Potter David. Henry VIII and Francis I

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170 chapter four

an oer Henry could not in honour accept. Neither Henry’s own dis-

comfort nor the misgivings of his advisers would therefore come into

play but those misgivings reveal a serious breakdown in agreement on

overall strategy that was to have disastrous consequences. Paget was in

such a hurry to get back to England that, passing Brussels on 9 June,

he declined to disturb the Regent from hunting and got on with his

journey.

Paget’s return signalled a change in strategy. It may be that being

forced to face the reality of an expedition in person revitalised the

brutal energy that had been masked for so long by Henry’s ailing and

ungainly body. At Calais on 21 July, Chapuys, not habitually starry-

eyed about Henry, observed that that ‘I never in my life saw the lord

King more joyful then we saw him today.’

By mid-June, the King

avowedly abandoned his idea of remaining at Calais during the cam-

paign and signalled to Norfolk, by then across the Channel, that he

intended to ‘go forwards.’ No longer was Norfolk to have a full war

chest of £160,000 as was decided when Henry ‘was partly minded to

have remained upon the frontiers’; that ‘rst resolution upon another

consultation’ had been changed. Yet where was the Duke to go?

Norfolk was still assuming that the English forces would ultimately

cross the Somme, yet on 13 June Paget told Lord Cobham (appointed

on 17 June as Deputy of Calais) that the King’s armies ‘shalbe so nere

Calais allwayes’ that no ‘extraordinary crewe’ would be needed for the

garrison there, as had originally been planned.

is is as close as we

can get to pinning down Henry’s change of strategy.

Henry saw Chapuys and Charles’ special envoy Courrières on

14 June and reiterated his cautions against Charles’ personal campaign,

stressing again the fact that his own illness was ‘only by chance’ while

Charles’ was chronic and especially dangerous in autumn. He also per-

‘il a delaissé de long temps de voyaiger hors de son royaulme’ plus the danger of ‘change-

ment d’air et le travail corporel.’ ‘gens de diverses nations et y a plusieurs chiefz, collonelz

et capitaines lesquelz comme l’experience la demonstré . . . dicillement se pourroient

regler et tenir en discipline, ne faire bon eect sans sa presence et respect d’icelle’ On

Charles’ role as an general in this period and in particular his growing determination to

command in person, see J.D. Tracy, Charles V: Impresario of War (Cambridge, 2002).

Mary of Hungary to Chapuys, 11 June 1544, L&P, XIX, i, 676.

Chapuys to Charles V, Calais, 21 July 1544, NA PRO31/18/3/2, fo. 201 (L&P,

XIX, i, 955): ‘je ne vis oncques en ma vie led. Sr. roy plus joyeulx que l’avons veu

aujourd’huy.’

Council to Norfolk, rec. 17 June 1544 (later copy), BL Harl. 6980, fo. 119 (L&P,

XIX, i, 690); Paget to Cobham, 13 June 1544, BL Harl. 283, fo. 188 (L&P, XIX, i, 691).

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ceptively warned against plunging deeply into French territory with-

out guaranteed supplies and in the face of serious French preparations,

while to count on the rebellion of the people of France was just ‘vanity’

(such aer all had been the experience of 1522–1523).

Henry insisted

that he would cross in person initially with 30,000 men and decide on

his objectives once he got to Calais. Paget had told Chapuys explicitly

(‘assez clerement’) that Henry, despite ‘the most urgent request of his

councillors and other important people of the kingdom to excuse his

going personally on the expedition’ would certainly go but the ambas-

sador feared that Henry would be very unwilling to send his army far

into France (in view of the diculties he was harping on), unless he

had news of the Emperor’s success in his invasion. Charles received

this report at Metz on 27th and resigned himself to Henry taking the

eld, though he insisted that the English should commit themselves to

sending at least 30,000 men into France, otherwise Francis would not

be constrained to divide his forces. He continued to insist that Paris

was a viable objective.

