Potter David. Henry VIII and Francis I
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160 chapter four
In fact, guesses about Henry’s probable intentions are fairly futile,
unsusceptible as they are to any proof. We can, however, infer strongly
from the strategic situation that the sieges of Boulogne and Montreuil
were virtually imposed by the military assumptions of the time. A
plunge deep into France was no more thinkable for Henry VIII than
it was for Charles V. e experience of the Imperial army was not that
dierent. Charles, too, was bogged down in lengthy and costly sieges
at Ligny and Saint-Dizier. If the latter town had held out as long as
Boulogne, it would have been impossible for the Emperor to advance
any further into France. As it was, Charles’s slightly earlier start, gave
him the edge in getting the sieges out of the way before the season
made further campaigning impossible.
The French Attempt to Divide Their Enemies
roughout 1544, Francis I and his advisers conducted an able and
ultimately successful diplomatic campaign to divide Henry and the
Emperor. It must be admitted, though, that they were knocking at an
open door. Suspicion was endemic between the two allies both before
and aer their treaties had been sealed in 1543. e reason is fairly
obvious; the two rulers were pursuing dierent objectives. Charles
aimed to use the campaign to reduce Francis ‘to a good and rm peace’
which would consolidate the Emperor’s primacy in Christendom and
allow him to pursue his vague long-term aims of restoring its uni-
ty.
22
For Henry, the aims were decidedly more local as well as rather
opaque. e Emperor was on his guard in the early months against
Henry’s being diverted by aairs of Scotland and also of the danger
the French might use a ‘practique’ to divert Henry from their com-
mon enterprise.
23
Granvelle passed on to Wotton, ‘intelligence’ he
said he had received from Cardinal Farnese, who had been in France,
that the French would do their best to sew distrust and beguile the
English into thinking that Francis would persuade the Scottish Queen
Dowager to hand over the young Queen, even though in reality they
would never do so.
24
Wotton was further bemused by the arrival of a
French Herald, Guyenne, at Speyer, whose objective remained unclear
22
See the letter to Vasquez de Molina, L&P, XIX, i, 861.
23
Charles V to Chapuys, 7 Feb. 1544, L&P, XIX, i, 96.
24
Charles V to Chapuys, 23 Feb. 1544, CSP Spain. VII, 42 (L&P, XIX, i, 129).
‘
fighting over the bear
’
s skin
’
161
except that he seemed to have some charge to the Reichstag. Other
rumours were circulating. It was said the cardinal de Lorraine was
in Germany but he may have been mistaken for Jean du Bellay, who
along with other envoys had been sent to Speyer to put Francis’ case
to the Reichstag.
25
So, quite apart from the diculties caused by the
Emperor’s resistance to declaring war on Scotland and Henry’s equal
reluctance over Denmark, there was room enough for suspicion.
Charles was wise to be concerned. At the end of March 1544, Oudart
du Biez made overtures to the English by sending a local gentleman
he sometimes used to spy on English territory, Nicolas des Marquais,
sr. de Saint-Martin, to an acquaintance in Calais, Francis Hall.
26
Saint-
Martin proposed that the English allow French ambassadors to come to
treat for peace but Hall was dubious about the authenticity of the oer
until du Biez sent a signed statement that Saint-Martin was speaking
on royal instructions. e English Council’s response in any case was
luke-warm.
27
Du Biez was persistent, though, and declared that Francis
was prepared to oer sureties for the pensions, make the Scots desist
from war and be reasonable about Ardres.
28
e obvious deduction
here is that Francis was prepared to oer almost anything to prevent
his kingdom being invaded on two fronts. Perhaps he was also trying
to gain time. Henry kept Chapuys informed and the latter pressed
hard for the proposals to be rejected. Henry was naturally unwilling to
risk his relations with the Emperor and so ignored the oers. In any
25
e Herald’s name was François Mailliard and he had for most of his career been
interpreter for the German language at the French court (L&P, XIX, i, 132, 134, 137).
