Gardiner V., Matthews H. The changing geography of the United Kingdom

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There were doubts over the second question, on tax-varying powers. Prior to the 1997

election, the Conservative Secretary of State for Scotland had mounted an effective campaign

against what he dubbed the ‘tartan tax’, arguing a Scottish parliament would mean a higher

tax burden for business in Scotland compared to the rest of the UK. The tax issue remained

the Achilles’ heel of Labour’s proposals. Polls prior to the referendum suggested that public

support for tax-varying powers was ebbing away. But in the event, the second referendum

question produced majority backing for tax-varying powers too (albeit by a narrower though

still substantial margin, 63 per cent).

The referendum gave strong public endorsement for the establishment of a powerful

Scottish parliament. Opponents of the measure were forced to come to terms with the changed

political environment. With widespread public support north of the border for a parliament,

and with elections due in 1999 before the next UK General Election (which, in any case,

Labour seemed likely to win, given its unprecedented landslide majority in 1997), there

was little chance of retrospectively abolishing the new body once it had been set up. The

Conservatives accepted the result of the referendum, and the inevitability of a new

constitutional settlement for Scotland. One of the ironies of the legislation for the new

assembly was that, by adopting an additional member proportional representation system

for electing MSPs (Members of the Scottish Parliament), it almost certainly provides a

route back into the Scottish political mainstream for the Conservatives, who will be

guaranteed some MSPs at a time when they have no Scottish Westminster MPs.

The long-term consequences of a Scottish parliament are not yet clear. Opponents of

the measure have seen devolution as a step to independence. They argue that conflicts between

the Edinburgh and London parliaments are inevitable and will increase pressure for a final

dissolution of the Union. Most advocates, on the other hand, have argued that by recognising

the desire of the Scots to have a government responsive to Scottish needs, devolution will

prevent the further development of resentments which might have otherwise led to demands

for independence. (However, some advocates, in the SNP especially, do see devolution as a

stepping stone to independence.)

In the year after the referendum, support for the SNP grew in opinion polls (McCrone

1998). Shortly after the referendum, around 48 per cent of voters said they would vote

Labour for the Edinburgh parliament, with about 30 per cent supporting the SNP. But by

early 1998, the two parties were neck and neck, and by May 1998, support for the SNP had

outstripped that for Labour: about 45 per cent said they would vote SNP, while 35 per cent

said they would vote Labour. These trends led some to suggest that the tide was turning

towards independence.

But that judgement was premature. Over the same post-referendum period, Labour

remained Scotland’s most popular party for the UK parliament (McCrone 1998). Although

SNP support climbed (from just above 20 per cent to around 30 per cent), the party still

lagged far behind Labour as a popular choice for Westminster. The great majority of Scots

still support pro-Union parties when it comes to UK elections. Furthermore, the rise of

support for the SNP after the devolution referendum needs to be put into the context of

Labour’s difficulties in Scotland, with allegations of corruption and misconduct against

some prominent Scottish Labour local authorities and MPs. The SNP’s rise in the Scottish

opinion polls may reflect a ‘conventional’ swing from government to opposition during the

parliamentary cycle (in Scotland, of course, the SNP is, in effect, the main opposition

alternative to Labour).

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Support for outright independence remains a minority concern (Table 16.3). Before

the referendum, it ran at just over a quarter of Scottish voters. After the referendum support

was slightly higher, at just below a third of voters (a very few polls have suggested much

greater support for independence, but these seem to be ‘rogue’ results). But a Scottish

parliament within the UK remained the most popular option, steady at just under 50 per

cent of the Scottish electorate (McCrone 1998). Furthermore, Scots’ sense of national identity,

while confirming the importance of ‘Scottishness’, hardly suggests a strong desire for

separation from the rest of the UK (Table 16.4). True, the proportion feeling ‘Scottish only’

seems to have risen slightly in the years between 1992 and 1997—from 19 per cent to 23

per cent. And the vast majority of those living in Scotland feel Scottish to some degree: only

between 4 per cent (1992) and 7 per cent (1997) of adults living in Scotland did not. But

equally a large majority of Scots continue to identify with Britain as a whole: while most

feel more Scottish than British, around 70 per cent felt a sense of dual nationality—Scottish

and British. As yet, there remains a large degree of attachment to the UK.

Wales

Unlike Scottish nationalism, Welsh nationalism does not draw on a history of independence.

While there were several Welsh-speaking ‘statelets’ and fiefdoms before conquest by the

TABLE 16.3 Constitutional preferences in Scotland and Wales, 1997

Source: British Election Studies.

TABLE 16.4 Scottish and Welsh national identity

Source: British Election Studies.

