Potter David. Henry VIII and Francis I
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150 chapter three
battery, on 28 October. Henry had already specied that Wallop
should, in any engagement, ‘have the Spanyardes as nere your men
as may be.’ e advance of the French army was classic instance of
sixteenth-century strategy and in this case enabled Francis to reverse
the roles of Pavia in 1525. So Charles V dared not continue the siege
and withdrew all the troops in the trenches into a fortied camp in
order to face down Francis. is meant, as Wallop clearly saw, that
Francis had gained his objective. Landrecies would be re-supplied and
‘the glory thereof will tourne to the frenche king and what tother par-
tie shall receave I will not take uppon me to wryte.’
135
e Emperor
issued his challenge to battle and began to advance on the extremely
well-fortied French position. e French had indeed run provisions
into Landrecies and, despite his challenge and the hotting up of skir-
mishing, the alternatives were unpalatable to the allies. Wallop was
present at the Imperial war council that debated these on the 3rd. An
assault on the French camp or laying siege to it were both discounted.
As for the third option – withdrawal – it was decided that Charles
might do this with honour as he had oered battle but that he should
march along the ank of the French camp to Solesmes and stay there a
couple of days.
136
As it was, in the night of 4–5 November, the French
army decamped in silence towards its own territory, executing one
of the most dangerous manoeuvres in warfare
137
– retreat in sight of
the enemy. e Emperor pursued in vain through the forest south of
Cateau-Cambrésis, though some stragglers and baggage were caught.
ere were losses and casualties among the English, including Sir
George Carew, reported as dead but actually captured.
138
Both sides
could make propaganda claims. François de Bourbon reported that
the French retreat was ‘as ne and without loss of men or baggage
as has been seen for a long time . . . Never were two armies so close
without ghting or loss of men.’ ere was certainly some mockery of
135
Wallop to Henry VIII, 29 Oct. 1543, NA SP1/182, fo. 44r (L&P, XVIII, ii, 321);
Paget to Wallop, 16 Oct. 1543, NA SP1/182 fo. 20r (L&P, XVIII, ii, 280).
136
Wallop to Henry VIII, 6 Nov. 1543, St.P., IX, 538 (L&P, XVIII, ii, 345).
137
Monluc told Piero Strozzi at Siena in 1554, that such a ne retreat in the face of
the enemy as had been accomplished by Francis at Landrecies was honorable ‘car tant
de vaillans capitaines s’estoient perdus en faisant la retraicte à la teste de l’ennemy.’
Blaise de Monluc, Commentaires et Lettres ed, A. de Ruble, 5 vols. (Paris, 1864–1872),
II, pp. 34–35).
138
See Trial of du Biez, BnF, Dupuy474, fo. 44v: ‘Mr Carew Anglois fut prins à
Landrecy et mené à Boulongne où il attendit v ou vij jours sa rancon et cependant
visita aussi la muraille et rempars et regarda les montaignes qui dominoient.’
england and the wars in flanders, 1542–1543 151
the French for slinking away in the night. To Wallop’s taunt that the
Emperor would have wished the day longer and that he would have
chased the French further, du Biez replied that Wallop would have
regretted a longer day. Francis had done what he had intended; ‘We
have been ve days within the Empire well camped near you and the
King doing what he intended . . . he withdrew in sight of your camp
without loss.’ Wallop noted that he said nothing about leaving dur-
ing the night.
139
Spinning was already the rage; a medal was issued in
France showing Francis and accoutrements of war, crowned with a
laurel wreath and the inscription VIRTUTI REGIS INVICTISSIMI.
140
e fact was, though, that the Imperial side, by changing its objec-
tives, had achieved nothing at Landrecies. at town had become a
powerful fortress that could threaten Hainault. e one consolation
for the Emperor was that he had ended the year’s campaigning in
a position much improved on that in which he had begun (Cleves
and Guelders conquered and most of the Netherlands secured). On
10 November, the Emperor informed Wallop that he was dissolving
his army because of the bad weather and the withdrawal of the French.
e next day at Crèvecoeur they took leave. For Wallop, the outcome
mixed ‘some sweete some sower fortune de la guerre.’
