Robson Martin. Britain, Portugal and South America in the Napoleonic Wars: Alliances and Diplomacy in Economic Maritime Conflict (ENG)

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October 1804 William Jacob, the statistician and astronomer, told Pitt

that British commercial penetration would ‘encrease our powers of op-

posing that rival [France], by making conquests or alliances, which our

naval superiority would enable us to preserve’. But sensibly he advised

the intention should be to benefit from ‘commercial intercourse [rather]

than the mere achievement of unproductive conquest’.

In 1804 Pitt, uncertain about the future course of the war in Europe

as Anglo-Spanish relations deteriorated, was receptive to various

schemes for opening the markets of Spanish America. Franciso Miranda,

a perennial Venezeluan patriot, in London from 1798 until 1804, and

Popham, who had met Miranda in 1803, were his most vociferous and

influential advisers on South American issues. At a meeting on 14 Octo-

ber 1804 Miranda and Popham presented detailed plans for British inter-

vention in the region to Dundas, now Lord Melville, First Lord of the

Admiralty. Popham believed South America shipped 50 million dollars

per year to European Spain; the deprivation of such a sum would re-

move any future maritime threat from the Spaniards. The meeting had a

profound effect upon future British policy in the region as it left a fa-

vourable impression on Popham, who possibly believed he had tacit

government approval for the schemes. In November Popham was actu-

ally at Spithead expecting Miranda to arrive and, possibly, undertake an

operation but nothing materialised.

According to Duffy this was typical of the subordination of Latin

American projects to European considerations. South American projects

were shelved to progress peace talks in 1796 and 1800-1801; for strategic

reasons, such as removing the French from Egypt in 1801; or to assist

Pitt’s coalition building in 1804-1805.

As already noted, British interest

in South America was intrinsically linked to the European situation, and

in particular relations with Spain and Portugal. It is interesting to note

the dates for possible military operations above all occurred when Spain

was at war with Britain. There were no plans before Spain changed alle-

giance in 1796 or after the peace of Amiens, until British actions forced

the Spaniards to declare war in late 1804. Of course, after 1808 Spain

was fighting with Britain against France, and, though this did cause prob-

lems in the relationship over conduct in South America, they are beyond

the scope of this study.

There was a key difference between Portuguese Brazil and the South

American colonies of Spain. Brazil had remained in contact with Portu-

gal (and would be the seat of Portuguese government from early 1808).

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But from 1796-1806, except during the peace of Amiens, Spanish South

America had been isolated from Spain, leading to a growing sense of

political and commercial independence. This had encouraged an illicit

trade in British goods. What Britain really wanted was legitimate access

to South American markets and specie. What she did not want was a

South American revolution against Spanish control, which might lead to

French or American intervention. Either of these would shut off the

possibilities for British trade in the region.

This commercial driver became more pressing by 1806 when there

was a clear need to open up new markets to enable Britain to continue

the war. Unlike France, Britain could not invade another power and set

huge reparations to make war pay for war. Money had to come from

expanding trade and South America seemed to fit the bill perfectly.

Nonetheless, there were dissenting voices questioning the value of South

American markets.

Admiral Campbell estimated the population of Bra-

zil had increased from 1.5 million in the 1770s to 2.5 million by the end

of the eighteenth century to an estimated four million by 1804. But only

500,000 were white of European extract.

Wealth was concentrated in

the cities of Rio de Janeiro (60,000 people in 1808), Buenos Aires (30-

40,000 in the 1800s) and Montevideo (10,000 in 1807). ‘Away from the

main cities and seaports’, Platt argued, ‘the population was sparse, trans-

port conditions appalling, and the marketing of imported goods expen-

sive and unrewarding’.

Alongside commercial considerations, Britain was interested in South

America for naval reasons. With Europe increasingly hostile to Britain,

the Baltic could not be solely relied upon for naval stores. Brazil pro-

vided an alternative source. The Bahia region provided straight timber,

Rio Grande could supply hemp and flax while in Pernambuco ‘the very

best crooked timber in the world’ could be found, an essential form of

timber for ships knees. Campbell thought Brazil would make an excel-

lent naval base due to the abundance of raw materials and the sizeable

coasting and fishing trade, which would act as a nursery for skilled sea-

men. Brazil embraced ‘almost every useful production that is to be found

in natural history’.