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English, there was never a consolidated Welsh state. Furthermore, Wales lacks the ‘quasi-

state’ institutions of a separate legal and educational system: English law covers Wales too.

Up until the late twentieth century, Wales was governed from Westminster in much the

same way as any English region. It was not until 1964 that a separate government department

was established for Wales (Jones 1997). Compared to the Scottish Office, however, the

Welsh Office remains relatively small and weak.

Instead, Welsh nationalism draws strongly on cultural traditions, and in particular

on the preservation of the Welsh language. Once spoken throughout the Principality, Welsh

went into decline after the Industrial Revolution, and is now spoken by only around 20

per cent of the Welsh population. The language is now confined to the north-west and

west coasts of Wales, and to some middle-class enclaves in the major cities of the south,

especially Cardiff (Giggs and Pattie 1992). Welsh society is split between Welsh- and

English-speakers, and between the Welsh-born and a large (relative to Scotland and

Northern Ireland) ‘incomer’ population from other parts of the UK, primarily from

England. Furthermore, and again in contrast to Scotland, the major roads and railways

within Wales do not provide a well-integrated ‘national’ transport network. Most major

routes run east-west, meaning that North Wales is better connected to the English North

West, and South Wales is better connected to the English Midlands than either part of

Wales is to the other.

Welsh national identity and nationalism are therefore rather more complex and

mediated than their Scottish counterparts. Like the Scots, a sizeable majority of people

living in Wales have a sense of dual nationality, Welsh and British (Table 16.4). But

respondents in Wales were less likely to say they felt ‘only Welsh’, or even ‘more Welsh

than British’ than were Scots asked about their Scottishness. Furthermore, a far higher

proportion of those living in Wales than in Scotland reported feeling only a British national

identity, or being neither Welsh nor British.

The complexities of Welsh national identity are reflected in the development of political

nationalism in Wales. Plaid Cymru (PC), the Welsh nationalist party, has its roots in the

Welsh language movement. Like the SNP in Scotland, it was not until the 1960s and 1970s

that it moved from the fringes into the electoral mainstream. But unlike the SNP, Plaid

Cymru has always found it hard to break out of a geographically concentrated base in

Welsh-speaking north-west Wales. The party has generally done very badly in the more

populous, English-speaking south of Wales. Even at its peak in 1970, PC won only 11 per

cent of the vote in Wales.

But because its vote is concentrated in the north-west of the Principality, PC has

been able to return two or more MPs at each election since February 1974. As a result, it

too was important to the minority 1974–9 Labour government. Furthermore, the Welsh

language issue had become increasingly politicised over the preceding decades. As a

consequence, plans for devolution to Wales were set in train at the same time as the plans

for Scotland. As in Scotland, they were subject to ratification through a referendum. But

whereas a narrow majority of Scots voted for devolution in 1979, a decisive majority (80

per cent) of those living in Wales rejected it. Furthermore, devolution was opposed even

by some Welsh Labour MPs. The 1979 referendum seemed to have ended prospects for

Welsh devolution.

As in Scotland, the experience of Conservative government between 1979 and 1997

seems to have been a catalyst for change, however. The Welsh repeatedly rejected the

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Conservatives (and the party’s share of the vote fell there, till in 1997 there were no

Conservative MPs from Welsh seats), but found itself governed by a party it had not voted

for. By 1997, support for Welsh home rule had strengthened (Table 16.3). Even so, it

lagged behind support in Scotland, both in quantity and strength, and a still-sizeable

group (by no means restricted to the non-Welsh living in Wales) was adamantly opposed.

Perhaps tellingly, there was no Welsh equivalent of the Scottish Constitutional Convention.

The broad consensus in favour of devolution which developed among Scottish opinion

formers (including the Scottish press) in the 1980s and 1990s was not so well developed

in Wales.

FIGURE 16.4 Percentage voting ‘Yes’ to a Welsh Assembly

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Welsh devolution remained the official policy of Labour, the Liberal Democrats

(and the Alliance before them), and, of course, PC. But—and again the comparison

with Scotland is telling—New Labour’s 1997 proposals for a Welsh assembly were

for a weak debating chamber, with no primary legislative or tax-raising powers.

Furthermore, while Labour in Scotland managed to silence its anti-devolution wing

in 1997 (a major change from 1979), many in the Welsh Labour Party remained

vociferously opposed.

The new Labour government put its proposals to a referendum (McAllister 1998), but

the timing of the Welsh referendum proved a bone of contention. Rather than hold both the

Scottish and Welsh votes on the same day, the government decided that Welsh electors

would vote a week after the Scots. The intention seems to have been to use the result in

Scotland (where a substantial ‘yes’ vote was widely and confidently expected) to create a

groundswell in favour of change in Wales, where the result was much more on a knife edge.

