Robson Martin. Britain, Portugal and South America in the Napoleonic Wars: Alliances and Diplomacy in Economic Maritime Conflict (ENG)

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July. One part would go to Spain, one, including Lisbon, to either the

Prince of the Peace or to the Queen of Etruria. The government thought

it right to send a military expedition to the Tagus, there to join with a

‘competent naval force’. The Talents were not afraid to commit addi-

tional troops, as ‘the land force appropriated to this service should re-

ceive successive augmentations as fast as the means of transport can be

provided’.

The Talents instructed Rosslyn to press the Portuguese to make ar-

rangements for the defence of the country ‘an object which it ought not

to be difficult for Portugal to provide for, if the invading force should

not exceed the numbers stated by the French government’. If Portugal

either by itself, or with the assistance of Spain, ‘where it is probable the

plans of France will create much more alarm than pleasure’, should de-

cide to oppose a French invasion, Rosslyn was to support them ‘to the

full extent of such means as His Majesty may be able to apply to the

object’. But he was reminded words were not enough, the instructions

only applied if ‘vigorous and effective measures, bonä fide adopted by

the Portuguese Govt for its own defence’. The British government

hoped the ‘urgency of the present crisis’ would ensure they might ‘look

with some confidence to its adoption’.

Only if the mission found either ‘the means or energies of the Court

of Portugal are inadequate for such a purpose’, Rosslyn was to urge:

…a resolution which they are understood formerly to have enter-

tained, & which, in the case supposed, is the only one that could be

adopted either with dignity or prudence; that namely of withdraw-

ing at once from their European territories & removing themselves

with all that they can carry with them to their possessions beyond

the Atlantic’.

St. Vincent’s squadron would ‘protect and secure such retreat’ and then

guarantee ‘the independence of its dominions in the Brazils’.

There was of course a different case, ‘unhappily not the least prob-

able’, whereby the Portuguese would abandon all ideas of defence or

evacuation and await their fate. In this case Britain would have to pre-

vent ‘the enemy from acquiring that accession of force, particularly of

naval force, which the possession of the port of Lisbon in such circum-

stances would give him, & which may have had a principal share in

prompting him to the present intended outrage’. Rosslyn was to devote

RITAIN, PORTUGAL AND SOUTH AMERICA

HE PORTUGUESE CRISIS OF 1806

all his conduct to this aim, ‘not by negotiation, but by demonstrations, &

possibly by actual measures of force’. Even if it came to this, Rosslyn

was to impress upon the Portuguese ‘the steps resorted to are taken with

no feelings or object of hostility toward them’. They were the result of

the ‘injustice and violence of the enemy and the weakness of Portugal’.

Ministers hoped Portugal could continue in ‘secure and undisturbed

neutrality’, so Rosslyn was to take care not to offend the Portuguese or

provide the French and Spanish with any justification for intervention. It

was a matter of great regret that Britain should look to employ force

against a friendly power to secure her own interests; such feelings should

be made patently clear to the Portuguese. Rosslyn was instructed to cir-

culate a manifesto in Portuguese stating Britain was acting solely to deny

Portuguese military resources ‘which the enemy has openly evinced &

formally declared his intention of seizing for his own purposes’. It was to

be made clear Britain had no desire to gain any advantage other than

‘depriving his enemy of means of annoyance which are intended to be

used both against the interest of this country and for the purpose of

attack against the colonies of Portugal herself’.

As the man on the spot Rosslyn was, naturally, granted a degree of

independence in his actions. He could agree ‘to any plan by which the

Portuguese ships of war if placed in his custody by that Govt without the

necessity of resorting to measures of force, shall be either retained in

trust for Portugal or shall be purchased from that Govt by H.M. accord-

ing to their full estimated value’. Though ministers were desperate to

prevent France gaining the use of the Portuguese navy, they were keen it

should be achieved with the ‘least offensive to the dignity or injurious to

the interests of an ally’. But at the same time Rosslyn was to threaten the

Portuguese if they submitted to France the consequence must be ‘the

loss of the Brazils, which in such event this country must occupy for its

own safety’ (as we shall soon see, this threat would soon benefit from

enhanced gravitas – at least in the short term). It was entirely possible

the march of the French troops, which the British government had been

informed would commence on 15 August, might be delayed. This would

add to the Portuguese ‘state of indecision’ and Rosslyn must ‘naturally

expect that the existence or at least the urgency of the danger will be

denied to you’.

