Long live France, long live England.
138
133
Lee, French Renaissance, pp. 76–80.
134
Claudius Holyband (Sainliens), e French Littleton ed. M. St. Clare Byrne
(Cambridge, 1953), Introduction.
135
Lee, French Renaissance, pp. 95–96.
136
Ed. Furnival for New Shakespeare Society (1890), pp. clx–clxii.
137
‘In Anglum Gallicae aectatorem’ tr. J.H. Marsden, Philomorus: notes on the
Latin Poems of omas More (1878), p. 223 Germain de Brie replied by G. Brixii in
. Morum (1519), to which More replied in turn in 1520.
138
Robert Gaguin, Passe-temps d’oisiveté from Epistole et orationes ed. uasne II,
p. 409, quoted G. Ascoli, La Grande-Bretagne, p. 22. ‘Laissons le moustier où il est,/
Qui est Anglois pour tel se tienne,/Qui est François le soit de fait;/ L’ung bon voisin
l’autre soustienne;/ Paix soit faicte et ne nous souvienne/De bruict, de noise, ne de
guerre:/ Vive France, vive Engleterre!’ ‘Laissons le monstier ou il est’ (the correct read-
ing) means ‘let us leave church matters to the church’ or ‘let us not alter ancient cus-
tom.’ (R. Cotgrave, A Dictionarie of the French and English Tongues (London, 1611),
sub ‘Monstier.’
introduction 31
Were these optimistic hopes borne out in literary evidence? In fact,
the recurrence of war kept the old hostilities alive. In 1492 Octovien
de Saint-Gelais exhorted his fellow-countrymen to throw back the
English from what a panegyric to Anne de Beaujeu called ‘France,
cimetière des Anglois’ a term echoed in one poem of 1513: ‘It is com-
monly said that France is their cemetery . . . Get you gone you stinking
disease-ridden lth, tailed goddamns, I would never see you more’
and another: ‘ese lthy great shameful Englishmen.’
139
By this time
Henry VII was a regretted gure in France who had presided over
an era of peace and his successor reproached with ingratitude.
140
Yet
the moment peace was concluded by the marriage of Mary Tudor to
Louis XII, it was formally welcomed by the city of Paris with devices
such as ‘France, paix, Amitié, Confédération, Angleterre.’
141
In 1512,
the rhétoriqueur and historiographer Jean Bouchet published anony-
mously his Epistre envoyee des champs Elisees au Roy Henry dengle-
terre a present regnant au dit royaulme
142
in the form of a letter sent
from beyond the grave by Henry VII to his son. Bouchet’s objective
was rstly to castigate Henry VIII for ungratefulness in view of the
help it was alleged that France had given to his father,
143
and secondly
to attack Julius II as an unworthy Pope and call for reform of the
Church. Cruder material appeared at the same time under the titles
Le Courroux de la mort contre les Anglais and La folie des Anglois who
139
H.-J. Molinier, Essai biographique et littéraire sur Octovien de Saint-Gelais
(1468–1502) (Rodez, 1910), p. 277–; ‘L’Ainée lle de fortune’ (BnF fr. 25409 fo. 8)
Courroux de la mort contre les Anglois (1513) Montaiglon, Recueil de poésies II, pp.
79–85 at 81 (qu. Ascoli, p. 22). La Folie de Anglais (1513) in Montaiglon, Recueil, II,
253–, at 267–268: ‘Ces gros souillards et infâmes Anglais.’
140
Déploration faite par République pour la mort du catholique roi Henry d’Angleterre
(Paris, 1517) (Ascoli, p. 49).
141
e entries into Abbeville and Paris were described in two contemporary pam-
phlets in Bibliothéque Nationale, Rés. Lb
29
, 50 and 51. See also L.M. Bryant, e King
and the City in the Parisian Royal Entry Ceremony (Geneva, 1986).
