Potter David. Henry VIII and Francis I
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130 chapter three
the sum total of the campaign in the area around English territory.
50
Nevertheless, the brief campaign testies to the close interest of
Henry VIII in the progress of the war and possibilities for further
operations. e strategic importance of the Pale as a ‘franchise’ to
both sides was yet again revealed when ve ensigns of du Roeulx’s
defeated force, plus terried peasantry, took refuge and furled their
standards in English territory near Bowtes bulwark. War booty was
being brought into the Pale for sale by the Burgundians and the French
were prepared to follow them onto English ground.
51
Scope for further
collaboration between Burgundian and English commanders was also
revealed. Wallop kept du Roeulx informed of French objectives and
transmitted news sent through Calais to the French ambassador in
England when it was unfavourable to the French at Perpignan.
52
e French campaign in Luxemburg and the Ardennes had met
with mixed success. Yvoy and Luxemburg were taken but then lost;
Rossem’s attack on the Netherlands, initially very threatening, was
beaten o. e Imperial army had assembled in enough force to throw
them back. By the end of August, Vendôme, du Biez and their forces
had joined the duke of Guise at Saint-Quentin, where they were joined
by the Cleves army. ey were drawn there by news of an enemy
assembly at Avesnes and Maubeuge.
53
e garrison at Ardres was fur-
ther strengthened and Tournehem held. Aer that, it was time to take
measures for winter garrisons. When it was suggested that some of van
Rossem’s Guelders troops might be stationed in Picardy, Vendôme
was quick to point out that the country had suered much during this
rst campaign of the war. Laon, Soissons and Noyon, towns much
to the rear, had been required to furnish supplies for the Luxemburg
campaign, while Picardy itself could not accommodate extra troops.
By October, he was at Mézières, which had been threatened by the
Imperial army.
54
pillaging its stones (Du Roeulx to Mary of Hungary, 17 Oct. 1544, AGR, Audience,
119, fo. 39).
50
Chronique du roy Françoys, p. 391; but see du Roeulx to Mary of Hungary, 7 Sept.
1542, AGR, Audience, 98, fo. 283: ‘Nos ennemis pillent toute la comté de Saint-Pol.’
51
Wallop to Council, 18 Aug. 1542, L&P, XVII, 637. See also ibid. 934, 973, 1005,
1106.
52
Du Roeulx to Mary of Hungary, 25 Sept. 1542, AGR, Audience, 119, fo. 13.
53
Wallop to the Council, 30 Aug. 1542, L&P, XVII, 706(1); Palmer to Wallop,
Aug. 1542, ibid., 706 (2); Vendôme to La Rochepot, 2 Sept. 1542, Marquis de Rocham-
beau, Lettres d’Antoine de Bourbon et de Jeanne d’Albret (Paris, 1877), no. V.
54
Vendôme to Francis I, 19 Sept. 1542, BnF, fr. 20521, fo. 32.
england and the wars in flanders, 1542–1543 131
e mid-winter months of 1542–1543 were, as usual, closed to
active campaigning. Montreuil, Boulogne and Ardres were seriously
reinforced with men.
55
Wallop claimed that du Biez had planned to
overrun the Pale but the marshal strenuously denied this.
56
We know
that Estourmel, hero of the 1536 campaign, approached du Roeulx in
March through an intermediary in Cambrai but this was probably a
move designed to discover Imperial plans rather than initiate talks.
Neither side was serious and du Roeulx in particular was now mainly
concerned with concerting plans with the English for a joint attack on
France. e conclusion of the Anglo-Imperial treaty in February 1543,
though not immediately widely known, gave an impetus to war prepa-
rations. Wallop had asked du Roeulx how many men he could pro-
vide in the event of an Anglo-French war. Du Roeulx was already
empowered to oer 500 horse and 2500 foot and, if they had a secret
enterprise, he could provide 6000 foot, 1000 horse with 3 siege cannon
and 5 eld pieces. He was pushing for the rapid taking of Montreuil
and the allocation of 40,000 écus for its fortication as well as the
destruction of Saint-Valéry, Le Crotoy and Saint-Riquier.
