Potter David. Henry VIII and Francis I
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200 chapter four
remain to do so if they took the oath to Henry and the rest to leave
with their moveable goods for Abbeville. Naturally, all arms and mili-
tary equipment were to remain in the town. e terms were agreed
on 13th and Vervins formally surrendered the town to Henry VIII
on 14 September.
159
Martin du Bellay, no friend of Vervins, gives the
well-balanced judgement that, aer the rst great English assault and
the loss of his best commander, the Corsican captain Philippe, Vervins
came to the conclusion that he was too weak to hold out. e people
of the town desperately tried to prevent the surrender, but Vervins had
negotiated good terms for his men and was determined to avoid the
horrors of a successful assault. e fact that he held to his word even
aer a great storm had damaged the English camp was a failure in duty
to his prince, argued du Bellay, compounded by the nearness of the
French army. It is obvious, however, that later accusations of treason
were manufactured. e priest Antoine Morin, whose verse chronicle
is the nearest we can get to an account from inside the town, makes no
complaint about Vervins and indeed accepts that there was no alterna-
tive but slaughter; gunpowder had run out.
160
e garrison marched
out (still nearly 1600 in number) followed by nearly 2000 women and
children, 87 wounded (in all 4500 people) and 100 waggons. Henry
watched them on the Montreuil road, no doubt with bloated satisfac-
tion and with the sword borne naked before him by Browne. Suolk
took the surrender from Vervins and entered the town. Henry did so
formally on 18th. e English were fortunate; a terrible storm began
on 14th that lasted until 25th, blowing down tents and wreaking gen-
eral havoc.
161
e panorama, which may have been commissioned by
Henry for a fresco at Whitehall and (unlike those at Cowdray) never
executed, shows the town in the aermath of the siege, the church of
159
L&P, XIX, ii, 222.
160
Du Bellay, Mémoires, IV, pp. 274–275. For the accusations against Vervins, which
essentially argue that the town remained defensible aer the assault of 12 September,
BnF, Dupuy 474, fos. 1–12. Potter, ‘A treason trial in sixteenth-century France: the
fall of marshal du Biez, 1549–1551’ English Historical Review, 105 (1990), 595–623.
We know the depleted nature of the remaining food supplies in Boulogne from the
accounts of Anthony Birkes’ widow, E351/180: 120 qu. wheat, 64 qu. barley, 98 qu.
malt. Morand (ed.), ‘Chroniques. . . . par A. Morin:’ ‘Veruins, qui de son corps nous
deendre eust grand peine’ (p. 247), ‘Le pourre estoit failly, on ne sceut s’en deendre’
(p. 257).
161
Hall, ed. Whibley, II, pp. 349–350; Order for the troops to enter Boulogne with
the King (in Mason’s hand), NA SP1/192. Fo. 75–77 (L&P, XIX, ii, 223). is con-
sisted of 3073 foot of the King’s Battle in their original retinues; L&P, XIX, ii, 424.
‘
fighting over the bear
’
s skin
’
201
Notre-Dame partially ruined, walls dilapidated and the siege trenches
still visible. In the foreground, refugees wend their way out.
162
Negotiations with Cardinal du Bellay and his colleagues had been
put on hold and the French envoys sent to Hardelot, holding some
discussions with Gardiner, St. John, Rich and Paget. On 14th, though,
Henry received them in his camp and put forward serious but impos-
sibly harsh conditions: abandonment of the Scottish alliance, 1 million
écus arrears of pensions and a life pension of 100,000; for war repa-
rations he demanded either 2 million or Ardres and the county of
Guînes. He would keep ‘what he could take . . . especially Boulogne’ in
perpetuity, rich hostages to be given until the conclusion of a full peace.
Shortly aerwards, they received their recall because of the treaty
of Crépy and were ordered to return, informing Henry that Francis
would accept the Emperor’s mediation between them. ey bad fare-
well to Henry on 23rd.