142
ere are two undated and anonymous versions. e Other has the title Epistre
envoyee par feu Henry roy d’Angleterre a Henry son lz huytiesme de ce nom and bears
a woodcut of the king on the title page. Bouchet later reissued the text in his Epistres
familières and the text was reissued by someone else in 1544 with changes to suit the
context of the war of that time. See J. Britnell, Jean Bouchet (Edinburgh, 1986), pp.
169–171, 307–308. For a related text that seems to have been printed in 1517, though
probably written in 1509, Déploration faite par République pour la mort du catholique
roi Henry d’Angleterre (Ascoli, p. 49).
143
is was a literary tradition dating back to Robert Gaguin (see A. Antonovics,
‘Henry VII, king of England “By the Grace of Charles VIII of France” in Kings and
Nobles in the Later Middle Ages, ed. R.A. Grihs and J. Sherborne (Gloucester,
1986), p. 186.
32 introduction
treated them much as had done Saint-Gelais in 1492: ‘Goddamns, ugly
tailed rogues . . . you are so foul, hideous, revolting’
144
e series of gran-
diose festivities between 1518 and 1520 that celebrated both the treaty
of Universal peace, the betrothal of the Kings’ children and above all
the Field of Cloth of Gold saw the deployment of considerable liter-
ary ingenuity to the celebration of Anglo-French friendship. Yet again
the renewal of war in 1522 saw the English return to their perdious
reputation. Bouchet’s Epistre was reissued in 1544 to suit the context
of Henry VIII’s coalition with the Emperor Charles V against France,
with changes to the references made. Charles takes the place of Julius
and Francis I that of Louis XII. It is, though, surprising that the attack
in satirical verse against the Emperor in France was relatively muted.
Meanwhile in England a low point of creative endeavour was reached
in the summer of 1543 in a pamphlet issued for the opening of the
war with France. Entitled a ‘Pasquyl of Rome,’ this mocked Francis as
‘the mad man thou doest play’ and taxed him with the loss of French
blood at Perpignan and for the fact the ‘unto the Turck of late thy faith
thou dydest plyght’:
Further more from Brytayne, a kingdom full royal
ou kepest their right, shewing they self not loial
is region is Englande, in artillery exceadinge
Other regions governed by Henry the royal kynge.
Many townes and cities, thou kepeste wrongfully
Which belong of right unto the said kinge Henry
Normandy, and Picardy, Gascony and Angiers
ou kepest which shuld sound shame in thine eres.
Render them agayne unto the righteous kynge
Or els thou shalt repente thyne ungodly doing.
145
e conception of the conict, in this execrable ditty, as a matter of
‘rights’ reminds us that this was still a powerful, if simplistic, mobiliser
of opinion.
144
Montaiglon, II, 79–85, 253– (possibly by Laurent Desmoulins – Ascoli, 50):
‘Godons, coués, crapauds . . . vous êtes si hideux détestables . . .’ ‘Crapaudaille’ is the
likely allusion, meaning a ‘gang of knaves or rogues’ (Cotgrave).
145
Pasquyl of Rome to the frenche kynge/ Sendeth by wrytiges unfayned gretinge.
(London: Jhon the Buys, 1543). Copy NA SP1/244, fos. 139–141. is pamphlet may
have been one of many pieces of poor quality propaganda that have not survived. It
is not in STC.
CHAPTER ONE
‘WHOMEVER I JOIN WILL (GOD WILLING) BE THE VICTOR:’
1
THE ROAD TO WAR
Henry and Francis: Perpetual Allies or Wary Opponents?
In February 1540, omas Howard, Duke of Norfolk, led an embassy
from Henry VIII to the French court. e duke was an old hand at
negotiating with the French. He had a ‘pro-French’ reputation and,
though this did not necessarily mean that he followed a consistent
line, he wrote to Cromwell in March 1540 that he needed the pen-
sion he still received from France.