The French Threat to South America

There was another key argument to justify British intervention in South

America: the fear that France would either seize territory in the region or

gain access through the conquest of Spain or Portugal. Certainly, as Ellis

has argued, the image of Napoleon as a ‘pacifist imperialist, driven to

fight defensive wars against the enemies of reason, is perhaps the most

absurd concept in the historiography of the subject’.

For Sparrow, with

Spain allied to France after 1804 ‘the fear that France would reap the

gold of El Dorado was very real’.

But what were French intentions

towards the region?

In September 1796 intelligence had been received in Lisbon regarding

French demands on Portuguese territory on the banks of the Amazon

and Rio Negro, along with proclamations insisting navigation of the

Amazon should be free to French and Spanish ships. The Portuguese

should allow French ships to use Portuguese ports and pay an indemnity

of 25 million livres to France. In exchange France offered ‘friendship’.

Nothing came of the demands but France retained a keen interest in the

region. In January 1801 when the French Brest squadron escaped, St.

Vincent thought the likely destination was Brazil (it was in fact Egypt).

The Chatham Papers contain an unsigned memorandum dated 26 No-

vember 1803 discussing possible French plans to seize the River Plate.

French occupation of this river, according to the author of the memo-

randum, would ‘counteract all our operations’, and ‘certainly with great

facility if he once had possession of the Brazils’. If British troops could

take Buenos Aires ‘it would make any attempt by France on the Portu-

guese settlements a serious consideration’. Dundas was apparently ‘fully

convinced of the importance of this point’.

In 1804 Campbell re-

minded ministers of the events of 1711 when the French had captured

Rio de Janeiro by landing troops in the Bay of Rio and successfully as-

saulting the city from the rear. They had also made off with a reported

haul of £4 million in cash. With appropriate measures, Campbell

thought, Rio could be defended to prevent a repeat occurrence.

But he

warned Rio de Janeiro’s harbour, ‘perhaps one of the best in the world’,

near the trade routes to the East Indies and China, would make an excel-

lent cruiser base for Britain’s enemies and once the defences were

strengthened it could be defended ‘against any naval force’.

Campbell’s wise words were suitably highlighted by Admiral Willau-

mez’s cruise of 1806 which displayed the danger posed by French cruis-

ing squadrons to British trade using the South Atlantic shipping routes.

His use of Bahia as a resupply base was a worrying development point-

ing to the possibility of French warships and privateers using a South

American port as a base from which to threaten British maritime trade.

In 1806 reports reached Lisbon of nine English merchant ships taken by

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a French privateer and sold along the coast of Brazil to various individu-

als not as prizes but as Spanish ships.

It was events in Europe that provided a new impetus to French inter-

est in the region. The campaigns of 1805 left the French economy in

ruins. The French Minister of the Treasury, Barbé-Marbois, had been

involved with speculators headed by Gabriel Julien Ouvrard who had

borrowed from the Bank of France, with his security being the Spanish

debt, which that country would pay upon receipt of specie from Mexico.

Ouvrard estimated there were 71 million piastres waiting for shipment to

Europe. The finances of European Spain were, however, also in a terri-

ble state, the annual subsidy payable to France was already 32 million

francs in arrears by 1804. The British blockade prevented the sailing of

the Spanish treasure ships, prompting accurate rumours that the Bank of

France was running out of cash, causing a run on the bank as people

withdrew their money. This situation had been compounded by the Brit-

ish seizure of the Spanish treasure ships in early October 1804. The Bank

of France was soon running out of gold and issued paper money, which

declined in value. By the end of September 1805 the Bank of France had

only 1.5 million francs as a cash reserve. The French financial crisis

lasted until 27 January 1806 when Barbé-Marbois was removed. Spain

was lumbered with a debt of 60 million francs which Ouvrard guaran-

teed against the gold from the Spanish American colonies, as had been

promised by Godoy.

The crucial evidence of French intent comes from Napoleon himself.

In September 1806 he composed a plan for an invasion of Portugal while

an expedition of 8-9,000 men would sail to Brazil to prevent, he hoped,

the Portuguese from evacuating Lisbon for Brazil. This would probably

cause the British to send a force in response, distracting the reinforce-

ments planned for Sicily.

In the Convention of Fontainebleau of 1807,

France and Spain would agree that the King of Spain would become

‘Emperor of the two Americas’. The colonies, islands and overseas pos-

sessions of Portugal were to be divided between France and Spain.

France was not the only threat to British interests in South America.