26
For details about Saint-Martin, who played a vital part in Anglo-French talks
throughout the summer of 1544, see depositions at the marshal’s trial, 16 Aug. 1549,
in Potter, Du Biez, pp. 300–301. ‘Led. mareschal se aydoit de Nicolas des Marquaiz
pour espye et luy promist avoir saulvegarde des Anglois an de pouvoir mieulx
hanter avec eulx . . . combien qu’il fust bien adverty que led. des Marquaiz pendoit plus
du costé des ennemyz que de nostre et ne venoit jamais au pays de Boulenois que les
ennemyz incontinant apres ne ssent quelque ravage et tel estoit le commung bruict
et que led. des Marquaiz estoit traistre et faisoit plusieurs advertissmens aux ennemis.’
While Saint-Martin himself insisted ‘que par le commandement dud. mareschal il
print lad. saulvegarde pour mieulx frequenter au pays des Anglois et scavoir leurs
secretz et luy promist x escus par mois et aultrement à son frere Me Arnoul qui avoit
moyen de scavoir à cause de la compaignie charnelle qu’il avoit d’une chambriere du
bailly de Guynes.’ (Henry Palmer). Saint-Martin was a landowner on the edge of the
Calais Pale.
27
Copy sent to Brussels, L&P, XIX, i, 291; Chapuys to Mary of Hungary, 13 April
1544, CSP Spain XVII, 68; L&P, XIX, i, 291, (ii).
28
L&P, XIX, ii, 292.2; St.P., IX, 391, mistakenly labelled as a letter from d’Orthe to
the Council, 1543. Potter, Du Biez, pp. 192–193.
162 chapter four
case, war in Piedmont (the French victory at Ceresole on 14 April)
and the defence of the frontier absorbed the energies of the French
military and possibly altered Francis I’s perspective. It was, aer all,
the rst major French military victory in Italy for a generation and,
though without consequences, was widely celebrated in France.
29
Bad
news, on the other hand, travelled slowly for those on the other side.
At the start of May, it was still unclear in Brussels what the outcome
would be; while the Imperial government was trying to play down the
outcome, Dr. Layton thought that the news must be bad since a victory
would already have been celebrated. Blame started to be apportioned
by opinion at the Imperial court with suitable ‘spinning’ of the event,
reported by Wotton, to minimise its signicance.
30
In May, a dual initiative was mounted by France to arrange a deal
with Henry, Charles or both. First, Cardinal du Bellay responded posi-
tively to an approach by Queen Eléonore’s confessor Gabriel Guzman,
who had had conversations with Pedro de Soto, the Emperor’s confes-
sor, at Speyer. Once back in Paris, du Bellay wrote to de Soto suggest-
ing that, had the Cardinal been heard at Speyer, there may have been
hope for peace with the Emperor.
31
On the other front, there had been
a shadowy approach to England possibly by the Cardinal’s brother,
Martin, sr de Langey, recently returned with the French infantry from
Piedmont. From fragmentary mentions, it seems possible that Langey
had sent or brought a present of wine to Henry accompanied by a
letter from Francis, dated at Saint-Germain, 9 May, expressing sur-
prise that Henry should be his enemy in view of their past friendship.
What the point of this was is dicult to say and Henry unsurpris-
ingly seems to have rebued it by pointing out that his troops had
burned French land the previous year and so it should be obvious that
he was Francis’ enemy. Paget told Charles V at Speyer about this, at
which Charles ‘laughed out hartely at the fynesse of the French letter,
and at the princely and frendely writing’ and remarked on Francis’
subtlety in insinuating that his correspondent had devised the prac-
tice.
32
Meanwhile, Francis was reported by Henry’s spy (but in fact a
29
See Potter, Renaissance France at War, p. 65.
30
Layton to Paget, 1 May 1544, L&P, XIX, i, 454; Wotton to Henry VIII, 7 May
1544, L&P, XIX, i, 478.
31
Jean du Bellay to Pedro de Soto, 9 May 1544, Scheurer), Correspondance du car-
dinal du Bellay, III, pp. 259–262 (L&P, XIX, i, 486), copy sent to England.
32
Chapuys to Mary of Hungary, 18 May 1544, L&P, XIX, i, 530; Summary of what
Paget said to Mary of Hungary, 23 May 1544, L&P, XIX, i, 578.2; Paget to Henry VIII,
‘
fighting over the bear
’
s skin
’
163
French double-agent) to think that Henry had been duped into ght-
ing the Emperor’s wars for him.
