Potter David. Henry VIII and Francis I

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210 chapter five

of Southampton in October 1542 and eventually replaced Suolk as

commander in the north. e death of Southampton, experienced in

the wars of the early 1520s as captain of Guînes, and then a prominent

courtier, was deeply felt by Norfolk and his colleagues. While he

thought Anthony Browne, Master of the Horse, ‘shall prove a man of

service,’ he was preoccupied with the cavalry. Norfolk suggested the

Lord Admiral, Russell, as ‘most mete.’ Southampton would have com-

manded 4000 infantry, mostly from the south, ‘his frendes in dyvers

parties and also the Duchie of Lancashire’ who would have followed

Russell willingly since ‘every man knoweth how gret frendes they wer.’

Otherwise, he thought Hertford would be willing to serve and ‘of good

estymacion being the princes uncle, and also hath be in the warrys

beyond the se both with me and my lord of Suolk. He is my nere

kynsman and shuld be very welcome to me.’

Few military appoint-

ments are better illustrated in terms of their assumptions. At rst,

Hertford was in a dicult position, with no background in northern

border warfare. Henry was obviously concerned with the loyalty of

Southampton’s personal following and wrote on 16 October, that:

to thintent suche as were in the retynue of the said lord privy seale shuld

doo their partes with the better will and courage, we have also sent with

our said cousin our trusty etc. Sir John Gage knight, comptroller etc. to

be also in the vauntgard undre our said cousin of Hertford being a dere

freende and allyance to the said lord privy seale whom we have also

determyned to preferre to the rome of the chauncellorship of the duchie

if God shuld dispose his will of our cousin of Southampton that aswel

the household servantes and famyliers of the said lord privy seale as the

tenantes of our duchie may be the better directid and serve us the more

gladly.

Gage, a courtier and logistics expert who could be described as a ‘safe

pair hands,’ was close friend to Southampton and father-in-law

to Anthony Browne, who had gone north with his half-brother

Southampton; he welcomed Gage at Berwick.

Gage himself pointed

out Hertford’s problems as lord Warden in his lack of ‘alliance’ with

the local nobility and gentry, so the problem was a real one.

Norfolk to Council, 13 Oct. 1542, Hamilton Papers, I, no. 210, p. 267.

Henry VIII to Norfolk and others, 16 Oct. 1542, BL Add 32648 fo. 65, Hamilton

Papers, I, p. 272 (L&P, XVII, 953).

Browne to Gage, Berwick, 19 Oct. [1542], BL Add. 32648, fo. 82 (L&P, XVII, 970).

Gage to Wriothesley, 22 Oct. 1542 (L&P, XVII, 976) Hertford himself reported

that his colleagues Norfolk, Gage and Browne considered Cumberland much ‘meeter’

an unequal contest? 211

Hertford quickly emerged as a very able military commander in the

north, who could envisage a form of economic warfare against the

Scots, enforced by a strictly organised blockade of the Firth of Forth.

But he was also a general of vision, who took the view that the

Scottish problem could only be solved by an eective control of the

Lowlands through English strongholds (see chapter 2). At the same

time, Russell took over Southampton’s post as Lord Privy Seal and

John Dudley, Viscount Lisle succeeded Russell as Lord Admiral.

Suolk, on the eve of the invasion of Scotland he had in part planned,

was recalled for the French campaign and replaced by Hertford as

King’s Lieutenant in the North. Hertford’s ingratiating letter to the

duke apologising for his lack of experience and asking him to ‘redubbe

with your goode worde’ any disapproval at court of his actions is a

classic of the genre.

Hertford had wished in this letter that he might

be with Suolk in France, ‘where most service is to be doon.’ He was,

in fact, recalled and replaced as Lieutenant-general in the North by

Shrewsbury on 10 June 1544. But initially this was to attend the Privy

Council (late June) and he remained with the Queen’s Council aer

Henry’s departure on campaign. His expertise was too valuable for

him to be le at home, however, and by the end of August he was with

the King in the siege camp at Boulogne.

When a rm grip was needed

at Boulogne in the early months of 1546, it was to Hertford that Henry

turned. Similarly, when the post of Lord Admiral was given to Lisle in

January 1543 a new era opened in which the lord Admiral actually

commanded the eet. Between them, Hertford and Lisle virtually ran

the war in 1545.