163
e King, with characteristic barefaced lying
devised surely to save face, told Wotton (still with the Emperor) that
the French envoys had accepted all his demands. No doubt he was
trying to increase his stock with the Emperor but this can hardly have
convinced him.
164
When Henry formally received the news that his ally
had made peace, he maintained an unusual degree of calmness but was
clearly agitated by the news that the French army was on its way.
165
Francis, as soon as he received the news, directed all his available
forces to march under the Dauphin’s command to confront the English,
a danger that had been threatening since the start of the campaign.
Vendôme, on hearing of the news from Boulogne, reported it to the
King on 17 September and took steps to hold up the Emperor’s envoy
to Henry, the bishop of Arras.
166
Having met the Emperor at Ribemont,
he prepared to join the Dauphin’s army at Auxi-le-château.
167
Henry
162
BL Cotton, Aug.I.ii, 116, reproduced in S. Doran (ed.), Henry VIII, Man and
Monarch (British Library Exhibition Catalogue, 2009), pp. 238–239.
163
‘ce qu’il pourroit prendre . . . mesme Boulongne’ e main source is the ‘Som-
maire de la negociation’ in Scheurer, Correspondance de Jean du Bellay, III, p. 272.
is places the interview with Henry on Sunday 11 September but in fact Sunday that
week fell on 14th. e audience must have taken place before the formal surrender of
Boulogne because of the phrase ‘pourroit prendre.’ On initial talks at Hardelot, Mason
to Honnings, 11 Sept. 1544, NA SP1/192, fo. 63 (L&P, ii, 216): the French ‘have ben
thiese three dais at Hardlow castell.’
164
Henry VIII to Wotton, 15 Sept. 1544, St.P., X, p. 271 (L&P, XIX, ii, 234).
165
Chpuys and Courrières to Mary of Hungary, 23 Sept. 1544, L&P, XIX, ii, 281.
166
Vendôme to Francis I, 17 Sept. 1544, BnF, fr. 20521, fo. 77.
167
Nicolas Wotton, 20 Sept. 1544, L&P, XIX, ii, 207.
202 chapter four
VIII nished the campaign by conferring the reward of knighthood in
the town of Boulogne on gures such as Cawarden.
168
Having inspected
the place and made up his mind about what needed to be done for its
defence, he le Boulogne in a hurry, realising that his forces would be
unable to meet the French in open battle. For a moment, he toyed with
the idea of remaining to see if the French would ‘taste battle’ but his
councillors were completely against this and even asked the Imperial
envoys to tell him that he could honourably withdraw.
169
Henry’s ex-
ible sense of honour was able to cope with this. Norfolk and Russsell,
as we have seen, abandoned the siege of Montreuil on 28th and set
up their camp on the hill opposite the town on the other side of the
Liane. e arrival of French skirmishers, though, was an indication
of worse to come and the high command decided to evacuate the
bulk of their forces to Calais and then to England on 3 October.
Whether they were acting on orders is not clear. Paget was assuming
on 30 September that Norfolk and his army would be at Calais by
2 October but on 4 October, Henry admonished all his commanders
for leaving Boulogne without rst knowing his pleasure and on the
following day ordered them to ‘redubbe’ their fault by going back to
Boulogne.
170
It was far too late for this.
Norfolk and Suolk le only a small garrison to man the ruined
walls of Boulogne, about 3,300 men with much of the equipment that
could not be got back to Calais in time. e French army of some
40–50,000 (23 ensigns of French infantry under de Taix, 20,000 Swiss
and Grisons and 4000 Germans commanded by the Rhinegrave) le
Auxi for Hesdin on 20th with Vendôme commanding the vanguard
and the Dauphin the rest. ey were across the Authie by 27th.
171
It
may have been Vendôme’s cautious advice which prevented the army
pressing forward immediately to take advantage of the precipitate English
retreat and this has been attributed to the habitually defensive mentality
168
30 Sept. 1544, L&P, XIX.ii, 334.
169
Courrières and Chapuys to Charles V, 27 Sept. 1544, L&P, XIX, ii, 318.