33
Further developments came with
approaches to the Emperor by the Cardinal de Lorraine through his
nephew, the new duke of Lorraine, at the end of June.
34
From infor-
mation sent by Chapuys, there can be no doubt that at the start of
the campaign Charles was beginning to form the view that Henry
was likely to leave him in the lurch and unlikely to march forward
into France. e special envoy he sent to Henry’s camp in mid-July,
Courrières, reported that Henry would not press forward until he had
taken Boulogne and Montreuil and this was unlikely to happen.
35
For
her part, Mary of Hungary thought that the continual complaints she
was receiving from English transport and victualling agents were as
likely to form a basis for Henry backing out of his commitments.
36
Legend has long claimed that Mme. d’Etampes and her ally
Longueval betrayed French secrets to the Emperor and led to a dis-
advantageous peace.
37
It is, of course, true that Mme. d’Etampes, like
many at court, was hoping for a good peace rather than a massive
military confrontation in the summer of 1544. At the end of July, with
the way for talks opened by lesser negotiators, Berteville and Gabriel
2 June 1544, St.P., IX, p. 682– (L&P, XIX, i, 619) e original correspondence with
Francis has not survived. e references to messages from ‘de Lange’ are dicult to
attribute to anyone other than Martin du Bellay, sr. de Langey.
33
Baptiste de La Vigne to Henry VIII, 24 May 1544, NA SP1/187, fos. 335v–36r
(L&P, XIX, i, 575): ‘je me trouve souvent à la salle là où le Roy mange et ay entendu
de luy mesmes qu’il expere si bien pourveoir a ses aaires que ses ennemys ne luy fer-
ont riens. Il est bien vray qu’il ne saict pas tout ce que je say, car il dit que vous vous
repentez de luy avoir commancee la guerre, et que I’Empereur vous a trompé de le
vous persuader, qu’il ne croit point que vous luy voullez mal, et que tout cella vient de
la fraude dudit Empereur, qui c’est vanté en Allemaigne et en Ytalie qu’il vous a fait
croyre ce qu’il a voullu, et dit tout hault quil faisoit faire la guerre à son ennemy par
ung autre qui ne l’est gueres moins, tenant ces propos pour s’escuser envers le Pape, qui
n’est pas contant de ce qu’il est allyé avecq vostre Magesté; comme il monstre bien, car
il a desja commancé à fournir une grosse somme de deniers à ce Roy pour se deendre
contre vous et banquiers à Lyon pour y contribuer tons les moys.’ (inaccurate passage
in cipher, corrected). Francis certainly wanted Henry to think this and deliberately
expressed these views to convey them to Henry.
34
Charles V to Chapuys, 27 June, 1544, L&P, XIX, i, 794.
35
Chapuys, 18, 28 June 1544, L&P, XIX, i, 730, 799; Instructions to Courrières,
ibid., no. 921, Courrières’ despatch, ibid., no. 956.
36
Mary of Hungary, 11 July 1544, L&P, XIX, i, 897.
37
For a dissection of this nonsense, see Paulin Paris, Etudes sur François Premier,
roi de France, sur sa vie privée et son règne, 2 vols (Paris, 1885), II, pp. 301–307;
see also D. Potter, ‘Anne de Pisseleu, duchesse d’Etampes, maîtresse et conseillère de
François Ier’ in C. Michon, Les conseillers de François Ier pp. 536–56.
164 chapter four
Guzman via the Emperor’s confessor, Mme d’Etampes and Longueval,
sent similar messages to the Emperor.
38
A meeting took place near
Bar between Mme d’Etampes, Longueval and Mailly, bailli of Dijon
on the French side and Granvelle and Gonzaga on the Imperial.
39
It
is, of course, inconceivable that such talks should have been initiated
without the King’s full knowledge. ey opened the way and arrange-
ments could then be made for Annebault and L’Aubespine to take up
the talks formally.
40
Saint-Martin also kept up his contacts at Calais
41
and when Henry
crossed the Channel in July he was called into the King’s presence,
despite having been reported to Henry by Norfolk as a ‘falls knave.’