Welsh voters went to the polls on 18 September 1997.

The referendum results could not have been more dramatic. There was no equivalent

of the Scottish landslide. Neither camp was at all confident of victory. Not until the last

local authority area had declared its result was the overall outcome clear—a ‘yes’ vote, but

by the narrowest of margins (50.2 per cent voting in favour of an elected Welsh Assembly;

only 5,900 votes separated the ‘yes’ and ‘no’ results).

Furthermore, the geography of the results emphasised the divisions within Wales

(Figure 16.4). Along the Welsh Marches, in populous South Wales, and in Pembrokeshire,

the result was a consistent majority against an Assembly. In North and West Wales (and in

some of the former mining valleys of South Wales), however, the result was a ‘yes’ majority.

Welsh-speaking and Anglophone Wales seemed at odds once more.

And the English regions…?

Arrangements for the government of the ‘Celtic fringes’ have proved controversial

over recent years, therefore, and the measures introduced by the Labour government

elected in 1997 represent a major constitutional shake-up in the affairs of a once

highly centralised state. But there has been very little equivalent discussion of

arrangements for the English regions. In some respects, this is surprising. There are,

as we have seen, substantial differences in political attitudes across the English regions,

and also large variations in local conditions, both social and economic. It is not obvious

that residents of the North East share the same hopes and expectations as those living

in the South East, for instance. But with no clearly established structure of regional

government there is no intermediary between local authorities and Westminster

(Mawson 1997).

Furthermore, it is not clear that sufficient public support exists for the devolution of

power to even the most distinctive of English regions (Elcock 1997). To a large extent, the

English ‘regions’ lack coherence. The now familiar standard planning regions, for instance,

have their origins in administrative convenience rather than in historically and socially united

communities. The South West, for instance, stretches from the western end of the affluent

M4 corridor and the south coast resorts, to economically depressed Cornwall. With no

generally agreed views on what constitutes a ‘region’, it becomes hard to mobilise active

public support for regional government.

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But this does not mean there is no regional devolution whatever in England, nor

that pressure for more does not exist—and will not increase in the future. Some members

of the local political elite in the North East have become involved in the Campaign for

a North of England Assembly, for instance. In part, the impetus comes from devolution

plans for Scotland. There are concerns in the North East at the prospect of a powerful

Scottish government with economic investment powers drawing much-needed

investment, while the North East, lacking similar regional government structures, would

be unable to respond. In the late 1970s, North East Labour MPs played a prominent

part in the opposition to their own government’s proposals for Scottish government. In

the late 1990s, overt opposition was almost non-existent. But, for some at least, the

strategy had changed: if Scotland was to get a parliament, one should be established in

the North East too.

Pressure for a degree of devolution to the English regions comes in part, then,

from concerns about the knock-on effects of Scottish and Welsh devolution, and a desire

not to be left out. A related issue concerns the so-called ‘West Lothian question’, first

raised by Tam Dalyell, Labour MP for West Lothian and long-time opponent of

devolution. A potential inequity would exist if devolution was applied to some parts of

the UK and not to others, especially if no change was made to the numbers of MPs each

region returned to Westminster. For instance, establishing a Scottish parliament with

no other changes would mean that Westminster MPs for Scottish seats (and hence Scottish

voters) would have a say in legislation affecting England, but English MPs and voters

would have no reciprocal say on Scottish affairs. As Labour’s electoral prospects began

to improve in the early 1990s, and the party seemed to have its first realistic chance of

forming a government since the very early 1980s, it was forced to confront the West

Lothian Question. One solution was to return to the policy espoused by the Liberals in

the early years of the century of ‘home rule all round’. In a 1991 consultation paper,

the party pointed to ‘the democratic deficit at the regional level in England’ and proposed

a rolling programme of regional devolution in England (Mawson 1997:184). The

timetable for change remained unclear, however, and no firm commitments were made,

in contrast to the plans for Scotland and Wales.

The Conservatives, meanwhile, under both Margaret Thatcher and her successor

John Major, were opposed to the establishment of elected regional assemblies in England

as well as in Scotland and Wales. Assemblies, they argued, would introduce an

unnecessary and largely unwanted extra layer of bureaucracy. However, this did not

preclude a degree of administrative devolution. In 1994, the government established

ten regional offices (Government Offices for the Regions, or GROs), which tried to

create Whitehall outposts in the regions, allowing local businesses and public bodies to

have access to an integrated local service. In addition, local authorities in most parts of

the country were coming together in relatively informal ‘regional organisations’ to plan

and campaign for common goals—for instance to provide co-ordination of land-use

planning at the regional level (e.g. the South West Planning Conference) and the East

Midlands Forum (which gave itself a wider remit). Four of the nine regional associations

also established offices in Brussels, hoping to gain access to EU investment (Mawson

1997:191).

