Robson Martin. Britain, Portugal and South America in the Napoleonic Wars: Alliances and Diplomacy in Economic Maritime Conflict (ENG)

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the Spaniards. If the Portuguese failed to implement the demands,

France would declare war and a French army of 20,000 men would

march from Bayonne to link up with a Spanish army for the invasion of

Portugal. On 29 July Napoleon ordered the formation of the Army of

Portugal at Bayonne.

At this point Napoleon viewed Spain as an essential ally in the subju-

gation of Portugal and wanted Spanish troops to assist the invasion.

Once this object had been achieved, however, Napoleon wanted to in-

troduce French troops into the strategically important areas of Spain as a

prelude to the reorganisation of the Spanish state.

When the deadline of

1 September passed, Napoleon waited for firm news from Lisbon re-

garding the Portuguese response. In the meantime Champagny was to

clearly state to Lima once a French army had entered Portugal it would

not be withdrawn.

The Portuguese Crisis Renewed

On the morning of 5 August, while the Portland ministry was concerned

about events in the Baltic and the Mediterranean, dispatches from Lis-

bon dated 25 July arrived at the Foreign Office. Napoleon had de-

manded four Spanish infantry regiments ‘to be immediately marched

into France’, and had ‘required the admission of...troops into Spain’. The

reason was to give ‘weight to some demands upon this Country which

the French Government is about to make, which will be highly hostile to

the interests of Great Britain’. Strangford thought just 2,000 French

troops on Spanish soil would ‘compel this court to accede to any de-

mands which Bonaparte might think proper to make, however deroga-

tory to the Honour of Portugal, or injurious to the interests of her An-

cient ally’. The Portuguese government would, he thought, comply with

any demands while secretly granting Britain commercial concessions at

the conclusion of a general peace. He also warned Canning that Sousa

might not be informed of this plan.

A further communication from Strangford arrived in London on 25

August. The French and Spanish ministers in Lisbon, Rayneval and D.

Manuel José António, 2° conde de Campo-Alegre respectively, had is-

sued a formal ultimatum to the Portuguese court on 12 August. This

note ordered Portugal to close her ports to British commerce, confiscate

British property and declare war by 1 September. The Portuguese did

not take the demands seriously as they were certain London would be

‘obliged to enter into negotiations for a general peace’ and Sousa would

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be instructed to stress this point. Strangford was convinced the Portu-

guese court would not respond to the ultimatum until made aware of the

British response. Until that was clear the ‘Portuguese Government is

resolved to use every effort to gain time’.

This communication reached Canning on 26 August, while he was

anxiously awaiting information of the Danish expedition. He immedi-

ately identified what line Britain would take, lamenting to Joan ‘we have

more work upon our hands. Lisbon ought to be another Copenhagen.

Would our fleet and army now come back and ready to start again!

Never was a time of so much anxiety!’

Canning was eager to confirm

the composition of the Portuguese navy and, like the Talents before him,

turned to John Gambier. Upon taking office in March Canning, possibly

sensing Portugal would play a major role in his foreign policy, had asked

Mulgrave for his assessment of Gambier. Mulgrave replied ‘I can only

say that I believe Gambier to be a clever man and that he did the whole

of what business was done while Lord Robert Fitzgerald was at the

Court of Lisbon’.

Unfortunately, Gambier had mislaid the paperwork

detailing the exact composition of the Portuguese navy, but in a rough

guess he estimated 12 ships-of-the-line, 14 frigates and 12 sloops and

brigs. He drew particular attention to the poor condition of these ships

as ‘not more than two of these sail of the line [are] in commission; The

rest lay in a state of Ordinary, most of them in tolerable repair’.

Three days later Canning sent Joan ‘a very curious paper’ that had

been discovered in the Foreign Office ‘some weeks ago but long after

my instructions to Jackson [envoy to Copenhagen] were written and the

fleet [destined for Copenhagen] actually gone’. This paper detailed ‘a

similar prank that our predecessors had played with respect to Portugal

last summer but failed’. According to Canning it was in Grenville’s hand,

due to Fox being too ill to write at the time. ‘This accounts for the Morn

[in]g Chron[icle] not being saucy’ over the expedition to Denmark.

This is a revealing letter on several counts. Aware of the 1806 crisis, Can-

ning may have been looking back through the correspondence in the

Foreign Office to find out exactly what discussions had taken place. He

was also drawing similarities between the Talents 1806 mission to Lisbon

and the current Danish expedition. This information would prove essen-

tial in countering opposition attacks if the situation at Copenhagen were

resolved by force, as this is exactly what the Talents had considered at

Lisbon. The line taken by the Morning Chronicle backed up this assertion.

