Potter David. Henry VIII and Francis I
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100 chapter two
Sadler undoubtedly relied too heavily on pro-English lords such as
the Douglases for information. A detailed reading of his despatches
reveals the extent to which he reacted to events rather than shaped
them; he was a ne reporter of meetings but probably out of his depth
in the treacherous politics of Edinburgh. Nor was his personal security
assured; in view of the ‘the malice of the people here to all English-
men’ and the attempt on his life in July he thought about withdrawing
to the castle of Tantallon with the Governor. Expressing relief that
there would be no outbreak of ghting between the Governor and his
enemies, he rst transmitted extraordinarily optimistic views of the
outcome of talks between the Scottish factions. He then realised that,
despite his expertise in Scottish aairs, he had been in eect double-
crossed by Arran.
51
Henry did not help his case by failing to ratify the
Treaties of Greenwich and by arresting 16 ships form Edinburgh in
August 1543 on the argument that they were bound for France.
52
But
there is also the eect of French intervention to be considered.
French Intervention, 1543
For the French, the defeat of their ally and the death of James in
December 1542 transformed the nature of their relations with England.
e English Council, in view of the fact that the French might be
‘glad to get into theire handes’ the new-born Queen, sent to France
on 26 December to learn what help to the Scots was to be expected
from there. Paget duly reported the sending of envoys to Scotland with
some resources and added that:
whatsoever they worke secretly in this matier, they wilbe seen in appar-
ence to do indierently; and yet they can not hyde their aections, for
from the highest to the lowest in this Courte every man maketh this
matier of the Scottes almoost theyr owne, and wil in no wise seame to
beleave these last newes of the Scottes rupture, but rather go about, by
all the meanes they can, to cover theyr losses, and, saving the reverence
of Your Majestie, do boste the Scottes with bragges and lyes.
53
51
Sadler to Henry VIII, 17 July 1543, Sadler State Papers, I, p. 573; For the evolu-
tion of Sadler’s views, see Hamilton Papers, I, pp. 589, 591, 602. E. Bonner, ‘French
Reactions to the Rough Wooings,’ 27–28. See also Slavin Politics and Prot, p. 112.
52
L&P, XVIII, ii, 47, 83, 111, 154.
53
Council to Paget, 26 Dec. 1542, BL, Cotton, E IV, fo. 99; Paget to Henry VIII,
9 Jan. 1543, St.P., IX, p. 258.
scotland between england and france 101
e dowager Queen of Scotland had all too many friends and relatives
at court for her cause to be ignored.
54
James had drawn back from the
anti-imperial coalition of the summer of 1542; the French objective
now became the renewal of the alliance with Scotland by the time
a war on two fronts developed. Scotland on its knees oered extra
advantages to France.
e English suspected that the French would try to get control of
Mary Stuart, though it is not clear that this was the immediate objec-
tive.
55
François Errault, sr. de Cheman and Jacques Montgommery de
Lorges (captain of the Scots Guard) were sent to Scotland. eir task
was to assure its rulers of French support and accompany Matthew
Stuart, 4th Earl of Lennox (next line to the throne aer the Hamiltons
and always a useful tool as a rival to Arran) to dispute the regency as
a counterweight to the ‘English’ party and act as a sort of ambassador.
56
Cheman and John Stuart (of the Scots guard and Lennox’s brother) took
with them 60–70 expatriate Scots and it was even rumoured (incor-
rectly) that the duke of Guise was at Le Havre on his way to Scotland
to help his daughter.
57
Arran told Sadler that Lennox’s credence from
Francis had been to ask the Scottish estates to observe their old treaties
with him, as he promised to do, and to promise aid with men, money
and supplies should the English invade again.
58
Reports sent back by
agents of Beaton and Lennox in May–June were pessimistic about the
position of the Queen Dowager and the Cardinal, internal Scottish
divisions and the likelihood of Arran treating with the English.
59
e
outbreak of the Anglo-French war in June 1543 gave more urgency
to French moves in Scotland and Ireland. e gure of the Irish exile
Gerald Fitzgerald had been an aggravation in Anglo-French relations.
He had escaped to France and then via the Low Countries to Italy.