A force of 10,000 men, under the command of Simcoe, was ordered

to join with St. Vincent off the Tagus. They were only to be landed if the

Portuguese intended to defend the country or to operate in conjunction

with St. Vincent’s naval force to seize the Portuguese ships. They could

also provide assistance if the Portuguese decided to flee for Brazil. The

disembarkation was to be swift, to prevent the Portuguese from prepar-

ing any possible resistance. Once the troops were landed and deployed in

a position of safety the Portuguese must place their ships ‘in such a state

as to be capable of being immediately removed on the approach of an

enemy’. If the Portuguese argued landing troops would violate their neu-

trality and provide the French and Spanish with a pretext for an attack,

Rosslyn was to state ‘the neutrality of that country is at an end from the

moment that a design of invading its territory & subverting its govern-

ment is openly announced by one of the belligerent parties’. The Talents

were implementing a strategy of pre-emptive intervention because they

could not wait ‘for the actual execution of such a menace before we take

measures for averting or lessening the evil. And experience has but too

plainly shown in too many instances with what facility the French gov-

ernment finds or make pretences for such measures when once an-

nounced’. If the Portuguese did not want help, Simcoe would proceed to

the Mediterranean.

On the same day Windham penned this extensive and exhaustive

explanation of British policy, the Admiralty sent additional instructions

to St. Vincent by the Kingfisher (18). This sloop had been detached from a

force under Rear Admiral Sir Thomas Louis, comprising the Canopus (if

ready) (80), Malta (84), Captain, Ganges, Theseus, Repulse, (74s) and the Re-

sistance frigate (38), with transports containing the troops and victuallers,

which was to join with St. Vincent off the Tagus. St. Vincent was to

communicate to Louis appropriate orders regarding the projected pro-

ceedings at Lisbon. Once the objects had been achieved or as soon as

Louis could be spared, St. Vincent was to direct him to proceed with the

ships under his command, excepting the Resistance, which St. Vincent was

to add to his command, to join with Collingwood off Cadiz.

On 12 August, almost as an afterthought, Windham wondered

whether the government should inform Sousa of the government’s

plans. Howick, upon questioning from the Portuguese minister, admitted

Rosslyn had left England, but Windham, quite wisely, thought it not

‘desirable to tell him all that was intended’.

The same day, taking advan-

tage of contrary winds preventing the convoy from rounding the Downs,

Windham wrote to Rosslyn and Simcoe advising them they would

probably find St. Vincent already in the Tagus. As they would arrive be-

fore the troops, Rosslyn was instructed to communicate his arrival to St.

RITAIN, PORTUGAL AND SOUTH AMERICA

HE PORTUGUESE CRISIS OF 1806

Vincent, and then land in Lisbon to commence his mission. Simcoe was

to wait with the fleet for the troops. Most of the instructions in this dis-

patch were similar to the orders of 9 August except that the French plans

and the preparations for implementing them, ‘has been confirmed by

additional intelligence received since you left London’.

The government continued to justify their pre-emptive actions by

pointing out they could not wait ‘till the hostile army is put in motion or

till some decree of the French government publishes to the world the

partition of Portugal’. To hesitate ‘would be to expose the Royal Family,

the government and the country to the certainty of that ruin with which

they are openly menaced’. With an invasion seemingly imminent, the

question was ‘whether to defend or abandon the country’. If the Portu-

guese were to flee, they would need to do so ‘with vigour and decision,

in order to preserve to the House of Braganza at least its American pos-

sessions’. If the decision was made to defend the country, the Portuguese

must mobilise the army and organise a suitable defence. If such measures

were implemented Britain would help with money, troops and ships.

With all these measures ‘the attack of a much more powerful army than

that now said to be assembling at Bayonne, might be successfully re-

sisted’. The French were currently constrained by the possibility of fur-

ther military operations against Prussia and Russia in central Europe and

hence, at this time, would not be able to send more troops than those

already at Bayonne.

