Robson Martin. Britain, Portugal and South America in the Napoleonic Wars: Alliances and Diplomacy in Economic Maritime Conflict (ENG)

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merchants wanted an unofficial hint as to government policy, but de-

layed sending an official memorial to the government to prevent their

concerns appearing in the newspapers. Grenville refused to give any

guarantee of safety and was perplexed as to why the merchants would

think that by sending an expedition to the Tagus the government would

endanger trade with Portugal. The troops were still at Plymouth, de-

tained by unfavourable winds, and Grenville had ‘almost decided to keep

them there till we hear from Lisbon’. Grenville’s comment ‘almost de-

cided’, pointed to the uncertainty Lauderdale’s information had cast over

the state of French preparations at Bayonne.

On 28 August Windham wrote to Rosslyn, St. Vincent and Simcoe

informing them since they had sailed the government had received infor-

mation ‘which induces them to believe that the preparations for the at-

tack of Portugal are in a less forward state than had before been sup-

posed’. The troops at Plymouth would be detained until Rosslyn could

provide accurate information ‘of the state of affairs at Lisbon’. Ministers

now hoped with the apparent change in French plans, there was a pros-

pect of the mission achieving its aims ‘without the necessity of resorting

to measures of force’. Although the government were adapting their re-

sponse, they were still worried about French ‘plans for the conquest and

partition of Portugal’. They did not entirely rule out sending the expedi-

tionary force; it would be ‘kept in constant readiness to sail’.

On 6 September Howick received dispatches from St. Vincent and

Strangford containing details of the communication made by Spain.

Howick was not optimistic about the possibility of ‘exciting that govern-

ment to shake off the yoke of France’ but he realised ‘no chance, how-

ever small, which might lead to the accomplishment of so desirable an

object should be neglected’. He was still awaiting the arrival of Rosslyn’s

first dispatches, which he believed would probably confirm Portuguese

accounts of the state of French and Spanish preparations. By 10 Septem-

ber he thought the best way to approach the Spaniards was by sending

Brougham to Madrid ‘with an ostensible appointment of commissary of

prisoners, to hear what they have to say and to judge the situation’.

The

question now was where to utilise the troops at Plymouth. News of the

British success at Maida arrived in London on 4 September

and four

days later Spencer, in agreement with Howick and Tom Grenville, lob-

bied for the troops to be sent onto Sicily ‘without a moment’s loss’. ‘The

accounts from Lisbon are (as I understand from Lord Howick) such as

very much to justify this measure’.

BRITAIN, PORTUGAL AND SOUTH AMERICA

HE ROSSLYN MISSION TO LISBON

In the meantime Lauderdale provided more news from Paris. A din-

ner held by Lauderdale on 7 September was attended by Talleyrand,

Champagny, Clarke, Metternich and Lima, ‘quite a creature of Talley-

rand’s’. Lauderdale stated he wanted ‘a written report of the Emperor’s

declaration in relation to Portugal, such as he described it to be’. He

knew the British government would like to receive such words in writing

‘not as adding to the security of Portugal, but as furnishing an authentic

document of the treachery of this court, in the event of things going

wrong’.

This insinuates Napoleon had given some kind of verbal decla-

ration he would not attack Portugal, something the British government

wanted in writing in case the Emperor changed his mind in the future.

But it was Rosslyn’s dispatches of 30 August, 1 and 2 September that

arrived in London on 12 September which provided final confirmation

regarding Portuguese security. Windham noted ministers had devoted

‘very careful attention’ to the ‘interesting picture which your lordship has

drawn of the present situation of Portugal, and of the actual disposition

of the court of Lisbon’. The strong wish expressed by the Regent and

Araujo for the British troops not to enter the Tagus had ‘already been

anticipated’. Rosslyn’s dispatches supported Araujo’s assurances and the

British government’s information that ‘there is no immediate menace of

attack from Bayonne’. As the Portuguese were concerned about the Brit-

ish squadron in the Tagus, it was now decided to ‘withdraw, for the pre-

sent, that assistance’. Rosslyn was informed his mission was at an end

and Strangford would continue as the British chargé at Lisbon. Rosslyn

himself was praised for his ‘zeal and ability’ during a ‘delicate and diffi-

cult business’.

