Robson Martin. Britain, Portugal and South America in the Napoleonic Wars: Alliances and Diplomacy in Economic Maritime Conflict (ENG)

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the fate which may be reserved for this country’.

In mid May, however,

a rumour circulated regarding a convention signed at Madrid on 29

March where Portugal agreed to ‘certain facilities to be afforded to the

Spanish American trade and colonial intercourse with Europe’ in return

for Spain not yielding to French demands to attack.

On 17 May Fitz-

gerald received news he could take a leave of absence

and four days

later was ready to leave for Ireland. In a hurried note to Fox he declared

the reported convention of neutrality between Portugal and Spain was

just a rumour. It was, however, obviously not unlikely as Fitzgerald be-

lieved it possible, while the incident also shows poor state of intelligence

in Lisbon upon which to implement British policy.

Fitzgerald left Lis-

bon on the 22

under convoy with the Scout brig.

Clearly the fate of Portugal was inherently linked to Spain and both

countries’ relationships with France and Britain. The intelligence coming

into Fitzgerald seemed to suggest that Spain might look to secure their

interests by offering to preserve the peace with Portugal in the face of

French pressure. The Spaniards were acutely aware of the vulnerability

of their South American colonies and wider maritime trade from the

Royal Navy; the capture of a Spanish treasure fleet off Cadiz in 1804

providing a recent example of British maritime power (and leading to a

Spanish declaration of war on Britain). Iberian rivalries were mirrored in

South America where the Portuguese had long-held ambitions, perhaps

with help from Britain, for extending the borders of Brazil at the ex-

pense of the Spanish possessions along the River Plate. The British had

also been looking at commercial penetration of the closed markets of

South America, and would strive to achieve this object during these

years. British commercial expansion, backed up by the Royal Navy, was a

clear threat to the whole existence of the Spanish Empire. This was an

important factor in Anglo-Portuguese and Spanish-Portuguese relations

during 1806-1808 (and will be considered in some depth below).

With Fitzgerald absent the duties of the British Minister at Lisbon

were now delegated to the 27-year-old Irish peer and poet Percy Clinton

Sidney Smythe, sixth Viscount Strangford. Strangford had arrived in

Lisbon during 1804 as Secretary of the Legation. Strangford was well

acquainted with the workings of the Portuguese court. He was well liked

in Lisbon society for his translations of the Portuguese poet Camoes and

socialised in Portuguese literary circles as well as with the many British

families and individuals in Lisbon. Lord Byron chastised Strangford’s

literary character imploring him to ‘Mend, Strangford! mend thy morals

RITAIN, PORTUGAL AND SOUTH AMERICA

HE PORTUGUESE CRISIS OF 1806

and thy taste’.

Brougham drew attention to his ‘childishness in doing

business’ and lamented his ‘total want of that first-rate quality which gives

a man’s words the right to be believed’ and thought him ‘flighty and un-

certain in his movements’.

Sir John Moore confided in his diary that

Strangford, ‘a very young man’, was one of those ‘who upon leaving

[education] without any intermediate intercourse with mankind become

statesmen and diplomatists’.

Historians have also not been too kind to

Strangford; Napier highlighted his lack of experience and influence while

accusing him of collaborating with Canning to ‘doctor’ official dis-

patches.

He has also been described as nearsighted, absent minded,

vain and childish and that he was extremely lucky that events of 1807 ran

so much in his favour that he could not have failed.

In November 1806

he would be promoted to Minister Plenipotentiary and became the offi-

cial Foreign Office representative; it will become evident Strangford

played a pivotal role enacting British policy.