Windham placed his faith in Araujo, who once convinced of the

immediate danger, ‘would exert himself to inspire more energy into the

councils of His Court, to remove some of the least efficient of his col-

leagues, and to enable his country to avail itself, in this extreme case,

of the proffered assistance of His Majesty’. Rosslyn was to impress

upon Araujo the French invasion would not be caused by the arrival of

a British force, ‘but only the execution of a determination taken and

announced antecedently to them’. There was one recurring danger to

the success of any British plans to assist Portugal: the perceived weak-

ness of the Portuguese government. Windham recognised this was the

major obstacle to the success of the Rosslyn mission, and urged him to

combat the ‘desire of procrastination so natural to a weak power, and

the delusive hope that by perseverance in the temporizing system, the

evils which they fear may yet be averted. This must be met by strong

representations of the immanency of the danger & of the mischief of

delay’.

Windham also reiterated if the Portuguese declined the assistance of

British troops from the fear of offending France, Rosslyn was not to give

any intimation troops were actually on the way. On the other hand, if the

Portuguese did undertake to defend the country, Rosslyn was to specifi-

cally state he was expecting an expedition of 10,000 men; ‘they will of

course cheerfully accept this proffered aid’, Windham optimistically

wrote. Although assembled ‘with a view to a different destination’, on

any request from the Portuguese for assistance ‘orders would be given to

these troops and to others which might successively follow them, to sail

immediately to Portugal’. When the troops did arrive in the Tagus, Ross-

lyn was to state their arrival was due to information received in London

as to the immediate threat from France. He was to insist the Portuguese

could not refuse the disembarkation of the troops, except if they decided

to abandon all measures of defence. The time for the Portuguese to

comply with British diplomacy was limited; the actual timescale to be

decided in conjunction with Simcoe and St. Vincent. Once troops had

been landed, Rosslyn was to reassure the court of Lisbon they would

only remain ashore for the current period of danger. If the Portuguese

did refuse permission for the British troops to disembark, then the in-

structions on the relevant course of action had already been made clear

to Rosslyn, Simcoe and St. Vincent in the orders of 9 August.

Strangford had already informed the government of the possibility of

Franco-Spanish disagreements and now Windham instructed Rosslyn on

the role the Spaniards might play in the crisis. Once in Lisbon, Rosslyn

was instructed to gather additional intelligence regarding the possible in-

tentions of the government in Madrid. Although the Franco-Spanish parti-

tion of Portugal gave Spain one half of the country, France had an ulterior

motive. Windham believed Spain had agreed to cede to France Navarre,

Catalonia and ‘it is surmised, something in South America’. ‘There is little

reason to believe that such exchanges can really be acceptable at Madrid,

tho’ the weakness of the government may induce an acquiescence, or the

personal ambition of the Prince of Peace [Godoy] find it’s account in

them’. Drawing on a recent example, Windham hoped the fate of Naples

must have some influence on the future conduct of the court of Madrid,

‘nor can the subversion of the crown of Portugal be indifferent to them

on the same grounds. If any indication could be found there of a disposi-

tion towards a concert and secret understanding with this court & that of

Lisbon, either for general purposes, or even for the limited object of pre-

serving Portugal, it ought to be met with all possible encouragement’.

BRITAIN, PORTUGAL AND SOUTH AMERICA

HE PORTUGUESE CRISIS OF 1806

The Talents were clearly convinced the information supplied by Yar-

mouth in Paris was accurate. With a French army apparently collected at

Bayonne and an invasion of Portugal seemingly imminent, the Talents

had acted with swift fortitude to assemble a diplomatic mission to head

for Lisbon and impress upon the Portuguese the great danger facing

their country. Moreover, the Talents backed up diplomacy with a naval

force under St. Vincent and re-directed a suitable land force to the Tagus

in an attempt to pre-empt any French attack. Finally, they hoped to per-

suade both the Portuguese and the Spaniards that Napoleon was not to

be trusted. The ministry had done all they could; success of the mission

now depended upon the situation in Lisbon and the actions of Rosslyn,

St. Vincent and Strangford.

…

St. Vincent had been stationed off Brest when, on 8 August, he received

instructions ‘to fly to the protection of the sacred power and dominions

of Her Majesty the Queen of Portugal’.

He could not have been sur-

prised by his mission. According to intelligence reports a crisis was brew-

ing in Iberia, Lieutenant Ramage of the Hibernia stating at Bilbao in June

‘a strong rumour prevailed that an army of 25,000 French was expected

at Bayonne, that preparations were making for their reception’.

