Potter David. Henry VIII and Francis I
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70 chapter one
not in anywyse be made an[y] fundatyon of our amitye, ne that wolde
in anywyse to yeve eare unto it.’ It was true that Henry had accepted
that, in the event of an alliance ‘no man shoulde have that auctoritye
with us in thinges honorable and reasonable than he should have.’
Vague promises of discussions aer an alliance would make no dif-
ference to the establishment of religion in England. When it came to
renewing old alliances, Chapuys asked if this was to be the old alliance
of 1521 for making Henry king of France. No, said, Henry, that was
so long ago broken that all he sought was the formation of a mutual
and balanced (‘indierent’) amity. Henry then went on to describe his
declaration of intent before the Chancellor and Norfolk. Gardiner was
recalled during the ten months’ interval.
165
How are we to understand all this? Did it mean that Henry had
eectively made up his mind for war with France and for forward
action in Scotland? e answer cannot be unequivocal. Henry him-
self seems to have made notes about this time, the main points of
which were: ‘Whych way to redowbe the pacte with th’Emperour,’
‘For a sucient nombre to themprys o the sea’ and nally, ‘For to
determyne wether the jornay oversee may be thys yere or nott.’
166
But
the démarche might have been designed to improve Henry’s bargain-
ing position with France and, for Charles, to put more pressure on
France. Besides, throughout the period, economic relations between
England the Low Countries remained dicult because of edicts in
both countries forbidding the lading of goods in the others’ ships.
Mary of Hungary even thought that any closer treaty must depend
on a new trade treaty.
167
e talks dragged on at Brussels and London
through the summer of 1541, while Henry went north to draw James V
into an alliance.
In the autumn of 1541, the ‘negotiations’ over Mary’s marriage,
either to Orléans or the Emperor limped on. Marnol, the imperial
ambassador in France, reported that a French marriage was just a tac-
tic ‘to derail any understanding that Your Majesty could have with
the King of England . . . to keep him occupied and deceive him. He can
165
Henry VIII to his ambassadors at the Diet of Ratisbon, 17 June 1541, ed. C.J.
Black and C.E. Challis (pub. by the Merchant Victuallers of York, 1968) document
sold at Sotheby’s 15 Oct. 1963, lot 492.
166
Memorandum in pencil, BL Add., 32,647, Hamilton Papers, I, no. 159, p. 197
(L&P, XVII, 630). e last phrase points at least to a possibility of this note dating
from spring 1543.
167
Mary of Hungary to Chapuys, 5 July 1541, L&P, XVI, 969.
the road to war
71
only take in bad part such obvious mockery.’
168
In England, Chapuys
was of much the same view and was able to score a real coup in getting
access to the French ambassador’s ciphered correspondence, through
the secretary he had corrupted. is enabled him to see clearly enough
that French talk of such a marriage was a front, the obstacles too seri-
ous. He did not underestimate the problems in arranging a reconcili-
ation with the Emperor; these included the Break with Rome and the
succession and would make it dicult to get reasonable conditions
from Henry.
169
On the other hand, Southampton held out good hopes
in November and at the very end of December 1541 Henry granted
the Imperial ambassador a very long private audience which indicated
well enough his inclination to an understanding and his sourness (to
be expected, of course, at such a meeting) about Francis. Ever cau-
tious, though, Henry would commit himself to nothing rm unless
he saw the colour of the Emperor’s negotiating powers.
170
Meanwhile,
Henry sent Edmund Bonner as the new resident with the Emperor, a
mixed blessing for his host.
Henry’s deviousness was conrmed when Chapuys learned from his
spy on Marillac’s sta how serious Anglo-French talks were in January
1542. He was not alarmed because he knew that Marillac was not opti-
mistic and was clear that Francis simply aimed to deceive Henry in
order to prevent him joining the Emperor. Henry was able to up his
price with Charles and Chapuys was convinced that the price must be
paid; not only Gardiner but Southampton and Wriothesley, who were
Henry’s chief condants, were in favour of it.
171
He was able to take
his time because, despite English claims, he knew the talks with France
were not going well.
172
168
Marnol to Charles V, Dijon, 3 Nov. 1541, HHSA, Frankreich, fasz. 9, ‘Villey an
Karl, 1541’ fo. 57: ‘an de divertir toutes intelligences que vostredicte Majesté pourroit
avoir avec ledict Seigneur Roy d’Angleterre . . . pour l’entretenir et abuser, et ne peult
estre qu’il ne pregne de bien maulvaise part une si apparente mocquerie.’
