Robson Martin. Britain, Portugal and South America in the Napoleonic Wars: Alliances and Diplomacy in Economic Maritime Conflict (ENG)

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danger or provoke an attack’ but would ‘profit by the short interval to

improve their means of resistance’.

Hence whatever happened at Paris Rosslyn urged a quick decision

from Araujo regarding the British troops, pointing out if they were not

required they must swiftly proceed to other objects. It was impossible to

have troops cooped up on board transports in the Tagus for an indefinite

period. Rosslyn gave clear warning if British assistance was rejected now,

it might not be forthcoming in the future. Araujo then complained if

British forces were used in other expeditions ‘Portugal would be exposed

to the utmost danger and left totally defenceless’. He remained convinced

the arrival of a British expedition in the Tagus would violate Portuguese

neutrality and draw upon Portugal ‘the resentment of France’. Rosslyn

remarked Britain had allowed Portugal to pay subsidies to France as long

as there remained a hope of preserving their neutrality. Araujo reiterated a

general peace was the only hope of preserving Portugal.

Rosslyn was engaged in another lengthy conference with Araujo on

the 27

in which the Portuguese minister restated all the arguments from

the first meeting. When Rosslyn mentioned the French plan to give Lis-

bon to the Prince of the Peace, Araujo ‘laughed at it as an idle rumour’

while the report of the Queen of Etruria receiving the city ‘as a ridicu-

lous story of the same kind’. Araujo then read out all the dispatches re-

ceived from Lima in Paris and the Portuguese minister in Madrid, the

Condé da Ega, in an attempt to persuade Rosslyn there were no French

troops at Bayonne and no intention of a French attack. Despite this

Araujo considered the current situation ‘a most alarming crisis for Portu-

gal’, with the danger increased greatly by the presence of the Royal Navy.

Araujo therefore informed Rosslyn he had instructed Sousa to ask for

the withdrawal of St. Vincent’s fleet.

Rosslyn now took the opportunity to quiz Araujo on the state of the

Portuguese army and the finances of the country. Araujo, contrary to his

earlier assertion to Strangford, declared the army to number 30,000 men

but did admit pay was in dreadful arrears and there were severe deficien-

cies in clothing and arms. There was no logistical support to move the

army, no magazines, provisions or hospitals. The cost of the army was

£1,330,000 per annum, but had only two thirds of this amount allotted

to it in the budgets. Even this had not been supplied as the Portuguese

finances were ‘in a state of absolute ruin’; not a surprising situation when

faced with paying a huge indemnity to France. According to Araujo a

‘vigorous, intelligent and active administration’ would have few problems

RITAIN, PORTUGAL AND SOUTH AMERICA

HE ROSSLYN MISSION TO LISBON

in addressing these issues, but Rosslyn lamented he did not find any

hope of ‘energy, intelligence or cordial cooperation’ from the Portuguese

administration.

Araujo also tried to refute the suggestion he was a Francophile, argu-

ing the French similarly accused him of continually favouring the Eng-

lish. He declared he was neither, but was only doing his duty to his coun-

try. Rosslyn replied Britain did not want him ‘to be English’ but only

desired him to be a good Portuguese and follow the ‘true interests’ of the

country. Rosslyn now hinted to Araujo:

…the designs of France upon the Brazils were well known, that

her intrigues had been seen at work in preparing the means of a

revolution there and that the facility which the possession of the

mother country would afford to any attempt on the colonies,

chiefly by giving a command of shipping, were most probably the

chief inducement to the threatened invasion.

Araujo ‘ridiculed this supposition’ adding Britain would never allow Bra-

zil to fall under French control. He also recognised ‘in case of real dan-

ger’ Britain would not hesitate to use naval force to remove the Portu-

guese ships from the Tagus.

Considering the poor state of the Portuguese army, Araujo admitted if

Portugal was attacked there was no other option but to abandon the

kingdom. But it would not be easy. The Regent had a ‘horror of the

sea…the situation of the Queen and the Royal Family presented the

greatest obstacles to such a design’. Although the plan had often been

talked of, Araujo seemed convinced the discussions were never serious.

Araujo finished the discussion by declaring if war came, it should be

carried on offensively into Spain to ‘secure a stronger and better frontier

to defend’. After three hours of negotiations Rosslyn laconically noted

he ‘did not think it necessary to enter into that discussion’.

On Friday 29

Rosslyn and St. Vincent finally gained a personal audi-

ence with the Prince Regent. Rosslyn spent some time describing the

exact nature of the intelligence the British government had received

from Paris, stressing the urgency of the threat, which had led directly to

his mission and the offer of British assistance. He also pointed out St.

