Robson Martin. Britain, Portugal and South America in the Napoleonic Wars: Alliances and Diplomacy in Economic Maritime Conflict (ENG)

Подождите немного. Документ загружается.

up maritime power – what are its elements? Mahan identified six key

constituent components:

• Geography (access to the main trading routes)

• Physical conformation (number and nature of good ports

and harbours)

• Extent of territory (not too much to defend, but enough to

provide resources and infrastructure – of course this could

include overseas territory)

• Population (enough people to build, crew and sail ships)

• Character of the people (i.e. are they a ‘seafaring’ people)

• Character of the government (naturally inclined to the mari-

time as a policy decision)

Of course, Mahan was writing with the history of Britain and the Royal

Navy in mind and took the ideal case, but his checklist provides a useful

illustration of the array of elements that must be factored in. The sea is

more than just a medium for the passage of warships and for fighting sea

battles. The sea is a resource, a medium for transportation and exchange

of goods and ideas; to exploit the sea requires a matrix of skills and re-

sources. It requires infrastructure: support from central administration,

insurance, access to quality resources in suitable quantity, robust and

sustainable ships, skilful sailors, officers and artisans. It also requires

elements Mahan identified, such as maritime geography and, above all

else, maritime trade for it is oceangoing maritime trade that provides the

finance to fund all of the above. Maritime trade lucrative enough to pro-

vide the necessary funds is also an obvious target for a potential enemy;

hence maritime security is a prime concern of maritime powers and led

to the development of naval force, which of course can be funded by

maritime trade creating a maritime cycle.

Approaching the subject in this wider sense highlights the relationship

between the military and non-military use of the sea and how such a

maritime approach contributed towards achieving war aims, or to para-

phrase Till, how maritime power influences the behaviour of others by

what you can do at or from the sea.

It is this wider aspect that forms

the theoretical framework of this study. To build on this theoretical dis-

course ‘maritime war’, as proposed in the widest context by Till, provides

an explanation as to why Britain fought a long (twenty-two years) and

expensive war against France and her various allies and why it was

RITAIN, PORTUGAL AND SOUTH AMERICA

NTRODUCTION

fought in a manner different to the campaigns that took place in Conti-

nental Europe. For, as a maritime power at the centre of a maritime trad-

ing economy, Britain was fighting for something different to the Conti-

nental powers and therefore would use different means to achieve aims.

Unlike the Continental powers Britain was not fighting an aggressive,

territorial war for chunks of land but was fighting to preserve her own

maritime security and maritime trading interests in Europe and overseas.

Maritime trade was at the heart of the system (and it is worth pointing

out for an island nation all trade with other states is maritime to some

extent) providing the money and credit which allowed for long term

fiscal planning: ‘British naval power ensured that Britain gained this

wealth and her opponents lost it, and this was vital to the ability to the

British state to finance its actions in peace and war’.

As we shall see,

this maritime approach has been branded as blatant imperialism. But

France had territory and possessions susceptible to the exercise of mari-

time power in many areas of the globe. It was only natural that Britain

would attack her enemy in the areas where British ministers thought they

themselves could fight at an advantage: the maritime. The problem was

all this provided perfect ammunition for Napoleonic propaganda to

claim Britain fought only for British objects and ignored the fate of their

continental allies.

Mention of objects brings us back to a fundamental question: what

were British war aims? Only once this fundamental question has been

addressed, using the wider framework of ‘maritime war’ proposed here,

can we then contextualise why Portugal and South America occupied an

important role in British strategy during 1806-1808.

Britain and Europe

The French Revolutionary Wars began in April 1792 when France de-

clared war on Austria and Prussia; this was followed in February 1793 by

a declaration of war against Britain. The British response was not to grab

territory in Europe, restore the Bourbon monarchy, defeat the French

militarily or restore order in France.

Many factors contributed to Brit-

ish active participation in the war, but the prime reason was defensive:

French expansion into the Low Countries threatened British maritime

security.

Although Britain had interests in the Baltic, the Mediterranean

and overseas, French attempts to control her Northern neighbours im-

pinged on this major, traditional, British security concern. French control

of the Low Countries was a threat to Hanover, the electorate of King

George III; gave France access to the Dutch navy, commercial shipping

and colonies; prevented British shipping from utilising the Rhine and

Meuse to access the markets of central Europe; and, most importantly,

posed a direct threat to the security of the British Isles.