170
Paget to Cobham, 29 Sept. 1544, BL Harl. 283, fo. 190 (L&P, XIX, ii, 331); Coun-
cil to Council at Boulogne, 4 Oct. 1544, ibid., no. 347; Council to Norfolk et al., NA
SP1/193, fo. 29v (L&P, XIX, ii, 352).
171
Norfolk to Council, 20 Sept. 1544, L&P, XIX, ii, 278; Courrières and Chapuys
to Charles V, 27 Sept. 1544, ibid., no. 318. Heilly to Francis I, 20 Sept. 1544, SAP, Ch.
Heilly, 57, no. 44; Norfolk to Council, 5 Oct. 1544, L&P, XIX, ii, 356. Wallop later
estimated French forces at 60,000 foot, 2000 hommes d’armes and 2000 light horse,
obviously exaggerated (ibid., XIX, ii, 779).
‘
fighting over the bear
’
s skin
’
203
of French commanders at the time.
172
At any rate, the French took the
upper road, skirting the fosse Boulonnaise to Licques by 5 October and
then on to Marquise, where the road from Calais to Boulogne could
be blocked.
173
French troops were encamped at Marquise and Fiennes, as had
Norfolk and Russell early in the summer.
174
e Dauphin, with his
brother Orléans and Admiral d’Annebault had to decide quickly on
strategy. Aer a few hours rest, it was decided to move straight onto
the attack and make a rapid overnight descent on the lower town at
Boulogne (the famous ‘Camisado,’ so named because, as in all night
attacks, the troops wore their white shirts on top of their gear for vis-
ibility). Monluc, who was there, recounted that a man from Boulogne
had come to Fouquesolles, du Biez’ other son-in-law, and told him
that the lower town was defenceless and easily taken. Once seized,
the upper town would be isolated. Monluc and Taix made an early
morning reconnaissance with about a hundred horse and found the
sentries around the artillery between the Tour d’Ordre and the town
very slack. So they reported back to the Dauphin and the decision
was taken to go ahead. Fouquesolles was to command the force with
de Taix in support. e Rhinegrave wanted to be in the attack but
was overruled in favour of San Segondo’s Italians (a decision Monluc
regarded as fatal to the success of the expedition). So, the French force
consisted of Taix’s French infantry (10,000 maximum), an uncertain
number of Italians and 6000 Swiss in support at the Tour d’Ordre.
is was the night of 12/13 October.
e fate of the conict hung in the balance. For England, the alter-
natives were bleak; if the French manoeuvre had succeeded, Henry
would have been massively humiliated and would have wasted pro-
digious amounts for no gain; if the English clung on, the war would
be prolonged. e lower town was still only defended by trenches and
was easily taken; but too little attention had been paid to the English
in the high town. Du Bellay, writing with hindsight, observed that a
force of 10–12 ensigns should have been told o to seal o the upper
172
G. Salles, ‘La Guerre et négociations entre François Ier et Henry VIII du traité
de Crépy au traité d’Ardres,’ Positions des theses de l’Ecole des Chartes, 1893, pp. 65–76
at p. 66.
173
Du Bellay, Mémoires, IV, p. 277.
174
Annebault to Granvelle, camp of Fiennes, 10 Oct. 1544, Nawrocki, ‘Annebault,’
II, pp. 762–763 (L&P, XIX, ii, 405).
204 chapter four
town but this was not done. and, while the French were busy loot-
ing and killing their enemies, 5 or 6 ensigns issued out of the high
town and cut them to pieces, killing Fouquesolles and putting many
to ight. Monluc’s narrative of the encounter is one of the most vivid
he ever wrote, not perhaps to be relied in detail or in terms of mem-
ory but one of the most convincing accounts of confusion in street
battle.