Relations were not improved by the disas-

trous outcome of negotiations with Landenberg (see chapter 7) which

threatened to unleash his unpaid troops into the Emperor’s patrimo-

nial lands or provoke them to take French service. Wotton gloomily

reported from Metz that it was being said in the Emperor’s entourage

‘the the Kinges highnesse dothe not much mynde this warre against

France.’ Granvelle told him the decision was ‘marvellous ill tidings,

and of great importance and of hard digestion.’ Chapuys’ protests to

the Council just drew the truculent response that ‘they cared not a

gooseberry’ if Landenberg went over to France. It would just embolden

Francis to give battle, which was what they all wanted! Henry himself

was blasé about Landenberg’s intentions, thinking him unlikely to go

over to France in view of his personal grudge against Francis. At all

events, news of a minor Imperial victory in Lombardy had encour-

aged him in his plan to cross the Channel.

ere were also problems

Henry had been told before that the people of France were about to revolt

and this had never happened (e.g. the spy report of 1522, BL Cotton, Calig. D VI,

fos. 353–354).

Chapuys to Charles V, 18 June 1544, L&P, XIX, i, 730; Charles V to Chapuys,

27 June 1544, ibid. no. 794: ‘la tres instante requeste de ceulx de son conseil et aultres

bons personnaiges du royaulme d’excuser son allee personnelle en lad. emprinse.’

Wotton to Paget, 23 June 1544, NA SP1/189, fo. 38(56) (L&P, XIX, i, 765);

same to Henry VIII, 24 June, St.P., IX. 718 (L&P, XIX, i, 770); Chapuys to Charles V,

29 June 1544, L&P, XIX, i, 799.

172 chapter four

of coordination. ough communications with the Regent in Brussels

were easy enough, on many matters the Emperor had to rule and let-

ters in post were taking ten days from London to Metz by the time

Charles arrived there.

It cannot have given Charles much condence

in his ally to learn at the end of June that Henry, though now much

more likely to take part in the campaign in person, would stick at the

campaign for no longer than the agreed term of 4 months agreed in

1543 ‘and that he will soon tire of it, because money is not so abundant

with him as was thought.’

Invasion: Montreuil

Despite extensive long-term preparations for the campaign (see chap-

ter 5) a great deal was also le to the last minute. Not until 25 May

did a letter go out to the Dean and Chapter of Wells to send 400 foot

to Dover by 12 June. On the same day, the Lord Mayor of London

was summoned to the Council to answer its command ‘for the fynd-

ing of souldeours to the kynges warres.’

By late May the vanguard

(‘vaward’) of the English army under Norfolk’s command, was cross-

ing the Channel, at rst in small detachments with delays caused by

diculties with the Flemish transport and escort ships.

ese two

formations should have consisted of 18,623 foot (equally divided

between the two corps) but only a paltry 915 horse. is army was

thus numerically the strongest in theory of the two deployed by Henry

but was dependent heavily on the Burgundian auxiliaries and German

mercenaries for cavalry.

Norfolk himself crossed on 8 June, to nd

that intelligence at Calais was hopelessly ineective, little more than

women’s gossip. He proposed to send an agent into France but he

knew nothing yet of current developments, though trumpeters sent to

arrange ransoms were able to report some movements on the French

L&P, XIX, i, 770 Letters between London and Speyer were taking 8–9 days in

April-May (Chapuys’ despatches of 13 April, 18 May).

Chapuys to Charles V, 29 June 1544, L&P, XIX, i, 799.

HMC, Calendar of the MSS of the Dean and Chapter of Wells 2 vols (London,

1914), II, p. 257; Goring, ‘Military Obligations,’ pp. 264–273.

For a series of warrants signed by Norfolk at Lambeth on 5 and 6 June for con-

duct of small detachments of soldiers, L&P, XIX, i, 632, 634.3 and 4, 655, 663.

L&P, XIX, i, 274, 275, 276.

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side.

Russell was scheduled to follow shortly aer with the rearguard,

the two corps to operate as one army.

It has been argued that Norfolk was too dilatory and cautious in

his leadership and that English strategy was undermined by rivalry

between Norfolk and his co-commander, Russell, and lack of co-op-

eration from the Burgundians. e Duke took nearly a month from

his landing at Calais to begin the siege of Montreuil.