Henry’s agents had long pursued him. In October 1543, there were
rumours that Francis would send him to Scotland and early in 1544
54
E.g. Jean Cardinal de Lorraine, Antoinette de Bourbon and Aumale to Marie,
1543, Balcarres Papers I, p. 87.
55
Council to Paget, 26 Dec. 1542, L&P, XVII, 1235.
56
Paget to Henry VIII, 20 Jan. 1543, St.P., IX, pp. 267–271; 2 Feb. 1543, ibid., p. 288;
4 Feb. 1543, ibid., p. 297. W. Bryce, ‘A French mission to Scotland in 1543,’ Proc. Soc.
Antiq. Scotland, 42 (1908), 243–252. Francis I to Arran, 19 Feb. 1542/3, crs. Bochetel,
NLS, MS 368/15.
57
Maltravers to Henry VIII, 13 Jan. 1543, NA SP1/175, fo. 41 (L&P, XVIII, i, 46).
58
Sadler to Henry VIII, 26 April 1543, Sadler State Papers, I, p. 160 (L&P, XVIII,
i, 438, p. 273).
59
Grimani, 5 and 21 June 1543, ANG, III, pp. 204–205, 206.
102 chapter two
the Council of Ireland reported that he was at Nantes, where a navy
was being prepared for Ireland.
60
Ireland, though, was a sideshow at this stage. e assembly of German
troops around Abbeville and of others in Normandy for despatch to
Scotland was already reported in April 1543, though the Germans
were unwilling to go.
61
On 25 June, Jacques de la Brosse, a household
ocer of Francis and Jacques Mesnage, councillor of the Parlement of
Rouen who was to emerge as one of the most accomplished French
diplomats, were commissioned to visit the lords in Scotland who had
shown an inclination for a new Franco-Scottish agreement:
To which, for the great and singular aection that we have always
had and have now to perpetuate that alliance . . . to negotiate in our name
and agree with our said allies or their representatives the said points and
articles concerning the security and strengthening of our friendship and
alliance.
62
ere is no doubt this document and the instructions dated 27 June
were expedited in June 1543 since they were recorded in an agreement of
24 October.
63
But the French expedition did not leave until September.
Why? It might have been the result of the King’s distraction with the
Landrecies campaign but more likely delay was brought about both by
slowness in assembling men and materiel and by Henry’s stationing
of a eet o western Scotland from July to mid-September. Grimani,
60
See D. Potter, ‘French intrigue in Ireland during the reign of Henri II, 1547–
1559,’ International History Review, 5, no. 2 (1983), 159–180. L&P, XV, 543; XVIII, i,
290, XIX, i, 542, St.P., III, pp. 501, 503.
61
Wallop to Council, 6 April 1543, St.P., IX, 345 (L&P, XVIII, i, 375); du Roeulx
to Wallop, 7 April 1543 (L&P, XVIII, I, 380).
62
Letters of commission addressed to the ‘gouverneurs et seigneurs du royaume
d’Escosse, dated at camp de Maroilles, 25 June 1543, le copy, formerly Villebon,
Archives de Laubespine, liasse 21: ‘à quoy pour la grande et singuliere aection que
avons tousjours eue et avons de perpetuer lad. alliance . . . de pour et en nostre nom
traicter et accorder avec nosd. allies ou leursd. depputez lesd poinctz et articles concer-
nans la seureté et corroboracion de nostred. amytié et alliance.’ is is fair copy signed
by several trial royal signatures kept as a le copy. I am not sure the signicance
attached to it by Marcus Merriman, that the signatures show that Francis withheld
the commission in June, can be sustained (Rough Wooings, p. 132) simply because the
secretary, L’Aubespine, may well have been trying out the royal signature for which he
was responsible on routine documents and it was quite normal to retain a copy with
a mistake as a le copy. It is printed from the text of the December 1543 treaty in
A. Teulet, Relations politiques de la France et de l’Espagne avec l’Ecosse au XVI
e
siècle
5 vols. (Paris, 1862), I, pp. 122–123. On 21 June, Dandino reported that Francis had
ordered La Brosse and Mesnage to be expedited (ANG III, p. 234.