2
Such high status embassies were
not unusual but the stakes were particularly high at this point. e
years 1538 and 1539 had been a time of increasing anxiety in England
about the improbable rapprochement between the French King and
the Emperor aer the Truce of Nice. is had seemed to bring an
end to the Anglo-French entente which had prevailed since 1525
and reached such a degree of warmth in the early 1530s; then Francis
had undertaken to pursue Henry’s case in Rome and Henry tried
to inveigle his fellow monarch into following him in breaking from
1
‘Celuy au quel ie m’adiouincts (Dieu aydant) vaincra,’ motto that Henry com-
manded to be set up at Calais at the time of his meeting with Francis in 1532, according
to Ulpian Fulwell, e ower of fame Containing the bright renowne, & moste fortunate
raigne of King Henry the viii. (London: William Hoskins, 1575), fos. 31v–32r.
2
By 1532, Norfolk had been scheduled for a pension of 1500 écus sol. or 3000 lt.
p.a. (roughly £375) (AN J 923 no. 8
4
). But he had also received in 1532 plate worth
11,050 lt. ‘en faveur de plusieurs bons, grands, recommandables et louables services
qu’il luy a faits, mesmement à l’entretenement de la paix, alliance et confederation
qui est entre led. Sr. et le Roy d’Angleterre’ and had been in part cause of the Calais-
Boulogne meeting ‘et à ce qu’à l’advenir il vueille continuer et perseverer de ayder à
conserver icelle paix et amour.’ (BnF Clair. 1215, fo. 70v). In 1540, it seems that he was
still being paid despite the failure of the main royal pension. He wrote to Cromwell
that he needed to know ‘how we shall do with Fraunnce’ because ‘I have so burdened
my self with gret number in my howse that as God be my help I am not able to
mayntayne the charges thero onles the pension o Fraunce shall contynew to me.’
(Norfolk to Cromwell, the Rye, 11 March [1540], NA, SP1/158 fo. 23 (L&P, XV, 329).
Charles V had tried to oer good treatment to ‘le duc de Norphorc et autres enclins
à la faction francoise, comme vous supposez et est vray semblable, à l’occasion des
pensions qu’ilz en tiennent’ (Charles V to Chapuys, 11 Sept. 1536, NA PRO 31/18/2ii,
fos. 349v–50r (L&P, XI, 441).
34 chapter one
Rome.
3
Francis, in any case, had ceased to pay the pension due to
the king of England even before war began with the Emperor in 1536
and there was no question of renewing it now that peace had come.
ough neither Henry nor Francis wished to permit a General Council
of the Church, the issue was enough to stimulate suspicion throughout
the 1530s. In 1532, a new Anglo-French treaty (negotiated by Gilles
de La Pommeraye, aer whom it is named) had agreed mutual aid at
sea in case of invasion by the Emperor and an agreement on each side
not to make any treaty to the prejudice of the other. When Francis
demanded aid of Henry during his war with Charles V in 1536–1537,
Henry argued he had conceded simply ‘a rendely abstinence of pay-
ment’ of the pension but Francis had subsequently done nothing to
dissuade the Pope from his Bull of Excommunication. Based on this,
Stephen Gardiner, then ambassador, argued that the Pommeraye
treaty had been nullied by Francis’s alliance with Clement VII and
by marrying his daughter to the King of Scotland.
4
At the same time
Henry and Cromwell were able (not perhaps very seriously) to dangle
the prospect of entering the war on the Emperor’s side before Francis’
enemy. Neutrality, formally proclaimed in August 1536, meant giv-
ing each side to understand there was a hope of catching Henry’s
alliance.
5
3
E. Hamy, Entrevue de François Ier avec Henry VIII à Boulogne-sur-Mer en 1532
(Paris, 1898). Francis’ intervention with Clement VII came too late for Henry, how-
ever. By 1534 he was pressing Francis to follow his example in breaking with the
Pope (Mémoire of Francis I in answer to Rochford and Fitzwilliam, 24 April 1534,
BnF fr. 3005, fos. 131–132: the French king saw nothing contrary to ‘le droit divin’
in Henry’s acts and accepted that he had good cause in what he had done. He could
not do so himself since this would only be to ‘se perturber et travailler’ when he was
at peace.).