The Talents mission to Lisbon also provided recent information that

Canning could refer to, along with previous memoranda and the actual

orders and aims of the 1806 expedition and, perhaps, intelligence regard-

ing the situation in Portugal and Spain.

In late August Eldon, the Lord Chancellor, argued Portugal ‘cannot

resist, and in the state in which we are, what can we do by the first of

September?’ He asserted to Canning if ‘we cannot lay hold of her fleet

(and how can we do that at this moment?) have we any choice but to

look to her possessions in other parts of the world’.

Writing to the

King on 27 August Castlereagh assumed a more dynamic attitude noting

the ‘importance of having a force disposable to prevent if possible the

Portuguese navy from falling into the hands of France’. He displayed a

sound understanding of the value of flexible and rapidly deployed mari-

time-based forces set against the limitations of land based logistics. A

French force marching overland could not get there ‘for a considerable

length of time’. Maritime mobility would enable Britain to place a sea-

borne force at Lisbon before the French, marching overland, could reach

the Tagus: ‘if the means of sending a respectable force into the Tagus be

prepar’d with secresy [sic] and dispatch it may be in your Majesty’s

power to anticipate the enemy in that attempt’. Fitzgerald informed Can-

ning the Portuguese might be playing for time until the November rains

made a French invasion impracticable until the spring of 1808. He was

convinced if Britain devoted a sufficient force the ‘Portuguese fleet

would be secured by us before an army marching by land could take

possession of it’.

To have a force ready to intervene in Portugal Castlereagh instructed

Cathcart that, if circumstances in the Baltic allowed, ‘at least 10,000 men

and, if possible, one half of your force of 25,000 men, should be de-

tached with the utmost possible expedition with a view to a particular

service, this force to proceed to the Downs there to receive further or-

ders’.

The force withdrawing from Sicily under Moore was ordered to

proceed to England after touching at Gibraltar, to be available for fur-

ther operations.

On 29 August Castlereagh, obviously well informed

about conditions in Iberia, told the King a French invasion force would

take 100 days or three months to arrive outside Lisbon. He was con-

vinced efforts to strengthen the French army in Poland had left the

southern and western departments stripped of troops. If the government

could react with vigour and speed to secure the Portuguese fleet ‘your

Majesty will not have reason to apprehend any very formidable resistance

from the forces of Portugal alone’.

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Further reports arrived at the Foreign Office on 30 August. The first,

dated 20 August, informed Canning the Portuguese had been apprised

Britain would not enter peace negotiations. Their hopes were now placed

in the ‘tolerance and generosity’ of Britain as they were ‘unable…to help

themselves’. If England could assist ‘the only sort of defence which she

could supply, is precisely that of which they least stand in need, namely

protection by sea….England cannot undertake the total defence of Por-

tugal by land’. As the Talents had found the previous year, the inability

of Britain to prevent the Spanish invasion of 1801 was clearly uppermost

in Portuguese minds. Whatever the number of troops Britain could spare

for the defence of the country France and Spain could bring forth supe-

rior forces and ‘Portugal would fall’. The only policy available to the

Portuguese government was to agree to a convention ‘to take place at a

general peace, permitting the establishment of English commercial

houses in the Brazils’.

Strangford noted the Portuguese were ‘determined to resist the de-

mands of France, respecting the confiscation of British property, and the

detention of British subjects in Portugal’, but seemed to be in ‘much

readiness to accede to the other propositions of Bonaparte’. All Portugal

wanted was to prevent her colonies and commerce being destroyed by

Britain. In return, Araujo assured Strangford, Britain had ‘nothing to

dread from the mock warfare in which we [Portugal] may be compelled

to engage’. Britain could ‘take and destroy our ships of war wherever

they may find them employed against her, a circumstance which it will be

our promise to prevent’. Strangford thought ‘any attempt on the part of

England to save Portugal by military succours, would be utterly unavail-

ing. No system could be adopted, of which the national resources of the

Country [of Portugal] would form an effective part’. He thought Napo-

leon was determined to act, concluding ‘I cannot help believing that he

will not carry his menaces into immediate execution’.

In London Sousa had only received a copy of the French ultimatum

in late August, and on the 28

wrote a lengthy letter to Canning stating

Portugal hoped to ward off the French threat while engaging in secret

negotiations with Britain over the course of policy the Portuguese should

follow. Canning transmitted a personal letter received in London by

Sousa from the Regent addressed to King George III on 1 September,

which confirmed the above intentions.

