Robson Martin. Britain, