Robson Martin. Britain, Portugal and South America in the Napoleonic Wars: Alliances and Diplomacy in Economic Maritime Conflict (ENG)

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sometimes sceptical of Grenville’s plans, came up with what Fortescue

called ‘one of the most astonishing plans that ever emanated from the

Brain even of a British Minister of War’.

Writing to Brigadier Robert

Craufurd on 30 October Windham noted the success attended on the

east coast of South America and the experience the indigenous peoples

would by now have gained of ‘the benign protecting government of His

Majesty’ as opposed to the ‘oppressive dominion of Spain’. Craufurd’s

object, therefore, was ‘the capture of the sea ports and fortresses and the

reduction of the province of Chili’. To achieve this he was provided with

just 4,000 men, which Windham thought adequate for the task ‘from a

just inference drawn from the success at Buenos Aires’. This force was

then expected to open up overland communications with the force in

Buenos Aires!

Everyone was clearly getting carried away. Grenville had already pro-

posed an audacious plan whereby troops from India would seize the

Spanish position at Manila and then go on to invade Mexico while a sec-

ond force, drawing extra troops from the West Indies, would also sail for

Mexico, joining with the first in Panama.

Noting that very soon there

would be more than 6,000 British troops at Buenos Aires and assuming

this force ‘will, of course, have taken Monte Video’, not more than 3,000

would be necessary to hold the city. The rest could go onto India. If the

forces in South America were insufficient then 5,000 Bengal Sepoys

could provide reinforcements from India.

Windham poured cold water

on these schemes, pointing out the complete impracticality of moving

forces between India, the Pacific and South America. Instead he thought

of attacking the west coast with forces drawn from Buenos Aires.

10 November the Admiralty wrote to Rear Admiral George Murray or-

dering him to escort Craufurd’s expedition to Chile, either by rounding

Cape Horn, or by heading east, via New South Wales. The unfavourable

weather and problems collecting transport tonnage delayed the sailing of

the expedition until New Year’s Eve 1806.

It seems as if, perhaps bewildered by his own plans and uncertain of

the weather and geographical conditions, Grenville sought professional

opinion and turned to Sir Arthur Wellesley. Wellesley had gained impor-

tant experience leading the 33

Regiment during the 1794 campaign in

the Low Countries where, he later recalled, ‘I learnt what one ought not

to do, and that is always something’.

Wellesley then had a successful

career in India from 1797 until 1805, winning a notable victory over

Maratha forces at Assaye, 23 September 1803.

His experience of inde-

BRITAIN, PORTUGAL AND SOUTH AMERICA

HE TALENTS AND SOUTH AMERICA

pendent command in India and his strong political and familial links

placed him in a position of influence high above his seniority.

Wellesley scotched the plan for a two-pronged attack on Mexico. In

order to sail from Manilla to Latin America, the attack on Manilla must

be made in July, but the weather conditions on the East and West coast

of the continent were completely different. December and January were

the fair season on the East coast of Mexico but at the same time the

West coast would be suffering rains in the sickly season. The defending

forces would have the strategic upper hand, operating on interior lines

the Spaniards could concentrate their forces against one of the two Brit-

ish expeditions, crushing it before moving against the other. Instead

what Wellesley envisaged was the option of removing all the men for the

attack on Mexico and basing them at Jamaica, ready for an assault in the

proper season.

By 20 November Wellesley was considering an attack with a force

from the east; troops from the west would only serve as reinforcements

once the initial conquest had been achieved. He wanted 6,000 European

infantry, 3,000 Negro infantry, 2,000 artillerymen, 1,400 cavalry and field

and siege guns to sail from Buenos Aires in September, while the appro-

priate logistical support vital for expeditionary warfare sailed from Eng-

land in April, with the rest of the troops leaving in June. The idea was to

achieve a concentration of force in Jamaica so the expedition could sail

for Mexico in November, arriving there in December. 3,000 Sepoys and

500 European troops from India would sail in October, to arrive on the

west coast of Mexico in February.

This memorandum was followed by

a discussion of possible points of attacking Mexico and instructions for

the Ordnance, Victualling and Transport boards.

Compared to minis-

ters’ schemes Wellesley’s plan was a master class in military planning. He

had learned his trade well in India.