Vincent had been specifically chosen for the command of the naval

forces ‘from a persuasion that he was peculiarly agreeable to His Royal

Highness’. Rosslyn then stated British policy to the Regent, as he had

already made clear to Araujo. To avoid any misunderstanding in the

course of the meeting, Rosslyn presented a written statement outlining

the objects of his mission, leaving copies with Araujo and the Count of

Vila Verde.

In this diplomatic note Rosslyn was a little more detailed than he had

been in conversation with Araujo. He informed the Regent the French

government had specifically notified the British minister at Paris that

30,000 men would march from Bayonne on 15 August to begin the inva-

sion of Portugal. The British government had also received news from

other parts of the continent, supporting the belief an invasion was immi-

nent. Rosslyn argued ‘even the details of the plan have transpired and

that they embrace the entire disposition of the Portuguese monarchy and

the partition of its provinces’. This was entirely consistent with the

French policy of announcing acts of intended aggression. In response

Britain would not act precipitately as long as Portugal could maintain her

neutrality ‘and did not even oppose the subsidies in money which Portu-

gal granted to his enemies’. But now, set against the wider Anglo-French

economic struggle, French aggression backed up by military force could

not be allowed to succeed: any prospect of Portuguese neutrality was out

of the question.

In order to determine what resources to devote to the defence of the

country the British government requested a full and frank account of the

state of the Portuguese military. Rosslyn informed the Regent a force of

10,000 men with artillery and ready to sail for ‘a service of the greatest

importance’ would now detour to Lisbon. Further reinforcements would

arrive once suitable transport tonnage could be hired, the orders for

which had already been given. All this would not upset the French as

they had already decided to invade Portugal. The British government

pointed out ‘experience has shown the promptitude with which a French

army assembles and the rapidity with which it moves’, drawing attention

to the speed of the French 1805 campaign and the resulting defeat of

Austria as a recent example.

Rosslyn dashed Portuguese hopes for a general peace, stating there

was little chance of agreement between Britain and France. In the

unlikely event of peace Britain would watch over the interests of Portu-

gal. This promise must have cut little ice with the Portuguese who were

still upset about the lack of British support at Amiens (see Appendix III).

The key factor in any British defence of Portugal would be diplomatic

moves to determine the true state of Franco-Spanish relations. The Brit-

RITAIN, PORTUGAL AND SOUTH AMERICA

HE ROSSLYN MISSION TO LISBON

ish government wanted a communication opened with Madrid to find

out if they would actively resist the French plans or even just refuse to

assist. The hope was to ‘to bring back the councils of His Catholic Maj-

esty to a just and wise consideration of what he owes to himself and to

the House of Braganza’. The Talents clearly recognised the only way to

guarantee the future security of Portugal was to separate Spain from her

alliance with France.

Throughout Rosslyn’s conversation the Regent made several expres-

sions of his desire to continue the friendship and the attachment of Por-

tugal to the interests of Britain. The Regent was ‘particularly struck with

the intimation and overture touching the sentiments and future conduct

of the court of Madrid and asked if it was desired that he should make

any particular proposition’. Rosslyn replied the preservation of Portugal

was the ‘principal motive’ behind that suggestion. It was up to the Portu-

guese, who were more intimate with Madrid, to judge how the true senti-

ments of the Spaniards might be discovered and of the means to be

taken in impressing upon them their own interests that were intrinsically

linked to supporting Portugal in the present crisis.

During the course of the visit Rosslyn had tried to sound out Vila

Verde, but worryingly, when Rosslyn began by stating the object of his

mission, ‘he flew from the discussion immediately’. When Rosslyn men-

tioned the declaration of the French government, Vila Verde interrupted

him with ‘a loose and idle story of some late news spread at Cadiz, re-

specting the preliminaries of peace…in short he was so determined to

avoid or interrupt this discussion that I found it impossible to force him

to it’.

On 1 September Rosslyn received a written response from Araujo

which commenced with the statement: ‘there exists no military force

there [Bayonne] or in its neighbourhood’. British intelligence was false

and contrary to what the Portuguese had received from their ambassa-

dors and agents. The Portuguese had received reports of a conversation

in Paris between Yarmouth and Lima, whereby Yarmouth had related his

conversation with Talleyrand. The Portuguese claimed at the last date of

news from Paris, 9 August, ‘Yarmouth had not communicated to him

[Lima] the determination of the French government to march from

Bayonne an army of 30,000 men as stated by Lord Rosslyn’. The Portu-

guese did not consider rumours from Paris as official French policy,

noting they had occurred many times since 1793 and had not been car-

ried into effect.

