Robson Martin. Britain, Portugal and South America in the Napoleonic Wars: Alliances and Diplomacy in Economic Maritime Conflict (ENG)

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expand his naval forces for the impression is clear: during the years fol-

lowing Trafalgar ‘Napoleon had not given up using his fleet to good

effect’.

Table 1: The European Navies, 1805-1810

1805 1810

Battleships Cruisers Battleships Cruisers

The Royal Navy 135 192 152 245

French Navy 41 46 46 38

Spanish Navy 40 50 28 27

Russian Navy 47 16 35 14

Danish Navy 20 16 2 -

Swedish Navy 12 11 13 8

Dutch Navy 15 13 13 9

Portuguese Navy 12 18 11 14

The Importance of Lisbon and the Portuguese Navy

Set against the wider context of an Anglo-French maritime war it was

vital the naval base of Lisbon and the Portuguese navy did not fall into

the hands of Napoleon. British naval assistance to Portugal had been

confirmed in the Methuen Treaty. In the event of Spain or France de-

claring war on Portugal, Britain and Holland would declare war on those

powers and supply a military force of 12,000 men for the defence of the

country. Britain also committed herself to despatching a Royal Naval

squadron of equal or greater strength to any hostile fleets that might be

off the coast of Portugal and to help defend Portuguese colonies. In time

of peace it was agreed Britain and Holland would each be allowed to

station six ships-of-the-line in the ports of Portugal.

Throughout the wars the Portuguese navy varied little in strength,

fluctuating between 11 and 13 battleships in service. Apart from a 74 gun

ship launched in 1802 there were no additions to battlefleet strength in

the years prior to 1807. As Glete has argued ‘the Portuguese navy had

changed little in either size or operational tasks since the early 16

cen-

tury’. In 1805 the Portuguese navy totalled 54 ships, with the battleship

force made up of one 80 gun ship, six 74s and five 64s. In September

1807 it comprised 13 ships-of-the-line, eight frigates and 18 smaller ves-

sels.

The main role of the navy was to safeguard Portuguese maritime

interests, in particular the trade with Brazil.

BRITAIN, PORTUGAL AND SOUTH AMERICA

HE IMPORTANCE OF PORTUGAL

Lisbon was the main fleet base of the Portuguese navy and, with its

close proximity to Spain, Gibraltar and Cadiz, it was of vital interest to

Britain as a base for naval and commercial activity in the Mediterranean

and Atlantic. Fisher has pointed to:

Lisbon’s unparalleled strategic location for major involvement in

Atlantic and European commerce….Vessels proceeding south-

wards from northern European countries, or sailing homewards

from the Mediterranean, Africa, the East and West Indies, even if

not directly interested in Portuguese commerce might use Lisbon

as a port of call, for a little trade, for supplies, repairs or commer-

cial intelligence.

‘All through the long imperial struggle between England and France’,

Corbett noted, ‘Lisbon, the womb of the Oceaninc expansion of

Europe, had been recognised as a point beyond price’.

Lisbon has one of the best natural harbours in the world; a visitor

described it in 1755 as ‘one of the most commodious in Europe’.

The

French General Foy who was there in 1807 thought the inner harbour

12-14 leagues in circumference ‘in which fleets may anchor and sail with-

out being exposed to the cannon on the shore’. Fisher notes the width of

the Tagus at Lisbon ranges from one and a half to four miles while the

deep water allowed great ships to sail right into the harbour.

Heading

down to the sea, a distance of around nine miles, Foy described the Ta-

gus contracting abruptly ‘before the western part of the city of Lisbon, in

such a manner that it is but eight hundred and six fathoms wide between

the Tower of Belem and the Old Tower’. This channel ‘is three leagues

long; its average width is fourteen hundred fathoms’ and it is flanked by

‘two calcareous chains, of similar form, but of which the northern chain

extends beyond and to the west of the southern chain’. At the mouth of

the Tagus ‘is the bar of Lisbon, intersected by a shelf of submarine

rocks, called os cachopos. Of the two passes by which ships of the line

enter the Tagus, the best is that which is nearest to the right bank’.