It was now decided the expedition at Plymouth could be ‘much better

employed in effectual operations against the common enemy’. The Por-

tuguese were to be made aware it was impossible ‘to keep in reserve for

the possible wants of Portugal, a body of troops and a squadron of men

of war already previously destined to active operation against the enemy,

already offered to the defence of Portugal, & declined by them’. Rosslyn

was to declare the force was offered upon ‘friendly and generous princi-

ples’ and it was now removed due to the court of Lisbon declining it ‘in

the present moment’. He was to make patently clear a strong desire re-

mained in the government ‘to support the interests of Portugal…by all

practicable means to assist & sustain any efforts she may be compelled

to make in her own defence, if France or Spain should violate the assur-

ances now given of not invading her territories’. Clearly there were suspi-

cions the day of reckoning for Portugal had not been completely averted,

only, perhaps, delayed.

The End of the Rosslyn Mission

On 11 September Rosslyn received news that the sailing of the troops

had been delayed until the government received firm intelligence regard-

ing French designs. He immediately informed Araujo of the change in

British plans.

By 14 September it was known in Portugal that a stop

had been put on any troops sailing from England for the Tagus, news

which the Portuguese greeted with much satisfaction.

With regard to Spain Rosslyn thought it clear Araujo did not trust

Godoy, and was afraid to make any British prompted overtures to Ma-

drid. Araujo also believed if Prussia had joined with the allies in 1805 and

if Napoleon had suffered any considerable reverse, then Spain would

have broken with France. Rosslyn, however, thought Godoy was

‘reduced to the most perfect subjection to the will of France’. Worry-

ingly, Rosslyn also discovered Ega in Madrid had been making assur-

ances to Spain he could not guarantee, including promising St. Vincent’s

squadron would be removed. Here, as in other cases, Rosslyn found the

Portuguese ministers short-sighted ‘with very little consideration of the

future consequences either of their declarations or their measures’.

While Rosslyn had been negotiating in Lisbon, Brougham, in the ab-

sence of Simcoe who had returned to England ill, inspected the military

preparations undertaken by the Portuguese. While in Oporto during

September, he persuaded Warre to provide intelligence regarding the

state of preparations at Bayonne. Brougham and Warre despatched three

agents to Bayonne and San Sebastian, while Warre had already sent a

person to Bilbao. It was hoped this would provide early intelligence of

any French moves towards Portugal. The French consul in Oporto de-

nied any attempt would be made on Lisbon, a belief apparently sup-

ported by intelligence from Spain. At Viana on 29 September Brougham

interviewed the crew of a Portuguese schooner recently arrived from

Bayonne. Although it had been reported there were 35-38,000 troops to

be expected in Bayonne for the invasion of Portugal, the actual force

there consisted of two Italian and a single French invalid regiment. He

argued ‘this account quite confirms our former information as to the

non-existence of actual preparations’.

With the assistance of Warre,

Brougham managed to place two British agents in Bayonne and Ferrol.

Brougham was pleased he had managed to improve the intelligence

BRITAIN, PORTUGAL AND SOUTH AMERICA

HE ROSSLYN MISSION TO LISBON

situation; the correspondence was now passed through various channels

and was ‘likely to be regular and full’.

On 27 September Rosslyn received dispatches from London inform-

ing him of the capture of Buenos Ayres by British forces (see Chapter 5)

and the death of Fox.

On 30 September Rosslyn wrote to Araujo in-

forming him orders had been sent to St. Vincent for the withdrawal of

the squadron. As Rosslyn clearly pointed out, although Britain had sent a

squadron and had a body of troops at hand to help defend the country,

the Portuguese had expressed alarm and declined this help. If Portugal

was threatened again Britain would certainly examine all possibilities for

assisting its ancient ally. But, with other strategic commitments, it would

be impossible for Britain to keep a body of troops ready to fly to the

assistance of Portugal whenever the country was threatened. Rosslyn

pointed out the Portuguese had wanted a body of British troops to be

ready to help them but had not taken a single measure to improve the

finances or the military force of the country.

St. Vincent received his orders to leave the Tagus on 26 September

and the fleet set sail on the morning of Sunday 28 September.