57
As he
had feared, French reinforcements were sent to Montreuil over the
winter but he was again encouraging Wallop to advise his master
to direct an English attack there. As before, he claimed this would
have érouanne, Hesdin, Ardres and Boulogne at the mercy of the
Burgundians.
58
Relations between the French at Ardres and the English
of the Pale were becoming more strained, while Wallop made sugges-
tions for action should a nal break occur, in which case ‘I wold not
doubte to sarve them wyth the furst buet.’
59
For the moment, how-
ever, the French, and particularly du Biez at Boulogne, were anxious
to avoid conict with the English and went out of their way to do so
while faced by the threat from the Burgundians.
60
55
Wallop, 13, 17 Sept. 1542, L&P, XVII, 782, 801.
56
Du Biez to Wallop, Potter, Du Biez, no. 161; Wallop to Council, 10 Oct. 1542,
L&P, XVII, 934.
57
Du Roeulx to Mary of Hungary, 11 Mar. 1543, HHSA, Frankreich, Varia 5,
fo. 107.
58
Ibid., Wallop to Council, 3 Dec. 1542, L&P, XVII, 1164; Du Roeulx to Wallop,
4 Jan. 1543 (L&P, XVIII, i, 9); 7 April 1543 (ibid., no. 386); Maltravers and Wal-
lop to Council, 11 May 1543, ibid., no. 524; Wallop to Council, 31 May 1543, ibid.,
no. 619.
59
Wallop to Henry VIII, 22 Feb. 1543, NA SP1/176, fo. 56 (L&P, XVIII, i, 195).
60
Proclamation at Boulogne against talking of war with the English (Wallop to
Council, 27 Feb. 1543, NA SP1/176, fo. 80 (L&P, XVIII, i, 210) and same at Ardres,
Wallop, 5 March, NA SP1/176, fo. 115 (L&P, XVIII, i, 249).
132 chapter three
Early in February, it was reported that a general muster was shortly
to be taken at Amiens ‘and incontynent upon the same shal enter into
wages ij or iij c men, to be in a reddynes upon the border and furniche
the castelles and piles of the same.’
61
However, the muster was delayed
until March while men were sent to work again on the fortications of
Ardres, damaged by the winter weather. Torcy came to Ardres with his
company and Du Biez was back in Boulogne early in March, bringing
with him Espinac, a new governor for Ardres.
62
Meanwhile, Vendôme,
now at Abbeville, was bringing men together at Montreuil, the objec-
tive being an attack in Artois. e French were, apparently, amazed
that the English were not yet helping the Burgundians.
63
At Easter 1543, Francis I decided on the provisioning of érouanne
and ordered Vendôme to see to this. By the beginning of April, the
duke’s army was ready at Hesdin and moved with 500 gens d’armes
and 6000 light horse to a camp at Gournay, from which the provision-
ing was eected and François de Lorraine (Aumale) set out to raid into
enemy territory.
64
Du Bellay’s description of this campaign is detailed
and is largely borne out by Vendome’s own report to the King:
You will understand by this gentleman the bearer the defeat that
M. d’Aumale and the troop with him in the garrison of érouanne
inicted yesterday on the garrison of Aire . . . the bad weather continues
and gets worse that I could describe.
65
On the 25th, Vendôme reported that the payment of his men fell
due at the end of the month and asked for a continuation. e King
decided against this as he was about to set out on campaign himself,
61
Wallop to Council, 5 Feb. 1543 NA SP1/175, fo. 160 (L&P, XVIII, i, 120).
62
Maltravers to Henry VIII, 27 Feb. 1543, NA SP1/176, fo. 78 (L&P, XVIII,
i, 216).
63
Wallop to Council, 18 March 1543, NA SP1/176, fo. 144 (L&P, XVIII, i, 293);
same, late March (L&P, XVIII, i, 345); same 19 April, ibid. no. 422.
64
Du Bellay, Mémoires IV, pp. 118–123. Du Roeulx was aware of French plans: let-
ter to Wallop, 7 April 1543, NA SP1/177, fos. 32/35 (L&P, XVIII, i, 380): ‘les allemands
franchois . . . sont prestz pour marchier vers icy au ravitaillement de erouenne.’