The Tagus was well protected at the bar by the St. Julien and Bugio

forts and along the length of the river by numerous batteries and forts.

All this presented a formidable crossfire to any ships trying to force pas-

sage upriver. The bar itself offered great natural protection to Lisbon,

and could be very difficult to pass even with local pilots. The Tagus has a

very strong ebb tide which, if combined with a sea wind, could make

ships entering the river virtually unmanageable. Running aground on the

bar was a very common occurrence, the Portuguese Admiral Niza suf-

fered this inconvenience in 1794. Several Royal Navy vessels shared his

fate, the Camel storeship grounded and the 3

Rate 74 gun Bombay Castle

was wrecked in December 1796. In January 1797 the 90 gun 2

rate St.

George ran aground on the shoals and the following December the Brig

sloop Kingfisher ran aground and was wrecked on the bar, a fate shared by

the Weymouth transport in January 1800.

As far back as 1657 the Portuguese had played up the value of Lisbon

to Britain describing it as an ideal base for operations against Spain. This

was a ‘potent argument’ for the Portuguese for the next 150 years. Eng-

land needed an ally in southern Europe to support Mediterranean naval

policy:

Portugal fitted the bill precisely: her empire was vast and overflow-

ing with riches which were only in part fabulous and imaginary; her

ports were ideal for bases in South European Atlantic and Mediter-

ranean waters; and she was an irritating and effective foil to be

used against Spain. From England’s point of view she would also

serve equally as well as a base of operations against France.

This was a key consideration. With Spain as an enemy, Lisbon was the

only friendly harbour south of the British Isles offering the necessary

facilities for a fleet base to project power into the Mediterranean. Facili-

ties were available at Genoa, Naples and Sicily but French military suc-

cess removed the former two, while the latter was always under threat

and was of little use against the enemy fleet bases at Cadiz (Spain) and

Toulon (France).

In 1796 Grenville had thought ‘the defence of H. M. F. m’s domin-

ions, of the Port of Lisbon in particular, [and] of the commerce of Por-

tugal in all it’s branches, will always form a leading consideration in H.M.

naval arrangements’.

After the Spanish declaration of war that year, the

Admiralty decided the Mediterranean fleet:

…be stationed from Cape Finisterre to Gibraltar, making its head-

quarters at Lisbon, and acting in conjunction with the Portuguese

fleet for the protection of Portugal, there keeping up a communi-

cation with Gibraltar, and taking every opportunity of annoying the

enemy…

RITAIN, PORTUGAL AND SOUTH AMERICA

HE IMPORTANCE OF PORTUGAL

The fleet would be ‘placed in the most advantageous manner for the

protection of our outward- and homeward- bound trade, and for the

cutting up that of Spain’. The presence of British naval forces at Lisbon

‘would probably be the means of preserving to us the friendship and

ports of Portugal, without which we shall in a very short time have no

port in Europe freely open to our trade south of Emden’.

Sir John Jervis, Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Fleet,

agreed there was ‘no port on the coast of Portugal, except the Tagus,

which will admit even a large sloop of war’, if Lisbon could not be util-

ised then he could not ‘advise the continuance of the fleet in these seas,

because the public will be led to expect what cannot be performed, and

with every possible exertion the preservation of the health of the crews,

nay, even the maintenance of them, is very doubtful’. Gibraltar was not

an option, its repair facilities were not on a par with Lisbon, victuals and

stores would not be secure, and the Royal Navy’s very presence there

would provide a focus for Spanish attacks and bombardments. It could

also be difficult for ships to enter the Mediterranean from Gibraltar.

Another option was basing the fleet at the Bayona Islands off the port of

Vigo, but again there were problems with supply, it ‘would require

greater resources and exertions that your lordship can possibly be aware

of, or indeed any one who has not been employed in a co-operation with

troops’. Also, a fleet stationed there would be too distant to watch over

Cadiz.

Jervis had in fact utilised the facilities at Lisbon for the repair of his

ships in late 1796.

In March 1797 Commissioner Libra, formerly of the

Naval Department at Porto Ferraio, now took a similar position at Lis-

bon.