Norfolk, just short of 70, actually did command an army in the war

of 1544, though he must still have found the weather trying enough in

for the post in view of his ‘lands, kindred and alliance.’ Parr, Lisle and Dacre were

also better qualied. Hertford to the Council, 29 Oct. 1542, L&P, XVII, 1002; same

to same, 30 Oct. 1542, HMC, Manuscripts of the Marquess of Bath, IV, p. 29. See also

B.L. Beer, Northumberland: e Political Career of John Dudley, Earl of Warwick and

Duke of Northumberland (Kent State UP, 1973), p. 14.

‘A Remembraunce to my lorde warden for annoyance of Scotland by our navie over

the sea,’ Longleat MSS, SE/III/46, fos. 140–141 (HMC Bath MSS, IV, pp. 56–57).

D. Loades, John Dudley, Duke of Northumberland, 1504–1553 (Oxford, 1996).

Hertford was appointed very briey as Admiral in December 1542 but Henry changed

his mind in January 1543.

Hertford to Suolk, 19 April 1544, Longleat House, SE/IV/no. 1, fo. 1 (HMC Bath

MSS, IV, pp. 103–104).

L&P, XIX, i, 656, 670, XIX, ii, 174.

212 chapter five

that atrocious summer. e army royal of 1544, as was traditional, was

divided into three corps, the Vaward (Vanguard), middle ward (or

Battle) and the Rearward (Rearguard). French armies were divided in

exactly the same way. Norfolk received his appointment as Lieutenant-

general of the whole army of the Vanguard and Rearguard and chief

captain of the Rearguard on 6 June.

is coincided with the recall of

Hertford from the northern frontier and the appointment of Shrewsbury

as Lieutenant-general in the north.

On 10 June, John, Lord Russell,

rather younger than Norfolk at 60 but still no spring chicken, was

appointed chief captain of the Vanguard and thus co-commander with

Norfolk in the rst corps of the army. Problems, though, were bound

to arise from the fact that no mention of the terms of his subordina-

tion to Norfolk was made in his commission. e decision had been

taken by 4 May, when Chapuys reported that Norfolk would cross the

Channel around 20/25 May and move out from Calais to make room

for the Rearguard.

ere is, though, some uncertainty about whether

Norfolk or Russell was deemed to be in command of the Vanguard.

Suolk’s appointment was only nalised on 3 July. Like his master, he

seems to have had one last burst of energy before age and illness over-

whelmed him.

Each corps of the army had its own sta, including an under-treasurer

to make payments to the troops and suppliers. ese were Richard

Southwell for the Battle, Robert Dormer for the Rearguard and John

Harrington for the Vanguard.

Dormer’s account gives a good picture

His commission is printed in Rymer, Foedera, 2nd ed. XV, p. 40, 3rd ed. VI,

p. 115 and, though undated, is placed by Rymer in July. is cannot be right as Nor-

folk had been in post for a month by that time. Suolk’s commission was made out in

terms identical to that of Russell but was dated 3 July. Shrewsbury’s appointment was

made on 10 June. e exact dates are recorded in a note by Cecil, L&P, XIX, i, 888.

Henry VIII to Hertford, 10 June 1544 L&P, XIX, i, 656; Council to Hertford,

11 June 1544 L&P, XIX, i, 670.

Chapuys to Mary of Hungary, 4 may 1544, L&P, XIX, i, 462.

In correspondence with the Council, although it is clear that he is the King’s

Lieutenant-general, Norfolk is sometimes called ‘captain of the vantguard’ (BL Harl.

6989 fo. 119 while at others Russell is ‘captain of the voward’ (ibid., fo. 128v). Gruydd

said that even he ‘could not get any certain knowledge of the matter.’ (‘Enterprises of

Paris and Boulogne,’ p. 11).

L&P, XIX, i, 610 (appointment 21 May 1544). Sir Robert Bowes is named for the

Rearguard in this document but the account of Sir Robert Dormer (BL Add. 35206,

L&P, XIX, ii, 552) makes it quite clear that he was vice-treasurer of the Rearguard

throughout and had been appointed on 4 May 1544. BL Add. 5273 is a collection of

warrants addressed mainly to Southwell.

an unequal contest? 213

of a bureaucrat in the midst of war, making himself comfortable in

the camp, with four canvas tents, lace for the windows, buckram,

candlesticks, furniture, canvas bags for cash and a board of green-

cloth, as well as servants and 6 clerks and, of course plenty of ink and

paper.

e vice-treasurers in turn were responsible to Sir Richard

Rich as High Treasurer of the Wars for the invasion of France in

conjunction with Wriothesley.