As we have

seen, Norfolk was still probably unaware that Henry had changed his

mind about overall strategy and was still planning for a crossing of the

Somme. When, a few days later, he consulted a messenger from du

Roeulx who had sent to nd out what his strategy was, Norfolk had to

ask du Roeulx’s advice. is was clear: Ardres and Boulogne should

be avoided as they were too strong. Norfolk should encamp before

Montreuil, which was winnable unless it was further reinforced by

6–7000 men. Du Roeulx also passed on current Imperial assessments

of French troop strengths: the main army to face the Emperor would

consist of 15–16,000 Swiss, 6–7000 Germans, 8000 French and 1500

light horse and 1500 hommes d’armes. But in Picardy it was thought

that Vendôme would have 1500 hommes d’armes, 8–900 light horse

and 10–12,000 foot from Boulonnais, Picardy, Normandy and Brittany

(obviously legionnaires). At Montreuil, Norfolk could be supplied from

Flanders and supported by du Roeulx and Buren. As for crossings of

the Somme, du Roeulx ruled out the one below Abbeville (presumably

the same used by Edward III in 1346) as too deep; instead he pressed

for a crossing of the Somme at Braye (between Péronne and Corbie).

Above all, du Roeulx was ‘ever more laying lode upon that in no wyse

your highness shulde consume no tyme in laying siege where was no

lycklyehode in brief tyme to wynne the same.’

ese points were

rammed home by du Roeulx when he met Norfolk in person at Calais

on 14 June: Montreuil should be attacked rst but only if its garrison

were not more than 2000. Ardres and Boulogne would take at least two

months to reduce. Once Montreuil was taken, the English could march

directly south to cross the Somme between Le Crotoy and Abbeville

and thereaer live o the land or be supplied by French peasants. If

Montreuil were not taken, the English should march through Imperial

Norfolk to Council, 9 June 1544, NA SP1/188, fos. 79–81(89–91) (L&P, XIX, i, 654).

MacMahon, ‘English Invasion of France,’ pp. 79–82, 85–89.

Norfolk et al. to Henry VIII, 11 June 1544, NA SP1/188, fos. 94–95 (102–103)

(L&P, XIX, i, 674).

174 chapter four

territory and cross the Somme further up. Corbie was suggested as

an initial objective, equivalent to the Emperor’s proposed objective

in Champagne.

e count of Buren had promised to be at Aire by

20 June.

When he came to talk to Norfolk on 21 June he pushed the

same view as du Roeulx: Montreuil should be the objective but should

be le alone if it had a garrison of 5–6000. Otherwise, the English

should march to cross the Somme, plainly a strategy favourable to the

Imperial cause.

Du Roeulx had been thoroughly enthusiastic about

a siege of Montreuil for two years; now he had changed his mind.

ere seems every reason to suppose that he was under orders to stop

the English getting bogged down and move them on to the Somme

as soon as possible. By the end of June, though, du Roeulx was pretty

pessimistic: ‘I fear that if they do not follow another course from what

they do they will do nothing serious this year.

One of the main problems was supplies. Burgundian objectives

were undermined by two facts: rst, Henry was determined not to

play along; second, supply lines were extremely dicult even for the

20,000 men or so of the van and rearguards marching on Montreuil.

e campaign began uncomfortably for Norfolk and continued so. He

had been complaining about the high cost of food at Calais since his

arrival. e supply of his forces on the march was even more pre-

carious and he claimed not to know the wage rates of German sol-

diers to be brought by Buren. He moved out of the town on 15 June

and lodged at Leubringhen on the borders of English territory on the

road to Marquise (7 miles o ).

e ordnance followed via Nieullay.

e problem was that, though there was forage, there was no stand-

ing corn except on the estates of the master of St. Inglevert hospice

(which formed the boundary of English territory). However, Calais

could now be prepared for Russell and his contingent (he was there

by 20th). Du Roeulx, who knew the territory like the back of his hand,

Norfolk et al. to Henry VIII, 14 June 1544, St.P., IX, p. 708 (L&P, XIX, i, 700).

Buren to Henry VIII, Mechelen, 2 June 1544, L&P, XIX, i, 617.

Norfolk et al. to Henry VIII, 22 June 1544, L&P, XIX, i, 758.

Du Roeulx to Mary of Hungary, Saint-Omer, 30 June 1544, AGR, Audience, 119,

fo. 34:’ ‘si crains je bien en cas qu’ilz ne prendent aultre fachon de faire qu’ilz ne feront

poinct grandte chose pour ceste annee.’