During June and July relations between Britain and Portugal deterio-

rated, as the latter appeared more concerned with placating Spain and

France than assisting her traditional friend. The most visible example

was an incident involving Lieutenant Henning of the Richmond brig. Hen-

ning had hailed a Portuguese ship whose conduct he thought ‘most sus-

picious’, and with good reason, for on boarding he found she was Span-

ish-built and laden with Spanish produce from the port of Bilbao. Fur-

thermore, she had no certificate from the Portuguese consul in that port

to prove the cargo was Portuguese property. Finding the ship, which he

now considered to be a prize of war, had sprung a leak, Henning put into

Lisbon whereupon the Portuguese authorities embargoed the Richmond.

Henning, out of respect to Portuguese neutrality, handed the brig over to

the authorities.

What marked out the affair was that the Portuguese had

seized a British warship, accused the officer in charge of firing upon a

Portuguese vessel wounding one man, and then changed their reason for

holding the ship once this was proved to be false. Araujo insisted the

embargo would continue until the British government apologised for

insulting Portugal. Strangford did not commit himself to any reply on

this point, assuring Fox that Henning was blameless.

In London the Portuguese minister Marquis Domingos de Sousa

complained to Howick about the actions of British vessels in Portuguese

waters, noting several incidents of a ‘melancholy and distressing na-

ture’.

Howick retorted the Portuguese embargo of the Richmond must

be ‘regarded as prejudicial to the friendship subsisting between the two

powers’. As noted above, despite the odd disagreement, Royal Navy

vessels had been active in Portuguese waters for many years but this

latest incident, when added to Portuguese unease at providing victuals

and water to British ships, seemed to suggest a change in Portuguese

policy. If this was accurate, what particularly annoyed Howick was the

lack of warning from the Portuguese. Clearly the Portuguese brig had

been carrying enemy goods but if suitable notice had been provided such

incidents could have been avoided.

With the peace talks still progress-

ing in Paris, Britain did not want to provoke a crisis with France and

Spain. Therefore Collingwood was specifically instructed to avoid any

further incidents or actions that would provide them with a causus belli

against Portugal.

The Richmond was eventually released, but Strangford

noted the incident had delighted the French and Spanish ministers in

Lisbon. He clearly saw their hand, and those members of the court who

were hostile to Britain, behind the affair.

Although the Richmond affair

in itself is of minor historical importance, it was symptomatic of the Por-

tuguese policy of trying to guarantee their security through appeasement

of France and Spain. Seemingly the land-based military threat posed by a

belligerent France or Spain carried greater gravitas than British diplo-

macy and maritime power.

This was recognised by Strangford who was increasingly worried

about the Portuguese policy of appeasement. On 21 June he heard fur-

ther rumours of an impending alliance between the Infanta of Portugal

and the Prince of Asturias.

By 1 July he had received news from Ma-

drid that the Portuguese minister had given assurances that no Portu-

guese merchant ships would provide intelligence to British vessels, under

penalty of forfeiting half their cargo. Though Strangford thought this

justifiable from a neutral nation, the problem, he saw, lay with issuing

such news ‘with a degree of indiscreet and unnecessary publicity’.

Further evidence was provided by the Portuguese embargoing the

Harbinger, a British transport vessel. His discussions with the Portuguese

regarding this ship convinced Strangford the ‘devotion of M d’Araujo to

the interests of France becomes every day more apparent’. Araujo was

very friendly with M. François Gérard, Conte de Rayneval, the French

chargé d’affaires in Lisbon, and he had just received a present of fine furni-

ture from France. Strangford had little ‘certain intelligence’ respecting a

rumoured convention concluded between Portugal and France but

thought ‘some arrangement hath actually been made; and that Madrid

has been the scene of negotiation’. Adding to the confusion, Strangford

RITAIN, PORTUGAL AND SOUTH AMERICA

HE PORTUGUESE CRISIS OF 1806

thought Araujo might be unaware of these negotiations due to the lack

of confidence displayed in him by the Conde de Villa Verde, the Prince

Regent’s chief minister. The conditions of the rumoured agreement

were: Portugal to grant ‘certain facilities’ to the trade of France and Spain

through the medium of her ships (a measure clearly aimed at the South

America trade) and Portugal to immediately pay the arrears from the

1801 indemnity due to France and to pay another six million cruzados in

quarterly instalments. There were also rumours of certain territorial de-

mands made on Portugal relating to the Bay of Lagos and the island of

St. Catherine’s off the coast of Brazil.