65
Vendôme to Francis I, 26 April 1543, BnF, fr. 20521, fo. 9: ‘vous entendrez par
ce gentilhomme present porteur la deaicte que Monsieur d’Aubmales et la troppe qui
estoit avec luy en la garnison de erouenne fesoit hier de la garnison d’Aire . . . . . le
mauvays temps se continue tousiours et vont en pis et sont comme je ne vous saurois
escripre.’ ere was speculation in English territory about who had the best of these
encounters – Wallop to Council, 1 May 1543, Sénicourt de Saisseval to Wallop, 1 May
1543 (L&P, XVIII, I, 485, 486).
england and the wars in flanders, 1542–1543 133
but Vendôme decided to use the day remaining to his army to take
Lillers and the strongholds around it. Reporting to the King:
I have been waiting to write to you about carrying out the enterprise
planned for so long, so you would be certain of what has been done. It
seems to me, my lord, you owe nothing to the sieur du Roeulx and have
given him a good riposte for what he did in the Boulonnais. You have
taken a good number of castles and other forts as you will learn from
M. d’Estrées the bearer, who can also tell you better than I can about
the taking of Lillers.
66
e recent raiding by the governor of Artois had, then, been success-
fully avenged. e campaign seemed to be at an end when Vendôme
received his orders for the garrisoning of the troops at Fervens (on the
Canche) but these were soon countermanded aer the King’s decision
to take advantage of a shortage of troops in Netherlands to move to
the attack in Hainault and lead his army in person against Landrecies.
Vendôme was told to re-assemble his men at Abbeville and march
across enemy territory in order to join the King.
67
A conference at
Montreuil in mid-May, at which du Biez and La Rochepot were both
present, revealed that the Boulonnais would be denuded of troops.
68
Plans were thrown o balance by a sudden attack by du Roeulx into
the Ardrésis, in which he burnt many of the villages and churches.
Wallop had already encouraged the Burgundians to destroy the sup-
plies being thrown in such large quantities into Ardres. Du Biez and
Créquy had assembled a force to attack strongholds in the pays de
Bredenarde and du Roeulx responded energetically, attacking the
‘peels’ around Ardres. Vendôme had to make a rapid visit to Boulogne
and more troops were sent to garrison Ardres.
69
Once the crisis was
66
Vendome 3 May 1543: ‘J’ay tousiours actendu vous escripre l’execucion que j’ay
faicte en l’entreprinse que de long temps avoye deliberé pour vous faire en tout certain
de ce qui y avoit este faict. Et me semble monseigneur que ne debvez riens au sieur de
Rieux et que luy avez rendu ce qu’il avoit faict en Boullenois, pour avoir prins bonne
quantité de chasteaulx et autres fors telz que pourrez entendre par le sieur d’Estrees,
present porteur, lequel vous en pourra mieulx informer que moy mesmes de la prinse
de Lislers.’ (BnF, fr.20521, fo. 12)
67
Du Bellay, Mémoires IV, pp. 124–128.
68
Maltravers to Henry VIII, 20 May 1543, NA SP1/178, fo. 59 (L&P, XVIII, i,
574).
69
Wallop to Council, 15, 16, 18 May 1543 (L&P, XVIII, i, 557, 562, 569); Wallop
to Council, 23 May 1543 L&P, XVIII, i, 587). e plan for Ardres had been discussed
early in April with Wallop – du Roeulx to Wallop, 2 April, L&P, XVIII, I, 359; Wallop
to Council, 4 April 1543, ibid., no. 367.
134 chapter three
over, however, Vendôme and du Biez returned to Amiens in order
to meet the King and discuss the plan of the summer campaign. At
Calais, it was reported that ‘the French Kyng preparithe a greate armye
and intendythe to marche in person with the sayde army abowtes the
xjth of June and hathe sworn an onavysed othe sayng that he wyll
have all Artoysee, orels hit shall cost hyme his lyf.’