In April 1797 Jervis praised the Royal Navy representatives at

Lisbon. In particular Captain Isaac Coffin, the former Navy Commis-

sioner at Leghorn, was now overseeing the repairs at Lisbon. Jervis also

recommended Mr Churchill ‘the master shipwright at Lisbon’ as an offi-

cer who ‘will not disgrace any situation you may think fit to place him

in’. By their efforts, and those of the Portuguese Minister of Marine, all

Jervis’ ships had been repaired.

Lisbon provided British merchant ships and convoys with a place of

refuge if enemy fleets were at sea or if, as happened in 1796, the coast of

Portugal was swarming with Spanish and French privateers.

Especially

troublesome were the Spanish row boats, which could operate out of any

river or bay. With the Royal Navy withdrawn from the Mediterranean in

1797 John Turnbull, the Chairman to the Merchants trading to the Medi-

terranean wrote to the Admiralty impressing upon them that Lisbon was

the most convenient rendezvous for merchant ships bound for Italy and

the Levant. The Admiralty asked Jervis for his views on the practicality

of this.

In 1800 a French fleet of over 40 ships-of-the-line in Brest

threatened the Mediterranean, Ireland, Portugal or even mainland Britain

if it escaped. The Admiralty utilised Lisbon as a central strategic rendez-

vous for its fleets. Moreover, the near continual presence of Royal Navy

and merchant vessels in the river during this period provided an impor-

tant source of intelligence regarding French naval movements.

Corbett summed all this up rather well, asserting ‘it is interesting to

note that in the eyes of this fighting admiral [St. Vincent], and indeed of

everyone else, the preservation of the base at Lisbon took precedence as

a strategic object over the attempts to bring the enemy’s fleet to ac-

tion….the whole episode of the struggle for the Tagus scarcely finds a

place in our histories, but it will seem that at a time when we were threat-

ened with isolation, it was considered vital to our ability to continue the

war’. Corbett’s passage, noting the importance of Lisbon and other stra-

tegic positions in the British war effort and the creation of the British

Empire, is worth repeating:

…the result of our long war experience had been rather to enhance

than diminish the strategic importance of such naval positions. The

men who knew what naval war was were dominated by the idea

that though battles might place in our hands the command of the

sea, the exercise of that command was impossible, without advance

bases rightly distributed. The view that the alliance of Portugal, or

at least her benevolent neutrality, was essential, as St. Vincent

points out, to our being able to exercise control of the great Medi-

terranean and oceanic trade routes was of course a tradition of our

foreign policy already two centuries old, but age and experience

had only increased its vitality.

The Dangers of Lisbon under French Control

Apart from denying Britain all the advantages detailed above, if the

French seized Lisbon and the Portuguese navy the impact upon British

maritime security would be significant. France had major problems pro-

jecting seapower in the age of sail due to her basic geography. The main

French fleet bases were at Brest and Toulon. To concentrate naval forces

in either the Atlantic or the Mediterranean entailed major fleet move-

RITAIN, PORTUGAL AND SOUTH AMERICA

HE IMPORTANCE OF PORTUGAL

ments, it was simple for Napoleon to do this on paper but it was im-

mensely difficult to coordinate fleet movements in practice due to

weather conditions, problems with communications and the activities of

the Royal Navy. The capture of Lisbon and a French-controlled fleet in

the Tagus, close to the Spanish base of Cadiz and the entrance to the

Mediterranean, would provide a secure central naval base from which

French fleets could operate. The French could and did use the Spanish

base at Cadiz, but the harbour there could be susceptible to attack from

both land and sea while Napoleon viewed Spain as not the most reliable

of allies. The conquest of Portugal would grant France permanent pos-

session of Lisbon. This situation would have impinged on the opera-

tional effectiveness of the Royal Navy requiring a permanent blockading

squadron, restricting British offensive strategy by decreasing the number

of ships available for furthering British maritime interests.

In 1795, when the Brest fleet put to sea, one French commentator,

Rear Admiral M Kerguelen thought it should attack Lisbon and seize

British goods:

This enterprise would gain for France 200 millions, in cash or Brit-

ish merchandise; England would receive a terrible shock, which

would produce bankruptcies and a general consternation; our fleet,

without being buffeted about the sea, [as in 1795] would return to

Brest, loaded with riches and covered with glory; and France would

once more astonish Europe with a new triumph.