Rich’s tenure of this position was

controversial; almost inevitably, by the end of the campaign the King

was dissatised with his performance, shadowed as he was by accusa-

tions of corruption. Rich was eectively empowered to make pay-

ments on bills signed by the Council committee for war provisioning,

by the under-treasurers of the army corps and by the Master of the

Ordnance and could scarcely satisfy them all. John Mason was

appointed Master of the Posts while the King was on campaign and

had to ensure rapid communications with London.

e commanders of the two main army corps were each assisted by

a sta of advisers. Suolk’s army (the Battle), with the King present,

naturally had a war council, including Anthony Browne as Master of

the Horse, Arundel, Sir John Gage (provisioning) and omas Seymour

as Master of the Ordnance. As Stephen Gunn has pointed out, Suolk

was surrounded by his friends and allies.

Naturally, the royal house-

hold also played a major part in the leaderships of the Battle; Sir

Richard Cromwell was Master of the camp in the King’s army.

e

Norfolk-Russell corps also had masters of the ordnance in the persons

of Arthur Darcy, Richard Caundyshe and Henry Johnson.

Norfolk,

too, was advised by his close relatives and friends: his son Surrey, his

brother Lord William Howard, omas Cheyney (Lord Treasurer of

the Household as well as Lord Warden), John Wallop and Francis

Bryan. But having to co-operate with Russell made his command

much more acrimonious than Suolk’s.

BL Add. 35206. £580.18.0d. was spent in this way (including Dormer’s salary,

of course).

Appointment, 21 May 1544, L&P, XIX, i, 610.1. omas Wriothesley also acted

as High Treasurer of the Wars: Jan. 1544 (L&P, XIX, i, 368) April 1545 (XX, i, 557).

L&P, XIX, i, 835 (fo. 89). e post was quite fast. A letter leaving Whitehall at

7 p.m. on 26 June was with Norfolk at Alquines on 28th (L&P, XIX, i, 781).

S. Gunn, Charles Brandon, Duke of Suolk, p. 192. Seymour was appointed Mas-

ter of the Ordnance in succession to Browne in April 1544 (L&P, XIX, i, 442 (23)).

L&P, XIX, i, 835 (fo. 57).

L&P, XIX, i, 784.

214 chapter five

Recruitment and Organisation

Jeremy Goring argued that the English army, in terms of recruitment

and military obligations, stood at a crossroads in the mid-Tudor years.

It retained many ‘semi-feudal’ characteristics, which meant that the

crown continued to rely heavily on raising troops through the nobility

and gentry, who in turn were obliged to raise able-bodied men among

their tenants and household servants. ere are many signs of this ad

hoc system persisting in the 1540s but Goring draws attention to the

fact that the great nobility were no longer so dominant in the eld and

that the crown had to rely on a much greater number of lesser gentry,

whose resources and capacity to raise men were dicult for the crown

to ascertain.

In France, the great and middle nobility played their

part in recruiting their retinues into the companies of gendarmerie. As

for infantry, though, the crown retained much stronger control of

recruitment and administration by commissioners sent into the par-

ishes, for the francs archers, later the gendarmerie and the new bands

of infantry.

One further element of this quasi-feudal regime needs to be brought

in, though. David Starkey has shown how the retinues of the Gentlemen

of the Privy Chamber ‘formed a small army-within-an-army’ for the

Boulogne expedition of 1544 and argues that generally the Privy

Chamber ‘was crucial to the Tudors’ military power.’ David Grummitt

has also underlined the importance of the court in the mobilisation of

noble military power.

e pattern was already well established. In

both the Flanders expeditionary force of 1543 and the army of Scotland

in the Spring of 1544, the royal household was well represented;

omas Cheyney, Treasurer of the Household was due to lead the

expedition of 1543, though replaced, and omas Seymour (of the

Privy Chamber) was Wallop’s deputy as marshal of the camp. Captains

included members of the Privy Chamber with interests in: Essex

J. Goring, ‘e Military Obligations of the English People, 1511–1558’ (London,

Ph.D. thesis, 1965), pp. 112–137.

Potter, Renaissance France at War pp. 117–119. For a vivid example see Hertford’s

report, 16 Feb. 1541, Longleat, SE/I/no. 13 fo. 182 (HMC Bath MSS, IV, p. 23).