A detailed itinerary of Norfolk’s march can be reconstructed from his correspon-

dence and from Elis Gruydd’s chronicle in M.B. Davies (ed.), ‘e “Enterprises” of

Paris and Boulogne,’ Bulletin of the Faculty of Arts of Fouad I University, Cairo, XI, i

(19.), p. 10– (in which the dating is askew).

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175

was clear that the cavalry forces stationed by the French at érouanne

were a crucial danger to English supply lines. Norfolk turned down

the idea of raising 500 Artois infantry to protect the supply lines and

du Roeulx thought on 6 July that is the English took no other action

they would starve.

Norfolk had two problems: strategy and supplies. Incredibly, he still

had no clear idea of his objectives. In fact, the Council (in the per-

sons of Wriothesley and Suolk) rebuked him by writing that the King

thought he understood what he was to do; at all events they reiter-

ated that he should ‘marche forwards and laye siege’ to Montreuil and,

should cavalry still be short, move back to attack Ardres using mor-

tars. He was also rapped over the knuckles about German pay, which

he was told he could have found out from omas Chamberlain. Yet

even Suolk and his colleagues with the other army said they were still

in the dark until 10 July about what Henry intended to do and even

then they were told to keep the plans secret from the Emperor’s rep-

resentatives. Encamped at the abbey of Beaulieu (burned the previous

year) on 22nd, with Russell a mile away at Fiennes, Norfolk was again

warned by Buren that, if Montreuil had been reinforced up to 5–6000

men he should on no account waste his time there but instead march

to the Somme. Yet at the same time, they told him that Vendôme

was waiting at Abbeville with 10,000 foot and 500 hommes d’armes

and that he had devastated the country around Montreuil. Promises of

supplies via du Roeulx’s post at the castle of Renty must have sounded

unpromising.

By this point, the fundamental strategic misconceptions of the

campaign are pretty clear and must have been so to the commanders.

Henry certainly realised that deep inroads into French territory were

potentially very risky without logistical back-up. In his own sphere, he

was invited to cross the Somme while leaving several heavily fortied

strongholds behind him besides Boulogne and Montreuil. Amiens was

out of the question and Péronne, which had resisted a siege of several

Du Roeulx to Mary of Hungary, 6 July 1544, Audience, 119, fo. 35: ‘s’ilz ne mec-

tent autre ordre au convoy de leurs vivres avant qu’il soit trois jours, ilz ne auront

poinct à menger.’

Norfolk’s despatches of 13, 14, 15, 19, 22 June 1544, L&P, XIX, i, 700, 701, 709,

738, 746, 758. Council to Norfolk, 20, BL Harl. 6989, fo. 121 (L&P, XIX, i, 741), same

to same, 26 June 1544, ibid., no. 781. Suolk and Browne to Norfolk, Russell and

Cheyney, 8 July 1544, BL Harl. 6989, fo. 129 (L&P, XIX, i, 872). See also L&P, XIX,

i, 849, 863.

176 chapter four

weeks in 1536, had been extensively refortied. Few exploits would

have been more dangerous than to press on south from the Somme;

Calais would be le exposed and the French border fortresses could

easily interrupt supply. e alternative – the course of action Henry

eventually opted for – was to attack neighbouring strongholds at

Boulogne and Montreuil, scarcely moving from the English base. Yet

this had two major drawbacks; it eectively tore up Anglo-Imperial

strategic agreements and it le English forces exposed to a power-

ful French counter-attack should both or either of those fortresses be

taken. All in all, the alternatives were unpalatable, though the ultimate

decisions concerning objectives can be understood.

Norfolk received the Council’s testy order by 23rd and announced

that he would head towards an old castle called Alembon, 6 miles south-

eastwards, in order to meet du Roeulx and decide whether to attack

Montreuil or Ardres; Russell would stay at Fiennes. is involved a

march south-eastwards along the borders of French and Imperial ter-

ritory. Everything depended on the advice of the Imperial command-

ers as the state of forage on the 40–50 km march to Montreuil was

unknown and the quality of English dray horses (e.g. for the porta-

ble ovens) was very poor. But when Buren and du Roeulx came to

Alembon, they repeated their advice not to ‘meddle’ with Boulogne

or Ardres and it was agreed to try Montreuil, though the Burgundian

commanders could not guarantee success, especially as the Dauphin

was expected with an army of 15,000.