In 1796 with a French squadron laden with troops at Brest Jervis

thought the Tagus as ‘the probable real object of the interprise…they

may by stealing a march possess themselves of Lisbon; from whence it

will be very difficult to drive them out; especially if they enter Portugal

with an army through Spain’.

‘As a naval base’, Corbett succinctly

noted, ‘the Tagus was far too valuable to be allowed to fall into the en-

emy’s hands’.

Lisbon was adjacent to the sea lines of communication to and from

South America, the West and East Indies and could serve as an excellent

base for French and Spanish privateers to threaten British maritime

trade. If the French gained possession of Lisbon, ‘Every river and creek

in the kingdom will be filled with privateers and the British trade har-

assed and obstructed to such a degree that no one will insure upon it’.

Napoleon himself realised the value of Lisbon. In 1808 he wanted three

ships-of-the-line, three frigates and nine Russian vessels ready for offen-

sive operations;

and in May 1808 was inquiring whether there were

enough transports to undertake an expedition to Brazil.

This latter statement raises another key point about the importance of

Portugal. The Portuguese navy was potentially useful to French maritime

strategy and Lisbon was ideally placed for a war against British trade. But

if Napoleon could add control of Portugal to his existing alliance with

Spain it raised the spectre of French claims to the entire American pos-

sessions of those powers. For, by 1806, that was a region both Britain

and France looked to with much interest. The key question, therefore,

was would the Portuguese nation be able to offer up any resistance to

French attempts to gain political control of their country?

…

RITAIN, PORTUGAL AND SOUTH AMERICA

If many contemporary commentators are to be believed, there really was

not much hope of the Portuguese resisting Napoleon. Dom João, the

Prince of Brazil, had ruled Portugal as Regent in the name of his mother

Queen Maria since 1799. João was married to the Spanish Infanta Car-

lota Joaquina, daughter of Charles IV of Spain, which contributed to the

Portuguese conciliatory attitude towards Madrid. Henry Brougham

thought them as ‘feeble beyond all description’,

while Admiral Campbell

was of the opinion Dom João possessed an ‘assemblage of vanity, indo-

lence, diffidence and fear’ and was ‘ambitious of being thought a States-

man…but loth to apply, and even doubtful of his own capacity, he is

ever consulting, but never deciding’.

John Hookham Frere was in Lis-

bon in early 1807 and remarked ‘this Prince has given himself up to me

all at once like a girl’; with regard to the Portuguese Court he confessed

‘I do not know what to do with them all’.

The official British Minister

Plenipotentiary in Lisbon from 1802 to 1806, Lord Robert Stephen Fitz-

gerald, highlighted the ‘mal-administration of a feeble, corrupt, and de-

graded ministry’

and thought the Regent ‘a most weak and timid Prince,

yet obstinate and bigotted’.

These views were not just prevalent in Eng-

lish circles, according to the French historian Thiers, ‘This race of Bra-

ganza, grown old, like its neighbour, the race of the Spanish Bourbons,

sunk like the latter in ignorance, effeminacy, cowardice’.

Until recently historians, such as Fortescue who described him as a

‘poor creature’, have ridiculed Prince João, but a recent assessment by

Macaulay presents a picture of the Regent trying to do the best for his

country in a difficult situation. His major failing was chronic indecision.

There is less disagreement about Carlota. For Francis she ‘remained a

THE PORTUGUESE CRISIS OF 1806

Spaniard first and foremost’ and although she was only ten at the time of

the marriage ‘she grew up to be a positive witch’.

Others are even more

scathing: ‘perhaps the ugliest royal personage that ever existed….4 feet

and 6 inches tall with bloodshot, malevolent eyes’ and possessing ‘an

atrocious temper’. Her fierce Spanish pride added another layer of com-

plexity and uncertainty to Portuguese policy.

João excluded the Portuguese nobility from any decision-making,

relying on a small group of confidential advisors who, according to Fitz-

gerald, were susceptible to French bribery.