141
e campaigning season ended in the usual way. Wallop brought
his little army back to Calais with diculty, though rapidly, along the
muddy roads of Artois, reaching Douai by 14 November and trying
to get as much of the artillery and supplies back to Calais before the
roads became impassable. In the end it was decided to leave much
of the artillery securely at Douai over the winter but most of the
army was at Calais by 19th and Wallop himself by 22nd. At least, the
139
Claude Chappuys, L’Aigle qui a faict la poulle devant le Coq à Landrecy (Lyon:
chez le Prince, 1543). Estouteville to Matignon, (Nov. 1543, Correspondance de Mati-
gnon, no. CXL, p. 91: ‘aussi belle et sans perte de noz gens ny bagaige qu’on feist long
temps a . . . L’on ne veist jamais deux armées si prez l’un de l’autre sans combatre ou
perte de gens.’; Potter, Du Biez, p. 191: ‘Nous avons esté cinque jours dedans le pays
de l’Empire et logez bien pres de vous et aiant faict le Roy ce qu’il desiroit . . . il s’est
retiré sans riens perdre à la veue de vostre camp.’; Wallop and Bryan to Paget, 10 Nov.
1543, St.P., IX, 543 (L&P, XVIII, ii, 365).
140
BnF, médailles, série royale, 81: no date (1538–1544) designed by Matteo del
Nassaro. Ob: FRANCISCVS PRIMVS FR INVICTISSIMVS, King’s bust in armour
facing le; rev: King enthroned crowned by victory and warrior and inscription as
above VIRTUTI REGIS INVICTISSIMI 32.8g and 44.7mm (A. Armand, Les médail-
leurs italiens des quinzième et seizième siècles, 3 vols. (Paris, 1883), II, 188/2).
141
Wallop and Bryan to Paget, 10 Nov. 1543, St.P., IX, 543 (L&P, XVIII, ii, 365);
Wallop to Paget, 6 Nov. 1543, NA SP1/182, fo. 70r (L&P, XVIII, ii, 346).
152 chapter three
commanders had the consolation of banquets and good cheer in the
towns through which the passed.
142
In France, Vendôme was ordered
by the King to ensure that Landrecies was well supplied for the win-
ter. Some problems arose over winter quarters for the light horse and
gendarmerie but du Biez, in conference with Vendôme, advised their
stationing in places north of Abbeville, so as to cover the necessary
revictualling of Hesdin, érouanne and Ardres during the winter.
143
is was a manoeuvre that Wallop, ever indefatigable, was already
hoping to frustrate.
144
e campaign had shown clearly what Henry
VIII (and some contemporary observers) would have understood: that
waging war as the inferior adjunct of a great ally can be both futile
and dangerous. Little solid had been achieved other than to distract
French attention from England and, as Wallop rightly understood, to
give English troops their baptism of re in great power warfare.
142
Wallop to Council, Douai, 14 Nov., Calais, 25 Nov. 1543, L&P, XVIII, ii, 385,
426.
143
Wallop to Henry VIII, Douai, 14 and 25 Nov. 1543, L&P, XVIII, ii, 384, 420);
Vendôme to Francis I, 20 Nov., 23 Nov., 26 Nov. 1543, BnF, fr. 20521, fos. 52–54,
55–56, 57; letter of Marini, AGR, Audience, 99 (Seigneurs II).
144
Wallop to Henry VIII, 4 Dec. 1543, L&P, XVIII, ii, 453.
CHAPTER FOUR
‘FIGHTING OVER THE BEAR’S SKIN:’
THE INVASION OF FRANCE (1544)
there is no worse war than between two friends who
have become enemies
1
The Anglo-Imperial Plan of Campaign
e year 1544 was dominated by the great concerted campaign osten-
sibly designed by the Habsburgs and the English to crush France by a
joint invasion. Henry and Charles were to march on Paris and there
divide up the country. Although Champagne was to suer the main
thrust of the Emperor’s attack, he and the English had agreed to march
on Paris without being held up by fortied places on the way. e
plan, which looked more feasible on paper than it proved to be in
practice, was subject to a degree of bad faith on the part of Henry VIII,
probably more concerned with his own limited plans to extend his ter-
ritories. As Blaise de Monluc acidly commented in an addition to his
Commentaires, the plan to carve up France was like quarrelling over
the bear’s skin before it had been killed. A united France could not
be conquered without a dozen battles, given its warlike nobility and
countless fortied holds. Paris might be taken but the many other cities
would swallow up thirty armies.
2
Du Bellay thought Henry’s Council
had urged him to land in Normandy but the King had changed his
mind and opted for the attack on Boulogne and Montreuil. is had
aerwards led to the ruin of England.