With Russell now at Licques,

Norfolk camped at Alquines on 28th and continued his talks with the

Burgundians. e latter were gloomier than before and pressed for a

march to the Somme once the King had arrived; not even Montreuil

could be fully encircled with the troops they had and they proposed

a siege on one side. Russell ‘said I had not harde of eny towne wonne

which was not besieged rounde abowtes.’ Norfolk and his fellow com-

manders were pessimistic about the Burgundians; ‘thies men do moste

desire that with thexpense of the kinges money we shulde defende

their cuntries,’ while they were not even helping with supplies. e

soldiers had had nothing but water to drink since the morning of

27th and no likelihood of any beer until the evening of 29th.

is was

Norfolk et al. to Council, 23, 26 June 1544, L&P, i, 763, 786.

Norfolk et al. to Council, 28 June 1544, NA SP1/189, fos. 97–99 (128–129) (L&P,

XIX, i, 795).

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the day it was decided to swing back south-west and unite the forces

under Russell and Norfolk at Bourthes, mid-way between Montreuil,

érouanne and Boulogne. e following day, Henry ordered the siege

to be pressed in earnest without taking too much notice of du Roeulx

and Buren (their advice was just to be followed about supplies) and

the King characteristically sounded o about the best place to lay a

siege – on the eastern and southern sides.

For his part, Russell was

even more acid about the campaign objectives by the time they got

to Bourthes; he likened the campaign to others he had seen involving

great English expenditure:

And now this iourney, as hit may be called a wylde warre as hit hath ben

used in tymes past, considering that we do here but wander dispending

your Majestes treasour aer this sorte without any gayne, and enterpris-

ing that whiche thorough the lacke of victualles . . . we shall not be hable

to atteyne.

All this would only encourage the French to ‘sett lytle by’ Henry’s

main army when it arrived. He was convinced that the best objectives

would be Ardres and Boulogne.

e army moved very slowly again south-eastwards to Wicquinghem.

Finally, on 6–7 July, Norfolk and Russell marched towards Montreuil

itself via an encampment on the east bank of the Canche, then crossing

to Brimeu on 8th; from there had could advance quickly to survey the

layout of Montreuil – one mile away – for the rst time.

Montreuil

occupies an elevated position except to the south. Aer the siege of

1537, Francis I had ordered the construction of new bastioned forti-

cations around the upper town but these were only partially com-

plete. To the east, the old 14th century walls remained around the

lower town, pierced by the Hesdin gate, but the approach to them

was rendered dicult by marshy ground. As soon as they arrived, the

English commanders noted the existence of a ‘great bullwarke without

Abbeville gate’ which their spy had not noted before and that ‘none of

Council to Norfolk et al., 30 June 15 44, St.P., IX, p. 725 (L&P, XIX, i, 806).

Russell to Henry VIII, 1 July 1544, NA SP1/189, fos. 116–118 (151–153) (L&P,

XIX, i, 816). At the same time he told Browne that aer four campaigns in France

Henry ‘hathe not in France oone foote more then he had fourtie yeres paste.’ (1 July

1544, NA SP1/189, fo. 118 (153)v (L&P, XIX, i, 817).

Du Roeulx to Mary of Hungary, 6 July 1544, AGR, Audience, 119, fo. 35: ‘Le

camp des Anglois est allé camper à Brimeu. Touttesfois ilz avoient conclud d’aller à

Clenleu jusques à avoir nouvelles du Roy d’Angleterre.’

178 chapter four

us have ever sene in any place a bullwarke made to serve to so good

a purpose.’ It was able to beat all the ground in front. According to

Russell, the town ‘wantith neyther plattformes, mountes nor rampires

with the which they most anoye us and as for other defences they

have none,’ though it is dicult to think what else were needed except

ditches. e plan drawn by Jean Errard at the end of the 16th century

shows a distinctive mount on the eastern side of the new fortica-

tions.

ree gates remained open; the others had been ‘mured upp’

since the Burgundians captured the town in 1537. It was ‘as dangerous

a towne to be approched as ever I saw any’ though the use of artil-

lery had forced the garrison to abandon some of their outer defences.

To the north, the town was covered by the river Canche and marshy

ground.