The Low Countries were the most favourable location in Europe

from which to launch an invasion of Britain. The French Channel coast-

line was opposite the south coast of England, relatively protected by

tides, currents, high cliffs and the fleet bases at Plymouth and Ports-

mouth. But directly opposite the River Thames, Britain’s main commer-

cial artery, and the open flat countryside of Essex, are the Scheldt, Rhine

and Mass estuaries and the shipbuilding deep water ports of Antwerp

and Flushing. This was the ideal location from which to launch an inva-

sion of mainland Britain. The Spanish Armada of 1588 was supposed to

pick up the Duke of Parma’s army from Flanders before landing them

on the Kent coast while the Dutch had launched their attack on the

Thames and Medway from the Mass in 1666.

The successful French conquest of the Low Countries in 1795 and

the foundation of the Batavian Republic as a satellite state also addressed

a French strategic weakness. French fleets were traditionally focused at

the main fleet ports of Brest and Toulon; French expansion into the

Low Countries ‘put an end to one of their ancient weaknesses at sea.

Hitherto, France had possessed no naval base, where a fleet might shel-

ter, north and east of Brest. But from 1749 [sic, 1794] she had Ant-

werp’.

This undermined a key naval component of British maritime

power: the Western Squadron which was designed to negate enemy fleets

in Europe by fleet battle and blockade. By concentrating her fleets off

Ushant Britain could use the prevailing winds from the south-west to

prevent (at least in theory) any enemy naval force from entering the

Channel. The Western Squadron also protected incoming trade, could

attack enemy trade and served as a strategic reserve. Hence, even for the

great historian of the British army Sir John Fortescue, Antwerp in

French hands was ‘a standing menace to England’s safety’.

‘In the Na-

poleonic wars’ Howard argued ‘the British fought in the Low Countries

whenever they had allies to fight for’.

The reason was simple: maritime

security.

Pitt began the war by sending direct military assistance to help the,

ultimately unsuccessful, defence of Austrian possessions in the Low

Countries. The fact that Austria had legitimate territorial claims to terri-

tory in the region was an added complication, especially when that coun-

RITAIN, PORTUGAL AND SOUTH AMERICA

NTRODUCTION

try proposed to France exchanging the area for control of Bavarian terri-

tory: a nightmare scenario for Britain. Although France founded the

Batavian Republic in 1795 the area remained a prime theatre for British

military operations. In 1799 an Anglo-Russian expedition was des-

patched to the Helder while a decade later in 1809 a massive amphibious

operation was launched against the French naval facilities at Walcheren.

In 1813 Castlereagh would write that to leave Antwerp in the hands of

the French, ‘is little short of imposing upon Great Britain the charge of a

perpetual war establishment’.

Famously, of course, the battle of Water-

loo was fought on the road to Antwerp. As long as France occupied the

Low Countries Britain could never feel safe.

Though an independent Low Countries, or at least a state free of

French influence, was the prime British war aim, there was some need to

tie British, or British subsidised, military and naval forces to other British

interests. In Europe the Baltic and Mediterranean had to be kept open to

British shipping. Of crucial importance for British maritime power, the

Baltic was the single most important source of naval stores, such as iron,

tar, timber for masts, planking and decks, pitch, tallow and linseed, while

Russia supplied 90 per cent of the navy’s hemp.

To take just one exam-

ple of this maritime trade, 1,011 British ships left Russian ports in

1794.

The river Elbe was a major artery into Central Europe for British

trade and in return a conduit for important grain shipments from Prus-

sia. British exports in 1806 to Russia, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Prus-

sia and the German States totalled £9,375,000.

British maritime trade was also important in the Mediterranean, to the

Ottoman Porte and Italy, though with the Levant Company imports only

valued at £175,000 in 1803

and the entire value of exports to Southern

Europe totalling £2,684,000 in 1806;

it was obviously of less impor-

tance than the Northern European markets. A key interest was strategic:

the British Mediterranean fleet could blockade the French fleet base at

Toulon, but, denied access to Port Mahon, Minorca, utilised the harbour

at Valetta, Malta. But as Malta could not feed itself it was important to

have friendly relations with Sicily to provide a ready source of victuals.

The region also had important diplomatic considerations for Britain.