Against this background on 19 July orders were received at the Con-

sul General’s office in Lisbon notifying that the Royal Navy Victualling

Board would be ready to contract for supplying British warships off the

Portuguese coast on 2 September. This order caused ‘much uneasiness’

in the Portuguese government, who, as noted above, had complained of

the supply of Royal Navy vessels from Portuguese ports for the best part

of a year. The underlying factor was ‘violent remonstrances and cavils on

the part of the Spanish and French Ambassadors at this court’. Araujo

and Fitzgerald had actually implemented a remarkably successful supply

system to operate in secret to avoid the wrath of France and Spain. As a

result, Strangford noted, the protestations from the French and Span-

iards ‘have almost totally ceased, although supplies have constantly been

afforded to ships requiring them’. If a formal contract was agreed the

advantages of the ‘informal’ system would end, ‘the various articles

which hitherto have been privately shipped by the British commissary

(who is a native of Portugal and acts under the secret sanctions of his

own government), must in case of a contract, pass publicly through the

customhouse, a proceeding which will excite much observation’. The

French and Spanish would renew their complaints, leading to either the

prohibition of the contract or implementing such measures as to make it

impracticable. In conclusion Strangford advised the current arrangement

be allowed to continue.

To support this he included copies of a num-

ber of testimonials addressed to the contractor, Miguel Satarro, from

British naval officers, including Nelson and Collingwood, highlighting

the effectiveness of the ‘informal’ system.

Yet, as apparent Portuguese appeasement gathered pace, there were

rumours of trouble in the Franco-Spanish alliance. Although Araujo con-

tinued to deny any conversations had taken place with Spain, Strangford

had been informed during June 1806 there had been a definite ‘temporary

misunderstanding’ between France and Spain. It was believed France had

demanded territory in North East Spain and Spanish support in French

involvement in Etruria; Spanish compensation would come at the expense

of Portuguese territory.

By the end of July Strangford had received con-

firmation from Madrid there certainly had been a ‘misunderstanding’ be-

tween France and Spain and the two countries had not resolved the prob-

lem (see Chapter 4). According to the Portuguese ambassador, France had

demanded the town of Porto Rico in Spanish America as well as Spanish

territory in Europe, while the Spanish King was to give up his claim to the

throne of Naples. In response it was rumoured the Spanish had mobilised

their armed forces, but then suspended the activity due to the abundant

harvest. In Lisbon the Portuguese had been scrabbling around trying to

raise money with which to pay off the French indemnity, and had recently

made some payment. Finally, senior French naval officers had arrived at

Madrid, en route to Admiral François Étienne de Rosily-Mesros’ five sail-of-

the-line sheltering in Cadiz since Trafalgar; it was rumoured these ships

would shortly put to sea.

Strangford’s next communication with London was not until 10 Au-

gust, when he reported the arrival of three British warships and a convoy

of merchantmen off Lisbon on 2 August. Two Spanish frigates were

loitering in the area, but did not attack due to the strength of the British

escort, and the convoy entered the Tagus on the 4

. After an unsuccess-

ful attempt to meet with Araujo, Strangford reported he was sure the

Portuguese were in negotiations with the French and some additional

demands had been made by Napoleon. In consequence the Portuguese

were trying every effort to procure more money, including the raising of

a forced loan. John Hunter, the Consul General in Spain during 1802-

1803 had seemingly remained in Madrid while diplomatic relations were

suspended during 1804-1808. He now provided an important piece of

intelligence to Strangford: Hunter was sure a French army was assem-

bling at Bayonne to march into Iberia.