175
Monluc thought that the outcome would have been dier-
ent if the main army had followed up the assault force quickly but
co-ordination was poor.
176
If it was indeed the case that the Dauphin
wanted to advance to save the day, he was advised against it; the rain
and wind washed away what was le of French ardour and supplies
were low. e French army had advanced too rapidly and the nearest
supply base was at Abbeville; the roads were deep in mud and the land
scoured by ghting. No fodder for horses was to be found between
Boulogne and Abbeville let alone food for the men.
177
is was the
turning-point. e impossibility of feeding such an army in a rav-
aged countryside forced the Dauphin to retire to Montreuil (by 21st),
where the mercenaries were discharged and du Biez le in command
to watch to English.
178
Early in November, the King gave the order to
pay o the Swiss and reduce the garrisons to winter quarters, retaining
only 6000 foot.
179
e outcome thus condemned both countries to a
prolonged and even more expensive conict.
175
Du Bellay, IV, p. 278; Monluc, Commentaires (ed. Courteault, Pléiade), pp. 173–
180. His approval of Andelot’s bravery, despite his disapproval of his later Hugueno-
tism is particularly convincing. Elis Gruydd’s accounts is equally vivid (‘Enterprises
of Calais and Boulogne,’ pp. 52–56).
176
Ibid., p. 178.
177
Du Bellay, Mémoires, IV, p. 279.
178
Ibid., pp. 278–279 Commission of Dauphin to Jean Pocques to raise 300 foot for
the defence of places in the Boulonnais, 21 Oct. 1544, A. De Calonne, ‘Jean et Raoul
Pocques, seigneurs d’Alincthun en Bouonnais (1516–1550) d’après des lettres inédites,
Mém. Soc. Antiquaires Picardie, 28 (1885), 514–515; Francis I to du Biez, 15 Oct. 1544,
Potter, Du Biez, no. 196.
179
Francis I to count of San Segondo, 2 Nov. 1544, Pierpoint Morgan Library: ‘Pour
ce que je delibere ne retenir cest yver que six mille hommes de pied en Picardie, scav-
oir est ijm Francois, ijm Italliens et ijm lansquenets, je vous prie à ceste cause reduire
voz benndes Italliennes à deux mille hommes et que pour le moyns il y ayt trois cens
hommes pour enseigne.’ Du Bellay, Mémoires, IV, p. 279 says that du Biez was le
with the French and Italians from Piedmont.
CHAPTER FIVE
AN UNEQUAL CONTEST? ENGLISH MILITARY
ORGANISATION, 1542–1547
It is dicult to avoid the conclusion that Henry VIII shrank from fac-
ing the full might of the French armies in 1544.
1
Francis made sure
Henry knew he had 103,000 men under arms in 1542, though a more
realistic gure is 70,000, and he assembled an army of 45,000 men in
the camp at Jalons in 1544 to resist the Emperor (with perhaps 20,000
on other fronts). He could spend about 1.75 million lt. on his navy and
around 4 million on the land army in 1545 alone.
2
If this represents
around £700,000 sterling, it should be compared with the £426,000
spent on war by Henry over the period September 1544–January
1547, a period over twice as long (see Appendices 7 and 11). is is
perhaps not so great a disparity when we remember that the popula-
tion of England in 1541 has been reliably estimated as 2.77 millions.
at of France, much less certain, probably rose from about 16 to 18
millions in the rst half of the sixteenth century.
3
Both countries had
to ght wars on two fronts, though the commitments of France were
of course greater. e unequal nature of the military resources of the
two countries, so evenly matched in the later middle ages, was spelled
out by Nicolas Bacon in1559 when he remarked that France had at
least four times the resources and manpower of England.
4
e late
medieval English military machine had made up in armament and
organisation for its lack of numbers but this was no longer so telling.