In the

Tagus on board the frigate Lavinia on 7 October 1806, two days after the

Regent had graciously received him at an audience of leave at Mafra,

Rosslyn penned his last dispatch from the mission to Lisbon. He con-

cluded the Portuguese would not defend themselves and any British

troops that were sent out would not have any impact upon a French

invasion. One of the key problems Rosslyn had identified was the lack of

accurate intelligence regarding the military movements of Spain and

France. With the establishment of an intelligence channel through Warre

in Oporto he hoped a flow of more accurate information would assist

future British policy regarding Portugal.

In October Strangford was instructed to inform the Portuguese only

the suspension of preparations at Bayonne and ‘the appearance of the

attention of France being suddenly diverted to other quarters [war with

Prussia]’ led the British government to halt the military expedition.

Strangford was to assure the Portuguese whenever danger threatened the

country ‘no effort military or pecuniary, which her resources will allow

her to make, shall be wanting on the part of G. Britain’. There was a

caveat, however, as any British efforts should be ‘seconded by those of

the Portuguese government’. The British government expected the res-

pite granted to Portugal by the distraction of France should be seen as an

opportunity not to be wasted. Measures should be implemented to ‘add

to the internal strengths of the kingdom and insure the direction of the

resources of the country to the great object of a vigorous and effectual

defence’.

In a second letter of the same date, written after Strangford’s

dispatches of 14 September had arrived at the Foreign Office, this im-

portant point was again impressed upon Strangford. Most important was

the need to promote a ‘cordial union between Dom Rodrigo de Sousa

and Mr d’Araujo and to exert all your influence in enforcing such meas-

ures as may be concerted between them for adding to the internal

strength of the kingdom’.

Though Strangford was to continue to press the Portuguese to make

effective preparations for the defence of the country, on 22 October

Howick lamented there was little actual hope for any effectual measures

being made. But it had been decided to try and safeguard Portugal by

making a direct proposition for the conclusion of peace through the

Russian minister in Madrid. It was, however, impossible upon any terms

that would not guarantee sufficiently ‘against the renewal of the influence

of the French govt over that of Madrid, at any future period, during the

continuance of the present war’.

In mid October Strangford had a meeting with Araujo during which

he was informed the Spanish were mobilising their army and militia;

‘there was every appearance of hostile designs on the part of Spain’. But

the question was mobilisation against whom? It seemed certain ‘from

many circumstances that such designs were not directed against this

Kingdom’. Instead Godoy, upset over the conduct of his ally, had de-

cided to mobilise against Napoleon and intimated to Ega that, in order

to conceal her real intentions from the French and obtain a plausible

pretext for mobilising the army, Spain might pretend to engage in hostili-

ties against Portugal. Godoy hoped the Portuguese would go along with

this idea, ‘that a deep and secret game was thus to be played, and that

Spain, apparently arming against Portugal, would watch an opportunity

of throwing off the yoke of France, and assisted by Portugal & England,

of reassuming her ancient rank among the Powers of Europe’. Araujo

had wanted to communicate the details of this plan to the British gov-

ernment but did not have the time and instead asked Strangford to pro-

vide the brief outline to his government, but to ensure de Sousa did not

find out. Strangford and Araujo were both concerned this plan would be

leaked from Madrid to the French.

In late October Strangford noted military preparations were still tak-

ing place in Spain, with an army of 120,000 rumoured to be assembling.

BRITAIN, PORTUGAL AND SOUTH AMERICA

HE ROSSLYN MISSION TO LISBON

There was no intelligence as to where they would be stationed. Araujo

confirmed no military movements of any description had taken place in

Portugal, while ‘the preparations making by Spain, are viewed with quiet

and unaccountable apathy’. All this pointed to the possibility the Portu-

guese knew what the Spanish were intending and might explain their

horror at the arrival of a British fleet in the Tagus. Strangford included

an edict, dated 5 October 1806, from Godoy calling for the Spaniards to

rouse themselves for military service to defeat the enemy and thereby

provide for the salvation of the country through a lasting peace. This call

to arms did not identify the intended foe, though the implication was

clear enough: France.