3
1
Letter about Anglo-French conict, 22 May 1544, NA PRO31/18/3/2, fo. 133r
(CSP Spain, VII, no. 107): il n’est point plus grande guerre que de deux amys quant ilz
se pregnent l’ung l’aultre en ennemityé.’
2
Monluc’s description of the Anglo-Imperial plan to carve up France (Commen-
taires 1521–1576, ed. P. Courteault (Paris: Pléiade, 1964), pp. 169–170): ‘c’estoit dis-
puter de la peau de l’ours.’
3
Du Bellay, Mémoires, IV, p. 260: ‘qui a esté la ruine par après du royaume d’Angleterre.’
Henry was informed by a spy in that ‘les Normans craignent assez la descente par mer
des Angloys et pour ceste cause se sont faict les monstres des arrierebandz et legion-
aires qui ne bougeront de pays’ NA SP1/187, fo. 239 (274) (L&P, XIX, i, 573.3).
154 chapter four
At the height of the campaign around Landrecies in October 1543,
Henry had argued against Charles’ giving battle unless with over-
whelming superiority or forced to do so as a matter of honour. He
thought that Francis had been forced to spend so much in the cam-
paigns of that year that he would be unable to face the joint invasion
of the English and the Emperor in 1544. He seemed by then com-
mitted to the joint invasion plan.
4
How far, though, did that com-
mitment go? We know that Henry ultimately opted for very limited
objectives. Indeed, his interest in the siege of Montreuil, Boulogne or
both had surfaced in exchanges with du Roeulx in 1541–1542. It went
much further back than that. During Suolk’s campaign in France
of 1523, Henry had wanted his army to besiege Boulogne rather than
march south into France, where problems of supply and the fortica-
tions along the Somme would make the campaign dicult. On that
occasion, even late in the year, Henry was persuaded to go against
his instincts by Wolsey’s analysis of the opportunities provided by
the treason of Bourbon, with whom John Russell had been negotiat-
ing. en, there had been some false hope the La Fayette, governor of
Boulogne, would win the town for Bourbon.
5
Neither Henry nor his
military advisers can have forgotten the experience.
As soon as the Landrecies campaign was over, the Emperor’s council
began to consider the campaign for the following year. On 7 December,
Ferdinando de Gonzaga, viceroy of Sicily, was commissioned to go to
England to negotiate the terms of the campaign plan. Passing through
Canterbury in the last week of the year, he was entertained by Lord
4
Council to Francis Bryan, 28 Oct. 1543, L&P, XVIII, ii, 317.
5
omas More to Wolsey, 12 Sept. [1523], St.P., I, pp. 131–135 (L&P, III, ii, 3320):
‘as towching the consultation of the siege to be layed to Boleyn . . . His Grace is, for
the prudent reasons mencioned in Your Graces lettre, determinately resolved to have
the said siege experimented; wherof, as Your Grace wryteth, what may happe to fall,
who but God can tell: and all the preparations pourvayed for that way, to be now
sodenly sett aside, or converted where they can not serve, sendinge his armye farre
of in to thenemyes land, where we shold truste to theyre provision, of whose slaknes,
and hard handeling, profe hath bene had ere this, and yit no prove had of the Dukes
fastenes, His Highnes veryly thinketh, as Your Grace hath moost prudently wrytten,
that there were no wisedom therin. And His Gr[ace] saith, that Your Grace hit the
nayle on the hed, where ye wryte that the Burgonions wold be uppon theire owne
frontiers, to thend our money shold be spent among theym.’ Same to same. 20 Sept.
1523, St.P., I, pp. 135–140 (L&P, III, ii, 3346). Russell to Henry VIII, 1 Nov. 1523,
St.P., VI, p. 184. (L&P, III, ii, 3496) and Russell ‘Memorial,’ St.P., VI, no. LIX. On this
see S. Gunn, ‘e duke of Suolk’s march on Paris, 1523,’ English Historical Review,
101 (1986), 596–634.
‘
fighting over the bear
’
s skin
’
155
Cobham with the gentry of Kent.