The Prince pointed out a Royal Navy squadron was useless against an

invasion of Portugal by land. In fact, they argued, St. Vincent’s presence

‘embarrasses all friendly intelligence with Spain’ and gave the appearance

of collusion between England and Lisbon, thereby jeopardising Portu-

guese neutrality. Not only would this excite the jealousy of France, but

also of Spain, who would probably undertake preparations for her own

security. The Regent thought it impossible to make preparations to re-

ceive British aid in this situation, as it would immediately provoke a war.

The only way to stop the danger to Portugal was for Britain to conclude a

general peace and urgently withdraw the fleet. The Prince thought British

assistance was ‘utterly insufficient for the defence of Portugal’ and threw

back the example of Naples, remarking British forces had not prevented

the invasion of that country. In a remarkable assessment he noted:

The rapidity of the French in marching their troops without bag-

gage, is only practicable in thickly peopled countries like Italy &

great parts of Germany, and not in Spain, where the want of provi-

sions and the distance from which they must be brought, would

impede quick marches undertaken by numerous columns. And

therefore there would be sufficient time for succours to arrive

from England for dispositions to be made to receive them, and

also for putting the forces of this kingdom in the best possible

state of preparations.

To this Rosslyn did not think it prudent to do any more than state nei-

ther he nor St. Vincent had the authority to withdraw the squadron.

Franco-Spanish Problems

Key to the success of any French invasion of Portugal was the support,

or at least indifference, of Spain. The Portuguese believed in the event of

war Spain, as an ally of France, would assist in the attack on Portugal;

not just out of duty to the alliance, but also due to the hold France had

over the Spaniards. The Portuguese Regent informed Rosslyn this fore-

stalled any attempts to sound out Madrid over resistance to a French

invasion. In this situation ‘such a project, instead of producing the de-

sired effect, would be the most dangerous negotiation that Portugal

could undertake’.

But it does seem as if Spain might have been more receptive to a

communication with Britain than the Portuguese officially stated. In late

BRITAIN, PORTUGAL AND SOUTH AMERICA

HE ROSSLYN MISSION TO LISBON

August Araujo had shown a letter to Strangford from the Portuguese

minister at Madrid recounting a conversation with Manuel Godoy. In

this the Prince of the Peace had expressed his displeasure with the peace

talks underway in Paris and hoped Britain might treat with Spain to pre-

vent the latter being placed in a ‘critical & dangerous situation in case the

expected peace between England & France should not prove perma-

nent’.

Clearly all was not well between Madrid and Paris; a conclusion

supported by Rosslyn after several conversations with Araujo. Spain

herself, Rosslyn pointed out to Araujo, must view the ruin of Portugal as

a precursor to her dependence on France. The current French plan to

allot part of Portuguese territory to Spain was to be countered by a sur-

render of Spanish territory to France. Rosslyn thought this entirely hos-

tile to the interests of Spain and hoped Madrid might be induced to fol-

low the views of England respecting the defence of Portugal or might

remain neutral.

The next day Araujo handed Rosslyn a letter from Ega, dated 16 Au-

gust, relating another conversation with Godoy. It included a request

that, in the present state of peace negotiations or even if they came to an

end, the Spaniards would find it extremely useful if a person possessing

the confidence of the British government were sent to Madrid to open

discussions. If such a person arrived after the conclusion of a peace,

Godoy hoped to establish relations ‘in such a manner that Spain should

never again find herself in the critical circumstance in which she had

been placed’. Araujo added Godoy believed peace preliminaries had ac-

tually been concluded at Paris and ‘It would be useless to attempt at pre-

sent in Spain any approach to conciliation whatsoever’.

Rosslyn re-

marked the British approach to Madrid was not founded on the agree-

ment of a general peace with France, but instead on continued hostilities

and the resulting danger to Portugal. Rosslyn was, however, satisfied

Godoy had articulated himself in a manner consistent with the views

Britain wished him to take. Araujo communicated this information to

Rosslyn under a promise of strict secrecy, no intimation of it was sent to

Sousa in London.