Dundas also saw danger from the United States fearing their involve-

ment would unleash revolutionary forces. He therefore urged for direct

British intervention to oversee the change from Spanish rule into some

kind of self-government.

The Louisiana Purchase of 1803 had provided

a much needed financial stimulus to the French economy. In return for

the 60 million francs paid to France the United States acquired a huge

area of land (over 800,000 square miles) stretching from New Orleans in

the South to the Canadian border in the north. The purchase removed a

barrier to American expansion westward into the Spanish Viceroyalty of

New Spain and provided the US with a maritime base at New Orleans.

In 1807 Canning would view American interests in Mexico as dangerous

for Britain, for if the government ignored the region ‘America will force

her into Independence, and herself become the carriers’. British inter-

vention in Mexico would, he hoped, inspire many of the citizens of Lou-

isiana to join with Britain; Canning was convinced that ‘they hate the

Americans’. Seizing Mexico, whether by force or installing a member of

the Bourbon family on the throne, would help protect British posses-

sions in the West Indies from American encirclement.

Clearly for France, Spain and Britain by 1806 the finance provided by

South American gold and commerce was seen as a key part of funding

the war in Europe. Moreover, denying such resources to the enemy or

even a third party was another factor. As Sparrow has argued, if a little

dramatically, ‘The race to gain control of South America was on’.

But

control and access to South America riches could only be secured by a

nation able to exercise maritime power.

Sir Home Riggs Popham

Shortly after taking office in the Talents ministry Auckland, President of

the Board of Trade, was pressing Grenville to ‘encourage and multiply

our licences as much as possible for the export of British produce and

manufactures to the Spanish settlements and to St. Domingo’.

In June

Auckland and Grenville were discussing a project to ship 10 million

Spanish dollars from South America in neutral vessels. This scheme had

originated with Pitt, to ship quicksilver to Vera Cruz, while the ships

returned to British port laden with dollars, to the account of the Spanish

government.

While governments had dabbled in South America it was Popham

who brought the subject to the forefront of British policy. In September

1805 he had been ordered to sail from Cork to capture the Dutch Cape

of Good Hope.

After failing to procure necessary victuals at Madeira,

Popham had put into St. Salvador, Brazil, to obtain provisions before

sailing onto the Cape. After the successful completion of his mission

Popham, believing the meeting of 1804 had provided him with official

support for South American operations from Pitt, decided to implement

a daring plan. He collected 1,500 troops under the command of Major

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General William Carr Beresford in four transports. With the Diadem,

Raisonnable, Diomede, Narcissus and Encounter gun brig on 14 April 1806

Popham set sail. Just under two months later, on 12 June, this force an-

chored in the River Plate and by the 28

had seized the Spanish town of

Buenos Aires.

Popham’s dispatches from the Cape (and a stop-over at St. Helena)

outlining his intentions arrived at the Admiralty on the morning of 24

June.

Nobody in the government was exactly sure what he was up to.

Howick wondered what measures to adopt ‘in consequence of so an

unexpected event’.

It seems as if Windham at least had been consider-

ing some as yet undefined plan regarding South America. Writing to the

King he declared Pophams’s actions ‘affect a question which has for

some time anxiously engaged the attention of your Majesty’s servants,

while they have been endeavouring to frame an opinion such as It might

be fit humbly to submit’.

Ministers reacted speedily to the news. At a

cabinet meeting of 26 June (conducted without Fox) it was decided to

recall Popham to give an account of his actions while a reinforcement of

2,000 men would be sent to Buenos Aires.

In late July the Admiralty

decided upon Rear Admiral Stirling as Popham’s replacement. Stirling

sailed at the end of August.

Ministers could only sit and wait for the

next batch of dispatches to arrive.

The question of expanding initial intervention in the region was al-

ready playing on ministers’ minds. On 11 September Windham consid-

ered seizing Spanish South American territory as a foothold. Part of the

force at Plymouth, destined for reinforcing Sicily but detained in case it

was needed at Lisbon, should be applied ‘not to the revolutionizing, but

to the obtaining possession of part of the Spanish settlements in South

America’. Once a British expedition had been established there the conti-

nent would fall under British influence ‘by a mild and gradual operation’.