4
Francis I to bishop of Tarbes and bailli of Troyes, 20 April 1536, N. Camusat,
Mélanges historiques (Troyes, 1644) fos. 14v–17r (J. Kaulek, Correspondance politique
de MM. De Castillon et de Marillac (Paris, 1885), no. 1); Henry VIII to Gardiner and
Wallop, 30 April 1536, L&P, X, 760; Cromwell to Gardiner and Wallop, 8 June 1537
L&P, X, 1084; Henry VIII to Francis I, 8 June 1536, ibid., X, 1085; Henry VIII to
Gardiner, 15 Feb. 1538, BL Add. 25114, fo. 282; Gardiner, instructions for his succes-
sor Bonner, 20 Aug.[1538], Muller, Letters of Stephen Gardiner, pp. 82–83 (L&P, XIII,
ii, 143). e bishop of Tarbes was clear that Gardiner had been sent to answer the
French demands for aid by prolonging all sorts of disputes before the French Council
(Antoine de Castelnau, bp. of Tarbes to Chancellor Dubourg, 8 Feb. 1537, AN J 967
no. 3/8).
5
Chapuys to Charles V, 5, 12, 22 August 1536, NA PRO 31/18/2ii, fos. 186–187,
188–191, 197–203 (L&P, XI, 219, 285, 479). On English proclamation of neutrality,
Chapuys to Charles V, 25 Aug. 1536, NA, PRO 31/18/2ii, fos. 192–193 (L&P, XI,
358).
the road to war
35
But what had seemed a strong position for Henry by staying out of
war in 1536–1537 had evaporated by the end of 1538. Henry had not
been included in the truce of Nice, as his agents insisted that Francis
had promised to do in any agreement with the Emperor. is personal
encounter of the sovereigns was given huge symbolic signicance on
both sides.
6
It led Henry at the end of the year to change his truculent
tone with the French ambassador for a more genial one, graciously
abandoning any idea of a marriage between Mary and the prince of
Portugal and insisting that, should Charles fail to return Milan to
Francis, it would be none of his doing.
7
Worse still, in January 1539,
Francis and Charles agreed the Treaty of Toledo, which contained a
‘secret’ clause that neither would negotiate with Henry. e height of
the anxiety perhaps came that spring, when it looked – though only
momentarily – as though both Francis and the Emperor had with-
drawn their ambassadors.
8
In fact, the French embassy was rapidly
lled by Charles de Marillac and, though the Emperor was to be rep-
resented by a minor diplomat, there was no complete break. Anxiety
was expressed in one of the most massive programmes of fortica-
tion embarked upon by the English crown before modern times, when
the coasts of England from Cornwall to Berwick were equipped with
modern artillery fortresses in 1538–1539.
9
e same fears were also
reected by Cromwell’s schemes for using the German Protestant
princes as counterweights to Francis and Charles.
10
6
In 1536, Francis had oered to Henry that he should be comprehended in any
Franco-Imperial treaty but was told that Henry was accustomed to be principal con-
trahent in any treaty (L&P, X, 760). On the Truce of Nice, see H. Keniston, ‘Peace
negotiations between Charles V and Francis I (1537–1538),’ Proceedings of the Ameri-
can Philosophical Society, 102, ii (1958), 142–147. A more recent study places the
emphasis on the symbolic signicance of the meetings (X. Le Person, ‘A moment of
‘resverie’: Charles V and Francis I’s encounter at Aigues-Mortes (July 1538), French
History, 19 (2005), 1–27.
7
Castillon to Montmorency, 22 Dec. 1538, BL Add. 33514, fos. 7–8 (Ribier, I,
pp. 333–334): ‘autant que j’ay trouvé le Roy autres foys hault et superbe, maintenant
je le trouve tant doux [et] gracieux qu’on ne scauroyt plus.’ Earlier in the month,
Anglo-French relations had been at a low point (Castillon to du Bellay, 5 Nov. 1538,
R. Scheurer (ed.), Correspondance du cardinal Jean du Bellay, 3 vols. (Paris, 1969–
2008), III, p. 143, L&P, XIII, ii, 752).