6
In London, discussions with the
Council (including Norfolk, Russell, Hertford and Gardiner) produced
on 31 December a joint declaration or treaty by which the two rulers
committed themselves to invade France by 20 June 1544 (the Emperor
had called for 15 May), in person if possible, by a lieutenant if ill.
e strategy was set as an invasion through Champagne in the east
and Picardy in the north, marching as rapidly as supplies permitted
to converge on Paris. Each ruler would provide 35,000 foot and 7000
horse (a considerable increase on the 1543 agreement). Henry speci-
ed (in a passage inserted by Paget into the dra) that he would use
German mercenaries as supplied by the Emperor but paid by him-
self and reserved the right to increase the proportion of cavalry. e
Emperor accepted his obligation under the treaty of 1543 to pay for
2000 foot and 2000 horse in Henry’s army. e Regent of the Low
Countries would provide transport for supplies and each party agreed
to furnish ships manned by 2000 men to hold the Narrow Seas during
the crossing.
7
ere was much horse-trading involved since Gonzaga
also asked Henry to contribute 2–3000 men for two months and
10–15,000 crowns for an expedition into Dauphiné to keep the Swiss
from marching to French service. As for the Swiss, Henry dismissed
them as ‘of small service’ more a hindrance than a help to the enemy.
In turn, Henry asked for Buren to command the troops to be sup-
plied by the Emperor and oered to add 2000 of his own to them. But
Gonzaga was told in no uncertain terms that Henry had spent much
treasure the previous years ‘aswell in the warres, as otherwise about
matiers of Scotlande, as by the continual maytenaunce of his navye.’
e campaign against Scotland (see chapter 2) was also just entering
its planning stage. Yet Henry was prepared to oer 20,000 crowns in
return for 1000 arquebusiers to send against the Scots. Gonzaga had
to report back to the Emperor.
8
Chapuys was fairly optimistic, think-
ing Henry fully committed and unlikely to be diverted by his Scottish
6
Council to Cranmer, 20 Dec. 1543, BL Harl. 283, fo. 253.
7
Charles V’s instructions, 7 Dec. 1543, BL 28593 fo. 259 (L&P, XVIII, ii, 467);
agreement of 31 Dec. 1543, NA SP1/182, fos. 165–168 (181–188) including English
translation (L&P, XVIII, ii, 526). On 22 March 1544 e Regent revoked a proroga-
tion of part of the subsidy of the Estates of Flanders on the gounds that the Emperor
had made this agreement to provide ships for the defence of the Narrow Seas (Diegerick,
Inventaire . . . Ypres, V, p. 260. no. 1670).
8
Council to Wotton, 4 Jan. 1544 St.P., IX, pp. 576–578 (L&P, XIX, i, 6).
156 chapter four
expedition into putting o the invasion of France.
9
On 7 February
Charles V agreed to the terms negotiated by Gonzaga but refused the
1000 Spaniards (they were needed for Italy). He decided not to press
Henry too much for the 20,000 crowns and nally oered him Buren
with 2000 horse and 2000 lansquenets; Henry was to provide the pay
for a further 2000 Germans.
10
e question of when and why Henry abandoned the joint strategy
agreed on in December 1543 is dicult to answer. One major deter-
minant was the progress of the campaign against Scotland. is had
been terminated as soon as possible in order to move resources to the
Channel and measures were taken for the best troops to be moved
south as soon as the campaign was over.
11
Early in May, Chapuys was
condent that the joint campaign would go ahead because:
He will not have changed his plan but will rather hasten it as much as
possible, partly out of fear that the French are building such a great
army to invade his country during his absence, in which case it would be
necessary to have his army ready on the south coast opposite Normandy
and Brittany to resist such an enterprise. e better to resist such an
enterprise the lord King has begun to order that men should be ready
at a moment’s notice in the principal ports of that coast and daily sends
commissaries and experienced men to provide for the garrisons as for
the north coast. As I understand it, the King raises men above the ordi-
nary troops to secure those areas as necessary. It would feared that the
French would rather send men to Scotland than to attempt an inva-
sion of this kingdom were it not that they have Cardinal Pole with them,
through whom they might be able to alter the aairs of this kingdom.
12
9
Chapuys to Philip, 18 Jan. 1544; to Mary of Hungary, 27 Jan., L&P, XIX, i, 39, 65.
10
Charles V to Chapuys, 7 Feb. 1544, CSP Spain VII, 22, 32 (L&P, XIX, i, 96).
11
Privy Council to Hertford and Lisle, 15 May 1544, Hateld MS. 231. no. 98.