70
Again, du Biez
returned to Boulogne while Vendôme moved to Péronne to inspect
the frontier. From there, he ordered Heilly, in the King’s name, to
call up the Picard legion and assemble his men between Amiens and
Corbie.
71
At Calais, with open war imminent, grain supplies and cattle
were gathered in and a serious shortage of forage reveaed.
72
Vendôme’s task in the summer campaign was at rst to support the
thrust of the King’s army into Hainault. Early in June he reported:
I shall not fail to obey your command and tomorrow will leave to go to
Doullens with as many gens d’armes and light horse as I can get assem-
ble to do you service and damage the enemy as much as possible.
From there, Vendôme marched to Gueret, where he was to meet a
troop of lansquenets and ‘carry out what it has pleased you to com-
mand me.’
73
Du Roeulx, summoned by the Regent to march to the help of the
Hainault frontier, reported a stark and imminent threat to Artois,
Arras, Bouchain, Bapaume or all three.
74
In fact, Vendôme at this
point marched straight to Bapaume and it is possible that this was on
his initiative and against the King’s instructions to join him immedi-
ately. Certainly, du Bellay reports that, aer taking the town, when he
was on the point of receiving the submission of the castle, he received
instant orders from the King to join him at Cateau-Cambrésis on pain
70
Wallop to Henry VIII, 26 May 1543 NA SP1/178, fo. 97 (L&P, XVIII, i, 599);
order of Francis I to Lorge, captain of Norman legion, to assembble men at Montreuil,
21 May 1543, Amiens, SAP, Ch. Heilly 57, no. 28.
71
Wallop to Council, 3 June 1543, NA SP1/178, fo. 144 (L&P, XVIII, I, 641);
Vendôme to Heilly, 5 June 1543, SAP, Ch. Heilly, 57, no. 44.
72
Maltravers and Wallop to Council, May 1543, L&P, XVIII, i, 586.
73
Vendôme to Francis I, 9 June 1543, 12 June 1543, BnF, fr. 20521, fo. 13, 14: ‘Je
ne fauldray obeyr à ce qu’il vous plaist me commander et demain partiray pour m’en
aller à Doullens avec le plus de gendarmerie et chevaulx ligiers que je pourray mectre
ensemble pour vous y fair service et nuyre à l’ennemy de ce qu’il sera possible.’ ‘pour
executer ce qu’il vous a pleu me commander.’
74
Du Roeulx to Mary of Hungary, 5 June 1543, AGR, Audience, 119, fos. 15–16.
england and the wars in flanders, 1542–1543 135
of incurring the king’s displeasure.
75
He was thus forced to abandon
the town and at the same time, Heilly, who had taken Maubeuge,
received direct instructions from the King to abandon it and slight the
fortications.
76
Francis had nally decided on an attack into Hainault
to support the operations of the duke of Cleves. e royal army, com-
manded by the King in person and the Dauphin but with d’Annebault
in real command, had crossed the frontier intending to take Avesnes,
before word came in that it was too strong. Instead, Landrecies, viewed
as the key to Artois and Hainault, was selected as the target.
77
Around
20 June, the King arrived with his army and set up camp at Maroilles,
joining the forces under Annebault and Vendôme together (Francis
may well have remembered his campaign in the same area in 1521).
e army’s rst objective was Brabant, though further progress there
was impossible. With Landrecies well on the way to being secured,
Francis decided to head for Luxemburg (taken and then lost the pre-
vious year) as his objective. Aer Stenay and Arlon, the capital of the
duchy fell on 11 September. Francis was determined, against better
advice, to fortify it as he had Landrecies.
78
e Habsburg government was clearly on the defensive in the
Netherlands during 1543.
79
On 20 June, Mary of Hungary called in the
English ambassadors, Wotton and omas Seymour to convey here
great ‘perplexity and fear’ at French advances to ask for Henry’s help
in accordance to the alliance. On the 23rd, she sent urgently to them
again to know exactly how many men Henry would be supplying and
where they could join up with du Roeulx.
80
75
Du Bellay, Mémoires IV, pp. 129–130: ‘sur peine de désobeissance et d’encourir
sa malgrace.’