8
12 Jan. 1539. For mention of this in Nov. 1541, Francis to Marillac, 23 Nov. 1541,
L&P, XVI, 1372.
9
e programme cost nearly £290,000 over four years (H. Colvin, History of the
King’s Works: IV, 1485–1660 (London, 1982) pp. 370–371).
10
R. McEntegart, Henry VIII, the League of Schmalkalden (Woodbridge, 2002).
36 chapter one
Another moment of danger seemed to come at the end of 1539, with
the journey of the Emperor through France and his triumphal recep-
tion at Paris. Promises were then made that all outstanding Franco-
Imperial dierences would be solved by the allocation of Milan to a
French prince and his marriage to a Habsburg princess. at these
promises would remain a dead letter on the return of the Emperor to
his own territories could not then have been known. When the French
and Imperial ambassadors came to notify Henry of the meeting and of
the invitation to James V to join in the celebrations, the English were
‘greatly astonished, never having seen two ambassadors, both from
you, Sire, and from the Emperor go together by common agreement
to this court.’ Henry’s ministers seemed convinced that war was immi-
nent against ‘leur paouvre Roy.’ Marillac described Cromwell’s reac-
tion in particular as a sign of ‘the jealousy, deance, fear and trouble
they are in.
11
From their posts with the Emperor and King at the very
end of 1539, Wyatt and Bonner advised: ‘we had rather Your Majeste
did yet dowt the worst, that is to say thire conclusion, than to con-
ceive uncertain hope of thire disagreement.’ It may have helped that
in private Bonner reported to Cromwell that the causes of the meet-
ing had been, on the Emperor’s part ‘necessite, feare on all sides &
very povertie’ and, on that of Francis, ‘vayne hoope, vayne glorie, folie,
lightenes, and ambition’ but Bonner was a known blusterer.
12
We now need to ask how quickly Henry became aware of the change
in his negotiating power aer this shock but also to clarify the con-
text of the three-sided relationship of rulers who were circling each
other, looking for signs of weakness, ready to seize on any opportunity
to exploit. What could Henry and his fellow monarchs expect? First,
Henry had been at peace with France since 1525 and had derived some
benets from that alliance. en, his relations with the Emperor had
been very poor since the repudiation of Catherine of Aragon. In the
Franco-Imperial war of 1536–1538, Henry had stood on the sidelines
(for certain obvious internal reasons) but had suered the danger and
11
Marillac to Francis I, 13 Nov. 1539, BL Add. 33,514, fos. 27–28 (Kaulek, p. 143,
L&P, XIV, ii, 508): ‘grandement esmerveillé, pour n’avoir veu deux ambassadeurs de
vous sire et dud. Sr. Empereur aller par commung advis en ceste court.’ ‘la jalosye,
deance, peur et trouble où ilz sont entrez.’
12
Wyatt and Bonner to Henry VIII, 30 Dec. 1539, BL Harl. 282, fo. 155; Bonner to
Cromwell, 30 Dec. 1539, BL Cotton, Calig. E IV, fo. 21. W. Honnings, ‘Certain notes,’
Dec. 1539: ‘Men of good iugement that I have herd common[ly] arme verely that
nothing shalbe treated betwixt thiese two princes anewe.’ BL Cotton E IV, fo. 25v.
the road to war
37
ignominy of near-ostracism when Francis and Charles came to terms.
If there were to be a renewal of war between those monarchs (not con-
clusively certain until 1541) could Henry risk staying on the sidelines
again? Plainly not, yet this raised the problem of which side to join.
Henry was temperamentally more drawn to Francis but the one
recent experience of Anglo-Imperial conict (in 1528), had taught
that this was not a viable option.