Further

intelligence came on 6 August from Thomas Usher of the Colpoys hired

brig who had heard the French were marching 40,000 men to the fron-

tier with Spain for the purpose of invading Portugal; in response, it was

alleged, the Spaniards had moved reinforcements towards the region.

On 15 August St. Vincent’s fleet of five sail-of-the-line and a frigate

arrived off the Tagus. He placed his fleet under eight-day quarantine,

preventing any contact with the shore and ensuring the Portuguese

could not gain knowledge of British intentions. Strangford managed to

obtain an interview with the Admiral where the object of his mission

was explained. At the time of St. Vincent’s arrival the Portuguese court

were absent from Lisbon; Strangford was not even sure where they had

gone.

Two days later, while trying to arrange a meeting with Araujo, Strang-

ford received news from a messenger that the Portuguese court had de-

camped to Nazaro, 90 miles distant from Lisbon.

Strangford reassured

Fox when the Princess of Brazil heard of the arrival of St. Vincent she

exclaimed ‘so, the true friends of Portugal are at last arrived’.

Next day

Strangford received a letter from Araujo informing him the French and

Spanish ambassadors had presented a ‘strong and decided’ note and

THE ROSSLYN MISSION TO

LISBON

HE ROSSLYN MISSION TO LISBON

threatened to withdraw their passports unless the Portuguese demanded

the removal of the British squadron.

A lack of instructions from the British government left Strangford in

a tricky situation. It was Rosslyn who would lead the mission and hence

assume diplomatic authority over Strangford but it seems the Talents did

not inform the latter of their intentions. Strangford received the details

of British policy direct from St. Vincent. Apart from protecting himself

against censure by his government in case he mishandled the negotia-

tions, the lack of direction left Strangford unsure of how far Britain

would go in protecting her ally. He resorted to using Sousa’s last des-

patch from London, which contained reports of a conversation that min-

ister had with Howick, to regulate his replies to Araujo. Strangford ex-

pounded the danger in which Portugal was now placed and the folly of

trusting the continued existence of the country on the chances of a gen-

eral peace being concluded at the talks in Paris. Araujo stated British

concerns appeared to come from the conclusions drawn by Yarmouth

after his conversations with Talleyrand. Araujo pointed to other rumours

originating from this source that had failed to come true, noting such

exaggerated alarms had been the cause of the current war between Eng-

land and Spain. He played down the notion of a French squadron trying

to enter the Tagus, while ridiculing the plan of a Royal Navy fleet at-

tempting to defend Lisbon by sea should France or Spain attack by land.

‘Of what use would be a British fleet in the Tagus which is commanded

by the neighbouring heights, and where every adjacent hillock could si-

lence a ship of the line?’ If Britain did send troops to defend the country

‘she ought to undertake it in full or not at all’ arguing Spain and France

would match in triplicate any troops sent by Britain. Araujo also pointed

to the poor state of the Portuguese Army as ‘little more than a nominal

establishment, in want of arms or clothing, and necessaries of every sort,

and unpaid and undisciplined assemblage of not more that 13,000 effec-

tive men’. In a barbed comment, Araujo criticised British policy for

sending troops on a diversity of missions, now ‘she could not spare too

great a number of troops as would be necessary for the preservation of

this country’.

Even if Britain could send assistance it might provide France and

Spain with a casus belli: ‘an English garrison in Lisbon, and an English

fleet in the Tagus, would be sufficient pretext to France & Spain to com-

mence hostilities’. Hence Araujo hoped St. Vincent would leave Lisbon

‘where his presence was unnecessary and alarming to the neutrality pro-

fessed by his Royal Highness’. It was not in Britain’s interest, he asserted,

for Portugal to be dragged into the war as an enemy of France and

Spain, accelerating the fall of the entire continent to Napoleon. Araujo

insisted the current situation, for Portugal at least, was no worse than it

had been during the previous war and pointed out if Portugal decided to

purchase ‘her own security at her own expense she is accountable to no

other state for measures which do not violate any established engage-

ments’. A British squadron in the Tagus, Strangford replied, could never

be considered as sufficient pretext for hostilities since a French squadron

under Admiral Jean-Baptiste-Philibert Willaumez had recently entered

Bahia in Brazil. He also pointed to the selection of St. Vincent whose

‘moderate conduct’ contrasted with the policy of France and Spain.