63
BnF fr. 17890, fo. 7r–v. e Instructions are not extant.
scotland between england and france 103
the papal envoy sent to oppose the Reformation in Scotland and pro-
mote French aid to the Scots, reported on 12 July that the munitions
had already le and 50,000 écus allocated; by the 16th, he had heard
that 12 ships were ready.
64
At all events, La Brosse and Mesnage made
their way to Brest, where they summoned pilots from Conquet to
know ‘if they knew the route to guide and conduct them to Scotland’
and employed local captains to interview English prisoners to as what
number of ships Henry VIII had stationed to block the route (‘pour
empescher led. passage en Escosse.’) e French eet is known in
some detail, thanks to the accounts of Jean de Vymond, trésorier de la
marine, drawn up the following April. e ships included: the Marie,
200 tonnes and 90 sailors, master Pierre Persac; the Jacques of Saint-
Valéry, 90 tonnes, 80 men, master Paullet du Bosc; the Katherine, cap-
tain Nicolas Wyard, 100 men; the Magdeleine, 40 tonnes; the Jacques,
Pierre Bachelier captain and Paullet du Bosc maître; the Françoise and
the barque La Vollandière.
65
e French eet, with Grimani, nally le Brest around 28 Sept ember
and arrived at Dumbarton, Lennox’s stronghold, on 6 October, reported
by Beaton’s agent to be ‘na gret personages.’
66
In fact, by September
1543, Arran had formed an alliance with Marie de Lorraine but Lennox
had become disaected with the French cause. e main aim of the La
Brosse-Mesnage mission was deliver a major store of money and muni-
tions to the pro-French party but they quickly realised Lennox could
no longer be trusted.
67
ey had been told to assure his delity and so
64
Grimani, Paris, 12 and 16 July 1543, ANG, III, pp. 209–210. Sadler reported to
Henry VIII on 28 July that the Governor of Scotland had word of the coming of the
French eet, reinforced from 15 to 20 ships because it was understood the English
would try to block the way (Hamilton Papers, I, p. 609).
65
Money paid by Jean de Vymont, trésorier de la marine, for the voyage to Scot-
land, Brest, 27 Sept 1543: BnF, fr, 17890, fo. 18–22. Enquiries ‘s’ilz scavoient la route
pour les pilloter et conduire jusques aud. pays d’Escosse.’
66
La Brosse and Mesnage to Francis I, 9 Oct. 1543, BnF fr. 17888, fo. 279; Lennox
to Francis, 10 Oct. 1543, BnF fr. 17890, fo. 10; Steward of Cardonald to Beaton, Scot-
tish Correspondence of Mary of Lorraine, ed. A.L. Cameron, (Edinburgh: SHS, 1927),
pp. 33–34: ‘na gret personages, quhikis sell nocht steir all the gydder out of Dumbar-
tayn or Gleskow quhill I hayf vord fra your lorschip.’ ey le Brest with the papal
legate Grimani on 27 September, (see Grimani, Brest, 27 Sept. 1543, ANG, III, p. 212.
R.K. Hannay, ‘e letters of the Papal Legate in Scotland, 1543’ Scottish Hist. Rev.,
XI (1913), 1–26 at 14–16). Chapuys reported their arrival on 18 Oct. (L&P, XVIII,
ii, 286).
67
G. Dickinson, e two missions of Jacques de la Brosse SHS, 36 (Edinburgh,
1942), p. 26 [cited here as Discours].
104 chapter two
informed him that he had been appointed special French ambassador in
Scotland with a commission to advise on the disposal of the munitions.
Lennox claimed that he had been instrumental in releasing the Queen
Mother and Beaton from captivity but that they had joined Arran. As a
result, he claimed, he had been asked by many lords to take the govern-
ment into his hands. Marie and Beaton, though, warned against trusting
him and advised putting the munitions out of reach.
68
e relations of Lennox with the English were complicated. At
rst they deeply suspected his motives in coming to Scotland and he
remained linked with Beaton and Arran until Arran changed sides
in November 1543. From being chief of the French faction, Lennox
gradually became Henry’s most reliable adherent in Scotland.