In opposition again after the 1992 election, Labour continued to plan for elected

English regional assemblies, which would take over powers from the GROs. But again,

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no precise timetable was set out, and the need for public support in each region was

reiterated, suggesting that referendums would be carried out, as in Scotland and Wales.

But by the 1997 election, devolution to the English regions had slipped down the party’s

list of priorities. The party now placed its hopes in Regional Development Agencies

(RDAs), bodies which would be charged with the task of co-ordinating economic

development strategies. Proposals for the establishment of RDAs were announced at the

end of 1997. RDAs still fall short of a commitment to elected regional bodies: members

are to be government appointments. But they represent a ‘half-way house’ option which

does not require a referendum mandate. Labour thus avoids the risk of seeing its proposals

rejected by local people.

London government has been the major exception to Labour’s otherwise tentative

approach to devolution within England. Since the abolition of the Greater London

Council in 1986, the capital has had no city-wide elected government. Labour supported

the re-establishment of a London authority. Its 1997 election programme contained

radical proposals for a directly elected London mayor. Unlike the largely ceremonial

role played by mayors in other British local authorities, the London mayor was to be a

powerful executive figure drawing a direct mandate from London voters. Although

technically a local government reform, the plans for London had, in some ways, more

in common with plans for Scotland and Wales, not least in that London’s population is

larger than Scotland’s.

Once again, the government used the referendum device: the vote was held on 4

May 1998. But, unlike the Scottish and (to a lesser extent) Welsh referendums, turnout

was poor (34 per cent). Although a majority of voters (72 per cent) supported the measure,

it hardly represented an overwhelming endorsement of the government’s plans: only a

quarter of London residents actively voted for an elected mayor. This is perhaps indicative

of a more widespread lack of interest on the part of English voters. Certainly,

consultations on the reform of English local government a few years earlier, although

badly handled, produced even less public interest and involvement, suggesting that

most are indifferent to the arrangements for the government of their area (Johnston and

Pattie 1996).

Demands for regional level government in England do not seem deep seated,

therefore. Rather, in so far as they exist, they operate at the level of the political elites in

particular areas. And, even then, the elites are not fully united. Of course, as devolution

to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland comes into operation and matures, there may

be a growth in the demand for similar measures in England. But in the absence of

clearly articulated regional loyalties to match the senses of national identity found in

the Celtic fringe, proponents of elected English regional government face an uphill

task. Unelected RDAs may well represent the limits, for the time being, of the devolution

of governance in England.

Conclusion

As it enters the new millennium, the UK faces new challenges. Although its political

geography is less polarised than in the recent past, pressure for substantial devolution of

power to some of the member nations has grown, resulting in new parliaments in Scotland,

Wales and Northern Ireland. In all three cases, relative economic disadvantage has helped

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fuel demands for change. But while an important catalyst, it is not in itself sufficient to fuel

demands for self-government. After all, many of the English regions have weaker economies

than the South East but have not spawned widespread demands for devolution. A distinctive

national identity (in addition to ‘British’) is also necessary—and even then may not be

enough, as the Welsh referendum shows.

In the short term, there will be significant adjustments as the new bodies interact

with each other, and establish their relationships with the older power centre of

Westminster. There is a learning curve to be climbed. It is as yet unclear, for instance,

how the new arrangements will cope with (say) a Conservative government in

Westminster and a Labour-dominated government in Edinburgh. In the longer term,

will the UK survive in its current form? Advocates of devolution argue that it will

preserve the Union, while opponents have argued that it will lead to break-up. Devolution,

of course, is now a fact. But, at the moment, neither the Scots nor the Welsh seem on

the brink of abandoning their British identity. It is worth remembering, of course, that

a degree of regional autonomy is common in many European states, without creating

secessionist pressures It is unusual only in the context of British politics (and then only

if we ignore the many ‘exceptions’ —Stormont from 1922 until 1972; the Isle of Man;

the Channel Islands, and so on). The greatest innovation, and the greatest challenge, is

in the arrangements for Northern Ireland. Power-sharing is fraught with potential

difficulties and it remains to be seen whether good will is sufficient to make the new

arrangements work there. But the referendum results suggest overwhelming public

support for the peace process. That is a good base to start from.

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