Several days were taken up in arguments over tactics between

Norfolk and Russell and between both and the Burgundian command-

ers du Roeulx and Buren. When the siege started on 10th, it proved

impossible, as du Roeulx had warned, to invest the town completely.

Russell took up position with his force opposite the walls from the

Abbeville to the Hesdin gates, Norfolk and the Burgundians opposite

the fortications damaged in the siege of 1537 to the east (the Hesdin

gate side). e Burgundians refused to take up their position to the

west and close the siege. ey argued that the siege camp should not

be divided because of the danger that Vendôme might approach with

his 10,000 men. ey may have had a point early in July but by early

August, many of Vendôme’s troops had been drawn away and in any

case he could not have marched so rapidly from Abbeville as to sur-

prise the siege. Russell oered to take up his position to the west and

allow Norfolk to move his men around to the south but the Duke

vetoed this. Russell seems to have done his best to undermine Henry’s

condence in the Duke; both commanders asked for neutral observ-

ers to come to assess progress of the siege.

at Norfolk and Russell

disliked each other seems certain; Elis Gruydd amply recounts their

BL Add. 21117, no. 41.

Norfolk and others to Suolk, 13 July 1544, NA SP1/190, fo. 27v (L&P, XIX, i,

907); Russell to Henry VIII, 16 July 1544; same to Paget, 16 July 1544, NA SP1/190,

fos. 45v, 49v (L&P, XIX, i, 919, 920).

‘He saith hit is no place mete for me to lye in, being so dangerous.’ Russell also

told the King that Norfolk had alienated du Roeulx by writing ‘somwhat sharplie’ to

him over the slackness of supplies. It is clear he thought the Duke inept in strategy

and in handling the allies. (ibid., fos. 45v–46r).

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petty rivalries. Russell was the younger man but both were getting

on. Norfolk was over 70 and Russell nearly 60. Both, as we have seen,

were experienced in the disappointments of French wars. ere was

even uncertainty in the army as to which of them was in charge of the

vaward or rearward, as will be seen (chapter 5).

Russell made a camp in a hollow and brought up artillery to sweep

the defences in order to provide some relief for his men. Only then

(24th) could mining begin towards the Abbeville gate but progress

was painfully slow. e construction of artillery mounts that would

enable to town to be properly bombarded took prodigious eorts and

was not nished until the start of August.

Meanwhile, hardly any

progress against the Hesdin gate was made by Norfolk’s force, prob-

ably encamped in the valley of Ecuires, described by Gruydd as very

damp. His troops seem to have been concentrated on the maintenance

of supplies from Saint-Omer. Constantly harassed by the garrison of

érouanne.

Even the setting up an artillery bombardment of the town seems

to have had limited eect. Despite all the eort put into building the

artillery mound in front of the Abbeville gate and evidence that inner

defensive trenches were being built in case the Abbeville gate bastion

were lost, Norfolk still thought that artillery was unlikely to do the job

and was relying on ‘mynes and tombelyng trenches.’

e real prob-

lem, though, continued to be the failure of circumvallation. Gruydd

thought that 60,000 men would not have been enough to ensure this

and called it a ‘half siege.’ His anecdotal narrative of the siege gives the

impression that the absence of assaults indicated a lack of determina-

tion on the part of the English; there was certainly much more skir-

mishing with a spirited garrison than there was at Boulogne.

Supplies

were dribbling into Montreuil throughout August. Meanwhile, the

besiegers were themselves weakened by lack of food and drink, to

the extent that the soldiers even had to buy their food from the local

peasantry.

Gruydd’s narrative of the overthrow of a supply expe-

dition to Saint-Omer led by Norfolk’s man Hussey, though it might

Elis Gruydd in M.B. Davies, ‘Enterprises of Calais and Boulogne,’ pp. 11–12,

18. Gruydd said that even he ‘could not get any certain knowledge of the matter.’

(p. 11).

L&P, XIX, i, 965, 976; ii, 9.

Norfolk et al., to Council, 2 Aug. 1544, NA SP1/191, fo. 8r–v (L&P, XIX, ii, 9).

Gruydd, ed. M.B. Davies, ‘Enterprises of Calais and Boulogne,’ p. 22.

Gruydd, ‘e Enterprises of Paris and Boulogne,’ pp. 22–23.