Historical Manuscripts Commission, Calendar of the manuscripts of the Most Honour-
able the Marquess of Salisbury . . . preserved at Hateld House, Hertfordshire, 24 vols
(London, 1883–1976) [hereaer HMC Cal. Hateld.], I., 159.] Haynes, State Papers,
I, 33 (L&P, XIX, i, 508).
12
Chapuys to Charles V, 12 May 1544, NA PRO31/18/3/2, fos. 117v–118r (L&P,
XIX, i, 497): ‘Il n’aura changé de propoz, ains y donnera toute l’haste possible, mesmes
pour estre en quelque suspecon et craincte que les François ne font si grande armee
qu’ilz ont pour invader son pays durant son absence, auquel cas seroit tres requis avoir
lad. armee en la coste du ponant correspondant à la Normandie et Bretaigne, et pour
mieulx resister à telle emprinse, led. sr. roy a commencé de fere mectre ordre qu’en
ung subit et se retrouveront force gens de guerre aux portz principaulx de lad. coste
et journellement y envoye commissaries et gens entenduz pour y proveoir et y a fait
asseoir les postes comme du coustel du Nort. Et à ce que puis entendre, led. sr. roy
oultre les gens ordinaires desd. costes fera quelque nombre de gens pour secourir là où
la necessité le requerra. Et est à doubter que lesd. Francois envoyeront plus tost gens
‘
fighting over the bear
’
s skin
’
157
Shortly aer this Chapuys was told that the preparations were being
pressed forward urgently and he seems to have believed this.
13
In June 1544, when the question arose of whether it was necessary
for the two rulers to lead their troops in person, Henry was already
beginning to suggest that the two armies of invasion could be dimin-
ished and part of them told o to attend the persons of the sovereigns,
while the ‘enterprise of Paris’ was not important enough for them to
lead it in person. Had Charles realised it, this was a telling indicator but
he brushed it aside with the remark that Paris was not to be attacked
with a view to occupying it but rather to compel Francis to come to
terms. Pitched battle with the French King he thought unlikely since
Francis had shown at Landrecies he had no taste for it (‘qu’il n’en
vouloit plus menger.’)
14
Such, then, was the grand strategy but it needed to be put into exe-
cution. Some time in February or March (the documents are undated),
members of the Council put certain alternatives to the King in a
series of consultation papers. One of them suggested a march through
Flanders to where Suolk had crossed the Somme in 1523, near Nesle.
Provisions could be available in the Emperor’s lands and victuals
brought from Calais used from the Somme onwards. is would take
12 to 14 days and then the route to Paris would lie though territory
well supplied with food and little fortied. Moreover, the German mer-
cenaries would not have to be paid until the crossing of the Somme.
Dates of disembarkation for the three corps of the army slipped from
1, 6 and 12 to 6, 12 and 15 June. e vanguard would cross rst, of
course, and make some attempt on Ardres while awaiting the King.
15
A second, slightly later, consultation was more open about possible
routes: rst to the causeway beyond Calais, then to Guînes or Lisques
to await Buren’s Germans. A route to cross the Somme between Le
Crotoy and Abbeville would take 6 or 7 days; victuals would be needed
for the whole route and for 10 days more since no wheat had been
sown in the Boulonnais. A crossing near Braye further up the Somme
aud. Escosse que non d’entreprendre par ailleurs l’invasion de ce royaulme n’estoit
qu’ilz eussent avec eulx le Cardinal Pole au moyen duquel se pourroient les aeres de
ce royaulme alterer.’
13
Chapuys to Charles V, 17 May 1544, L&P, XIX, i, 518.
14
Charles V to Chapuys, 3 June 1544, CSP Spain, VII, 188; L&P, XIX, i, 626.
15
‘Considerations which way is thought by the Council to be most convenient for
the King’s Majesty to set forward with his royal army this summer to invade the
realm,’ St.P., I, p. 761 (L&P. XIX, i, 271.3).
158 chapter four
would take 9–10 days and no provisions needed until that point.
On routes:
some men of trust which knowe both the ways maye be spoken withal
and of them lerned also in what cace for forage and victualles either
of them be and the progresse of both ways with the distaunce of the
myles from place to place lerned aswel betwene Guisnez and the ryver of
Somme as from the sayd river to Paris, so thereupon his heighnes may
determine which was is best to passe.
16
It might come as a surprise that, so late in the day, consultations about
possible routes still needed to be made. Already, the route through
Boulonnais was being considered but how seriously is dicult to say.
e tenor of advice was certainly to opt for the crossing of the Somme
from Imperial territory, yet clearly Henry ultimately decided against
it.