69
On
their arrival, La Brosse and Mesnage found that Lennox was ‘usually
with the earl of Angus, the earl of Cassillis and the earl of Guilmar and
other lords who have a pro-English reputation.’
70
e French envoys
put heavy pressure on Lennox and engineered a compromise between
him, Marie and Beaton at Stirling in October, whereby all agreed that
the marriage between Mary Stuart and Edward would be prevented,
that Lennox would marry the Queen and that he would strive to uphold
the Catholic faith. La Brosse and Mesnage argued that Lennox must
be diverted from handing over Dumbarton to the English, otherwise
‘the kingdom of Scotland would be in great danger of being entirely
lost because it would be open to attack by sea.’ Lennox would retain
the French war chest at Dumbarton until Christmas as guarantee that
the agreement would be carried out.
71
e agreement did not hold and
some French cash remained in Lennox’s hands in Dumbarton.
e French envoys set themselves to ensure that at the com-
ing Parliament, the Treaty of Greenwich would be quashed and the
68
La Brosse and Mesnage to Francis I, Dumbarton, 9 Oct. 1543, BnF, fr. 17888,
fo. 279.
69
Sadler to Henry VIII, 20 March 1543, Sadler State Papers, p. 75; ibid., p. 299.
70
La Brosse and Mesnage to Francis I, October 1543, BnF fr. 17889, fo. 20r–v:
‘ordinairement avec le conte d’Angous, le conte de Cassel et le conte de Guilmar et
aultres seigneurs qui sont en la reputation de favoriser le Roy d’Angleterre.’
71
‘le Royaume d’Escosse seroit en grant dangier d’estre entierement perdu par
ce que la mer luy seroit ouverte.’ e agreement was that Lennox should marry the
Queen. See agreement signed at Stirling, 24 Oct. 1543, BnF, fr. 17890, fo. 7. Original
of the treaty signed 24 October 1543, BnF, nafr. 23514. But also agreement by Lennox
to submit his pretension to marry the young Queen to the next meeting of the three
Estates, fr. 17890 fo. 11. e nuncio’s entourage seems to have misunderstood all this
and thought the French envoys had made a fatal mistake in handing over the money
and supplies to Lennox (C. Burns, ‘Marco Grimani in Scotland, 1543–1544: a versied
account of his legation’, Renaissance Studies, 2, ii (1988), 299–311).
scotland between england and france 105
Auld Alliance restored. Besides immediately using the money they
had brought to shower pensions on key lords,
72
they also did all they
could to sow suspicion between Lennox and the English party and
persuade Arran to suppress it. ey noted with satisfaction that Ralph
Sadler and George Douglas had le the country but were convinced
that major military aid would be needed if the Scots were to be able
to resume the war against England.
73
When the Scottish Parliament
met, 3–11 December 1543, it was a complete success for the French.
La Brosse and Mesnage were able to speak to the assembly and call
for the restoration of the old treaties. e Treaty of Greenwich was
repudiated, as was the marriage agreement between Mary Stuart
and prince Edward; the alliance with France was conrmed and war
declared against England on 11 December. e triumph was sealed by
the conclusion of a new treaty with France.
74
On the face of it, then,
the disaster of Solway Moss had been reversed.
As yet, there were pitifully few French troops in Scotland.
75
La Brosse
and Mesnage told Francis that Scotland would be unable to wage oen-
sive war against England ‘sans vostre aide’ and sent the Discours to the
King to explain.
76
e artillery brought by the French eet – eectively
a small but well equipped artillery train – was handed over to the
Earl of Argyll’s agent in January 1544.
77
Francis I was understandably
72
Receipts for payments: (1) Mandate by Marie de Lorraine, Beaton, Lennox, La
Brosse and Mesnage to Jean de Vymond, trésorier de la marine or his commis to
pay the following: Arran 2000 écus, Argyll, 1000, Earl of Bothwell, 1000 écus, Earl of
Moray 1000, Earl of Huntley, 1000, Lord Fleming, 300, Lord Erskin, 300, Lord . . . stin,
300, Lord Wemys, 300, Lord Tullibarnie, 300, chevalier de Cawdor, 400, David Pan-
iter, secretary to Queen Dowager, 100, total: 8000 écus. Dated Stirling, [Oct.] 1543.