Ministers seemingly deferred to Wellesley’s superior knowledge. On 25

November the Marquis of Wellesley informed Grenville that Sir Arthur

was ‘highly pleased with the discussions which have passed between you

respecting the proposed expedition…if it should be prosecuted he would

prefer that employment to all others’.

It also fitted in with government

policy. In early November 1806, with Prussia apparently humbled by

France, Earl Fitzwilliam wrote to Grenville arguing Britain must look away

from Europe. ‘The disasters in Germany, I find, exceed even the French

reports; these are only preparations to the destruction even of the Russian

empire; there is an end of the old world, we must look to the new’.

Central to all the varied plans put forward at this time was a belief the

populace of Spanish America were ready to throw off the yoke of impe-

rial control and would welcome British forces with open arms. What

they failed to realise was the indigenous population would not want to

swap control by one empire for control by another. This explains some

of the bewilderment that greeted the arrival in London during January

1807 of the news Popham’s initial expedition had sparked a popular up-

rising, not just against the British but also against Spanish control. The

outnumbered British troops had been attacked and forced to surrender

Buenos Aires on 12 August 1806.

The first account of the recapture of Buenos Aires ‘after a bloody

contest, wherein many had fallen on both sides & the remainder of the

English troops had been made prisoner’ arrived in London on 2 January

1807.

New orders were immediately sent out to Murray. He was to

head for either Rio de Janeiro or Buenos Aires, whichever he judged

best, and, if he was still there, provide any assistance possible to the

force already sent out under Auchmuty. If Auchmuty had been ejected

and had retired to the Cape, Murray was to try to retake Buenos Aires if

his force was sufficient. If not, he was to wait for reinforcements from

the Cape under Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Backhouse.

Though the

government could not confirm the news until the receipt of more defi-

nite intelligence or dispatches from Buenos Aires, Grenville for one be-

lieved the reports were accurate.

On the 17

the Admiralty received a

telegraph message from Plymouth stating ‘Buenos Ayres [sic] taken, and

Army prisoners. August the 12

’.

By 20 January there was so little defi-

nite news that Tom Grenville began to express doubts as to the validity

of the reports, especially as no intelligence had arrived from one of the

many Royal Navy ships now operating in South American waters.

All doubts were removed when Popham’s account of the capture of

the city by the Spaniards arrived in London on 25 January.

Having al-

ready made a major commitment to attacking Spanish America, the Tal-

ents reacted to this unwelcome intelligence by drawing up new plans for

the polyglot of forces already on the way to the region. The difficulty of

coordinating troop and fleet movements thousands of miles away was

clearly coming home to roost.

First off the mark was Wellesley who, on the very same day the news

arrived in London, again raised the question of the Mexican expedition.

Four days later he submitted a confidential memorandum forecasting the

likely proceedings of the various forces in South America, and the possi-

BRITAIN, PORTUGAL AND SOUTH AMERICA

HE TALENTS AND SOUTH AMERICA

bilities for the recapture of Buenos Aires. He surmised the force under

Backhouse would have reinforced Popham and Beresford. Wellesley

thought Backhouse would not attack Montevideo, but should remain in

Maldonado. The combined force, once Auchmuty arrived, would be just

over 5,000 men. Wellesley thought Auchmuty would then attack Monte-

video with this force. This would be the likely situation Craufurd found

when he arrived with his troops, bringing the force up to 9,500 men.

Such a concentration would enable the attack on Buenos Aires to com-

mence; once completed the troops would remain there until further or-

ders arrived from London. Wellesley advised the government to send

out two general officers of sufficient rank to assume command. He esti-

mated the Spaniards would be able to call on 18,889 troops to oppose

British operations, therefore no less than 5,200 infantry and 2,100 cav-

alry were needed for the conquest and possession of Buenos Aires, in-

cluding the town itself, Montevideo, Maldonado and Cordova.

In February Wellesley submitted another detailed memorandum for

an attack on the Spanish American provinces of Venezuela, Maracaibo,

Cumana, Guiana and St. Marguerite. The total Spanish force in these

areas was estimated to be a little over 13,000, but after the experience of

Buenos Aires this number might not be accurate. Wellesley thought it

would require as large a British force to keep the area under British rule

as it would for the initial conquest. This convinced him ‘the gain which

Great Britain will derive from the possession of this colony, under pre-

sent circumstances, will not compensate for the loss which may be sus-

tained’. The only viable reason to seize territory was to prevent the

French claiming them in a peace settlement. Wellesley could only suggest

achieving the object through the establishment of an independent gov-

ernment.