With Austria the main anti-French protagonist and many of the cam-

paigns of the French Revolutionary Wars taking place in Northern Italy

it provided an important communications route for British diplomacy

with Austria and Russia. The Mediterranean theatre took on increased

strategic importance to Britain as France intervened and expanded di-

rectly in the region, though loss of access would not be, and was not in

1796-1797, a crushing blow to Britain. At the western end of the Medi-

terranean, for commercial and naval reasons Britain was interested in the

fate of the Iberian nations. Both Spain and Portugal had naval capabili-

ties, excellent harbours at Cadiz and Lisbon, and major overseas posses-

sions, notably in South America.

The crucial issue was how could Britain secure all such interests in

Europe? Due to political, economic and demographic restraints Britain

could only recruit a small army compared to the Continental powers. In

1789 the British army numbered 40,000 men, compared to 170,000

Frenchmen under arms. By 1803 Britain had managed to raise the total

to 130,000 and a remarkable 250,000 by 1813-1814. Yet, during the Em-

pire France alone managed to sustain an army of 600,000: clearly the

British army could not simply land on the continent and force a decisive

pitch battle, in the Napoleonic style.

Rarely could a major force of Brit-

ish soldiers be spared for European operations. This was understood by

ministers, for instance in September 1806 William Windham admitted

‘Our force in the present case can be little in the scale of continental

armies’.

In 1807 Britain could only spare 10-12,000 men for offensive

operations.

Forces could and were sent to campaign in Europe, for

example to preserve British interests in the Low Countries in 1793, 1799,

1809 and again in 1814.

But only in the summer of 1809 were two ma-

jor armies of 40,000 men committed to Europe, one in the Peninsular

and the other around Walcheren Island, and only because the latter force

could be easily evacuated.

Moving and maintaining such expeditions

was an expensive business, not just transporting them to the theatre of

operations but also paying for the necessary logistical support.

With a small army unable to guarantee British interests, diplomacy

was vital to organise continental alliances to fight France. Central to this

policy was one of the great European powers accepting responsibility for

the defence of the Low Countries. Prussia would not agree, Russia was

not interested and so Britain looked to Austria. The hope was for perma-

nent tension between Austria and France, which Britain could exploit to

preserve the balance of power in Western Europe.

The difficulty here

was the Austrian desire for the Netherlands-Bavaria exchange, an event

that would legitimately hand control of the Low Countries over to the

French.

As the war progressed and it became clear Austria could not be

relied upon to assist with British aims it was Russia who became:

BRITAIN, PORTUGAL AND SOUTH AMERICA

NTRODUCTION

…the most important single factor in British grand strategy. With

Russia’s co-operation the British government could plan in terms

of decisive victory. Without it, Britain must carry the burden alone,

sealing off her maritime empire and searching – for long in vain –

for some theatre where her military strength could be exerted in an

independent effort. To create and preserve the Russian alliance was

for many years the principal object of our military policy and diplo-

macy.

Britain’s main war aim in Europe centred on the desire for an inde-

pendent Low Countries to be achieved through coalition warfare created

by British diplomacy and underwritten with British cash in the form of

subsidies. Such subsidies could only be afforded as long as British mari-

time trade continued to provide the necessary finance. A coalition strat-

egy was not without problems. In this period none of the Great Powers

were fighting exclusively for the overthrow of Napoleonic France, every

power had specific regional concerns. It was not until 1813-1814 that all

the states of Europe would put aside their own interests in what they

regarded as their own spheres of influence in order to unite to defeat the

particular problems posed by Napoleon. In the meantime, Napoleon

could pursue expansionist policies and build a barrier of satellite states by

exploiting the differences between the Great Powers. In the east, parcel-

ling out Polish territory was a key policy driver for Prussia, Austria and

Russia. Austria also had concerns in Italy and, along with Prussia, in the

German states, and with Russia, in the Balkans. Russia also had major

interests in the territory surrounding the Black Sea, in particular the

crumbling Ottoman Empire. Britain was no different; the problem for

British statesmen was apart from the Low Countries and maybe Hano-

ver, there were no interests inherently linked to European territory. Brit-

ish interests lay in the continued growth of her maritime economy and

could argue that despite all the financial and military aid she supplied, the

Continental powers continued to pursue independent objectives.

An example will highlight the problems of using subsidies to enhance

British diplomatic leverage. In 1805-1806 Pitt had planned to send

£7,000,000 to the Continental powers; in 1806 Alexander asked for

£6,000,000 just for the sacrifices Russia was making. British ministers

thought the Russians unappreciative, and promised to send Alexander

£500,000 owed from an earlier agreement.