D. Starkey, ‘Intimacy and Innovation: the rise of the Privy Chamber 1485–1547’

in Starkey et al., e English Court from the Wars of the Roses to the English Civil War,

(1990), p. 90. D. Grummit, ‘e court, war and noble power in England, c. 1475–1558’

in e Court as a Stage: England and the Low Countries in the Later Middle Ages, ed.

S. Gunn and A. Janse (Woodbridge, 2006), pp. 145–155.

an unequal contest? 215

(omas Darcy), Huntingdon (Richard Cromwell), London (Peter

Mewtas), and Berkshire (John Wellesbourne), all scheduled to lead

companies from their own counties as well as their own retinues (see

Appendix 1). e expedition to Scotland included retinues led by John

Cary (Essex) and John Jenyns (Sussex), grooms of the Privy Chamber.

Mewtas, of French extraction and son of a secretary of the French

tongue to Henry VII and Henry VIII, proved a particularly able leader

of infantry as well as something of a cloak-an-dagger operator.

So,

however unsatisfactory it was, the quasi feudal system continued.

In addition, a new dimension in assessment and recruitment was

becoming important: what Goring called a ‘national’ system which

built upon the centuries-old obligation of all those with £10 in land or

20 marks in goods to keep arms in readiness to serve the King. is

underwent a revival from the ‘General Proscription’ of 1522 and the

appointment of JPs and others as muster commissioners from 1535

onwards to take three-yearly musters in order to discover the numbers

of able men and arms in every hundred.

e problem here was that

the musters revealed, rather as with the attempts to reinvigorate the

franc-archers in France from 1521,

a very patchy resource in terms of

military potential, archery oen in decline and both harness and arms

in short supply, this at a time when, as will be evident, demands for

manpower were being made on an unprecedented scale. What the

immensely ambitious enquiry of 1522 did was to inform the crown

of some of the military and nancial resources of its subjects. In the

28 counties for which returns survive, Henry VIII could have learned

that there were 128,250 able men available. As yet, the full range of

readiness might not be clear, since the returns did not connect the

able-bodied with the armour available, but in 1523, there is some sign

that assignation of arms and harness to able-bodied men was becom-

ing more systematic.

At the same time, the enquiry reinforced the

eectiveness of the semi-feudal system by making it possible for the

crown to ascertain the numbers of tenants of landowners and therefore

NA SP1/183, fos. 107–110 (L&P, XIX, i, 135.ii)

Mewtas’ father, John, counter-signed many of the royal letters sent to foreign

rulers in the earlier 16th century. He is described as a ‘Pickarde or Frenchman’ in the

account of the Evil May-Day riots in Stowe’s Annales (J.G. Nicholls (ed.), Chronicle of

the Grey Friars of London (London, Camden Society, 1852), p. 99).

J. Goring. ‘e general proscription of 1522’ and idem., ‘Military obligations,’ 20–39.

Potter, Renaissance France at War, pp. 102–112.

Goring, ‘General Proscription,’ 697–698.

216 chapter five

of their capacity to ‘make’ men, though some of the information was

necessarily out of date and information below the level of the greater

landowners may have been sketchy.

When men were formed into

companies and shipped, they were placed under captains and petty

captains in companies of roughly 100. While some were leaders of

their own tenants, others were appointed by patrons. omas Audley,

who famously remarked that it was ‘a grievous pain to set to battle

with untrained men’ acidly commented that captains should be men

of strength ‘and not to chose them as captains be chosen in England

by favor.’

ere were indeed English captains who were incompetent

and amateurish but, as Luke MacMahon has shown, there was also a

solid core on commanders who had served in many campaigns.

e most important permanent body of troops outside the royal

household was the ‘retinue’ (oen called the ‘old crew’) or garrison of

Calais. In 1541, the population of the town was numbered as just over

4000, of whom 1,785 were accounted for by the garrison.

Calais was

therefore a highly militarised town. As David Grummitt has shown

most of the additions to the garrison aer 1539 were provided by tra-

ditional ‘quasi-feudal’ methods. While commissions of array were sent

to the localities and royal servants assembled their military followings

as usual,

additional soldiers were largely provided by the ‘service

nobility’ or by the members of the Privy Chamber, giving a greater

role to courtiers than established regional magnates or gentry families.