169
Chapuys to Mary of Hungary, 9 Oct. 1541, L&P, XVI, 1243; to Charles V, 26
Oct. 1541, L&P, XVI, 1291.
170
Chapuys to Charles V, 19 Nov. 1541, L&P, XVI, 1390; Chapuys to Mary of
Hungary, 30 Dec. 1541, L&P, XVI, 1482.
171
Chapuys to Mary of Hungary, 10 Jan. 1542, L&P, XVII, 16, app. 1; Chapuys to
Charles V, 25 Feb. 1542, L&P, XVII, 124, CSP Spain VI, i, 232; ibid., VI, i, 234, 244,
p. 493.
172
Chapuys to Charles V, 9 Feb. 1542 16 April 1542, L&P, XVII, 92, app. 6; CSP
Spain, VI, i, no. 244 and ibid., p. 502.
72 chapter one
Charles was at Valladolid recuperating from the defeat of Algiers
and from an attack of gout. Communications were necessarily slow.
He was initially very cautious about Henry’s unaccustomed warmth,
warning Chapuys to consent to nothing until he knew what Henry
was prepared to oer. He need not have worried about Chapuys’ real-
ism. e ambassador was clear in his own mind that Henry was only
being friendly because he feared a Franco-Imperial reconciliation. e
moment he knew that war was likely he would break o the talks and
expect to reap the benet when both the major powers were exhausted.
He was able to conrm reports that Francis was preparing seriously
for war on marshal d’Annebault’s advice. Henry, Chapuys thought,
disliked the Emperor and tended to raise his terms when sought aer
but he wanted to go along with talks because by now he knew from
his spy with Marillac that the French ambassador had virtually carte-
blanche to negotiate.
173
On 14 March 1542, the Emperor nally drew up a commission for
Chapuys to negotiate. Even then, it was covered by a neutral-sounding
letter that was not to be physically handed over in case the English
presented it to the French.
174
When he saw Bonner on 2 April, Charles
received Henry’s condolences for Algiers and a reminder that a time-
table for negotiation had been agreed at Regensburg. Charles neatly
sidestepped that by saying that it was Granvelle who had made the
promise and he needed to consult him.
175
In fact, when Chapuys pre-
sented the commission he found even the pro-Habsburg councillors
grumbling that the ten months set at Regensburg were up and the
commission was so general as to be meant simply to spy out their
intentions.
176
e King was more pleased when Chapuys was able to
place the Emperor’s letter about his commission in his hands, though
the ambassador continued sceptical. Henry, he thought, would only
sign a treaty on terms very advantageous to himself and thought him
more likely to remain neutral.
177
e pace quickened when Bonner
was nally able to get an interview with Granvelle at Valladolid, in
which the bitterness of the Emperor about the French was all too
173
Chapuys to Charles V, 29 Jan. 1542, L&P, XVII, 63, app. 4; 25 February 1542,
L&P, XVII, 124.
174
Charles V to Chapuys, 14 March 1542, L&P, XVII, 170, 171; Mary of Hungary
to Chapuys, 31 March 1542, L&P, XVII, 217.
175
Charles V to Chapuys, 6 April 1542, L&P, XVII, 239.
176
Chapuys to Charles V, 9 April 1542, L&P, XVII, 245, app. 12.
177
Chapuys to Charles V, 16 April 1542, L&P, XVII, 251, app. 13.
the road to war
73
apparent and clarication of the Regensburg agreements was made.
True, Bonner was probably not instructed to go beyond oering a
defensive alliance.
178
Chapuys had lamented not having a convincing
enough set of negotiating powers early in May.
179
But when he met a
council committee of Gardiner, Southampton, Browne and Sadler in
mid-May, he was able to oer a defensive and oensive alliance with
the conrmation and clarication of old treaties. is was two weeks
aer the failure of the talks with Marillac and followed informal talks
over a glass of wine between Gardiner and the Imperial ambassador.