By now there were disagreements in the cabinet over South American

policy. Reacting piecemeal as already out-of-date news arrived in Lon-

don, Thomas Grenville summed up the state of the government to

Buckingham on 17 February:

I am more than ever convinced that all these distant operations are

of necessity subject to so many chances that I have little stomach

for them; but in spite of my feeble opposition, our military

projectors are running after one expedition and one general with

another and another.

Yet, as he realised, those who succumbed to the benefits, real or imag-

ined, to be gained, outnumbered him.

In February Grenville had composed a minute, perhaps for circula-

tion at cabinet, outlining what the Talents would now try to achieve. A

further reinforcement under Lieutenant General John Whitelocke would

be sent to the River Plate ‘with the utmost practicable expedition’. As

was usual in distant operations, Whitelocke was to be allowed the free-

dom to exercise his judgement. The main object was to seize a strong

position as an entrepôt for British goods and from which to spread politi-

cal influence. If he thought seizing Buenos Aires was possible and could

be retained by 6-7,000 men, he should attack and remain there until re-

ceiving further orders. It was up to Whitelocke to decide if, once Buenos

Aires had been captured, Montevideo could be destroyed. In essence

Whitelocke was only to occupy strategic positions that could be easily

captured and garrisoned.

In one of their last decisions in power, the ‘Talents’ consolidated all

the forces in South America under the command of Whitelocke. The

combined expedition would now total 11,180 men. This was a major

commitment to South America; as Duffy has noted, it was the second

largest single force committed outside of Europe between 1796 and

1814.

On 24 February Whitelocke was given the option of dispatching

a portion of his force for operations in Peru, while Windham considered

occupying Panama and establishing communications across the isthmus

to the West Indies.

Whitelocke’s expedition was a catastrophic failure for direct British

intervention in South America. Auchmuty arrived in the region first and,

finding Buenos Aires had fallen, attacked Montevideo, seizing the city in

February 1807 for a loss of 350 men. Whitelocke arrived off Montevideo

on 10 May with Craufurd appearing ten days later. Whitelocke now de-

cided to retake Buenos Aires, assaulting the city on 5 July. British forces

became separated in desperate street fighting and were surrounded and

isolated by a numerically superior enemy. Whitelocke lost 3,000 men

killed, wounded and captured. There was no choice but to agree to a

humiliating surrender. British forces retreated and agreed to evacuate the

River Plate. The Talents policy had ended in utter disaster.

While the reputation of the Talents can be rescued somewhat by their

response to the Portuguese crisis of 1806, it is clear their strategy to-

wards South America was fundamentally flawed. Their confusion over

what constituted Buenos Aires was only compounded by general igno-

RITAIN, PORTUGAL AND SOUTH AMERICA

HE TALENTS AND SOUTH AMERICA

rance of the geography of the region. The very nature of Popham’s ac-

tions, however, forced ministers to react in support of the supposed

commercial opportunities he had created. In approaching this they failed

to decide what they wanted from intervention in the region. Grenville

initially saw conquering territory as a bargaining tool at the peace talks,

but then changed his mind to conquering the entire region and holding

until a more permanent settlement. All those involved wrote about the

oppression of the indigenous people and expressed a desire to free them

from their Spanish overlords. But Grenville’s plan for a multi-pronged

attack on Spanish America was a clear attempt at seizing territory.

Those who have criticised the Talents for ignoring the European war

must, however, remember that operations in South America occupied

around 15,000 British troops; in fact almost the entire military force Brit-

ain had for offensive action. At Ulm and Friedland the French inflicted

100,000 casualties on the Russians and Prussians. British troops would

not have made any difference to slaughter on this scale. But with the

Royal Navy thrown into the mix Grainger noted:

…in a way, Lord Grenville was quite justified in devoting himself

to the prospect of empire overseas instead of activity in Europe,

for small British forces exerted a power wholly disproportionate to

their numbers the further they were from Europe, whereas not one

of Napoleon’s 200,000 strong Grande Armée got salt water on his

boots.

But the problem with the Talents intervention was ‘aiming to involve

itself in unending warfare on a continental scale’. The majority of those

Britons involved had a ‘sheer ignorance of South American geography,

population, distances and attitudes’, one of the main elements in the

failure of the policy.