Told that Francis would avow the proposals, Henry said he regretted
nothing had come of them but that he was bound to the Emperor. He
hinted that, should a reasonable approach to the Emperor be refused,
he would not be bound to continue the war and that a meeting with
Francis was a possibility.
42
is brought an immediate response from
Francis, with letters of credence to Robert de Framezelles, an ocial
at Boulogne claiming to have received ‘good and honest propositions
from you.’ is was a fairly obvious ploy.
43
e Imperial commander
Buren was well aware of these comings and goings; both Norfolk and
Suolk were anxious to insist there was nothing in it, despite Imperial
suspicions. Norfolk added of Framezelles
38
Longueval to Granvelle, 18 July 1544, HHSA, P.A. 55, fo. 441.
39
Navagero to Council of Ten, 28 July 1544, A. Rozet and J.-F. Lembey, L’invasion
de France et le siège de Saint-Dizier par Charles-Quint en 1544, (Paris, 1910). p. 456.
Charles V to prince Philip, 14 Aug. 1544, Calendar, Spain, VIII, p. 612.
40
F. Nawrocki, ‘L’amiral Claude d’Annebault: faveur du roi et gouvernement du
royaume sous les règnes de François Ier et Henri II’ 2 vols. (èse de doctorat, Paris
IV, 2009), I, pp. 343–352.
41
Letter to Henry Palmer, L&P, XIX, i, 553; CSP Spain VII, 107, Some of the docu-
ments on these exchanges are in E. Deseille, L’année boulonnaise (Mémoires de la
Société académique de Boulogne-sur-Mer, 8 (1885–1886), 401–407.
42
Norfolk to Henry VIII, 11 June 1544, NA SP1/188, fo. 95(105) (L&P. XIX, i, 674);
Saint-Martin to Francis I, 17 July 1544, NA SP1/190, fo. 74 (L&P, XIX, i, 929).
43
Francis I to Henry VIII, 20 July 1544, NA SP1/190, fo. 103 (L&P, XIX, i, 953.1):
‘bons et honnestes propos . . . proceddans de vous.,’ letter signed in autograph ‘Vre bon
frère [et*] cousin et allye’; Framezelles, autograph note, 20 July 1544, NA SP1/190,
fo. 104 (L&P, XIX, i, 953.3). Deposition of Saint-Martin, 17 Aug. 1549, Potter, Du
Biez, pp. 301–302: ‘Au paravant led. des Marquaiz advertist led. mareschal du Biez que
si le feu Roy vouloit payer aud. Roy d’Angleterre des arrieres de sa pension et faire
bresche à Ardres, il ne feroit aulcune descente.’
‘
fighting over the bear
’
s skin
’
165
He could well seek to negotiate but he [Norfolk] was sure that the
King his master would make no agreement without the Emperor being
satised by the King of France and that the said King would renounce
for ever the Scottish alliance and pay the King his master all he owes
him as well as the costs of this war . . . Coquart, a Frenchman, said at
the duke of Norfolk’s table that the Emperor was happy to have English
help and without them the French would have expelled the Emperor
from his lands.
44
In fact, Henry was most of all determined to establish that Francis
had sued for peace and his demand for hostages before talks could
begin was a non-starter.
45
e propensity for double-dealing and dis-
trust between the allies was therefore well established before ghting
began. ough Henry was kept informed of the peace feelers put out
by Mme d’Etampes, Mary of Hungary told her brother with extraor-
dinary foresight that:
I fear greatly that he could well do otherwise and that, if he captured
Boulogne and Montreuil, he would negotiate to keep what would be
convenient for him . . . and if he saw he could not capture them, he would
negotiate an honourable retreat, for, as I understand it, he seems to have
no great desire to move further forward . . . I fear that, should he enter
further into these talks and give ear to the French as he seems prepared
to do, that he present some terms to Your Majesty that he will judge
reasonable and, if you do not accept them, that he will negotiate for what
he is owed to escape from the costs of war.
46
44
Maximilien d’Egmont to Mary of Hungary, 31 July 1544, HHSA, P.A. 55, fos.