In the years immediately

previous to 1806 the Regent had been steadily falling under the influence

of subsequent French ambassadors especially General Jean Lannes who

had arrived in Lisbon in April 1802 and held the post spasmodically until

July 1804.

The divisions and inefficiency of the Portuguese Court were

exacerbated by the fact that in 1805 João had discovered a plot, originat-

ing with his wife, to remove him and seat her on the throne. He mis-

trusted everyone, saw treason everywhere and retreated into his palace at

Mafra.

In January 1806 Fitzgerald raised concerns about the Regent’s

mental health; it seems João was convinced he would become afflicted

by the same illness incapacitating his mother. This resulted in a loss of

authority (though the Prince was not that confident of his rule anyway)

compelling the Portuguese to discuss the possibility of forming a Re-

gency Council composed of the ministers currently in office, though the

Portuguese dismissed all this as mere rumour.

During the crises of

1806-1807 ‘the man in whom rested the ultimate authority and responsi-

bility for the Portuguese nation permitted only a meagre contact with his

ministers and the diplomatic corps at Lisbon and remained out of touch

with developments in Europe’.

The Situation in Portugal

Writing his dispatches from Lisbon during March 1806 Fitzgerald did

not see any signs of impending danger to continued Portuguese inde-

pendence.

This optimism was not shared by the wine merchant and

British Consul in Oporto William Warre. Intelligence reports detailed

‘various outrages’ upon Portuguese ships in the Spanish ports of Galicia,

especially at Vigo where their ships had been ordered to leave the port.

Fitzgerald thought Spain might be about to declare hostilities against

Portugal.

Although the Portuguese ministers had lodged an official

complaint in Madrid, they were little concerned with the Spanish actions.

Further rumours concerned Spanish forces at Ferrol, where a possible

BRITAIN, PORTUGAL AND SOUTH AMERICA

HE PORTUGUESE CRISIS OF 1806

expedition had been foiled from sailing by the appearance of a British

squadron. The Portuguese made light of additional rumours that troops

were being made ready in Spain and France for an invasion of Portugal.

In fact on 14 April Napoleon had inquired whether the Spaniards

‘wished to try an enterprise against Portugal’ and if assistance from

French troops would be needed.

With Lisbon a hotbed of rumour, accurate intelligence was at a pre-

mium. The Portuguese themselves were convinced there would be no

hostilities from Spain or France and looked favourably on all incidents

supporting this belief. With Spain and Britain at war, they reasoned

Spanish ships would be seized by the Royal Navy. In this context, Fitz-

gerald noted, Portugal could maintain friendly relations with Spain

through ‘the great utility which she proves herself to be of to her

neighbour, in the facilities afforded by means of her flag, and a variety of

other ways, of covering the property and produce of the Spanish Ameri-

can Colonies and of conveying the same to Europe’. South American

commerce was a key factor in relations between the two European pow-

ers and Fitzgerald was convinced ‘this individual object forms the basis

of a pacific arrangement and compromise between the two courts, lately

negotiated at Madrid’. Meanwhile the French chargé d’affaires was pressing

for the payment of the last instalment due on an indemnity of 1803,

which the Portuguese had paid to preserve their neutrality (see Appendix

III). To meet the payment, the Portuguese government were emptying

all public coffers and raising forced loans.

Despite believing France and Spain were not interested in the coun-

try, the Portuguese were extremely worried British violations of their

neutrality might lead to punishment from Paris and Madrid. On 16 April

the Portuguese Foreign Minister Antonio Araujo e Azevedo expressed

alarm that a British frigate from the Mediterranean Fleet (under the com-

mand of Vice Admiral Cuthbert Collingwood) had appeared off Lagos

Bay demanding a large amount of provisions. Araujo wanted Fitzgerald

to impress upon Collingwood ‘to avoid all immediate chance of compro-

mise which certainly would be attended with the displeasure of His Royal

Highness’.

Collingwood, understanding the delicate nature of the Por-

tuguese situation, had avoided sending British ships into the Portuguese

ports but vociferously defended the right of British ships to procure

victuals and water from a neutral, supposedly friendly, nation.

By 2 May Fitzgerald could report that, while there was no specific

threat, Portuguese ministers expressed ‘distant apprehension in regard to