76
Francis I to Heilly, 27 June 1543, Dohenny Mem. Library, Camarillo, Cal.
77
Order of march of the French army, BnF, fr. 20502, fo. 69, showing d’Annebault
in the avant-garde, du Biez and the Dauphin in the battle and Vendôme with legion-
naires in the rear. Du Bellay, Mémoires, IV, pp. 125–129; AGR, Audience, 1610,
fos. 14–15, ‘Advertissmens venuz de Lorrayne,’ 8 Oct. 1543: ‘j’entends la bastir de
sorte que l’empereur ne sçauroit garder de retenir ce que j’ay enjambé sur luy.’
78
Du Bellay, Mémoires, IV, pp. 151–158.
79
Mary of Hungary, letters to Ypres, 12 June 1543, Diegerick, Inventaire . . . Ypres,
VII, p. 262, no. 2566 and to Estates of Flanders, 11 July 1543 (Ibid., no. 2568) appeal-
ing for support in view of the military emergency.
80
Wotton and Seymour to Henry VIII, 20, 23 June 1543, NA SP1/179, fos. 47–48,
114.
136 chapter three
Open War: Border Conflict and Wallop’s March
to Landrecies (June–December 1543)
As war was declared between the two kingdoms, a degree of uncer-
tainty was removed for the French. In the Spring of 1543, as we have
seen, the French were doing all they could to delay an English decla-
ration of war, now regarded as inevitable, until the advanced season
should rule out a joint Anglo-Imperial campaign.
For those with responsibility for French border defence, the prob-
lem was all the greater since an English declaration of war would place
the Boulonnais in a dangerously isolated position. As has been seen,
Francis I’s advance on Landrecies involved his calling on Vendôme’s
forces of light horse and gendarmerie and this le Picardy without
enough troops. He pointed out early in June that there were no more
than 2000 men on the Picard frontier, including the 1400 men of the
old bands in garrison at Ardres and La Capelle; of the rest, 500 had been
allocated to Ardres and 120 to Doullens.
81
is was scarcely a serious
wartime garrison. Du Biez was in charge of securing the border against
the English. He had accompanied the Picard infantry to Landrecies
early in June but was quickly sent back when relations with England
deteriorated. Rumours of the arrival of troops at Calais were common
in June and this is why the Ardres garrison was bolstered from 600 to
1200 foot. ese, with a sucient number of hommes d’armes would
he thought, be sucient ‘to keep it from surprise attack, while waiting
to see what the English are doing.’
82
e King ordered the late Admiral
Chabot’s company to join du Biez at Boulogne and also 1000 men
under Heilly’s command.
On 7 July, du Biez went to inspect Montreuil and oversee the sup-
ply of érouanne. at done, he retired to Boulogne to see what the
Lord Warden would do but rst he appealed to Annebault for more
men at Montreuil:
One thousand foot and y hommes d’armes are still needed that I
would have put into this town and Hesdin for despatch where needed;
may it please you to take order. It is not possible to have fewer men here
81
Vendôme, 9, 12 June 1543, BnF, fr. 20521, fos. 13, 14; Du Bellay, Mémoires, IV,
pp. 125–126.
82
Potter, Du Biez, no. 173: ‘pour la garder de surprinse, actendant ce qui succedera
de ces facons de faire des Anglois.’ e garrison for Ardres was Du Biez’ own com-
pany, 20 hommes d’armes and 15 archers of La Rochepot’s.
england and the wars in flanders, 1542–1543 137
or manage with less cost for the security of the strongholds than what
I have asked for, which is 4000 men and 400 hommes d’armes. What I
have is 3000 and 350.
83
By the end of the month, order had been given for 2000 foot and
100 hommes d’armes to be sent to Montreuil, the most obviously
threatened frontier post since the enemy knew that Boulogne, Ardres,
érouanne and Hesdin were beyond them (‘n’est pas vyande pour
eulx. Ils le sçavent bien.’)