If the Spanish Americans did turn against the mother country, ‘we

should equally be in a situation to secure a great portion of the advan-

tages which such an event is supposed likely to produce’. But for Wind-

ham, ‘what is of most consequence of all, to prevent probably the

French from establishing themselves there’. Windham saw British in-

volvement in South America as part of the wider struggle with France:

With Calabria well supported, with the discontents in France

described in Lord Lauderdale’s letter, and with an establishment on

the continent of South America, followed by a hearty support of

the war in this country, the period may not be far distant, nor

exceed the term to which we can afford to wait, when the power of

Bonaparte may begin to totter; and, if once thrown out of it’s

balance, fall to the ground with very little strength.

The very next day, Popham’s report of the capture of Buenos Aires

and of the fantastic profits to be made reached England. It was accom-

panied by a very visible example of the riches available in the region. A

procession of eight wagons escorted by thirty sailors from HMS Narcissus

made its way from Portsmouth to London, firing a salute at every major

town on the route. With captured Spanish flags and suitable martial mu-

sic provided by a Royal Marine band this triumphal carnival parade also

contained around a million dollars in hard cash, prize money from Bue-

nos Aires, some of which had been seized from the Viceroy who, ac-

cording to Popham, had ‘absconded with all the treasure from the town’

until intercepted and relieved of his burden by a British force.

Ministers

heard the news on the 13

and the next day the King voiced his ap-

proval informing ministers that although the mission had been unauthor-

ised ‘it is impossible not to approve of the manner in which it was

planned and executed….His Majesty trusts from the reports made, that

the acquisition of Buenos Ayres [sic] will prove very advantageous to this

country’.

Popham’s dispatches arrived at a crucial time. With the Talents at-

tempting to open a rift between France and Spain the news would cer-

tainly not help that process. Yet, in every other respect it offered oppor-

tunity. The Austrians and Russians had been smashed at Austerlitz, Aus-

tria had left the war, Prussia remained fearful of French ambitions in

Germany, the French had overrun Naples and were apparently threaten-

ing Portugal. Grenville was now directing the stumbling peace talks (Fox

finally succumbed to his illness the same day Popham’s dispatches ar-

rived in London), which eventually collapsed. The Holy Roman Empire

was dissolved by Napoleon and the Confederation of the Rhine estab-

lished, though French activity in Germany would force Prussia into war

in August 1806. Finally, there was the looming prospect of economic

warfare confirmed in Napoleon’s Berlin Decree of November.

In this situation Popham’s actions had major strategic effects. They

provided the French with great propaganda value, vis-à-vis Britain’s po-

tential allies. The Talents refused to send help to Prussia and Russia,

reinforcing the belief Britain acted out of her own self-interests. It

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dashed any hope of thawing of relations with Spain; that country now

feared Britain would attempt a complete take over of its South American

possessions. Their fears were well founded; until Madrid broke with

France and joined with Russia and Britain at the conclusion of a general

peace, Britain would keep all territorial gains it had made at Spanish ex-

pense.

For the Talents, facing the Continental blockade, it was access to the

specie and markets of Latin America that overrode all other considera-

tions. There was one fundamental problem, however: ministers clearly

misunderstood what territory Popham had actually seized. Popham had

taken the city of Buenos Aires. In London it was believed he had control

of the entire province of Buenos Aires: in other words, a huge tract of land

encompassing the modern states of Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay and

Bolivia. Popham maintained his forces were well received wherever they

went and this along with the promise of trade with the specie-rich region

was just too much to give up.

Essentially, Popham presented the gov-

ernment with a fait accompli by bringing South America to the forefront of

British strategy for the next two years, until the Spanish uprising of 1808

provided the opportunity for British intervention in Europe and re-

moved the spectre of the Iberian South American empires falling under

the control of France.

Policy of the Talents

Despite Windham’s earlier musings the Talents had given Miranda short

shrift and generally tried to avoid entangling themselves in South Amer-

ica for fear of starting a revolt against Spanish control.

Now, however,

Grenville was unwilling to give up any colonial gains. On 12 September

he informed Lauderdale in Paris:

The possession occupied by His Majesty are so circumstanced that

France cannot hope to regain them by war, and cannot, if she be

really disposed to peace, reasonably object to their being retained

by his Majesty as a very small counterbalance to the immense

acquisitions of territory and influence on the continent.

The capture of Buenos Aires might ‘facilitate peace, or to afford an

opening for measures that will make a deep impression on France’.

This hope initially seemed to be borne out by Mr Goddard, attached to

Lauderdale’s mission in Paris, who wrote on 19 September ‘The news of

Buenos Ayres [sic] is exactly what they dreaded here, and it had made a

great impression’.