King’s trusted courtiers played a central role. When Norfolk was sent

to the Scottish border as King’s lieutenant in 1542, he was ordered to

Goring, ‘Military Obligations,’ pp. 113–114 and appendix III.

omas Audley, ‘Book of Orders for the warre . . . at the command of Kinge

Henry the viij’ BL Harl. 309, fo. 8r. J.R. Hale, War and Society in Renaissance Europe

1450–1620 (London, 1985), pp. 165–167.

L. MacMahon, ‘Military Professionalism in the early Tudor armies in Renais-

sance Europe: a reassessment’ in D.J. Trim (ed.), e Chivalric Ethos and the Develop-

ment of Military Professionalism (Leiden, 2003), pp. 187–190.

Longleat House, SE/I/16, fo. 203 (HMC Bath MSS, IV, p. 27). e purpose of

this census was for the enumeration of rations needed by the town’s population for

six months. Lisle had enumerated 3858 in 1538 of whom 848 were English born, the

rest born in Calais or strangers (Longleat House, SE/I/10, fo. 89 (HMC Bath MSS,

IV, p. 12).

D. Grummitt, ‘Calais, 1485–1547: a Study in Early Tudor Politics and Govern-

ment’ (Ph.D., London, 1997), pp. 158–159.

In December 1545 the Council register notes the origin and number of reinforce-

ments: ‘For the Pale at Calays: Bucks’ CCCC; Cambridge CCC; Northampton CCC;

Beds’ CCC; Huntingdon C; Warwyk CC; Hertford CC; Middlesex CC’ (APC, I, 572).

an unequal contest? 217

take with him certain gentleman from Suolk ‘with all such hable

men as they canne make of their oune servants tenantes or in their

romes and oces’ and to ‘levye and take out of our said country . . . all

your oune tenantes and others within your romes and oces there,

and such other as youe shall think mete.’

is certainly provided the men but it was up to commanders to

ensure they were equipped properly. Norfolk reported in September

1542 that many of the gentlemen he had brought with him from East

Anglia were complaining that the cost of corselets (‘Almain rivets’) in

the region was prohibitive at 20s. the rivet and asked for a maximum

to be proclaimed as in London.

us, in July 1542 the Council

informed Wallop, as Lieutenant of Guînes, that, as well as the 200 men

of Sir omas Poynings’s retinue already sent, another 500 men were

to be sent to Calais, raised by various nobles and members of the Privy

Chamber. Norfolk, Lord Chancellor Audley and the Earl of Oxford

contributed 100 each, as did Richard Rich, Chancellor of Augmentations.

Sir Richard Long, a Gentleman of the Privy Chamber contributed

another 100 and Wallop commented that for the most part they were

‘all right tawle men in very good ordre, warlike appointed and many

good archers.’ ose sent on to Guînes were not so satisfactory. e

200 sent with Poyninges were in good order but ‘the most parte of

them cam without swords in white cotes homely trymed’ though ‘those

sent from Master Longe . . . be tawle men [always an important feature

for Wallop] and right warlike trymed, yet lacking swords the more

part of them.’ e bishop of Ely had authorised his captain to follow

Wallop’s instructions in upgrading his contingent, which included not

only swords but cloth to make them surcoats in appropriate colours.

ese methods of recruitment are present in every army raised by

the English state between 1542 and 1546. To show how they inter-

acted, we shall consider a number of key armies assembled during this

period in terms of recruitment and organisation: Wallop’s Flanders

army of 1543, Hertford and Lisle’s amphibious operation of 1544, the

Boulogne army of 1544 and Hertford’s army of early 1546. All have

much in common, though it should be obvious that the assembly of

the Army Royal of 1544 was on a much grander scale than the others.

Henry VIII to Norfolk, 28 Aug. 1542, Hamilton papers, I, no. 129, pp. 159–160.

Norfolk to Council, 2 Sept. 1542, Hamilton Papers, I, no. 144, p. 172.

Council to Wallop, 31 July 1542, SP 1/172, fos. 4–5 (L&P, XVII, 552); Wallop to

Council, 26 Aug. 1542, ibid., fo. 129r–v (L&P, XVII, 683).