On 15 August Strangford reported the arrival off the River Tagus of a

Royal Navy squadron under the command of the Earl of St. Vincent

comprising the powerful three-decked flagship Hibernia (110), Donegal,

Defiance, Kent, Illustrious (74s) and the Lavinia frigate (40).

With Strang-

ford aware of degenerating Anglo-Portuguese relations and rumours

abounding in Lisbon that Portugal was to be invaded, it is a suitable mo-

ment to explain why a British fleet appeared off the Tagus in early Au-

gust and what it was supposed to achieve.

RITAIN, PORTUGAL AND SOUTH AMERICA

HE PORTUGUESE CRISIS OF 1806

The Talents React

While intelligence from Fitzgerald and Strangford had kept the British

government informed of events in Portugal, it was a source in Paris that

brought Portugal to the forefront of British strategy. During the peace

talks Talleyrand had accused Britain of not taking the discourse seriously

and playing for time until the season was too late for France to act

against Britain or other targets. Although the other targets were not

specified ‘some movements of troops towards Bayonne might excite

apprehension that Portugal was one of them’. Talleyrand then argued

nothing would be gained by Britain delaying the talks and two or three

months hence Britain would be perhaps obliged to consent to the con-

quest of Portugal, as she had consented to the conquest of Naples.

According to Butterfield, Yarmouth’s dispatches were filled with the

threat: ‘If we do not make peace before 15 August, Portugal will proba-

bly be seized’.

Napoleon certainly had a history of following up his

threats with aggressive action: seizing Hanover in 1803 and installing

Joseph Bonaparte as King of Naples in February 1806, as Talleyrand had

alluded to. As we shall see during the Portuguese crisis the British gov-

ernment would make constant reference to Yarmouth’s intelligence as

the key factor in reading Napoleon’s intentions.

It has been argued the French declarations against Portugal might

have been a ruse, as Grenville himself admitted,

to force Britain into

sending troops to Lisbon and hence preventing reinforcements going to

Sicily or Northern Germany.

Or they were, perhaps, to tempt Yar-

mouth into agreeing to a peace treaty before the arrival of a special dip-

lomatic mission from Russia.

In fact Yarmouth turned out to be a less

than scrupulous individual. He had been held in France as a prisoner of

war and only recently released, arriving in London on 6 June. Ten days

later he was sent back to his former captors to negotiate with Talley-

rand.

By 28 July ministers were concerned about Yarmouth’s inexperi-

ence and were keen to provide him with ‘explicit and positive directions’

not to commit to anything outside his instructions.

Preoccupied with

affairs in Naples and a desire to seize Sicily, it seems, at least during the

summer of 1806, Napoleon had no concrete plans for Portugal. There

are no further references to Portugal in his correspondence until Sep-

tember when, as part of a possible campaign, 60,000 French and Span-

iards were to march on Lisbon.

In London, however, the Talents took Talleyrand’s words, as commu-

nicated by Yarmouth, as a direct threat and reacted with surprising vig-

our. On 24 July Howick felt ‘uneasy’ about the possibility of a French

squadron of six ships ‘pushing for Lisbon’. He feared such a force might

seize the Tagus forts while ‘the march of the army from Bayonne would

make the thing certain’. As was expected for Britain, a power heavily

reliant on her maritime security, the main danger was the possibility of

France seizing the Portuguese fleet. Hence, the first response was to

swiftly place a naval force off Lisbon, not just as a visible support to the

Portuguese, in essence showing the flag, but to act as a floating diplo-

matic mission, a centre for intelligence gathering and a very potent sym-

bol of the power of the Royal Navy, providing leverage to British diplo-

macy. Howick raised this plan with Grenville, and both agreed it would

be a prudent course of action.

The government had already quizzed Lieutenant General James St.

Clair Erskine, Earl of Rosslyn as to the likelihood of Portuguese resis-

tance to a French or Spanish invasion. Rosslyn had gained first hand

experience of the Portuguese military, serving as Brigadier General and

Adjutant General to the British army in Portugal from November 1796

until leaving as a Major General in 1798.