Just one example will illuminate this point. In November 1806 Buck-

ingham wrote to Grenville informing him he had just received ‘a very

valuable and interesting work….a bird’s eye view of all the ports, bays,

roads, rocks and shoals’ by William Hack, covering the whole of the

West Coast of South America from California to the Strait le Maire.

Buckingham hoped it might prove useful and was searching for a copy

of a book on hydrography by the same author.

All in all this added up

to the inevitable conclusion expressed by Grainger that ‘a better knowl-

edge of the Spanish empire would have convinced everyone, from Po-

pham onwards, not to meddle’.

A viewpoint Grenville himself had

expressed before being entangled in the question of how to react to Po-

pham’s actions.

Therefore, it seems as if on balance Napoleon was right: under the

Talents Britain did follow an ‘imperialist’ maritime strategy while turning

her back on potential allies in Europe. Taken at face value the weight of

evidence against the Talents seems to support this theory as they looked

to the area to gain bargaining leverage at the peace table. When the talks

broke down the conquest of the region to counterbalance French he-

gemony in Europe was certainly on the agenda. But commercial oppor-

tunities also impinged heavily on strategy; when faced with the actions of

Popham and the domestic pressure for new markets, could they realisti-

cally have done anything else? Hall argues after this ‘sudden, apparently

heaven-sent, opportunity to expand British imperial power’

the Talents

looked to South America as a region where ‘British interests at their

most blatant, could be pursued’.

Of course, British interests at this

point were securing new markets and money to keep the war effort go-

ing. The problem with the Talents strategy was one of focus and clarity;

they just did not get to grips with strategic and operational difficulties.

Wellesley brought some sound military advice to the table but it was

probably too late. The Talents lack of strategic understanding was

brought to a head by the appointment of Whitelocke and his consequent

bungling in the region, all of which helped convince the local populace

they had little to fear from further British military intervention or their

imperial masters in Madrid.

The Talents did not have to deal with the consequences of these

events. After just over a year in office, the administration collapsed.

The issue of British aims in South America would be discussed at length

by the next administration leading to a distinctly different approach.

…

RITAIN, PORTUGAL AND SOUTH AMERICA

100

The fall of the Talents in March 1807 was followed by the return to

power of a ministry comprising Pitt’s friends and followers. William

Henry Cavendish Bentick, 3

Duke of Portland, became head of the

new government as First Lord of the Treasury. The leader of a group of

Whigs that had joined Pitt in 1794, Portland was now sixty-nine, infirm

and continually fortified with laudanum. He was no more than a figure-

head,

but his experience ensured him genuine respect.

Also in the

Lords were Henry Phipps, 1

Earl Mulgrave as First Lord of the Admi-

ralty, and General John Pitt, 2

Earl of Chatham as Master General of

the Ordnance.

Henry 3

Earl Bathurst was the least experienced mem-

ber of the Cabinet and took office as President of the Board of Trade.

These individuals had amassed a great deal of ministerial experience,

but the real centre of the Portland government lay with several promis-

ing younger ministers, none of whom were old or experienced enough in

1807 to become leader. Also sitting in the Lords was the Home Secretary

Robert Banks Jenkinson, Lord Hawkesbury (after 17 December 1807,

Lord Liverpool).

Perhaps the most promising member of the Cabinet

was, at thirty-six, also one of the youngest. George Canning took the

seals at the Foreign Office. Canning had worked under Grenville in the

Foreign Office from 1796 bringing him into regular contact with Dun-

das, Windham and Pitt.

Robert Stewart, who had the Irish courtesy title

of Viscount Castlereagh, became Secretary of State for War and the

Colonies,

the only holder of that post ‘in this whole period to be widely

praised’, according to Muir and Esdaile.

The final important member of

the Cabinet sitting in the Commons was the forty-four-year-old practis-

ing lawyer Spencer Perceval.

THE STRATEGY OF THE

PORTLAND MINISTRY

Just as historians have had plenty to say about the Talents the Portland

administration has also come in for some stern criticism. A strong be-

liever in the Whig cause, William Napier savaged the Portland administra-

tion often vilifying Tory ministers while playing up the achievements of

fellow Whigs. Highlighting the Talents offer to help defend Portugal with

a British army in 1806 he thought the Portland government ‘did not

evince as much foresight and ready zeal’.