13
e obvious course was to pre-
pare for war with France; yet, to do so openly risked reducing Henry’s
negotiating power. Nor could the Scots be le out of the equation. In
previous conicts they had been used skilfully by France to impede
Henry’s military operations and no war with France could be launched
without confronting them. It will be the argument here that nothing
was decided in terms of grand strategic alliances in 1540, that every-
thing remained open for exploitation. As a result, the participants
could not be certain of the outcome and behaved in exceptionally
devious ways toward each other. Henry VIII, Francis I and Charles V
may have reached middle age but his did not reduce their appetite for
war. It seems, though, to have made them more cautious. e result
was that it took three and a half years from Charles’ visit to France
for Henry openly to declare himself against France. He had received
a jolt in 1538–1539 but had one major asset. e dissolution of the
monasteries, along with a series of Parliamentary grants, had given
his nances a signicant boost. is had enabled him to embark on
a serious programme of refortication and shipbuilding with unusual
rapidity. Charles V, on the other hand, was notoriously short of ready
cash while Francis would take time to marshal the formidable taxa-
tion resources of his kingdom. One further point should be remem-
bered. Both in France and England, the years 1540–1542 saw ferocious
struggles for inuence around the kings, involving disgrace or death
for leading ministers (Montmorency and Cromwell) and a degree of
uncertainty about who now held favour. is raises unusually delicate
problems about who inuenced the kings in this or that direction in
matters of foreign policy, generally regarded as the domain of royal
prerogative par excellence.
13
S.J. Gunn, ‘Wolsey’s Foreign Policy and the Domestic Crisis of 1527–1528,’ in
S.J. Gunn and R. Lindley (eds.), Cardinal Wolsey: Church, State and Art, (Cambridge,
1991) pp. 149–177.
38 chapter one
Henry’s technique at the moment of Charles’ visit to France seems
to have been to oer some form of provocation in order to nd out
which way the wind was blowing. So, omas Wyatt with the Emperor
and Edmund Bonner with Francis, both under instructions to pursue
the extradition of an otherwise unimportant exile named Brancetour,
caused immense oence, each of them, by accusing their host prince
of ‘ingratitude’ in not allowing his extradition.
14
True, Bonner seems to
have gone too far
15
and Henry agreed to recall him, but he was known
to use such tactics to spy out the land. French envoys to the Emperor
reported Charles’ opinion that when Henry ‘felt himself to be in state
of malady, he was prepared to stir up trouble so the nature of the ill-
ness became clear.’ Granvelle thought that he aimed to ‘to set re to
both of their majesties by these provocative words . . . to see if anything
emerged to display their thoughts.’
16
Granvelle told the French envoys
that the Emperor was ever more inclined to his understanding with
France and saw nothing new in Cromwell’s approaches.
17
Francis I, though observed by Bonner to be pensive on his envoys’
return from escorting the Emperor to Cambrai,
18
let his ambassador
in England, Marillac, know that all dierences between him and the
Emperor were on the way to being solved.
19
Marillac in turn observed
that the English were anxious to reinforce the French alliance in light
of the complete settlement between Francis and the Emperor and the
reported likely settlement between the Emperor and the Turks; both
of these developments might allow the continental powers to turn
their arms against England.
20
is was the dilemma confronted by
14
Wyatt to Henry VIII, 3 Feb. 1540, BL, Harl 282, fo. 113 (St.P., VIII, 240, L&P,
XV, 161, K. Muir, Life and Letters of Sir omas Wyatt (Liverpool, 1963), no. 22)
makes Henry’s direct order to negotiate in this way quite clear. Hellin and Lavaur,
Brussels, 6 & 10 Feb. 1540, Ribier, I, pp. 497, 499–500. On Brancetour, see J.J. Scaris-
brick, ‘e rst Englishman round the Cape of Good Hope?’ Bulletin of the Institute
of Historical Research, 34 (1961), 165–77.