Initially Canning attempted to resolve the Portuguese crisis by diplo-

matic means. He hoped Portugal could be made to realise the strategic

situation on the Continent had been altered drastically by events leading

up to and as a consequence of Tilsit. In response, Sousa was told on 7

September, British policy and strategy had also changed. Canning recog-

nised Portugal was a pawn in a wider French strategy as had been the

case with Denmark. Although he expressed the ‘liveliest indignation

[with] the unprincipled and extravagant demands which have been made

by France’, British policy was now firmly centred on self-preservation.

He communicated the belief in the British cabinet that the French object

‘now in view, is not to distress, but to annihilate Great Britain, that the

determination to force Portugal into war is but part of a system involving

the whole of those nations who had hitherto preserved their neutrality’.

If France succeeded ‘Britain may find herself under the hard necessity of

first overpowering [them] as enemies, with the purpose of hereafter rees-

tablishing them as independent States’. This was a clear warning to Por-

tugal that the consequences of complying with the demands of France

would be war with Britain. The one course of action Portugal could fol-

low to preserve her independence, and in which Britain would provide

assistance, would be for the Regent to sail for Brazil with his fleet. This

would preserve Portuguese sovereignty while removing their navy from

French designs. If the Regent decided upon this course then ‘The fleets

of H[is] M[ajest]y are ready to cooperate with those of the Prince regent

to convoy H.R.H. to his destination’. Canning impressed the ‘essential

importance of having recourse to this measure without delay’.

An unofficial letter of the same date allowed Canning to take a more

flexible stance. If, in the present state of Europe, France could ‘bona fide

acquiesce in the shutting of the ports of that country as the sole and ex-

treme measure of its hostility to us’, then there would be ‘the same dis-

position to forebearance, on the part of this government, to which had

been shewn on former occasions’. But Canning was convinced Napo-

leon wanted more than the shutting of the ports; rather the measure was

‘a prelude, or accompaniment to others of a more decidedly hostile char-

acter’. Canning recommended Sousa amend his dispatches, including

‘some expression which should shew that this case [Portuguese compli-

ance placating France] is not thought to be a probable one; lest by shut-

ting it, without such precaution, you should mislead your court as to our

opinion of its probability’.

The threat to Portugal was clear to many. In August 1807 Harriet

Slessor, an English national living in Oporto, decided to keep a regular

diary of events. On 7 August she confided:

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While Lord St. Vincent was last year in the Tagus with his

squadron, this Government had little reason to be at their ease

with regard to French plans for the pretended future good of

Portugal. She will now I fear be made to pay dear for her constant

and time immemorial alliance…. Those deeply concerned in the

event, because they ardently wish it, flatter themselves that it may

again blow off. Alas, appearances are not for certain in favour of

so desirable an event.

In London Brougham, still a keen observer, suspected ‘something is in

agitation with Portugal’ remarking to Howick, ‘Souza has been frequently

in town, and full of something, but exceedingly afraid of being talked

to….The English connected with Portugal seem to believe that their last

danger is now come’.

While negotiating with Sousa British ministers also had to consider

the dénouement of the Danish crisis. After the military expedition had

sailed on 30 July, Canning was faced with a frustrating wait for news. In

August he had been growing increasingly anxious over the fate of the

operation and was suffering many restless nights. On 11 September he

was still awaiting information regarding the expedition, although he

noted news must come soon and ‘it must be good’. It was not until 16

September that news of the success of the operation reached Canning,

who was naturally overjoyed and overlooked the moral objections voiced

by critics of the bombardment of Copenhagen. With the major part of

the operation now resolved the cabinet could devote more attention to

the crisis in Portugal.

New South American Policy

Yet, just as one crisis was resolved another one blew up. Intelligence

reached London on 11 September of Whitelocke’s failure and was pub-

lished in the London ‘Gazette Extraordinary’ of 13 September.

This

humiliating reversal cast doubt over the effectiveness of British forces in

the region - a point appreciated by the Portuguese court in Lisbon. For

Hall it was a final defeat for British strategy in the region,

for Napier it

signalled the end of South American conquest.

‘After 1807’, Schroeder

has argued, ‘Britain sought trade, not colonies, in the New World’.

1807 and 1808 the possibility of widespread conquest was shelved and,

according to Muir, ministers ‘decided to attempt to forestall the French

by reviving their South American strategy in a different form’.