Fortescue directed invective

against the Portland administration, though most of it was aimed at Can-

ning’s treatment of Sir John Moore, rather than the government as a

whole.

Oman criticised the Portland administration for concentrating

on overseas operations, only redeeming themselves by their prompt and

united intervention in Iberia in 1808.

In some way, the Portland minis-

try has never recovered from these early attacks; Watson writing in 1960

argued there was ‘no cabinet policy…it staggered along like a motor firing

intermittently on different cylinders as first one then the other of its

members took the initiative’.

A recent work notes the cabinet’s ‘strategic

drift’ as it could do nothing to prevent Napoleonic hegemony.

Recent re-assessments have provided a more balanced view. Muir and

Esdaile point out the Cabinet had no strong leader and the debate could

drag on for months, though this ensured strategic questions were dis-

cussed at length leading to at least some ‘boldness and decision’ on cer-

tain issues.

As Glover notes, though Portland may have been pompous

and indecisive, the administration contained the men of the future, Per-

ceval, Castlereagh, Liverpool and Canning.

Certainly with Portland ill,

the direction of the war effort would fall upon Canning and Castlereagh,

advised noticeably by Wellesley (who sat as MP for Rye, was appointed a

Privy Councillor, and held the position of Chief Secretary in the Irish

Government), in much the same way as strategy during the period 1794-

1801 was defined by Pitt, Dundas and Grenville.

Pitt’s legacy greatly influenced the early months of the Portland Cabi-

net. From March 1807 until late June, when news of the defeat of the

Russians at the battle of Friedland filtered through to London, the Cabi-

net tried to resurrect another European coalition.

But, unlike Pitt’s

coalitions when British money in effect hired troops, now financial aid

would only be forthcoming once countries had actually taken up arms

against France. Yet, the prospects were not too promising. With Austria

on the sidelines, Prussia and Russia were most obviously threatened by

French military prowess and British efforts concentrated on those two

powers. An initial subsidy of £100,000 was sent to Prussia and a treaty

RITAIN, PORTUGAL AND SOUTH AMERICA

102

HE STRATEGY OF THE PORTLAND MINISTRY

103

was later signed in which Britain agreed to pay £1,000,000 in return for a

promise that Berlin would throw all resources into war with France. As-

surances along those lines were reiterated in May as Canning was pre-

pared to provide £2.6 million in aid to both Prussia and Russia. Even the

difficult King Gustavus IV of Sweden was promised £50,000 if he added

4,000 men to his army. With the Continental blockade causing problems

to the distribution of British financial aid Canning was keen for the pow-

ers to receive arms as part of the subsidies. This policy had some suc-

cess, 100,000 British muskets being sent to allies by June, though even

here there were problems as the Ordnance Office was not in a position

to meet the continued demands, as the British arms industry was not yet

self-sufficient.

British hopes of raising another coalition would be supplemented, if

possible, by direct military support in the shape of British maritime-based

expeditionary forces. Upon taking office Castlereagh examined the strate-

gic situation. With troops tied up in the Mediterranean and South Amer-

ica, others set aside to reinforce positions in the East and West Indies and

the requirement for home defence, there were 33,622 troops for overseas

service. With 3,000 reinforcements to go to the East Indies, 2,000 to the

West Indies and 5,000 to support policy in South America, Castlereagh

concluded it would not be prudent to send more than 10-12,000 infantry

to Continental Europe. On 3 April he asked permission from the King to

organise 12,000 men into an expeditionary force to be ‘held in readiness

to move at the shortest notice….for the purpose of cooperating with, or

effecting a diversion in favor of your Majesty’s allies’.

With available manpower constraining strategy on 12 May Castlereagh

proposed measures for increasing the total military force available for

operations and on 26 May drafted a detailed memo for the Cabinet. He

voiced concern over the numbers available for home defence and ques-

tioned the advisability of committing troops to Europe. One major

problem was the lack of sufficient transport capability to convey troops

to an area of operations, but by raising the hiring rate paid to contractors

he managed to increase the tonnage available for overseas service from

the 21,727 tons in February to 115,586 tons in June, despite complaining

the expense involved was great.

With the transport capacity increasing, ministers could seriously con-

sider the options for committing British troops on the periphery of Con-

tinental Europe, where maritime power carried an inherent advantage.

One such theatre was the Baltic, where, alongside traditional maritime