BnF, fr. 17890 fo. 13. (2) Receipt by cardinal Beaton for 5000 écus from the ambas-
sadors and lent for the re-supply of the French ships, 23 March 1543/4; (3) receipt of
Mathurin Richer, Vymond’s commis for 1500 écus from the ambassadors and then
paid to the Queen Dowager for her expenses in paying Moray 500 écus in comple-
tion of his 1000 écus and to Beaton 100 that he had lent to the ambassadors. Stirling,
24 March 1544. Fr. 17890 fo. 27.
73
Discours, pp. 37, 42; Sadler State Papers, I, pp. 338–341, 348–351.
74
Franco-Scottish treaty, Edinburgh, 15 Dec. 1543, AN J 679, no. 54; Teulet, Rela-
tions politiques, I, pp. 119–123.
75
For the payments of Vymond to 10 archers of the Scots guard and 10 hommes
d’armes, 16 Nov. 1543, BnF fr. 17890, fo. 6.
76
Discours, p. 42; La Brosse and Mesnage to Francis I, Dec. 1543, BnF fr. 17890,
fo. 313; same to [Annebault?], 25 Dec. 1543, fr. 17890 fo. 1. e ‘instruction’ meant
here is either the Discours or the shorter report, BnF fr. 17889, fo. 20.
77
État de l’artillerie unloaded at Carrick from the Marie, the Françoise the Magde-
leine, 7 Jan. 1544 (BnF, fr. 17890, fo. 41): 2 great culverins, 2 bastard culverins, 5 moy-
ens, 2 falcons and 1 falconneau; 33 hand culverins, 39 arquebuses à croq, 5000 balls
(2500 middle, 1000 batarde, 1000 great culevrins, 500 cannon); 42 and a half barrels of
106 chapter two
delighted at the course of events. He declared that he knew that, had
he not sent his envoys when he had, ‘the kingdom of Scotland was
on the way to being completely lost and all reduced to the obedience
and subjection of the King of England.’ Francis expressed his gratitude
especially to Beaton, ‘considering the aairs of France and Scotland the
same thing.’ Mesnage and La Brosse were therefore ordered to con-
rm Arran in his loyalty to the French alliance. As for Lennox, he had
shown instability and ill-will (‘sa grande legereté, ses mauvais deporte-
ment’) but since he still controlled part of the French money and was
potentially dangerous, the French envoys were told that to treat him
graciously (‘il est requis qu’on luy tienne le plus gracieux et amyables
propoz qu’on pourra’) in order to entice him back to France and the
prospect of a Guise marriage. A gracious letter to him from Francis
brought by Baudreul sought to reinforce this.
78
Lennox had joined
the remainder of the pro-English lords at Leith in January and deed
the Governor but their military resources were weak. He withdrew to
Dumbarton but had to surrender at Glasgow. By late January 1544 the
envoys had spent 41,700 lt., leaving 16,869 écus in Lennox’s hands.
79
ey could therefore report that Lennox and Angus had returned to
at least nominal allegiance and reported the agreement of the Scottish
lords to launch a border campaign against England in the 1544 season,
if Francis could aid them with 2000 arquebusiers and money for 500
light horse from the start of June. Such reinforcement would enable the
Scots to put an army of 25,000 into the eld.
80
Francis promised fur-
ther aid. La Brosse remained in Scotland and Mesnage returned with
powder; 114 ‘pacques’ pikes each contain a dozen; 216 pacquets o pikes, each with 7;
300 horse collars for pulling artillery; 62 saddles; a barrel of ‘dez de fer;’ lead; a barrel
of cartouches for charging artillery, full of powder; equipage for artillery.
78
Francis I, Instructions to Baudreul to convey to Mesnage and La Brosse, 12 Feb.