Yet, just a week after writing to Lauderdale, Grenville admitted he

was caught in a quandary. Although expressing a ‘great reluctance to the

embarking in South American proposals because I know it was much

easier to get into them than out again’, in reality he realised it would be

extremely difficult to give up Buenos Aires ‘trumpeted up as it has been

by Popham…unless one could get much more for it in the way of secu-

rity in Europe than I know how to shape or expect’.

A week later he

considered a British withdrawal from Buenos Aires in exchange for free

trade in the region and a French withdrawal from Naples. It is difficult

to counter the accusation, however, that British ministers were already

thinking in terms of territorial conquest. Thanks in part to misunder-

standing Popham’s dispatches, Grenville seemed to have a completely

unrealistic impression of the situation in the region, believing ‘rather

than see all Spanish America fall into our hands, as it must do in twelve

months more of war, France would willingly give up Naples’. Moreover,

a British occupation of South America would ‘cut off her [France] best

resources for carrying it on [the war]’.

On 1 October Grenville had

made up his mind, British possession of South America must be reck-

oned into any peace arrangement, on the grounds of uti possidetis. If Brit-

ain was compelled to follow up the initial success she would not be will-

ing to give anything back. Ministers were already running way ahead of

themselves, caught up in the dreams of a permanent conquest of South

America.

So the ‘imperialist’ accusers seem to have won the argument,

or have they?

Quite simply, Popham’s clever manipulating of the situation made it

almost impossible for the government to consider giving up the South

American conquests. Accompanying his official dispatches had been an

open letter to English merchants describing the value of the South

American markets in such glowing terms, around two million per annum,

that Lloyd’s immediately resolved to present Popham with a £200 in-

scribed vase. The triumphal landing of the captured specie at Portsmouth

must have contributed to the belief that the region was fabulously rich

and ripe for British trade.

Lord Lowther noted the trade in Lancashire,

Glasgow and Carlisle ‘is become very brisk in consequence of the Cap-

ture of Buenos Aires’. Responding to a letter Popham had addressed to

them from Buenos Aires, the merchants of Manchester and Salford rec-

ognised that due to the French attempts to remove British trade from

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Europe, the commercial advantages of Popham’s actions were ‘extensive

beyond calculation’ and resolved to impress their views upon Auckland.

‘Visions of new markets, boundless wealth and relief from the terrible

burden of taxation rose before the eyes of all’, Fortescue reasoned,

‘Napoleon’s great plan for excluding British commerce from the conti-

nent of Europe could be laughed at if the whole of South America were

thrown open as a new market’.

This was appreciated in government; on

19 September Auckland estimated imposing duties on trade in Buenos

Aires might produce between one and two million sterling.

By Novem-

ber he was convinced ‘that in the actual predicament of Europe, the ex-

tension of our commerce is become the most efficient measure of war’.

The result, as Hall argues, was that, unable to overlook the military and

commercial implications of Popham’s actions, the government were

caught up in a ‘fever of plans for New World conquest’.

Hence, British

intervention was not to be based on liberal commercial intercourse but

by direct British conquest, a policy which, as Esdaile notes, ‘laid her wide

open to the charge that she was interested solely in the expansion of

British naval, economic and commercial dominance’.

As plans to exchange Spanish America for French-held European

territory floundered in the Paris peace talks, Grenville’s mind turned to

large-scale conquest informing his elder brother, the Marquis of Buck-

ingham, he was ‘revolving in my mind a project…to attack Mexico on

both sides’!

On 15 October Buckingham, admitting he had no docu-

ments describing the South American interior, mooted his own idea for

an attack on Panama and pressed for a squadron to be based off the

coast of Peru to intercept Spanish specie shipments.

Clearly ministers

were having severe problems understanding the situation in South Amer-

ica; their own ignorance of the region compounded the misunderstand-

ing over what Popham had actually seized.

In August Ministers had set

aside a reinforcement of 2,000 men under Sir Samuel Auchmuty to go to

South America but they had been delayed to deal with the crisis in Portu-

gal. Once the danger to Portugal faded, these troops could resume their

original mission and Auchmuty sailed on 12 October.

Contemporaries certainly questioned this ‘imperialist’ policy, Sid-

mouth querying the prudence of sending 4,000 men to South America

‘with a view to interests separately and exclusively our own’ when it was

in Britain’s interests to help Prussia.

Nevertheless, there was a strong

body in the Cabinet, led by Grenville and including Windham and Moira,

supporting further intervention in South America. Windham, himself