105–106: ‘Qu’il povoit bien charcher de practiser, mais qu’estoit asseuré que le Roy
son maistre ne feroit nul appointement sans que premierement l’Empereur ne fut
content du Roy de France et que led. Roy renoncea à jamais à l’aliance d’Escosse et
payat au Roy son maistre tout ce que luy doit et remboursa les frais fait pour ceste
guerre . . . Cocquart, françois, dit à la table du duc de Norfock que l’Empereur estoit
bien heureux d’avoir l’ayde des Engles, et que sans eulx le Roy de France eust chassé
l’Empereur hors de tout les pays de Sa Maiesté.’
45
Letter of Francis, NA SP1/190 fo. 103 and Henry’s dra reply corr. by Paget, NA
SP1/191, fo. 61; Framezelles to Saint-Martin, 18 Aug. 1544, NA SP1/191, fo. 119.
46
Mary of Hungary to Charles V, 24 July 1544, HHSA, P.A. 55, fo. 88: ‘Je suis en
merveilleuse doubte qu’il pourroit bien faire aultrement, et s’il emportoit Boulongne et
Monstreul, vouldroit traicter pour retenir ce que luy est convenable . . . et s’il voit qu’il
ne les scauroit emporter, traicteroit pour retourner en son royaulme avec reputacion,
car, à ce que je puis entendre, ne semble avoir grant envie de passer plus avant . . . et
suis en craincte que, s’il entre plus avant en ceste praticque et vueille accouster les
francois comme il semble estre intentionné, qu’il ne face presenter à Vostre Maiesté
quelques conditions qu’il jugera raisonnables et, si ne les acceptez, qu’il traictera son
deu pour soy desmesler des fraitz de la guerre.’
166 chapter four
It could, of course, be the case that such suspicion is exactly what
Francis and his ministers wanted to sew. ese talks also illustrate well
how ambiguous was Henry’s alliance with the Emperor.
e day of the fall of Saint-Dizier, 17 August, the Emperor issued
a safe-conduct for Annebault as a result of unocial talks between
French and Imperial representatives, initiated by contacts between
Queen Léonor’s confessor and Mary of Hungary. Ocial talks began
with the French at Saint-Amand on 29 August; despite his victory,
Charles had lost many casualties and his supply lines were fragile.
47
At the same time, a low-level French negotiating team was making its
way to Boulogne.
A Strategy in Dispute
As the decisions necessary for the war approached, Henry bunkered
down in Whitehall. Over the winter of 1543, he had moved around
as usual from Ampthill and Bisham in November, to Woking early in
December and then to Hampton Court for Christmas and the New
Year. Aer the middle of January he returned to London and hardly
le Whitehall (except for a brief excursion to Greenwich in late April–
early May). He even passed over the job of presiding at the Order of
the Garter to Suolk there in the last week of April.
48
e reason seems
to have been that he was ill. Chapuys reported that he was suering
from his leg ulcer again at the end of March and was still recovering
on 12 April and again he was incommunicado in mid-May, taking
pills. As it was, there was enough disquiet on both sides of the Channel
about Henry’s tness to lead an army in person. e Emperor even
sent Chantonnay (Granvelle’s son) in April to nd out the truth.
49
If
Chapuys is to be trusted, even the King’s own advisers were doubtful
about his crossing.
47
C. Paillard, L’invasion allemande en 1544: fragments d’une histoire militaire et
diplomatique de l’expédition de Charles-Quint (Paris, 1884), pp. 367–367; Rozet et
Lembey, L’invasion de France et siège de Saint-Dizier, pp. 163–167, 284–286, 571–573;
Nawrocki, ‘Annebault’ (2009), I, pp. 343–344.
48
Commission to Suolk, 21 April 1544, BL Harl. 304, fo. 136 (L&P, XIX, i, 363).
49
Chapuys, 30 March 1544, L&P, XIX, i, 263; Chapuys to Mary of Hungary, 12
April, and to Charles V, 17 May 1544 (L&P, XIX, i, 318, 518); Charles V, credence for
Chantonnay, 15 April 1544, ibid., 339.