Britain was mistrustful of

Russian intentions in the east, especially as Russia had provoked wars

with the Ottoman Empire and in the Caucasus in order to make territo-

rial gains. Britain also wanted influence at the Porte, to prevent Russia or

France from gaining the upper hand, and so sent a fleet. In the event the

mission failed and the British went to attack Egypt, which ‘further con-

vinced the Russians that Britain cared about nothing but its own inter-

ests’. A statement that could in fact apply to relations between any two

powers in Europe at this time.

In essence the Continental powers

thought Britain now owed them a ‘debt of gratitude’ and wanted com-

pensating for their losses.

The major problem for British diplomacy was that repeated attempts

to encourage the European powers to take up arms in offensive cam-

paigns against France ended on the battlefields of Europe. Austerlitz,

Jena and Friedland impacted on the policy of European powers in a way

that British money and alliances could never achieve.

As Muir notes,

despite all the financial aid given to her allies subsidies seemed to give

little real return: ‘Britain lacked the leverage to influence significantly the

policy of any of the great Continental Powers’.

The Atlantic Economy

There was another, controversial, strand to British strategy: maritime-

based colonial expeditions. As we shall see, starting with Napoleon him-

self the case is often put forward that Britain was responsible for the

continuation of the wars. While the European powers mobilised their

manpower to fight bloody campaigns against France, Britain ignored

their needs, especially their financial ones, and instead concentrated on

overseas empire building.

At first glance there appears to be little con-

nection as to how an aggressive overseas policy would contribute to-

wards achieving key British war aims in Europe. As Geyl’s assessment

shows, many French writers, such as Armand Lefebvre, were convinced

Britain suffered from an insatiable lust for power.

Or as Albert Vandal,

Arthur-Lévy and Albert Sorel contended, that Napoleon really wanted

peace with Britain but the latter’s overseas aggrandisement policy pre-

vented this,

an argument repeated by Vincent Cronin.

As George

Lefebvre has argued, after the Peace of Amiens broke down in 1803:

England broke the treaty and took the initiative to wage preventa-

tive war….Britain’s justification was the preservation of the Euro-

pean balance of power, but this grave concern did not extend to

the sea, since in her eyes God had created the oceans for the Eng-

RITAIN, PORTUGAL AND SOUTH AMERICA

NTRODUCTION

lish. The conflict between Bonaparte and England was in reality a

clash between two imperialisms.

For Lefebvre ‘Britain’s main concern, as always, was to profit commer-

cially from her maritime supremacy by laying claim to a monopoly of

trade’. The spirit of aggression against France was fostered in part by

‘England’s economic interests and policy of maritime imperialism’.

Criticism of Britain climaxed during 1806-1808 when British actions

seemed to give some credibility to the arguments put forward above. For

instance in January 1807 Howick wrote:

…if the great Powers now at war, or threatened by France, cannot

find in themselves the means of such exertion, it is in vain to ex-

pect that this country, by any supplies which we could afford,

would be able effectually to support them. It is now indeed more

than ever necessary that we should husband our own resources.

Or the statement made by Lord Henry Petty: ‘It was ridiculous to talk of

saving Europe, if Europe could not save herself’.

It is not surprising

that such an attitude left the European powers convinced of feeling be-

trayed by Britain.

The very fact Britain was believed to have provoked the renewal of

war in 1803 by refusing to hand over Malta to the French and often

stood alone against France might be seen as evidence of Britain’s sup-

posed real intentions to exploit perpetual conflict in Europe to enrich

herself. ‘The idea that it was Britain, rather than Napoleon’, Simms has

argued, ‘which stood against the world had a wide currency, and was

encouraged by Napoleonic propaganda’.

Certainly, British actions pro-

vided much fertile ground for critics of British attitudes and no one was

more critical than Napoleon himself.

He wrote after the breakdown of

peace talks in 1806: ‘One wonders what England will gain….It could

recover Hanover keep the cape of Good-Hope, preserve Malta, make a

honourable peace and render tranquillity to the world’. Instead England

wanted to ‘excite Prussia against France’, Prussia would be ruined and

the continent placed in a state of blockade against Britain. ‘Is this the

blood with which the English hope for to feed their trade and to revive

their industry?’