In the meantime Strangford had employed a person to travel to the

Spanish frontier town of Badajoz to observe the state of military prepa-

rations. This source reported there were no Spanish military preparations

taking place on the frontier and troops were actually moving east from

Badajoz, back into central Spain suggesting a possible confrontation with

France rather than Portugal. Strangford also enclosed intelligence from

the Swedish envoy at Madrid dated 26 August 1806, noting the arrival of

the British squadron in the Tagus and describing the apparent disgust of

the Prince Regent with his wife for wanting to establish a separate gov-

ernment with the assistance of France and Spain. It was reported the

Prince was now resolved to transport ‘himself, his riches and friends to

the Brazils, there to establish a new monarchy & with the aid of England

to conquer part of the Spanish main, an object which he pretends that

court to have very much at heart. Indeed he makes no secret of his

knowledge of the designs of England upon South America’. The Swed-

ish diplomat concluded by remarking that once the Prince had fled the

Spaniards would take advantage and seize Porto.

By 2 September Rosslyn reached the conclusion France was unlikely

to invade Portugal in the immediate future. While this was good news

for ministers in London, Rosslyn’s thoughts regarding the defence of

Portugal made for depressing but familiar reading:

I am sorry to say that I cannot see the least grounds to expect vig-

orous efforts from this nation in its own defence and it is evident

that no force G. Britain can possibly furnish, would of itself be

adequate to arrest the progress of a French invasion.

Even in the hands of a Portuguese minister who possessed absolute au-

thority combined with energy and talent, such as Pombal, it would still

take much time before any improvements could be made to the Portu-

guese military and infrastructure. Even if reforms were implemented the

French could overrun the country long before the finances and army

were improved. Rosslyn thought the Portuguese administration ‘perhaps

the weakest that this nation has seen for a long time’, describing Vila

Verde as ‘a man of no talents, no strength of mind’. Araujo expressed a

benevolent attitude towards Britain and maybe it is of no surprise Ross-

lyn regarded him as ‘the ablest man in the present council’. There was a

strong conflict between him and Vila Verde, the latter possessing the

confidence of the Regent and believed by many contemporaries to be

pro-French.

Rosslyn believed if France did attack Portugal, Spain would be com-

pelled to participate, even if it was with much reluctance. If the British

government did send troops to help defend Portugal, Rosslyn expected

the Regent would strongly protest against the infringement on his neu-

trality. Though the Portuguese would probably give permission for a

RITAIN, PORTUGAL AND SOUTH AMERICA

HE ROSSLYN MISSION TO LISBON

force to land, as transports could not remain safely off the bar, any re-

quest to take possession of the Tagus forts, a vital consideration for the

safety of any fleet operating in or off the river, would be refused.

Rosslyn clearly felt some sympathy with the Portuguese and urged

caution in future British policy towards Lisbon. Although Britain herself

was faced with a difficult situation, ministers ought not to depart from

cordial relations while the Portuguese maintained a friendly disposition.

The one exception to this would be if an enemy force marched upon

Lisbon. In this case only, Rosslyn stated, would there be reason for

‘seizing the forts and ships…and those measures so necessary for the

security of Great Britain be carried into execution’. Rosslyn resolved to

use every argument ‘short of absolute threats’ to persuade the Portu-

guese to let British troops into the Tagus forts. But he thought it would

be impossible to remove the fleet ‘till after the French army shall have

made some progress in its march’.

Rosslyn also pointed out a fundamental problem with the strategy of

sending British troops, once deployed it would be impossible to remove

the squadron and troops without severely damaging relations with the

Portuguese. Instead, akin to the recently reinforced garrison on Sicily,

they would have to remain there ‘as long as France and Spain may

choose to make demonstrations without actually carrying the attack into

effect’. Napoleon had the power ‘of confining to the Tagus in a state of

inactivity as long as it shall choose the squadron now under Lord St.

Vincent, or a large part of it, and the whole of the troops sent’. Of

course, it could have been Napoleon’s intention to tie up British military

force in static defence, thereby limiting the troops available for opera-

tions in support of Prussia or Russia, overseas operations or for am-

phibious descents upon his coastline. Simply put it was impossible to

keep 10,000 British troops and a squadron of warships in Lisbon for an

indefinite period to the detriment of other strategic issues.

As well as strategic considerations there were problems at an opera-

tional level for the force could not be withdrawn ‘without entirely aban-

doning the object for which it was sent and leaving the ships of war and

Brazilmen behind’. Rosslyn and St. Vincent thought possession of the

Tagus forts alone would be insufficient to fulfil the mission and would

not provide the Portuguese with confidence to rebut pressure from

France and Spain. Even if the forts were under British control, additional

troops were needed to act ‘in the field’ to dissuade the Portuguese from

using their military to interfere with British operations, to control the

civilian population and to secure access to the aqueduct, granaries and

arsenal.