Rosslyn arrived in the Tagus on the evening of Monday 25

August to

find Charles Cotton, stationed off Ushant in the San Josef, seemingly cor-

roborate all the previous intelligence regarding a French army of 30,000

men collected at Bayonne.

While St. Vincent forbade his men to go

ashore, he appealed to the hearts and minds of the ordinary Portuguese

inhabitants by allowing them to visit his ships. According to Brougham

the ‘multitudes never ceased pouring through the vessels, lost in admira-

tion of their beauty, their force, and the discipline of their crews’.

Early

on the morning of the 26

Rosslyn conversed with St. Vincent before

going ashore to conduct a long conference with Araujo. In this meeting

Rosslyn stated the British government’s concern regarding Portugal from

the ‘extreme danger arising from…the intelligence respecting the plans of

the French’. In reply Araujo claimed he had sent several individuals to

Bayonne to ascertain the facts and discovered no major French army was

assembling there; a view supported by intelligence from Madrid and also

Paris, where the Portuguese Minister Laurenço de Lima had no reason to

apprehend any danger. Araujo, rather naively, highlighted the difference

between a declaration from the French government and a personal state-

ment from Bonaparte, with the language of Talleyrand, which was ‘mere

device or threat to induce Lord Yarmouth and His Majesty’s Ministers to

consent to the terms of peace proposed’.

Rosslyn witnessed in Araujo ‘a due apprehension both of the power

and ambition of the French Government…which he was aware aimed at

nothing short of the entire subjugation of Europe’. It was also clear

Araujo was trying to placate the Spaniards, who were nervous enough

over their relationship with France. The Spanish minister in Lisbon had

expressed ‘surprize and jealousy upon the arrival of Lord St. Vincent’, to

RITAIN, PORTUGAL AND SOUTH AMERICA

HE ROSSLYN MISSION TO LISBON

which Rosslyn retorted the placing of Spanish troops on a war footing,

especially those on the Portuguese border had caused a ‘just and natural

alarm’ in the British government for the safety of their ally. Rosslyn in-

formed Araujo he could communicate the information passed onto him

to the Spaniards ‘relative to the apprehensions that England entertains of

France in consequence of Mr Talleyrand’s declaration’. Araujo declined,

remarking he ‘could not attribute the arrival of Lord St. Vincent to

preparations which he did not believe to exist, nor to declarations of

which he had received no account, and which had not been made and

were not known to the Portuguese minister at Paris’. Araujo was clearly

worried the ‘sensation produced by Lord St. Vincent’s arrival, would

have the worst effects upon the interests and safety of Portugal’ and it

would ‘provoke an attack not otherwise intended’. It was not just the

number of ships, Araujo reasoned, but sending St. Vincent would greatly

annoy the Spaniards by the ‘the consequence attached to His Lordship’s

exalted character’.

Rosslyn countered Araujo’s arguments by playing a trump card: Brit-

ish troops had been diverted ‘from other objects of the first importance’

and were ready to sail ‘for the Defence of Portugal’. He reiterated the

British desire to offer ‘every assistance that the case might require or His

resources afford, as well in ships and money as in troops’. It was made

clear Britain had gone out of her way, risking other strategic objects, to

assist a friend in danger. With his experience of Portuguese affairs Ross-

lyn was not to be fobbed off by protests stating assistance was not

needed or would compromise Portuguese neutrality.

The Portuguese were pinning all their hopes on a general peace agree-

ment in Paris, and Araujo ‘seemed almost to believe that the terms had

already been settled’. Rosslyn responded by informing Araujo the British

government ‘were in full possession of everything that had passed at

Paris’ and urged the necessity of taking precautions ‘without delay’ point-

ing to the time it would take to prepare the country for defence. Rosslyn

added the French could arrive in Lisbon ‘almost as soon as the succours

now offered could be sent for from England’. Araujo agreed in the event

of a breakdown of the peace talks, ‘the situation of Portugal would be-

come dangerous in the extreme’, but he always returned to the assertion

that ‘a few days more would determine the question of peace’. Rosslyn

declared if peace came, Portugal would be secure, but if it did not, then

the French would not delay the invasion. If Portugal accepted British

assistance and prepared her own defences, this would not ‘increase their