180
is was a major development and Chapuys declared he was empow-
ered to discuss any reasonable terms. In fact, he seems to have turned
on all the argumentative powers and charm of which he was capable
at this remarkable meeting, oering a wide-ranging tour d’horizon
of European aairs as an argument in favour of Henry’s entering an
alliance with the Emperor, mixing geopolitical insights with cynical
propaganda. is exchange, conducted almost at the same time as
Chabot’s equally persuasive arguments in favour of the Anglo-French
alliance, deserves quoting at some length and compared with it (see
above p. 63). Chapuys opened by saying that Christendom had been
‘vexed and trobled’ by the quarrels of the Emperor and the French
King and also ‘infested’ by the Turks, incited by the French:
In this tragedy the Kynges Maiestie hath not intermedled but geven the
lokyng on. Nowe, he said, it is to be considred that this troble shal ende
eyther by agrement or by force. If it ende by force, thenne if the Turke
prevayleth he shal confounde al. If the French Kyng prevayle, he cannot
cesse but style serch a newe troble and be intollerable; and if themper-
our have the upper hande he shalbe thought to gret. If the troble shulde
ende by agrement, it is comenly said that those which have been newter
be in such agrementes not always soo provyded for as othewise they
shulde be.
Henry might be a powerful and rich prince and therefore not need
either King or Emperor but he ‘shuld not let Christendom perish in
his tyme.’ In doing so, he would be father not only to the Emperor but
to all Christendom. Asked by Gardiner whether he meant a common
war against Francis, Chapuys thought their conjoined power would
178
Bonner and Knyvet to Henry VIII, 3 May 1542, St.P., IX, p. 1 (L&P, XVII, 292);
Charles V Chapuys, 3 May 1542, L&P, XVII, 293, app. 17.
179
Chapuys to Mary of Hungary, 7 May 1542, L&P, XVII, 307.
180
Gardiner to Henry VIII, 12 May 1542, St.P., IX, p. 23 (L&P, XVII, 319).
74 chapter one
bring him to reason. A just cause for war was available in the non-
payment of the pension.
Soo, as he rekenyth, that with thauctoritie oonly of the Kynges Maiestie
al shal be quyeted and reason ministred to al parties. And he wold the
matier of the Turke to be the principal matier in open apparaunce
wherby to allure the good wyl of the woorld.
Other articles could deal with details of how and when to wage war
and what should be done if the Scots or Danes attacked Henry at
French incitement. In the event of a new peace, the pension could
be assured by the handing over of Montreuil, Boulogne, Ardres and
érouanne to Henry. In this way, ‘the dreade of England sumwhat
quykened in the French mennes hartes wherby they shal the better
knowe themselves.’ Coming to his peroration, Chapuys ‘concluded that
it lyeth now in the Kynges highnes handes to make the worlde newe
again . . .’
181
Chapuys was not to give his own account of this meeting
to the Emperor until the end of the following month (possibly because
he made a brief journey to Brussels to talk to the Queen of Hungary).
He does not dier in general terms from Gardiner’s account though
we should wonder whether the bishop signicantly embroidered the
case he made in order to push the case for the alliance. All the same,
the cynical propaganda idea of using the threat of the Turks as casus
belli was certainly borne out in the form of subsequent dra pre-
ambles of treaties and proclamations. Chapuys reports that Gardiner
advised him, when discussing the treaty with Henry, not to emphasise
expediency in making an alliance; his own councillors would see to
that. In fact, Henry proved all too keen to discuss the practicalities in
great detail. By now, the ambassador was prepared to admit a certain
understanding of English nit-picking over detail. For them, he told
Granvelle, it was a matter of launching out on dangerous seas and
taking risks when they could easily stay neutral.
182
Marillac was aware of this and other meetings with Chapuys and
alarmed by them.
183
He was right. Henry told Bonner that Chapuys,
having argued about details, had ‘descended nally to this overture
181
Gardiner to Southampton, Browne and Sadler, 17 May 1542, NA, SP1/170, fos.
131–134 (L&P, XVII, 329); Muller (ed.), Letters of Stephen Gardiner, pp. 96–100.
182
Chapuys to Charles V, 30 June 1542, L&P, XVII, 441, app. 22; to Granvelle,
30 June 1542 L&P, XVII, 442, app. 23 – Chapuys repeated this point in his letter to
Granvelle of 20 June 1542, L&P, XVII, 518.
183
Marillac, 20 May 1542, Kaulek, p. 420 (L&P, XVII, 338).
the road to war
75
that if themperour wold be bound at the daye prexed to invade the
said Frenche King in such place as he shulde thinke for his most com-
moditie with the army pre[xed we for our part would] be bounde to
doo the semblable in the parties of Picardye.’ By the end of the month,
a dra treaty, containing a preface using the justication of the Turks
as Chapuys had advised, was roughed out by Wriothesley. is pro-
vided for an undertaking for neither side to negotiate with another
prince or to make peace without consulting the other.