17
Why? Luke MacMahon has argued persuasively for the positive
interpretation of Henry’s strategy in his later years and that Henry
had planned all along to make Boulogne and Montreuil his principal
objectives. He had learned through experience that he was likely to be
le in the lurch by allies and that large-scale ambitious excursions into
France were unlikely to succeed.
Henry had been in favour of a siege of Boulogne in 1523, the fail-
ure of which he attributed to lack of logistical support from the Low
Countries; he been dissatised with the outcome of the Landrecies
campaign.
18
In June 1542, the King had demanded to know from
Wallop some ‘knowledge how Bouloigne was fortied within.’ Wallop
reported that there was a ‘rampire’ (presumably a terre plein) 24 foot
thick between the castle and the Notre-Dame gate.
19
Yet the exis-
tence of the planning documents discussed above and the fact that
Norfolk and Russell remained in the dark to some extent about their
objectives even when they crossed over to France should caution us
about assuming that Henry had denitively made up his mind before
weighing up the options in June 1544, especially when he was still
16
An example of the kind of report on routes envisaged is attached to La Vigne’s
letter of 24 May 1544 to Henry VIII, NA SP1/187, fos. 239–242 (274–277) (L&P, XIX,
i, 575.3).
17
‘A consultation concerning the provision of victuals to furnish the King’s Majesty’s
army that shall pass over into France.’ L&P, XIX, i, 271.4.
18
MacMahon, ‘English Invasion of France,’ pp. 29–33. More to Wolsey, 20 Sept.
[1523], St.P., I, pp. 135–136.
19
Wallop to Henry VIII, 11 June 1542, NA SP1/171, fos. 10–11 (11–12) (L&P,
XVII, 397).
‘
fighting over the bear
’
s skin
’
159
undecided whether to cross the Channel himself. Above all, in a world
in which a Franco-Imperial rapprochement was always a possibility,
could Henry aord to jeopardise his alliance with Charles V? Nor can
it be assumed that the insertion of qualifying words into the agreement
with Gonzaga show that Henry was already contemplating a get-out
clause.
20
However, it is certainly the case that there was a tradition that
Henry had kept his plans secret recalled in an historical tract pub-
lished in 1575 by Ulpian Fulwell. Henry, he claimed:
in the ende was fully mynded to passe into Fraunce very secretly with a
mightie & puissant power, which in deede was wrought so priuily, that
he imparted his minde in this matter vnto no man, sauing only to the
Duke of Suolk, but caused a rumor to be spread that hee was deter-
mined to goe ouer vnto Parys.
e trustworthiness of this account is open to question, though it is
larded with details of conversations to give verisimilitude. It is the case
that Norfolk was uncertain about the King’s plans and Fulwell adds
here:
e Duke of Norfolk . . . hearing of the kinges pryuie passage into Fraunce,
maruailed with him selfe what shoulde bee hys pretence: And thought
some vncurtesie y
t
he might not haue been made pryuy therof, he being
one of the kings pryuy counsail. Wherupon he sent a letter vnto Sir
Anthony Brown the maister of ye kings horse, wherin he declared that
he mused what the kinges purpose shoulde bee, desiring Sir Anthony
Browne to resolue him by his letters of this doubt. is letter was brought
when the kinge lay at Calyce to passe into Fraunce.
21
is is contradicted (as will be seen below) by messages to Norfolk
which seem to indicate that Henry thought that Duke also knew his
plans and, indeed, it is dicult to imagine the planning of a campaign
of this magnitude without a clear idea of its strategy in the minds of
all its executants.
20
In the texts of the agreement NA SP1/182, fo. 165v and 168r the words ‘comme
la commodité luy pourra servir’ (or in English ‘bythe passages which they shall fynde
most easie and commodious to passe’) apply specically to the strategy of crossing the
Somme not as L&P, summary indicates, as a general qualier: ‘as strategy, victuals and
the enemy shall permit.’
21
Ulpian Fulwell, e ower of fame Containing the bright renowne, & moste for-
tunate raigne of King Henry the viii. (London: William Hoskins, 1575), fos. 34–35
(dedicated to Cecil). Fulwell was a bad clergyman but a better satirist and comic play-
wright. ough he relied on standard chronicles he got his information on 1544 from
his friend Edmund Harman, a member of Henry VIII’s household.