15
Francis to Marillac, 27 Jan. 1540, Kaulek, pp. 153–154 (L&P, XV, 121); Marillac,
2 Feb. 1540, Kaulek, 156 (L&P, XV, 154).
16
Selve and Hellin to Montmorency, 4 Feb. 1540, MC Chantilly, L XVI, fos. 245–246:
‘se sentoit avoir quelque indisposition il estoit content de faire ung peu the desordre
an que la maladye se declarast.’ ‘estinceler l’une et l’autre de leurs magestés par ces
propos picquants . . . et s’il en sortiroit chose qui luy peust manifester leurs pensees.’
(G. Ribier, Lettres et Mémoires d’Estat 2 vols. (Blois/Paris, 1666), I, 496; L&P, XV, 169).
17
Selve and Hellin to Montmorency, 10 Feb. 1540, MC Chantilly, L XVI, fos. 250–
252 (including reports on Wyatt’s words to the Emperor).
18
Bonner, 26 Jan. 1540, St.P., VIII, 236 (L&P, XV, 115).
19
Francis to Marillac, 22 Jan. 1540, Kaulek, p. 152 (L&P, XV, 96).
20
Marillac to Mont, 2 Feb. 1540, BL 33,514, fo. 34 (Ribier, I, 495, Kaulek, p. 157,
L&P, XV, 155).
the road to war
39
Henry in sending Norfolk to France. What did Henry have to oer,
though? Norfolk was under orders to stress to Francis the disadvan-
tages of his understanding with the Emperor. is is hardly a sur-
prise, but Henry was unsubtle in the way he chose to do it. First, he
advised Francis of what he stood to lose: the Turkish alliance and that
of the German princes. ese were valid enough points but Henry
(or Cromwell) thought they could poison the French king’s mind by
asserting that Charles had revealed to omas Wyatt that he knew of
a scheme mooted at Calais in 1532. By this, Henry would have given
up his pension and joined in a war against the Emperor; in return
he would have received the Flemish coastal towns. Henry could only
think, he declared, that a member of Francis’ council had revealed this
(Montmorency was obviously intended). Henry added that Charles’
words to Wyatt about Brancetour that he was not being ungrateful
to Henry because a superior could not be ungrateful to an inferior
revealed his ultimate aims of universal dominion (a stock propaganda
theme of the period).
21
As for Milan, Henry oered his aid in getting
it back and, crucially, put on the table giving up all the pension arrears
and half the pension, stressing a point he returned to several times in
these months: that the Emperor’s resources were low and he could get
no money from Spain or the Low Countries.
22
Norfolk le England in haste on 14 February and reached the lit-
tle fortress town of Doullens, north of Amiens, where Francis was
hunting.
23
He was well lodged and quickly received by Francis in an
aer-dinner audience. Francis seemed annoyed about the reported
words of the Emperor on ingratitude and asked for them to be put
in writing. e duke was glad not to have done so before the King’s
departure for hunting around Hesdin. Subsequent conversation with
the Queen of Navarre conrmed her dislike of the Emperor but
21
e whole matter was blown up out of proportion as a means of nding out
Francis’ thoughts, as can been seen by the dierent accounts of the words between
Wyatt and the Emperor in Kaulek, pp. 163–164. Norfolk used the device of putting
Francis on his guard against the Emperor’s ambition in February 1540 (17 Feb. 1540,
St.P., VIII, 254; L&P, XV, 222) and Marguerite of Navarre responded to his sug-
gestions by exclaiming ‘Will he have no equal, will he be God?’ (ibid. St.P., VIII,
258, L&P, XV, 223). In June 1541, it was Francis’s turn to persuade Henry that the
Emperor ‘n’a aultre project que de se faire grant et et aspirer à ceste monarchie tant
odieuse et préjudiciable à toute la chestienté.’ (Kaulek, p. 311, L&P, XVI, 885).
22
Instructions to Norfolk, Feb. 1540? St.P., VIII, 245 (L&P, XV, 145).
23
Marillac, 14 Feb. 1540, Kaulek, 161 (L&P, XV, 202) on his departure, Norfolk to
Henry, 17 Feb. St.P., VIII, 254 (L&P, XV, 222).