184
In essence, the
deal had been done, though the detail had to be argued out and this
was to take many more months, given the Emperor’s absence in Spain.
For the direct negotiations in Spain, omas irlby was deputed at
the end of June. In his instructions to irlby of 1 July 1542, Henry
approved du Roeulx’s scheme for a quick attack on Montreuil in
1543, before it could be refortied but only on condition that Charles
approved the treaty. He also proposed a major joint campaign with
the Emperor in 1544. Of signicance for the future, Henry staked a
claim to all French territory from the Somme northward as guarantee
of his pension (Charles’ rights there he was prepared to trade with his
own rights in Gascony).
185
Chapuys made a brief visit to the Queen of
Hungary at Brussels during which he consulted the comte du Roeulx
on possible war objectives (Montreuil, Ardres, Boulogne) and got
Mary’s agreement to the suspension of the Edict against English ship-
ping. By his return, the English were pressing to set a date for joint
invasion of not later than 1 July 1543 and have the agreement kept
secret until October.
186
Henry expressed the view to omas Seymour,
then in Vienna, that he expected war to begin early in 1543.
187
June–July 1542 was, then, the crucial turning-point in Henry’s
decision to ally with the Emperor, in following up the move made by
Gardiner in 1541. e Franco-Imperial war was beginning and the Low
Countries in need of help against a two-pronged assault. Henry neatly
side-stepped this (aer all, he had heard nothing from Spain).
188
But
184
Henry VIII to Bonner, late May 1542, NA, SP1/170, fos. 162–167 (L&P, XVII,
360), at fo. 167; dra treaty, NA, SP1/170, fos. 168–173 (L&P, XVII, 361).
185
Instruction to irlby, July 1542, St.P., IX, pp. 68–73 (L&P, XVII, 441).
186
Chapuys to Mary of Hungary, 29 June 1542, L&P, XVII, 439, app. 21; Treaty
to suspend the Edict and keep Anglo-Imperial agreements secret, 29 June 1541, St.P.,
IX, p. 65 (L&P, XVII, 440); Chapuys to Charles V, 30 June 1542, L&P, XVII, 441,
app. 22.
187
Henry VIII to omas Seymour, 29 Aug. 1542, St.P., IX, 138 (L&P, XVII, 701).
188
Chapuys to Mary of Hungary, 2 Aug. 1542, L&P, XVII, 562, app. 34.
76 chapter one
this was also the period when border skirmishes in Scotland got out of
hand and developed into full-scale war. No doubt this shaped English
objectives as to timing but not on fundamentals. One major problem
was that the Emperor was in Spain, which might have been o the
edge of the world in terms of speed in communications. e Emperor
proved dicult partly because he still had not heard of Francis’ decla-
ration of war when Bonner and irlby held four days of talks over the
dra treaty. No agreement was possible on some knotty problems such
as the terms of the defensive alliance (whether the Pope could count
as an enemy), the oensive alliance stipulation that each side was to
declare war against all enemies of the other (here Scotland for Henry
and Denmark for Charles were involved), provisions for separate
negotiations for peace, the status of the Channel Islands, treatment of
rebels (crucial in that the wording might or might not include Henry’s
erstwhile ally the Duke of Cleves) and the pay of troops. Had Charles
known that war had already begun, his councillors might have been
more exible.
189
Communications via the Bay of Biscay were dire in
the summer of 1542. e Emperor commissioned Courrières to reply
to Henry and accompany irlby back to England on 12 August at
Monçon, before news of the war arrived. Aer delays in starting and
bad weather en route, they did not drag themselves ashore separately
at Plymouth and Falmouth until 5 October or reach London until
14th; meanwhile the treaty hung re.
190
Henry, though he appointed
another team to negotiate (Gardiner, irlby and Wriothesley) was
furious. He could not understand why Charles was raising such dif-
culties over the inclusion of the Pope or the article about rebels.
Chapuys and Courrières did not wish to irritate him and kept the
details for the commissioners on 17 and 21 October; these insisted
that all might yet be broken o and Chapuys thought the King could
be cooling. e game was clearly one of who blinked rst. Chapuys
and Courrières thought the matter not yet desperate enough to com-
promise.