1544, BnF, fr. 17890, fos. 38–40: le Royaume d’Escosse s’en alloit entierement perdu
et du tout reduict en l’obeissance et subgection du Roy d’Angleterre.’ ‘pour estymer
les aaires de France et Escosse une mesme chose.’ Francis I to Lennox, 13 Feb. 1544,
fr. 17890 fo. 37. is letter was not delivered as the envoys thought it would be incon-
venient to the dominant party, see fr. 17890, fos. 24–25.
79
Francis I to La Brosse and Mesnage, 25 Feb. 1544, BnF, fr. 17890. fo. 28.
80
Ibid., ‘la delliberacion prise par lesdictz seigneurs d’Escosse de faire durant ceste
annee ordinaires courses sur la frontiere d’Angleterre pour les brusler et endommaiger
le plus qu’ilz pourront, mays que de mectre armee sure ou grosse forse pour campeger
ils ne le pourront faire.;’ Procès-verbal of the Scottish Council, 25 March 1544, BnF
fr. 17890, fo. 25v.
scotland between england and france 107
a list of what would be needed for the campaign.
81
Baudreul continued
to shuttle between France and Scotland until arrested o Scarborough
in July 1544.
82
In the short term, French aims had been achieved in
Scotland in the midst of a dicult situation of war on two fronts and
internal confusion in Scotland but communications between the two
countries became increasingly dicult.
The English Invasion of 1544
Henry VIII reacted with predictable rage to the reversal of English
fortunes in Scotland. He despatched a declaration to the Scottish
Parliament on 20 December, denouncing their alliance with France
as ‘so yvel a quarrel,’ and declaring war against them. e Estates had
broken up before the message arrived but there was no doubting the
meaning; the Scots had made their choice and were going to pay the
price.
83
ere are no absolutely clear explanations for Henry’s determi-
nation to invade Scotland. It is the case that his truculent tone reects
a certain consciousness that his honour had been impugned but the
decision was a grave one. It can only seriously be explained by under-
standing the European context. Henry was irrevocably committed to a
large-scale campaign in France in 1544 and could not leave Scotland to
attack England while he took the bulk of his forces to France. Suolk,
who was on the Borders, advised strongly that, if there were to be an
invasion, it should be early in the year to give the Scots no time to
gather forces or for the French and the Danes to come to their aid.
But the earliest date possible was 1 May since only then would there
be enough grass for the horses. He envisaged 20,000 men and a cam-
paign of six weeks. e campaign would have to be short if it were
not to interfere with plans for France. All the same, Suolk oered
alternatives: a systematic wasting of the Scottish border country so the
Scots would not be able to invade, or, if they oered a truce, that it
be accepted for one or two years. One of the more interesting aspects
of this planning process is a sort of cost-benet analysis produced by
81
La Brosse to Mesnage, Sterling, 5 March 1544, BnF, fr. 17889, fo. 41.
82
Shrewsbury to Queen and Council, 29 July 1544, Hamilton Papers, II, p. 434;
Council of North to Privy Council, 6 Aug. 1544, L&P, XIX, ii, 40.
83
Hamilton Papers, II, pp. 235–238; St.P., V, pp. 350–352, a more extreme dra in
the hand of Paget.
108 chapter two
Suolk for his three plans: the rst would cost £44,000 plus expenses
at sea, less £1500 pm. saved because there would no longer need to
be an army to protect the Borders. e second would cost £9000 over
three months, though for the next nine months no garrison would be
needed and this would save £13,500. Should the Scots invade, an army
of 20,000 men for defence would cost £20,000. e third option would
cost nothing.
84
Unlike in December 1542, Henry was not attracted by
the cheaper options. He told Suolk on 29 January 1544 to plan for a
campaign in March with 14,000 foot and 2000 horse which would burn
Edinburgh and Teviotdale to stop the Scots ‘annoying’ England dur-
ing the French campaign.
85
Suolk, though, was recalled for the main
royal campaign and replaced by Hertford as the King’s Lieutenant for
the army in the North. Paget later summed up the invasion army in a
bulletin to Nicolas Wotton: the army going by sea, 15,000, with vict-
uals for 56 days, 26 sail and 3,000 soldiers to keep the ships. 4,000
horsemen under lord Eure advanced by land; while 3,000 horsemen
under lord Wharton raided the west march.