84
But Picardy was not the only frontier at risk. Lower Normandy was
exposed to English raids and the garrison there was even more feeble
than that in Picardy. True, the arrière-ban of the Cotentin, at the most
450 men, was summoned under a reliable commander, La Bouache,
(testimony to the fact that this relic of the feudal levy was still thought
useful militarily). e arrière-ban of Caen was slower to assemble
and money still needed for the defences of Granville and Mont-Saint-
Michel. 500 foot were needed for the defence of Cherbourg (40 stand-
ing garrison men, mortespayes, had not been paid for 13 months,
as was usual). Artillery and cannoneers were needed from Caen and
Rouen. e arrière-ban was kept on duty for three months.
85
ough d’Orthe told du Biez to expect the arrival of Lord Warden
Cheyney with 10,000 men on the 12th, the latter did not arrive and
he began to wonder whether the English intended instead to join
the prince of Orange in the Netherlands.
86
However, the threat of an
English descent on the Boulonnais, either directly or via La Montoire,
83
Ibid., nos. 183, 184: ‘il s’en fault encores mil hommes de pied et cinquante hom-
mes d’armes que j’eusses mis en ceste ville et à Hesdin pour en envoyer où il seroit
besoing; à quoy il vous plaira tenir la main et n’est possible de tenir par deca moins
de gens ne faire les choses à moins de fraiz pour la seureté des places que ce que j’ai
demandé, que sont iiij
m
hommes et quatre cens hommes d’armes et j’en ay trois cens
cinquante et trois mil.’
84
François de Bourbon to Matignon, 21 July 1543, Correspondance de Matignon.
no. CXXI, p. 74.
85
Francis I to Matignon, 28 June 1543, Correspondance de Matignon, no. CXVI;
François de Bourbon to same, 29 June, ibid., no. CXVIII; same to same, 17 July, ibid.,
no. CXIX; Memoir on the defence of Cherbourg, July 1543, ibid., pp. 76–77.
86
Potter, Du Biez, nos. 173, 174; Francis I to Heilly and Vervins, 22 July 1543, BMA,
MS 1150, no. 2: order to take their companies to Montreuil as rapidly as possible Francis I
to Matignon, 28 June 1543, Correspondance de Matignon no. CXVI; Villebon to
Matignon, 28 June, ibid., no. CXVIII; Francis I to du Lude, 28 June 1543, B. Ledain,
‘Lettres addressées à Jean et Guy de Daillon, comtes du Lude’ Archives historiques de
Poitou 12 (1882), no. 4.
138 chapter three
still kept du Biez waiting anxiously at Boulogne,
87
Other French com-
manders were rather over-condent. Villebon declared that ‘as for the
English, since they saunter as they do through Artois and other places
and dare not approach our frontiers, we think they will not do us
much harm.’ A commander at Ardres, Espinac, reported in July: ‘con-
cerning the English, since the measures you have taken for the fron-
tier, I nd them much less aggressive.’
88
In a lengthy survey of all the
war fronts, François de Bourbon was also sanguine: Landrecies would
soon be a state of defence, the King was withdrawing the royal army
from the camp at Maroilles (where the stink had become intolerable)
to replenish supplies and augment it; Barbarossa, to the King’s joy, was
o Marseille with, it was said, an Ottoman eet of 200 sail and 30,000
men ready to act wherever the King wished and, as for the English, ‘we
think they will not do us great harm.’ though a good watch should be
kept. Only at the end of July did he register the fact that the English
were indeed stirring and then thought they were just promenading
through Artois.
89
Such opinions were far from the mark. Henry may have been dragged
into active war against France but, once the decision was taken, the
formation of an expeditionary force was relatively rapid. e Anglo-
Imperial Treaty of February 1543 specied that both should keep eets
of 2000–3000 men to harry enemy coasts but little was settled about
an immediate campaign. A joint Anglo-Imperial attack on France
was called for within two years, each to provide an army of 20,000
men and 5000 horse to serve for four months. Charles was to prepare
a force of 2000 horse and 2000 landsknechts to serve with Henry’s
army.
90
is was the bare minimum and, as we have seen, du Roeulx
had been pressing from the summer of 1542 for a joint Anglo-Imperial
87
Potter, Du Biez, no. 185.