191
For her part, Mary of Hungary was also unwilling to com-
189
Charles V to Chapuys, 12 Aug. 1542, L&P, XVII, 616; Bonner to Henry VIII and
irlby, 24 Aug. 1542, St.P., IX, 131 (L&P, XVII, 669).
190
Charles’ commision to Courrières and letter to Chapuys, 12 Aug. 1542, L&P,
XVII, 615, 616. Chapuys to Mary of Hungary, 7 Oct. 1542, L&P, XVII, 918. omas
Wyatt, sent to meet them on 3 Oct., became ill on the journey and died at Sherborne,
where he was buried (Muir, Life and Letters, pp. 215–216).
191
Chapuys and Courrières to Mary of Hungary, 18 and 28 Oct. 1542, L&P, XVII,
963, 993; Chapuys to Charles V, 2 Nov. 1542, L&P, XVII, 1017; Council to Bonner, 7
Nov. 1542, St.P., IX, p. 213 (L&P, XVII, 1044).
the road to war
77
promise and certainly refused to take on responsibility for accepting
English terms. Charles V wanted nothing in the treaty to the Pope’s
prejudice. Much hard bargaining followed.
192
Time passed while both
sides gave a chance for the other to budge.
e delay in nalising the Treaty between November 1542 and May
1543 was almost entirely the result of slow communications. In the
middle of December, Chapuys reported that he could still not get a
decision and argued that, in any case, the English were waiting to see
how the invasion of the Netherlands turned out; they would be unwill-
ing to contribute to its defence, nor would they be likely to mount a
joint campaign in 1543, as they insisted earlier in the year.
193
At the end
of the month, Mary of Hungary seemed more content to press ahead
with the terms for fear of another invasion of the Low Countries, but
an answer was dicult to get from Henry and his councillors as news
came in of the defeat of the Scots and the death of James V. is raised
all kinds of interesting possibilities that threw the English court into
ferment. Indeed, Chapuys thought the recent entertainment of the
French ambassador at court may have been designed to keep France at
peace in order to allow Henry to attain the crown of Scotland through
his prisoners.
194
Messages may have taken weeks to get to Spain but the
talks were not helped by Henry’s devious foot-dragging, itself partly
caused by his needing the Emperor’s full agreement. Chapuys saw his
councillors on 22 and 23 November but still had not received a reply
by mid-January 1543. At that point, Chapuys had abandoned hope of
getting the English to move against the French in 1543; Scottish war
expenses and the opportunity to control the northern kingdom were
diverting Henry’s energies. He hoped to be able to persuade Henry to
accept the terms on oer by arguing that, by doing so, he would be
able to control Scotland without trouble where otherwise the French
would easily be able to hinder this.
195
By late January, Charles still felt
unable to accept Henry’s modications since they concerned matters
of Faith but was at least prepared to allow Chapuys to go ahead if
192
Mary of Hungary to Chapuys and Courrières, 31 Oct. 1542, L&P, XVII, 1008;
same to Chapuys, 16 Nov. 1542, L&P, XVII, 1092.
193
Chapuys to Mary of Hungary, 17 Dec. 1542, L&P, XVII, 1212.
194
Mary of Hungary to Chapuys, 22 Dec. 1542, L&P, XVII, 1229; Chapuys to Mary,
23 Dec. 1542, ibid., 1230; Chapuys to Mary of Hungary, 28 Dec. 1542, L&P, XVII,
1241.
195
Chapuys to Charles V, 15 Jan. 1543, L&P, XVIII, i, 43; 21 Jan., L&P, XVIII, i, 63.
78 chapter one
the Queen of Hungary thought best. is was a crucial breakthough.
196
Clauses 3 and 4 of the treaty committed each side to declare war
against all enemies of the other. On 11 February Chapuys signed the
dra treaty in London (sometimes erroneously called the Treaty of
Barcelona
197
because the Emperor’s ratication took place there) with
Gardiner and Wriothesley. His explanation was that the French were
again making big oers and he feared a rupture of the talks. He thus
took advantage of the authorisation he had received and dealt with the
matter of titles of Head of the Church and Defender of the faith by
allowing them to be placed in the English copy but not in his own.