Louis de La Trémoille, faced by a similar invasion threat in Picardy
in 1523, reported that ‘I shall never fear the English and, were it not
1
I have discussed the organisation of French armies in this period in my Renais-
sance France at War, passim but see also P. Contamine (ed.), Histoire militaire de la
France (Paris, 1992), pp. 233–256; G. Dickinson, Fourquevaux’s Instructions sur le
Faict de la Guerre (London, 1954), pp. xxiii–lxxxi; D. Potter, War and Government in
the French Provinces: Picardy, 1470–1560 (Cambridge, 1993), pp. 155–199.
2
Potter, Renaissance France at War, p. 64. See below Appendix 15.
3
E.A. Wrigley and R.S. Schoed, e Population History of England, 1541–1871. A
Reconstruction (Harvard UP, 1981), Table &.8, pp. 209–209. I have tried to summarise
the state of France in my History of France 1460–1560: e Emergence of a Nation
State (London, 1995), pp. 7–11.
4
BL Harl. 253 fo. 87v.
206 chapter five
for the large number of Flemish and Hainault cavalry they have with
them, they could not have endured; they are a poor nation.’
5
e
dependence of the English on their Flemish allies was to be as signi-
cant in 1544. Monluc in his description of the ghting of 1545
remarked that ‘we were all under the illusion passed on by our fathers
that one Englishman was worth two Frenchmen; that an Englishman
never took ight and never surrendered.’ Having experienced them at
close hand at the Camisade of Boulogne, he thought their reputation
for toughness simply stemmed from their need to get up close in bat-
tle because of the nature of their main weapon, the longbow. e
French, now quite used to rearms, would deal with all that.
Elsewhere, Monluc declared that ‘I knew them to be men of poor
spirit and think they are ght better on water than on land.’
6
David Grummitt has argued persuasively that the population of
England was more ready for war under Henry VIII than any time
since the great victories of the 14th century. ere was certainly a
degree of pride and swagger in the way the towns of England tted out
their contingents for war.
7
For the English, wars fought on foreign soil
were not as problematic as for the French, whose King employed so
many foreign mercenaries and whose border territory was so fre-
quently fought over. Some English were apt to purvey the view that,
though they were pricing themselves out of markets by paying them-
selves excessively, the English ‘by the reason of their stronge feadinge
be mouche hardier and stronger in the warres then be the french
Pezantes.’ When Norfolk was rapped over the knuckles by the King for
playing up the numbers of French troops opposing him in 1544, he
was told ‘be they all for the most part Frenchemen and my lord of
Norfolk hath Englishe men with hym.’
8
Yet doubts about the decline
5
La Trémoille to Montmorency, 8 Nov.[1523], BL Egerton 22, fos. 125–126: ‘je
ne craindray jamais les Anglois et n’eust esté le gros nombre de chevaux Flamens
et Henuyers qu’ilz avoient avec eulx le Anglois n’eust point duré et est une pouvre
nation.’
6
Monluc, Commentaires (ed. Courteault), pp. 188, 179: ‘estions tous abusez sur
ce que nous avions ouy de nos predecesseurs, qu’un Anglois battoit tousjours deux
François, et que l’Anglois ne fuioit jamais ny ne se rendoit.’; ‘je les cognus gens de peu
de coeur, et croy qu’ils vallent plus sur l’eau que sur terre.’
7
D. Grummitt, ‘e reputation of the English soldier, 1400–1550’ (forthcoming,
paper delivered at the 2010 Fieenth Century Conference).
8
‘Polices to reduce this realme of Englande vnto a prosperus wealthe and estate’ (1549),
E. Power and R.H. Tawney (eds), Tudor Economic Documents 3 vols (London, 1924),
III, p. 329; Paget to Suolk, 12 July 1544, NA SP1/190 fo. 24v (L&P, XIX, i, 903).
an unequal contest? 207
of population and husbandry were also widespread as an explanation
of military failures. Morison, whose enthusiastic defence of the obliga-
tions of all to serve the King in 1539 have already been noted
(pp. 9–10), recorded the remark of a foreign ambassador that English
warlike action ‘is nothinge so nowe. I se neyther harneyes, ne weapons,
of manhood amonges them, they haue ben of good hartes, coragyouse,
bolde, valiant in marciall feates: But those Englyshe men are deade.’