As we have seen, however, Castlereagh had already come to the con-

clusion that it would be hopeless to conquer South America against the

will of the indigenous population. Whitelocke’s failure only reaffirmed

the belief that attempts to conquer the region would be pointless.

In-

stead Castlereagh viewed the growing French threat to Portugal as a glo-

rious opportunity to spread British influence throughout South America.

If the Portuguese Royal Family, government infrastructure, fleet and

treasury could be plucked from the clutches of France and transported

to Brazil it could ‘lay the foundations of a mighty and magnificent em-

pire which would speedily compensate for the loss of Portugal, and pre-

serve (if it be considered worth preserving) the Portuguese name’. What

ministers were thinking of was the possibility of bringing all the popula-

tion of South America under one friendly government. This new Empire

would not only provide huge demands for British goods, but could also

be a source of naval stores. ‘In fact’, he concluded ‘the occupation of the

Brazils by Great Britain, or her ally, under the present circumstances of

the Continent of Europe, seems to be indispensably necessary for our

salvation’.

An alternative option, already considered by the Cabinet, was placing

a Bourbon monarch on a South American throne. Canning, initially

sceptical, now wrote: ‘As the advantages to be derived from S

America

have been universally discussed and admitted…it may be acceptable to

HMM’s to have it suggested to them the possible means of recovering it.

It has occurred to me to look into the connection of the House of Bour-

bon with the Spanish branch’. He found Louis XIII had married Anne

of Austria, daughter of Philip 3

of Spain. This marriage produced Louis

XIV and ‘the Duke of Orleans, grandfather of the present one’, although

Canning marked ‘impossible’ in the margin. Louis XIV married Maria

Theresa, daughter of Philip IV, and produced the Dauphin, grandfather

of Louis XV. In 1700 Charles II, the last male of the Spanish branch had

died without issue, therefore the Dauphin became the legitimate heir to

the crown of Spain, ‘and next to him the duke of Orleans’. To prevent

the two crowns uniting, Louis XIV caused the right of succession to the

Spanish throne in the Duke d’ Anjou, the second son of the Dauphin,

and Spanish Princes with claims to the French throne and French

Princes with claims to the Spanish, ‘mutually exchanged renunciations’.

This was guaranteed in the Treaty of Utrecht and ‘thus the D. of Orleans

would be received and acknowledged by those colonies if they wish inde-

pendence, the other Bourbons can only hope it through conquest, which

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England is not Quixotic enough to attempt’.

The idea for placing a

Bourbon monarch on a South American throne gathered momentum

with the arrival in England of Louis XVIII on 2 November. Ministers

were not certain, despite Portland’s views, that a Bourbon restoration in

France was the best policy. The South American project was an ideal way

to get Louis XVIII out of the way.

The Situation in Lisbon

Of course, a vital part of Castlereagh’s first plan was actually persuading the

Portuguese court to evacuate Lisbon and sail for Brazil. Accurate intelli-

gence regarding the situation in Portugal and the likely course of Portu-

guese policy was at a premium for Canning. But with English merchants

expelled from the majority of the Continent the only channels of informa-

tion open were via Strangford, Gambier and Sousa. Due to the passage of

communications dispatches from Portugal tended to arrive in batches.

Canning was naturally hesitant towards Sousa; he did not really think the

Portuguese government were being open and honest with him. It was,

therefore, sensible for Canning to wait for an accurate assessment of Por-

tuguese policy before committing himself to a course of action. In an at-

tempt to improve the intelligence situation he hoped to introduce a spy

into the Portuguese court. This was Mr Piuma, a Genoese Franciscian

monk in the service of the Government. Piuma was recommended to Can-

ning by the Count D’Antraigues, an important figure in the British intelli-

gence network, who wanted the monk to be introduced into Spain via Lis-

bon for the purpose of ascertaining Spanish policy on behalf of Austria.

Canning wrote to Strangford on 12 September informing him Piuma was

to stay in Lisbon for a while ‘collecting whatever information he can

through the channel of the Prince Regent’s confessor’. If Strangford had

no use for him he was to proceed to Spain. On 13 September Canning

stressed to him the need to ‘impress upon the Portuguese Government the

expediency of adopting those measures which have been recommended by

His Majesty to the Prince Regent’; namely the removal of the Portuguese

court and navy to Brazil. It is unclear whether Piuma actually went to Lis-

bon or was dispatched to Havana on another mission.