88
Villebon to Matignon, 17 July 1543, 3 Aug. 1543 Correspondance CXIX, CXXV:
‘quant aux Angloys, puisqu’ilz se pourmaynent, ainsi qu’ilz font, tant en Arthoys
que autres lieux, et qu’ilz n’ozent approcher noz fronctieres, penssons qu’ilz ne nous
feront pas grant mal.’; Espinac to Francis I, Ardres, 30 June 1543, BnF, fr. 6616,
fo. 66: ‘touchant les Angloys, depuys l’ordre que avez mise sur ces frontieres, je les
treuve merveilleusement radoulcis.’; du Biez to Francis, 14 July 1543, Potter, Du Biez,
pp. 182–184.
89
François de Bourbon, duke of Estouteville, to Matignon, 17 July 1545, Correspon-
dance de Matignon, no. CXIX, pp. 71–72, no. CXXI: ‘penssons qu’ils ne nous ferons
pas grant mal,’ p. 74, no. CXXV, p. 77. Barbarossa’s eet was actually 174 sail (La
Roncière, Histoire . . . Marine III, p. 380).
90
L&P, XVIII, i, 414.
england and the wars in flanders, 1542–1543 139
attack on Montreuil (see ch. 1). Du Roeulx had been informed in May
of English intentions to send him aid in the defence of Flanders. In
June, he was assuming that the English forces would be available with
landsknecht backing. He took the view that only the open declara-
tion of English intentions had held the French back from an invasion
of Brabant. Returning to the charge about Montreuil, he urged that,
should promised Spanish troops materialise, he could join the English
to mount ‘the enterprise heretofore discussed against Montreuil, which
would give put the kingdom of France in great fear’ and would force
Francis to divide his forces and certainly block any French move to
invade Brabant and join up with van Rossem.
91
e outbreak of formal war saw intensive negotiations on the make-
up of direct English intervention; small problems had to be solved
such as the right of English troops to spend their own currency
despite Netherlands edicts to the contrary.
92
One complication was
that Francis for the moment had withdrawn his army from Hainault,
having taken and occupied Landrecies. Was Henry, as always legalis-
tic, still bound to send troops?
93
e expeditionary force was at rst
to be commanded by omas Cheyney but he proved too cautious
and Chapuys pressed for the appointment of John Wallop, initially his
deputy, in his place. Henry was understandably irritated by this but
quickly saw that Wallop was a more combative commander who got
on well with the Burgundians. Wallop was appointed on 7 July with
omas Seymour, recalled from embassy to Brussels, as his deputy (or
marshal of the camp). Wallop was anxious that his authority over his
captains and men be reinforced. He was formally assisted by a council
of war that included Robert Bowes, the treasurer of the army.
94
Charles
V later praised Wallop highly (he was clearly an eective commander).
Seymour, the Emperor thought, was more ‘dry and dicult.’ Wallop
91
Instructions to Seymour as ambassador in Flanders, late April 1543, St.P.,
IX, 365 (L&P, XVIII, I, 473); Wallop to Council, 26 May 1543 (ibid., no. 600). Du
Roeulx to Mary of Hungary, 5, 19 June 1543, AGR, Audience, 119, fos. 15–16, 17–18:
‘l’entreprinse de piecha advisee sur Monstroeul, qui mectroit gros estonnement au
reaulme de France.’
92
Du Roeulx to Mary of Hungary, 4 July 1543, AGR, Audience, 119, fo. 19: ‘il seroit
estrange veu que lesdictz Anglois viengnent au service de l’Empereur de non sourir
allouer leur monnoie.’
93
Henry VIII to Wallop, 10 Aug. 1543, L&P, XVIII, ii, 27.
94
Chapuys to Mary of Hungary, 23, 24 June 1543, L&P, XVIII, i, 759, 763. Instruc-
tions for Wallop, 7 July 1543, St.P., IX, 440 (L&P, XVIII, i, 831); Wallop to Wriothes-
ley, 12 July 1543, L&P, XVIII, I, 877.