9
We have to be careful here; the military lore of all European coun-
tries was replete with traditional clichés, such as that the French were
vigorous in attack but quick to give up, that Germans were dogged
on the battle-eld but not so useful in siege warfare. e Swiss not
unlike the English, regarded themselves as worth two Frenchmen.
10
ere was a real consciousness that English military power was not
what it had been but Henry and his advisers were also able to deploy
the machinery of a formidable and growing state in galvanising mili-
tary and naval power that enabled it to take on France seriously. In
earlier decades, Henry and Wolsey had managed the power politics of
the time in such a way as to minimise problems with resources by
maximising the negotiating clout of England between Francis and the
Emperor. e acquisition of nancial resources through the dissolu-
tion of the monasteries helped to sustain a long military eort in the
1540s. But problems remained.
Both in terms of numbers and arms, profound doubts were being
expressed by English commentators in the 1540s. e author of the
Discourse of the Commonweal of 1549 argued that ination, enclo-
sures, population decline le the kingdom militarily weak. Sheep were
eating up men.
11
ose that remained were no longer able to draw a
bow: decay of tillage led to ‘great decay of artillery: for that we do
recken that shepeherdes be but yll artchers’ argued one commentator.
12
Jeremy Goring calculated that the proportion of archers within all able
bodied men in the shire musters dropped from one third to one quar-
ter between 1522 and 1557.
13
is had important implications for the
9
Richard Morison, An Exhortation to styrre all Englyshe men to the defence of
theyr countrye (London, 1539).
10
Potter, Renaissance France at war, pp. 124, 126.
11
A Discourse of the Commonweal of this Realm of England, ed. M. Dewar (Charlot-
tesville, 1969), pp. 36, 89.
12
Certayne causes gathered together, wherin is shewed the decaye of England onely
by the great multytude of shepe (London: Hugh Syngelton, 1552), sig.Bjv.
13
J. Goring, ‘Social change and military decline in mid-Tudor England’ History, 60
208 chapter five
quality of the troops that could be raised, since the rest of those sur-
veyed as ‘billmen’ were eectively without any useful skills, though
oen substantial enough to pay taxes.
14
‘Bills’ were equated with hal-
berds by some; Audley, for instance, thought that they should only be
used around the standards and that otherwise pikes were necessary, as
in German formations.
15
But the demands of war in the period were
also changing. As Gervase Phillips and Bert Hall have shown in dier-
ent ways, the triumph of rearms over archers in the sixteenth century
was neither rapid nor uncomplicated. e cost of a hand-gun remained
greater than that of a longbow (5–8 shillings as opposed to 2 s. for a
bow); archers had a far longer range and accuracy and could still re
more rapidly than arquebusiers (one arquebus shot per 40 seconds
against 6 arrow shots). On the other hand, the penetrative power of
arrows was less than that of guns at short distance and the cost of the
best imported yew bows was increasing. Perhaps most telling, though,
was the dominance of positional warfare in the 1540s; the construction
of trace italienne fortresses and fortied encampments with revet-
ments. ese were much more suitable theatres for the deployment of
hand-gunners than for bowmen, who needed to stand up to shoot.
16
At Landrecies in 1543, with the French ensconced in the marshes out-
side the town, du Roeulx sent forward 200 English archers, who ‘shot
right honestly against as many as appered owt of the shedgges of the
(1975), 184–197, at p. 193. idem., ‘e general proscription of 1522,’ EHR, 86 (1971),
681–705 at pp. 694–695.