86
From the start, the army’s instructions were contradictory. In his
letter of 29 January to Suolk, Henry seemed to be envisaging a
pitched battle and the acquisition of Edinbugh and other key towns.
is would put pressure on the Scots to hand over Mary. But the tone
of the instructions of 10 April was entirely punitive. e time allo-
cated for the campaign, one month, was very short. Neither Suolk
nor Hertford were wholeheartedly in favour of the King’s strategy.
Hertford thought there was a danger that the army would be wasted by
simply devastating few towns, which could later recover. He advised
instead the fortication of Leith as a bridgehead from which to put
pressure on the Scottish regime but was turned down by Henry.
87
e
reasons are not hard to nd; Hertford’s strategy was extremely sensible
if the long-term objective were to control Scotland but the fortication
84
Suolk to Council, 25 Jan. 1544, Hamilton Papers, II, no. 156 (L&P, XIX, i, 59);
L&P, XIX, i, 59.2.
85
Henry VIII to Suolk, 29 Jan. 1544, Hamilton Papers, II, no. 158 pp. 265–266
(L&P, XIX, i, 71).
86
Paget to Wotton, 14 May 1544, L&P, XIX, i, 501. English strategies vis-à-vis
Scotland are examined by Merriman in Rough Wooings, pp. 139–163.
87
Hertford to Henry VIII, 12 April 1544, St.V, p. 371; Hamilton Papers, II, no. 209.
By 23 April, Hertford had been told by the Council that Henry was determined on his
punitive strategy (L&P, XIX, i, 387, St.P., V, p. 382).
scotland between england and france 109
of Leith would have taken several months and this was time Henry did
not have if he was to get on with the campaign in France. Nothing
better demonstrates how far Scotland was subsidiary in English calcu-
lations at this time.
e English eet was paid from 18 April, when it le the ames
gathering around 200 ships, with 12,000 men, as it made its way up
the east coast, delayed by bad weather. It assembled at Newcastle on
20/21 April and le on 1 May with favourable winds and arrived o
Leith on 3 May.
88
Hertford had ordered the strategy for disembarka-
tion at North Shields next to Tynemouth on the eve of his departure
and specied that all troops and artillery were to land at two places
as close together as possible.
89
e general strategy for an amphibious
campaign was a sound one in that the long trek with artillery and
munitions from Berwick was avoided. Arran mobilised his forces on
21 April but was obviously outpaced by English movements since there
was no opposition during the English landing near Leith. ey were
faced by 6000 Scots gathered by Arran and Beaton. ese were swept
aside in a sharp encounter in which English numbers and an arque-
busier company under Peter Mewtas carried the day. e rest of the
Scottish force was driven o by arquebusiers and archers, the Scottish
guns captured. Within a day, Leith had been taken and the English
army had secured a crucial base of operations and also the main ships
of the Scottish eet. On 6 May, it was the turn of Edinburgh, where
the city leaders would not surrender to the drastic terms oered by
Hertford. e city itself proved impossible to defend but the castle
quickly revealed itself to be impregnable to the siege equipment avail-
able to the English. All that could be done, therefore (most of the
population having ed) was to burn the city down. 4000 cavalry from
the English borders extended the devastation to the surrounding
country. Hertford, aimed to march homewards, devastating the coun-
try on the way and two weeks aer his arrival, aer burning Leith and
88
See chapter 8 for a fuller discussion of the eet. e outline of the campaign is well
laid out in G. Phillips, Anglo-Scots Wars, pp. 161–169 and Merriman, Rough Wooings,
pp. 144–150. For an an older but detailed account, J.P. Balfour, ‘Edinburgh in 1544
and Hertford’s invasion,’ Scottish Hist. Rev. 8 (1911). e main narrative source is the
anon. ‘e Late expedition in Scotland’ in A.F. Pollard (ed.), Tudor Tracts 1532–1588
(Westminster, 1903), pp. 39–51. is gives ‘being 200 sail at the least,’ though see the
planning documents (below chapter 8 and L&P, XIX, i, 355).
89
Hamilton Papers, II, nos. 227, 227.2 (L&P, XIX, i, 416).