There remained the possibility of installing British troops into the

forts without Portuguese consent but this would, Araujo argued to Stran-

ford on 8 September, lead to conflict. The Regent had been advised by

Vila Verde and M de Vascomcalles ‘to prevent, even by force, the entry of

English troops into Lisbon’. ‘Araujo himself had expressed his ‘utmost

alarm’ at the plan. Strangford thought that the moment a fleet of British

transports arrived off the Tagus the Portuguese would hold a council of

war, a measure not implemented for several years. The ten members of

this council would either decide British troops should be admitted,

thereby incurring the wrath of Spain and France, or deny the troops en-

try, thereby showing immense ingratitude to Britain. Strangford resolved

to employ himself in trying to secure the former outcome.

Rosslyn also wrote to Fox on 8 September reiterating he was

‘convinced from all the resources I can collect that no such armament has

existed’ at Bayonne; there was no French threat to Portugal. After outlin-

ing how the squadron had received supplies from the Portuguese, a sign

of continued good day-to-day relations, he turned his attention to diplo-

matic issues, for Sousa’s report of a conversation with Grenville and

Windham (dated 22 August) had arrived in Lisbon. Sousa’s ‘unexpected

intelligence’ that 10-12,000 British troops had already sailed for the Tagus

filled the Portuguese court with the ‘utmost alarm’. They feared it

breached their neutrality and would provoke an immediate declaration of

war from Spain in an attempt by Godoy to prove his devotion to

France.

The Portuguese Crisis Alleviated

While Rosslyn was questioning the reasoning behind his mission, minis-

ters in London also received intelligence casting doubts over the alleged

French threats.

The first, dated 7 August from Lauderdale, informed

Grenville of rumours implicating Yarmouth in very extensive financial

speculations involving French funds.

Next day Lauderdale was even

more convinced Yarmouth had been colluding with the French, noting

Lady Yarmouth had been intriguing with Monsieur de Montron ‘the

creature and tool of Talleyrand’. Lauderdale believed Yarmouth was

passing information to the Talleyrand’s, ‘they know everything I allow

him to know within half an hour’.

According to the Russian negotiator,

Yarmouth spent morning to night drinking with Montron.

BRITAIN, PORTUGAL AND SOUTH AMERICA

HE ROSSLYN MISSION TO LISBON

It was now clear Yarmouth’s dispatches detailing the French threats

to Portugal portrayed a false view of the situation. Lauderdale thought

they represented the French ‘in a greater state of forwardness in point of

preparation that I really believe to be the truth’. Lauderdale had talked to

Lima who thought there was an army at Bayonne ready to march on

Portugal, but upon quizzing him further, the Portuguese minister could

not name any of the commanders or regiments, but insisted provisions

had been collected for 20,000 men (Lauderdale asserted Lima was

‘perfectly under the dominion of M. Talleyrand’). Lauderdale had also

talked to the American minister, who thought there were moves to as-

semble an army but ‘no great number of troops was hitherto collected

there’. Eager to clarify matters, Lauderdale contracted a gentleman (he

does not give the name) to find out the true state of affairs at Bayonne.

Lauderdale received a report from his agent that same night: ‘he holds

the idea of an invasion of Spain for the purpose of marching to Portugal,

perfectly cheap’. The Portuguese had been correct all along.

On the 14

Lauderdale received a report from ‘A friend to his coun-

try’ providing full details of Yarmouth’s actions. Yarmouth had been

contacted by Montron about a scheme for using the peace talks as cover

for speculating on the French Bourse and the London Stock Exchange.

Since agreeing to the plan Yarmouth had been ‘open to the insinuations,

and the surveillance, if I may call it, of De Montron, who is known to be an

intelligent diplomatic spy, the active and dangerous agent of M. De Talleyrand’.

Yarmouth’s activities were now common knowledge in Paris. On 14

August Grenville replied to Lauderdale informing him of Yarmouth’s

recall. He was also keen to hear any more news regarding French de-

signs, or lack of them, on Portugal.

Yet, in London, ministers were still receiving mixed intelligence. On

17 August Howick received news from the Rosario sloop, which had been

ordered to reconnoitre the Biscay coastline around Bayonne and Bilboa.

Though the Rosario reported that no vessels suitable for transporting

troops were collected anywhere, ‘He confirms the accounts of an army

being at Bayonne, and ready to march for the purpose of attacking Por-

tugal; and adds…that the Spaniards were preparing to resist them’.

On 25 August Howick received St. Vincent’s initial dispatches from

Lisbon, but noted they contained ‘nothing very material’. Those with

trading interests in Portugal were also uncertain, one Leeds merchant

wrote privately to Fitzwilliam to ascertain ‘if they may risk their trade to

Portugal, ships now loading and preparing to sail early next month’. The