218 chapter five

The Flanders Campaign

e army for the ‘Flanders’ campaign was a relatively small one for the

period but it was the rst expedition to the mainland of Europe by an

English army for twenty years. Its planning went through several stages

in the early summer of 1543. As we saw in chapter 3, decisions about

leadership were changed at a late stage; Sir omas Cheyney, Treasurer

of the Household and Warden of the Cinq ports, was set aside under

Imperial pressure because he was too cautious. Sir John Wallop was

known and liked by Imperial commanders. He was in a good posi-

tion, as we have seen, to assemble men and advise on eectiveness

since he had been Lieutenant of Guînes since the end of his stint as

ambassador to France. A uent French speaker, he was all the more

able to liaise with his Imperial counterpart, du Roeulx. e army was

scheduled to consist of 5000 men, mostly infantry with a small (400)

component of cavalry. In the rst stage of planning, half the infantry

and almost all the cavalry were to be raised by selected gentlemen who

were either courtiers, royal pensioners (the two Carewes, Breane,

Keleway, Blunt, Granado, Markham, Knowles and Pollard) or trusted

gentleman of military reputation. At a later stage these were re-grouped

and the cavalry provided by gentlemen from the Scottish border

(Bowes, Ellerker and Dacres), known as the ‘northern horsemen.’

ese were eectively light horse, a formation highly praised by

omas Audley.

In addition to this component of personal followings of selected

gentlemen (2000), there were levies from the landowners of the shires

of south-east England, many of them assembling at Malden, amount-

ing to 2000 foot, bulked out by 100 London men, 200 (possibly arque-

busiers) under Peter Mewtas of the Privy Chamber and 100 labourers

from Guînes (see Appendix 2). At a later stage, these followings were

re-grouped, mostly under the rst list of trusted captains, whose

companies (ranging between 100 and 200) included their own follow-

ings plus levies from (usually) one county. In a few cases, one captain

seems to have had command of more than one company. us there

were 17 companies amounting to 2026 men.

is, of course, now

ere are 13 separate texts, some copies of each other, some with signicant

emendations: NA SP1/180, fos. 1–38 (L&P, XVIII, i, 832 nos. 1–13).

Order for the warres, BL Harl. 309, fo. 9r.

NA SP1/180, fos. 30–36 (L&P, XVIII, i, 832.12).

an unequal contest? 219

only produced half the necessary numbers. e disparity is partly

explained by Wallop’s decisions once he had taken command. In a

planning document of about this time the Calais garrison was listed

as 4000 men, 3330 of them ‘hable men.’ With the 1500 ‘sent over

lately,’ this made 5500. 2000 were selected to garrison Calais, Guînes

and Hammes (800 of the garrison, the rest labourers). is provided

3500 for the expeditionary force with a further 1900 to be sent out.

ese arrangements were conrmed when at the end of June 1543,

Wallop reported that the 1500 men had already been sent out but he

would leave 3–400 of them at Calais and take the same number from

‘tholde crewes,’ the Calais garrison, ‘for they be expert men wel in

ordre and can right well carry theire weapons and of thother many

be yet unmete for the same.’ ose he considered would pass muster

were Cheyney’s company, both horse and foot, Cobham’s and

Mewtas’ 200 (all described with his usual approval as ‘tawle men.’) Of

the rest, most ‘woll passe honestlye saving onely iij or iiij C whiche

be right hable and sucient men to tarry at home and kepe the gar-

risons and frontiers being as yet not do mete to be ledde into a

strange cuntrye as tholde crewes.’ He also asked for 21 of his own

servants at Guînes castle to go as his halberdiers, or personal guard,

at his own cost. Some of the 300 labourers from Guînes had been

training to shoot ‘half hakes’ by John ap Richards, ‘a very warlike

person’ and he suggested some northern horsemen for Guînes for

scouting (‘skult’). Other outstanding items were the provision of wag-

ons for transport of war materiel and the despatch of beer from

Calais as Flemish beer was ‘very evill.’

Artillery was decided on before Wallop took over. 150 draught

horses would be needed for the transport of 2 culverins and 120 iron

shot; 4 sakers, 200 iron shot; 6 falcons, 240 iron shot; 6 falconets, 80 shot,

all pieces to be taken from Calais. 58 gunners and two master gunners

would take charge of them. e army also needed to take, in about

60 waggons, a whole range of equipment: 800 barrels of powder,

3000 bows in 40 chests, 5 barrels of bowstrings, archers’ stakes, 100 chests

of arrows, bills and morice pikes from the Tower plus a vast range of

tools. No mention is made of arquebuses or equipment for them.

NA SP1/180, fos. 25–28 (L&P, XVIII, i, 832.9), gures are several times re-arranged.

Wallop to the Council, 28 June 1543, NA SP1/179, fos. 116–117 (L&P, XVIII,

i, 786).

NA SP1/180, fos. 24, 34–36 (L&P, XVIII, i, 832).