198
At Barcelona on 12 April, Charles issued his commision to Chapuys
to receive Henry’s ratication. A month later, Chapuys received this
but the act was put o. e Privy Council reported on 13 May that the
‘matyer is not yet openly divulged here . . . albeit the same standing in
the terms it doth . . . it cannot much lenger be hidden.’ Chapuys’ recur-
rent illness also caused delay.
Finally, on 27 May at Hampton Court, before the ambassador and
Council, Henry ratied the Treaty and the way was open for the
English and Flemish heralds to go to France to present the common
act of deance.
199
While the Treaty itself lacked the preamble draed
by the English in June 1542, the actual printed Declaration of War let
rip with the full force of propaganda. Henry had been informed that
Francis had been helping and inciting the Turk in his plans to invade
Christendom (aer all blatantly true though not necessarily of much
concern to his subjects).
200
What was more, Francis had long with-
196
Charles V to Chapuys, 21 January 1543, L&P, XVIII, i, 69.
197
E.g. referred to as such by a French ambassador in Feb. 1546, BnF, fr. 17890,
fo. 115v.
198
Anglo-Imperial Treaty, London, 11 Feb. 1543, T. Rymer, Foedera, conventiones,
literae 3rd. ed. 10 vols. (e Hague, 1739–45) VI, pp. 86–90 (L&P, XVIII, i, 471);
Chapuys to Mary of Hungary, 12 Feb. 1543 (L&P, XVIII, i, 150).
199
Mary of Hungary to Chapuys, 7 May 1543, L&P, XVIII, i, 511; Council to Suf-
folk, 13 May 1543, NA, SP1/178, fos. 11–16/14–18 (L&P, XVIII, i, 534); Act of Rati-
cation, 17 May 1543, L&P, XVIII, i, 603; Chapuys to Mary of Hungary, 29 May 1543,
L&P, XVIII, i, 613.
200
e preoccupation with the Turks was a favourite theme of policy makers.
When Henry sought to use the Turkish threat in the Balkans to get voluntary contri-
butions from his subjects in 1543, he was predictably cold-shouldered. C. Kitching,
‘Broken angels: the response of English parishes to the Turkish threat to Christendom,
1543,’ in W.J. Shiels and D. Wood (eds.), e Church and Wealth (Oxford, 1987), pp.
209–217.
the road to war
79
held the pension he owed Henry, paid as recompense for the crown of
France and various dukedoms. So, Henry had entered a ‘strayte leage
and amitie’ with the Emperor and, together they had ‘intimated’ war
to Francis by heralds sent to oer reasonable terms. Francis had not
received them or replied. As a result, King and Emperor intended to
prosecute war with Francis until he desist from his alliance with the
Turk and render them what was due to them and authorised their
subjects to treat Francis and all his subjects ‘to their moost advauntage
and commoditie.’
201
One problem remained unresolved despite the
terms of the treaty. e commitment to wage war against all common
enemies remained a dead letter since Charles V did not wish to declare
war against Scotland and Henry VIII did not wish to do the same
against Denmark. It was a small but telling indicator of the durability
of the treaty in that it was allowed to lapse for the time being.
202
The French Rearguard Action for Peace with England
May 1542 had been the end of the road for the Anglo-French alli-
ance, yet war did not break out until June 1543. Why? In part, as had
been seen, negotiations with the Emperor proved arduous but there
was also the problem in England of assembling war materiel and men
and of exploiting the fortuitous victory over the Scots. For their part
the French were determined to put o the break as long as possible.
William Paget used to go out in the streets incognito to sample public
opinion. He found the populace unenthusiastic about the war:
Of their debtes every man speketh, and all the woorld knoweth they be
not hable to pay it You. For great store of money they have not, (as I am
credibly enformed) not sucient to mainteyn their numbre appointed
for Piedmont, if the warre shuld contynue any season, and hath alredy
grated asmuch as He can get, and that He hath gotten sithens the last
warres, what with thEmperours entreteynement at his being here (which
was mervailous chargeable unto Him), and the Duke of Cleves entreteye-
ment (which was at his charge), and partely with the payment of thar-
rerages of pensions, and the daily continuance of the same, to Italians,
Almayns, Suisses, gensdarmes and their capitaynes here at home, for-
tications . . . is Chauncelour deviseth meanes to get Him money, at
201
For as much as by credyble meanes printed by T. Berthelot, 1543, STC 7801.
202
L&P, XVIII, i, 120, 383, 397, 612, 632, 732, 925, 954; ibid., ii, appendix no. 4.