‘
fighting over the bear
’
s skin
’
167
e reasons why some of those around the lord King would not, as I
understand, wish him to go personally on campaign are, among other
things, fear for his person and also because they assume that, should he go
in person, all matters would be delayed, for it would be necessary to march
much more slowly because of the weight and illness of the said lord King
and because of the greater anxiety about risking his person. I believe, as
your Majesty can all too well understand, that he would be worse should
he continue to make known that he will actually cross to Calais.
50
He even recommended pushing Beltran de la Cueva y Toledo, duke
of Albuquerque, who had recently made a very favourable impres-
sion on Henry, for a leadership role in the invasion. Again in May,
Chapuys reported on Henry’s lack of tness. His entourage had tried
every means to dissuade him from a personal campaign but to no
avail. Chapuys alerted the Emperor to the real possibility that the
English army would not be in place on the agreed date (20 June) and
was brutal in his analysis:
e delay would only be from the keenness, nay the obstinacy of the lord
King in aiming to go in person, since for his security so many precautions
need to be made that things will not be ready for several days. My foolish
opinion is that the lord King could not undertake the journey prudently in
person. For whatever his stoutness of heart, other than his age and weight,
he has the worst legs in the world, such that those who have seen them
are amazed he does not stay in bed all the time and judge that he would
not be able to endure the least hardship in the world without endangering
his life. However, no one dares tell him. It is clear that his presence would
serve the expedition well if he were well enough but that if he went there
is apparent danger to his person, from which problems would arise.
He therefore advised that ‘all means should be sought to rid the expedi-
tion of his person and that the King meanwhile should stay at Calais
to watch over and promote matters.’ Chapuys thought that only the
Emperor’s intervention could work since Henry would regard it as
dishonourable not to go if Charles were on campaign, so if both rulers
50
Chapuys to Charles V, 13 April 1544, NA, PRO31/18/3/2, fo. 80v (L&P, XIX, i,
324): (italicised passage in cipher) ‘Les causes pour lequelles pluseurs de ceulx qui sont
autour dud. Sr. roy ne vouldroient comme j’entendz qu’il se treuve personnellement
en l’emprinse sont entre autres la craincte de sa personne et aussi qu’ilz presupposent
que soy y retreuvent [sic] en personne, tous les aeres se rendroient plus tardifz, car il
fauldra marcher beaucoup plus lentement pour la gravité et indisposicion dud. Sr. roy
et aussi avec plus grand soing et respect pour non le hazarder, et croy qu’il ne seroit le
pire pour beaucoup de respectz que vostre majesté peult trop mieulx entendre, pourveu
qu’il face continuer le bruyt d’y aller et qu’il passe jusques à Calaix.’
168 chapter four
were to stay at the frontier, this would still have an eect and allow the
campaign to move more swily.
51
Charles, on Chapuys’ advice, would have been prepared for Henry
not to go or at least stay at Calais to direct his army from there but
could not give up his own campaign. Chantonnay had found Henry
apparently determined to lead in person. On 17 May, Paget was sud-
denly despatched to the Emperor, calling rst at Brussels where he
spoke to the Regent on 23rd about arrangements for logistical co-
ordination between their forces, and then rode on rapidly (complain-
ing as usual of his piles – he was ‘a man of many others the unmetest
to ryde’) to Speyer for an interview with Granvelle and the Emperor on
28th.
52
ough instructions do not survive, it is clear enough that there
was an emergency and the objective was also clear: cards on the table
about French attempts to negotiate and above all to nd out whether
Charles still intended to lead the army in person. It can hardly be for-
tuitous that Henry charged Paget to suggest to Charles that he need
not lead the army himself in view of his age and gout (Charles was,
of course, a decade younger than Henry). Paris, he now asserted was
not an important enough target for them to go in person (‘n’est chose
tant importante qu’ilz y doibvent aller en personne’); its wealth would
have been carried o by its people; the progress of the Emperor’s army
would be slow because of his gout, as well as through resistance on the
51
Chapuys to Charles V, 18 May 1544, NA PRO31/18/3/2, fo. 123r–v (L&P, XIX,
i, 529): ‘Ne sera cause de tardance autre chose synon l’aection [voyre?] qui l’oseroit
dire, l’obstinacion que led. Sr. roy monstre tousiours de vouloir aller en personne, pour
la sheureté de laquelle convient et est necessaire de faire tant de choses que je crains ne
seront achevees de quelques jours. Et me semble pour dire ma folle opinion que led. Sr.