14
As an example, Herefordshire, Hundred of Wormelow: of the 8 ‘billmen’ listed
with harness at the villages of Much and Little Birch in Herefordshire in 1542, most
had jacks, saletts and just a ‘sta.’ Some had a pair of ‘splyntes,’ arm protectors. ere
were no archers. (NA E36/16, fo. 36v). ese parishes had 15 taxpayers between them
in 1546, 6 of whom were listed as ‘able bodied’ in 1542. In the 1547 survey of ‘house-
lings’ there were 40 communicants at Little Birch. At Goodrich (E36/16, fo. 40v),
there were 30 billmen and 5 archers in 1542 only 6 of whom are listed among the
24 taxpayers in 1547, when the survey of houselings reported 165 communicants
(M.A. Farady, Herefordshire Taxes in the Reign of Henry VIII (Woolhope Club, 2005),
pp. 218, 252, 348, 393, 397).
15
omas Audley, ‘Order for the warres,’ BL Harl. 309, fos. 6v–7r.
16
G. Phillips, ‘Weapons technology and technology transfer in early modern Eng-
land,’ Technology and culture, 40, iii (1999), 576–593. B.S. Hall, Weapons and Warfare
in Renaissance Europe (Baltimore, 1997) In 1545, yew was being sought in Ireland
(see payments to Wm. Hatcher, Ric. Morris and John Collye, ‘for their charges and
transportation into Ireland for the putting in order of certain yew for munition,’ £40
L&P, XXI, i, 643.v). For useful points on armaments in general, see O. Chaline, ‘Faire
la guerre au temps de la Renaissance’ in La Renaissance des années 1470 aux années
1560 (Paris, 2002), pp. 262–276.
an unequal contest? 209
marrys but doing small hurt’ while the French gunre ‘ew abowt so
freely amongst us and lyke to doe moche hurt.’
17
e decline in demand
for archers, then, had a profound eect on the processes of recruit-
ment of English armies. Foreign mercenaries supplied much of the
re-power in 1543–1546, though still mixed with archers in a support
role. omas Audley, writing in 1546–1547, was clear that the
Germans had the secret of infantry warfare: no excessive over-reli-
ance on ‘shot’ (either bows or arquebus), separation of pike and shot
‘for the mo that you do apoynte for shotte the weaker is the body of
the battell when it shall cum to pushe or ght.’
18
Command and Control
One of the clearest features of the English command system in the
later years of Henry VIII is the gradual displacement of the military
heavyweights of the earlier reign, the Dukes of Norfolk and Suolk, by
younger men. is is only to be expected. Just as the King aged, so did
his generals. Norfolk, threatened with appointment as Warden of the
Marches in 1542, wrote despairingly that he was too old to cope with
the cold winter weather in the North.
19
Suolk served as the King’s
lieutenant on the northern border from January 1543 to March 1544,
taking over aer Norfolk’s less than brilliant showing but in the aer-
math of the fortunate victory of Solway Moss. He too was in declining
health and Henry chose not to put him in command of the invasion
of Scotland for which he had been planning. But he continued to be a
reliable commander and indeed distinguished himself by his energy
(as well, it must be added, a degree of good fortune) in 1544.
20
In the last years of his reign, whenever serious problems copped up,
the King called on the men who had emerged from the struggles for
inuence in the late 1530s and early 1540s as courtiers with some mil-
itary competence. While Norfolk hardly shone as commander against
Scotland, Edward Seymour, Earl of Hertford took command of the
vanguard in Norfolk’s army on the death of William Fitzwilliam, Earl
17
Eure to Fisher/Hertford, Sept. 1542, Longleat MSS, SE/IV, fo. 84v.
18
omas Audley, ‘Order for the warres,’ BL Harl. 309, fo. 6v. On this see also, J.
Davies, omas Audley and the Tudor ‘Arte of Warre’ (2002).
19
Norfolk to Gardiner and Wriothesley, 12 Oct. 1542, Hamilton Papers, I, pp. 264–265.
20
S. Gunn, Charles Brandon, Duke of Suolk, 1484–1545 (Oxford, 1988), pp. 183–193.