Reports of a disagreement between Paris and Madrid were true. Still

smarting from the loss of naval power at Trafalgar Godoy had become

increasingly unhappy with his ally. While Britain was engaged in the sum-

mer peace talks in Paris, France and Spain had discussed a plan to parti-

tion Portugal. Godoy had already turned his thoughts to such a plan in

1805 desiring a principality of Portugal to rule as his own and ap-

proached the French again in May 1806.

In June and July this began to

take shape into a clear plan to divide up Portugal between the two pow-

ers. But by October France had instead launched a war against Prussia

disappointing Godoy’s ambitions. Of course with France distracted

Godoy was not one to miss an opportunity and issued the 5 October

proclamation.

The scale of French military success against the Prussians forced

Godoy into a swift and humbling volte-face but his actions had long-lasting

repercussions as Napoleon became ever more determined to solve the

many problems posed by his Spanish ally. They also provided the British

government with an opportunity to exploit the frosty relations between

Madrid and France. Godoy had apparently made an approach to the

Russia minister in Madrid, Baron Stroganoff. This backed up the infor-

mation supplied to Strangford by Araujo. British ministers wanted to

send a diplomat to Spain, ‘not only to treat for peace, but for a concert

with the allies against France’, but Howick realised this was dependant

on the continuance of war in the north of Germany. French success

against Prussia would, and did, lead to continued Spanish subservience

to France. The Spanish mobilisation might then be used against Portugal

‘if the threat of the French government shd be renewed, at the same time

that the means of enforcing them are increased’. Strangford was to press

Araujo on the danger of this policy and to urge him to restore ‘the ener-

gies of the Portuguese government and securing its means of defence,

which whether they are to be called upon to resist the attack of Spain, or

to join with that power in support of their mutual independence against

the common enemy, are equally indispensable’.

On the same day,

Howick wrote to Strangford with the news he had been promoted to

Minister Plenipotentiary to the Court of Lisbon during the absence of

Fitzgerald.

On 9 November Strangford informed Howick he had spoken to

Araujo about reforming the Portuguese military but thought the minis-

ter’s support ‘too frequently rendered ineffectual by the system of jeal-

ousy and opposition adopted towards him by his colleagues’. The prime

blame lay with Vila Verde, whose influence with the Regent and within

the court, added to his own ‘unaccountable obstinacy’ towards military

reform.

On the same day Strangford passed on information that the

French chargé d’affaires at Madrid had presented two notes to the Spanish

demanding an explanation regarding the Spanish troop movements.

Though the French danger to Portugal had passed, at least for the

time being, Strangford had to deal with other problems caused by

French actions. In December he wrote to Howick regarding ‘Very seri-

ous unease has been excited amongst the British merchants of this city in

consequence of the third article of the [Berlin] Decree [of 21 November]

prohibited by the French Government’. There was a possibility France

might use the military preparations undertaken in Spain to enforce the

decree. There had also been a report that ‘the French Government had

resolved to compel the several neutral powers of Europe to declare posi-

tively either in favour of France or against her’. Strangford looked for

government confirmation on this point and what line of conduct he

should take with the Portuguese court. The French ambassador was on

his way to Madrid, and his arrival there ‘may be considered as prepara-

tory to some very decisive measures on the part of France’.

On 28 December Strangford confirmed 25-28,000 Spanish troops

would be cantoned in the very centre of Spain. The Portuguese court

had also discussed the expediency of communicating with France regard-

ing the Berlin decrees but Araujo argued it would be ‘unwise to hazard

any declaration which might betray the uneasiness felt by the Portuguese

government at the prospect of being obliged to violate their neutrality’.

Araujo hoped Britain would realise they would gain more by a plan of

forbearance and consideration for the rights of neutral countries than by

retaliating. If Britain was to implement this plan towards Portugal, not

RITAIN, PORTUGAL AND SOUTH AMERICA

HE ROSSLYN MISSION TO LISBON

only would she gain benefits in general opinion but ‘actual and real bene-

fits of other sorts’. This might have been a Portuguese attempt to dangle

the carrot of trade with Brazil in exchange for a British understanding of

their neutrality. Araujo told Strangford he intended to write to the Portu-

guese minister in Paris with dispatches containing ‘friendly and confiden-

tial representation to the French Government of the danger with which

this country is menaced on the side of Spain’. The Portuguese hoped the

French would not ‘suffer any insult to be shown to a power which had

hitherto preserved relations of amity’.