Howick himself was con-

vinced that, due to the poor state of the Portuguese navy and army, it

would not be difficult to seize the Tagus forts. He stressed to Grenville

5-6,000 men might be easily landed and brought off again. There was

some risk involved, but the question was to balance it against the chance

of success. He was confident enough to state ‘even without a land force

we may by means of our fleet be able to save the Portuguese navy, or at

least the greater part of it’.

Windham had also been seeking advice, this time from John Gambier,

the British Consul General to Portugal. Gambier was a nephew of Admi-

ral Lord Gambier and a friend of Pitt. He had taken up the post in 1803

and since 1804 had worked closely with Strangford. Francis has de-

scribed him as ‘rumbustious’ but efficient, noting with Strangford they

‘made a good team’. Gambier had asked for leave from Portugal in Janu-

ary 1806 and had returned to England. Gambier now warned the gov-

ernment about the conduct of the leading Portuguese ministers, who

were more inclined to France than Britain. He also raised doubts over

the readiness of the Portuguese navy, most were in ordinary (not in com-

mission) and would need time to prepare for sea, but he thought 3-4,000

men a suitable number to send to Lisbon. Windham himself was inclined

to make an attempt against the Portuguese fleet.

The cabinet and the Admiralty agreed that St. Vincent would com-

BRITAIN, PORTUGAL AND SOUTH AMERICA

HE PORTUGUESE CRISIS OF 1806

mand the naval part of the mission. A man of vast experience (he had

entered the navy in 1749) and forceful personality, as already noted he

had extensive experience of Portuguese waters having served off Lisbon

as Commander in Chief of the Mediterranean fleet in 1796-1797 and

again in 1798. He had won the battle of Cape St. Vincent in 1797 for

which he gained his peerage, a factor that would undoubtedly annoy the

Spaniards. Moreover, he had acquired experience of maritime expedi-

tionary warfare in the West Indies during 1794-1795 and this played an

important part in his selection for the task at hand. This was an impor-

tant consideration for the Admiralty, who noted ‘the unanimity from

which the country has derived so much advantage, in the joint opera-

tions in which your lordship has formerly been employed, will not fail to

distinguish the present service’. The Portuguese mission was one of

‘peculiar delicacy and importance’ and ultimate success would require

‘the utmost harmony & good understanding between all the persons

entrusted with it’s execution’. The Admiralty clearly thought St. Vincent

was the man to provide unity of purpose between the naval, military and

diplomatic levers of power.

The certainty that a French army was assembled at Bayonne to invade

Portugal, the Admiralty informed St. Vincent on 4 August, necessitated

him proceeding ‘with as little delay as possible to Lisbon’. He was to

form a squadron ‘as you shall judge necessary’ and to remain off the

Tagus until joined by an expeditionary force of troops. The main object

was to provide a highly visible military presence to ‘afford the means of

counteracting the success of the intended French invasion of Portugal,

which their own declarations do not any longer give room to consider as

doubtful’.

St. Vincent was provided with clear orders:

. If the Portuguese government should, contrary to the expecta-

tions, entertained in this country, be willing and able to make effec-

tual exertions for their own defence, either singly or in cooperation

with Spain, His Majesty will be willing to afford them such assis-

tance as may be in his power and for this object, the presence of a

respectable British squadron in the River Tagus may be of essential

use.

. If the government, convinced that resistance is impracticable,

shall take the resolution which is said to have been in contempla-

tion last war, of moving themselves with their ships, forces, stores

etc to the Brazils which can only be done with the aid of a British

fleet, your Lordship will be able to cooperate with them for that

purpose.