By December 1806 he noted to his brother Louis, on

the throne of the newly created Kingdom of Holland, British disasters

and impotence on the Continent had led them instead to attacking the

colonies of France and Spain.

On 3 May 1807 Napoleon wrote to Fou-

ché: ‘The English make fun of the Russians’. While the Russians fought,

‘the English made expeditions important for their particular account.

They have just taken Montevideo’.

Such accusations may seem justified. For after 1806 a British overseas

strategy in response to the European situation:

…appeared to gain wide currency as a cheap, profitable alternative

to ruinous subsidies and land warfare….Indeed, it is a curious fact

that during the Napoleonic period Britain – supposedly fighting for

the defence of European liberties against French hegemony – actu-

ally found herself at war with almost all of the major and middling

powers of Europe, at some point before 1815.

Therefore a key question is whether the strategy as enacted by Britain

was a strategy of choice or necessity. Duffy has argued maritime

strength, commerce and the fleet, ‘became the fall-back defensive strat-

egy for successive British governments’.

For Esdaile it was Britain’s

manpower problem which led to governments adopting a strategy of

‘blockade and colonial aggrandisement’, a form of war that ‘could not

but antagonise potential partners on the Continent whilst at the same

time continuing suspicions that the British were determined to avoid the

sort of commitment they required of their allies’. Moreover, this method

was not particularly cost-effective, ‘colonial offensives were notoriously

wasteful in terms of lives’.

Hall questioned the concept of using colo-

nial acquisitions to gain territorial concessions in Europe: ‘It was impos-

sible to think in terms of a peace with Napoleon based on colonial ex-

changes in return for a balance of power in Europe’.

Napoleon would

not concede territory won in battle; especially as the European territory

likely to be at the centre of any discussions was the Low Countries, key

to both British and French war aims.

Although ministers did look at the bargaining value of colonial sei-

zures from time to time, it was not the prime object behind their seizure:

Britain did not go to war in 1793 to conquer French colonies.

What

Britain did go to war for in 1793 was maritime security and this again

raises the issue of what the war was about and how those aims would be

achieved. Right from the start of the war Secretary of State for War

Henry Dundas had been convinced Britain should retreat from Conti-

nental entanglements and fight a purely maritime war for British inter-

RITAIN, PORTUGAL AND SOUTH AMERICA

NTRODUCTION

ests. The experience of the war only reinforced his views as outlined in a

memorandum of 1800.

Ehrman has pointed out that even for Dundas

this maritime strategy was not one of territorial acquisition but the estab-

lishment of ‘Commercial Stations’ to promote overseas trade.

As we

shall see, it was always claimed by British statesmen that an overseas

strategy was a measure of self-defence, to prevent maritime, strategically

important, positions from falling into French hands. The enlarged em-

pire Britain had gained by 1815 ‘was not the triumphant fulfilment of

any detailed master plan’,

though the argument could be put forward

that it most certainly was part of a master plan for Britain to come out of

the wars with an enhanced maritime economy.

The key point here is not to think, as Paul Schroeder has pointed out,

of Britain as a part of the European system but rather as ‘only marginally

a European country’.

Using the definition of ‘maritime’ already pro-

posed we can push this assertion to its logical, contrary conclusion. Brit-

ain during the wars with France was not a European country, but was at

the centre of an Atlantic Empire, encompassing possessions in the West

Indies, East Indies and Canada that provided a maritime trading system

fundamental to the well-being of the British economy and the skills,

knowledge and resources necessary for effective utilisation of maritime

power.

The British Atlantic Empire was based on maritime commerce and

protected by the Royal Navy. It was only natural that in fighting Napo-

leon, Britain should rely on those advantages granted to her by an insular

strategic position at the centre of the maritime economic system. For

Britain the successful outcome of the wars was largely built on her mari-

time power, vis-à-vis her two main rivals in economic maritime conflict:

Spain and France. The Low Countries might fall into the hands of

France, as in 1795, the Baltic may be closed to British shipping, as in

1801 and 1807, the Mediterranean might be evacuated, as in 1796-1797,

Spain might ally with France and Portugal might be invaded. But none of

these events prompted Britain to accept defeat. What might have had a

catastrophic effect on the British war effort was the potential impact

upon the British economy posed by the loss of overseas commercial

possessions, in particular the valuable West Indian colonies.

The West Indies

During the eighteenth century a significant shift had occurred in British

trade. European trade for the year 1700-1701 had comprised 82 per cent