Strangford argued against this as it ‘gave France a right to set her own

price upon the protection which virtually she was thus invited to afford

Portugal’. Moreover, it was clear if this policy was implemented,

‘Portugal might be called upon to pay for that protection by hostility to

England’ and it was unwise to consider Spain as acting purely as a sub-

sidiary of France. Araujo insisted his talks with France were to show

Portuguese attempts to reform the military were purely in consequence

of the hostile appearance of Spain.

Howick received Strangford’s despatches up to No.47 on 23 Decem-

ber. He was annoyed Araujo had taken no means to press upon the Re-

gent the ‘calamitous state into which Portugal has fallen, and the abso-

lute necessity of a radical change in the measures of the government’ or

to attempt to form an administration that would make suitable efforts

for the defence of the kingdom. So long as the new arrangements in

Portuguese affairs were unsettled, Strangford was to press the Portu-

guese ‘to bring the Court of Lisbon to a due sense of the dangers of its

present situation’.

In early 1807 Strangford conferred with Araujo. Looking back over

the events of 1806 the Portuguese minister was convinced ‘Portugal will

be spared, since there is no French army in her vicinity, since England

will protect her by sea, and since France has given a positive promise that she

will not suffer Spain to attack her by land’. In March Strangford declared he

would ‘omit no opportunity of continuing to urge the necessity of such

measures as may place this Country in a state of defence, wherein her

own means shall be principally employed’.

It is clear that, although France had long-standing designs on Portu-

gal, there was no plan to invade the country in 1806. Napoleon had not

organised an army at Bayonne nor had the Spaniards mobilised their

forces to invade. The British had based their policy on information pro-

vided by Yarmouth in Paris which proved to be entirely false. Yet, Na-

poleon’s past conduct, in particular with regard to Naples, had set a pat-

tern of activity which Britain could not ignore. The outbreak of war be-

tween Prussia and France in Northern Europe shifted focus away from

Portugal, at least for the time being. Yet by reacting to a perceived threat

to Portuguese independence, the Talents had shown themselves more

than capable of moving swiftly to protect British interests. One reason

for this was the availability of an expeditionary force, which had origi-

nally been destined to reinforce Sicily. While reacting to the perceived

French threat to Portuguese neutrality, however, a multitude of possibili-

ties had opened up on the other side of the world.

…

RITAIN, PORTUGAL AND SOUTH AMERICA

With Napoleon attempting to ruin the British economy by means of the

Continental blockade during 1806-1808 South America became a key

region for expanding British commerce. This strategy remains controver-

sial and has provided fruitful ground for critics of British policy. Napo-

leon himself began the propaganda campaign mocking British dabbling in

South America, declaring while European powers mobilised their man-

power in futile resistance to his ambitions Britain turned her back on

Europe and concentrated on overseas empire building.

Following their

leader some French historians point to Britain’s overarching lust for im-

perial power,

while Lefebvre called it a ‘policy of maritime imperialism’.

Certainly there was a long held belief in Britain that South America

was ripe for commercial exploitation. The problem was Portuguese and

Spanish reluctance to give up their monopolies over South American

trade and specie; this could only be reversed by opening up the markets

through the use of British military force. This was particularly true of

Spanish Latin America during the years that country was allied with

France. Hence there was little interest in the early years of the war and

British operations were concentrated in the Low Countries and the West

Indies. But with Spain changing sides in 1796 the colonial possessions of

that power became fair game. As Secretary of State for War, Henry Dun-

das planned expeditions to Chile in 1796, Venezuela in 1797 and Buenos

Aires in 1800. In 1801 Venezuela was considered by the Addington min-

istry and again by Dundas after the war with Spain broke out in 1804.

1803 an unsigned memorandum had been submitted to Addington; in

the same year Sir Home Popham RN had expressed the need to remove

the wealthy Spanish colonies from the influence of European Spain.

THE TALENTS AND

SOUTH AMERICA