. If there should not be sufficient decision in the court of Lisbon

to adopt either of these resolutions, His Majesty’s ministers must

in such extreme case, look to the preventing as far as possible, the

great accession of force, particularly of naval force, which the en-

emy would receive, were they allowed without resistance to possess

themselves of the port of Lisbon in its present state, and which

must therefore at all events be prevented, and strict measures

adopted as will enable your Lordship in this last case to bring away

the Portuguese ships of war, together with the Brazil ships and

others capable of being made serviceable for the like purposes, and

also the persons, ships and property of the British factories, as well

as the court, if even in the last moment they should so decide.

The Admiralty conveyed a note of caution, just in case the intelligence

from Paris was inaccurate and perhaps reflecting the British govern-

ment’s unwillingness to force matters by antagonising the French or

providing them with an excuse for military intervention. Yet, with an

expeditionary force set to sail from England ‘with the least possible de-

lay’, the unexpected arrival of 10,000 British troops off Lisbon would

initially grant St. Vincent the element of surprise, perhaps providing the

opportunity for a decisive strike to secure the Portuguese navy. Secrecy

would be key, hence he was instructed to be:

…most careful, not to give any inclination, before their actual arri-

val, of your expecting them, nor take any measures, nor hold any

language, that may alarm the French Minister at Lisbon, or the

French party in the government there, so as the lead to any meas-

ures of preparation or precaution against what your Lordship may

ultimately be obliged to do.

It was possible the troops would have to act immediately upon their

arrival in the Tagus ‘in order to establish themselves in a secure position’,

therefore St. Vincent was to keep the marines and boats in his fleet in a

state of readiness to assist the landing of the troops, though again he was

to take care not to alarm the Portuguese. As first on the scene he was to

collect any information ‘that may in addition to the knowledge which

RITAIN, PORTUGAL AND SOUTH AMERICA

HE PORTUGUESE CRISIS OF 1806

you already possess of that place & the people’ assist the commander of

the land forces.

In contrast to their reputation for ineffective military expeditions, the

Talents were certainly acting with decisive intent to resolve the apparent

impending crisis in Portugal. Howick pressed the matter with Grenville

again on 7 August noting ‘every thing depends upon time, and that it

would be better to risk a failure in an attempt at a coup de main, than to

make a failure almost certain by delay’. It was impossible to place British

troops off Lisbon sooner than the 21

and his concerns turned to the

possibility of having to besiege Lisbon before the French arrived.

In order for ministers to gain a clear impression of the situation in

Lisbon, and perhaps unwilling for Strangford, a junior diplomat, to nego-

tiate with the Portuguese, it was decided a special diplomatic mission

under Rosslyn, with Henry Brougham as secretary, would go to Portugal.

Although the naval and military force would be under the respective

commands of St. Vincent and General John Graves Simcoe, Rosslyn was

granted full powers to negotiate with the Portuguese on ‘all matters that

may concern the joint interests of the two courts in the present conjunc-

ture of affairs’.

To ensure all parties in the mission were clear about the objectives, on

9 August joint instructions were drafted for Rosslyn, Simcoe and St. Vin-

cent. The decision to send a British expedition to the Tagus was

‘founded on no light surmises, but on the declaration of the French gov-

ernment itself’. ‘Intelligence has been received by His Majesty’s ministers

of an intention on the part of France immediately to invade the King-

dom of Portugal, and the French govt has by its own declarations left

little or no room to doubt the truth of that intelligence’. It was clearly

stated the French government had informed the British Minister con-

ducting the negotiations in Paris ‘an army, said to be composed of

30,000 men, is actually assembled at Bayonne for this purpose’. The ob-

ject was ‘nothing less than that of dethroning the present Royal Family

and destroying the very existence of the Portuguese monarchy’. This

declaration was taken seriously due to the ‘habit of that government thus

previously to announce its acts of violence – that other measures of a

like nature were in like manner announced, & have actually been since

carried into execution’. Though the French might temporarily postpone

the actual attack it would be unwise for Britain to delay any response.

Once occupied by the enemy the Kingdom of Portugal would be parti-

tioned, as had been agreed in talks between France and Spain in June and