Further information from Lisbon arrived in London on 14 Septem-

ber. On 27 August the Portuguese council had ‘resolved that the most

determined resistance should (at all events) be made to the demands of

France respecting British property and residents’. No French troops

would be allowed into garrisons in Portugal and ‘no measures really or

apparently affecting the relations between England and Portugal, would

be carried into execution’. If the Prince did flee to Brazil he looked to

the ‘support and assistance of England in the execution of this great and

commendable project’. According to Fortescue, at this time Strangford

was negotiating with the court of Lisbon without explicit orders from

Canning as to how he could proceed. Strangford himself wrote of his

‘ignorance of the present intentions of his Majesty’s government with

respect to Portugal’.

This is not true as Canning had replied to Strang-

ford’s communications on 31 August and on 12 and 13 September.

With regard to the Portuguese navy, Strangford reported orders had

recently been sent to prepare and refit some of the ships, and a great deal

of activity had ‘begun to be manifested in the Dockyards and arsenal’,

though he supported Gambier’s assessment that ‘many months would be

necessary in order to equip for sea an inconsiderable portion of it’. This

was not a great problem due to the ‘backward state of hostile prepara-

tions in Spain…much time must elapse before the actual appearance of

danger’. Rumours pointed to preparations at Bayonne to accommodate

21,000 French troops; they would enter Spain to replace a similar force

that may be brought by that country against Portugal. If the Portuguese

were to evacuate, Strangford argued, ‘the presence and protection of an

English squadron might be of importance to the success of the measure’.

This would also provide a good reason for a British squadron to appear

off Lisbon without raising undue concern in the Portuguese court. This

was an important consideration as the Regent had voiced his concern a

British squadron would come and seize his ships.

Strangford also reported a courier had arrived in Lisbon carrying dis-

patches from Lima in Paris containing an account of a conversation be-

tween that minister and Napoleon on 2 August:

The Emperor came up to me…and in a low voice, so as not to be

heard by those near us, said, “Have you written to your Court?

Have you dispatched a courier with my final determination?” I

replied in the affirmative. “Very well”, said the Emperor, “then by

this time your Court knows that she must break with England

before the first of September. It is the only way to accelerate

peace”.

Lima responded ‘“I should think, Sire, that England must now be sin-

cerely anxious to make peace.” “Oh,” replied the Emperor, “we are very

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certain of that-however, in all cases, you must break with England or

France before the First of September”’.

Unsurprisingly the Regent did not wish to flee his country until an

invasion force was on its way. Therefore accurate intelligence regarding

French preparations was vital. At Bayonne it was reported the French

had collected 23,611 men in readiness for operations. On 2 September

the Portuguese decided that, in the event of an invasion, they would re-

tire to the fortress of Peniche while ‘the forces of Portugal undertake the

defence of the kingdom, which, however imperfect and, too probably,

unsuccessful, must nevertheless be attempted’. Araujo assured Strang-

ford that military preparations taking place in Lisbon were solely de-

signed to facilitate an emergency evacuation of the Royal family to Bra-

zil. Strangford was optimistic, assuring Canning ‘this exact project is in

the serious contemplation of his Royal Highness’ and would be ‘carried

into execution should France insist upon the adoption of those measures

which she has so spiritedly and so honorably determined to oppose’.

Fortescue dryly noted one advantage the Portuguese possessed: if

they sided with France ‘the ships of war would be useful to defend Lis-

bon against the British; if England were too strong or too clever…they

would serve as…[a] convoy to Brazil’.

Once the fleet had been made

ready it would enable the Portuguese to hold their hand until the last

minute. Unlike the courts of Austria and Prussia, maritime mobility

would allow the Court of Portugal to escape from Napoleon. Araujo had

declared the Regent ‘was willing to give any security to His Majesty, that

“not a boat belonging to the Marine of Portugal should be permitted to

fall into the hands of His Majesty’s enemies”’. In commission on 4 Sep-

tember were seven ships-of-the-line, two frigates and six brigs and

smaller vessels in the Tagus. Added to this were two 74s, one frigate, one

schooner and a brig cruising off Algerines, between Algeria and the Al-

garve. In ordinary there were four 74s and five frigates plus nine smaller

vessels.

Fitzgerald, still on diplomatic leave, sent his thoughts to Canning on

11 October. The Portuguese interest ‘forces them to be our

friends….they will assuredly manage their matters with France with ut-

most dexterity, and with a better prospect of success, by being left to

their own choice of the means and mode of treating with us’. If the Por-

tuguese ‘still possess the means of bribery, they will assuredly again suc-

ceed in corrupting the French civil and military agents who may be em-

ployed against them’. By implementing a policy of appeasement designed