roy ne fera prudentement entreprendre led. voyage en personne, car quelque bon cueur
qu’il ayt, oultre l’eaige et la pesanteur de sa personne il a les pires jambes du monde et
telles que ceulx qui les ont veu s’esbahissent comme il ne demeure continuelement au lit
et jugent qu’il ne scaura endurer le moindre travail du monde sans dangier de sa vye,
et que toutesfois personne ne luy ose remonstrer. Il est tout cler que sa presence pour-
roit beaucoup servir à lad. emprinse si sa disposicion le permectoit, mais ainsi qu’il se
retreuve il y aura manifeste dangier en sa personne, dont suyveroient les inconveniens.’
‘l’on devroit sercher tous les moyens à despescher led. voyage de sad. personne, laquelle
se pendant pour pourveoir plus commodement aux aaires et les favorizer se pourroit
tenir à Callaix pendant lad. emprinse.’; to Mary of Hungary, 18 May 1544, L&P, XIX,
i, 530: ‘Car oultre l’eaige il est si tres mal des jambes que eust merveille qu’il se peult
soustenir, et s’il est question (apres long sejour où il a esté) de se mectre en travail
s’en jour perdre.’
52
Paget’s credentials to Charles V, Mary of Hungary and Granvelle, 18 May 1544,
L&P, XIX, i, 525–527. Chapuys to Mary of Hungary, 17 May 1544, ibid., 520. Paget
to Henry VIII, 23 May 1544, St.P., IX, p. 679 (L&P. XIX, i, 566).
‘
fighting over the bear
’
s skin
’
169
way. Winter would soon be upon them and all they would be able to
do was sack Paris. What about the dishonour of taking no permanent
conquests? en there was the possibility that Francis would attack
their own territories while they were on campaign. So Henry put for-
ward a revised plan: instead of armies of 42,000 led by the sovereigns,
they should be commanded by Lieutenants with 30,000 or 32,000.
ese could march more rapidly to Paris. Moreover, while it would
not be honourable for a prince simply to ravage territory and capture
nothing (here came a pointed reference to the Emperor in Provence
in 1536), it would be so for a lieutenant. e two rulers could wait on
the frontiers in support with the rest of their armies.
All this may well have been designed to provide an escape route
for Henry but the Emperor was having none of it; in a memorandum
replying to Henry’s points, he observed that Henry was the older man
and ‘he has le o for a long time travelling outside his kingdom’
while the ‘change of air and bodily exertion’ would be dangerous for
his health, in particular from a ‘discharge (ux d’humeurs) in his legs.’
As for himself, Charles insisted that his health was ne and that the
gout did not bother him in the summer. In view of Francis’ actions
the previous year in invading his patrimonial lands with such swagger;
of his promise to the Estates of the Empire; of the dishonour of not
pressing forward; and nally (and probably most crucially) the fact
that his army was made up of ‘men of many dierent nations where
there are various chiefs, colonels and captains who, as experience has
shown . . . can only be commanded and disciplined through respect for
his presence’ he had to go. As for Henry’s suggestions about diminish-
ing numbers, Charles argued that, should Francis realise this, he would
concentrate all his very formidable forces against one of his enemies.
Large numbers were needed to break down Francis’ prepared fortica-
tions. As we have already seen, Henry’s suggestions about Paris were
brushed aside. For Charles, the capture of the capital was to put pres-
sure on Francis and bring him to the negotiating table (‘le constraindre
à faire la raison’). Perhaps the deciding point was that Charles was pre-
pared to accept the lower number of English troops on oer if Henry
did not lead them and they moved immediately.
53
is, of course, was
53
‘Ce que a esté consideré et advisé sur la charge de sr. Messire Guillaume Paget’
enclosed in Charles V to Chapuys of 3 June, NA SP1/188, fos. 46–49 (51–54) ,
PRO31/18/3/2 fo. 148 (L&P, XIX, i, 626): ‘en cas que led. sr roy ne iroit personel-
lement en l’armee, que il pourroit sure qu’elle fut de trente mil homes.’ (fo. 49)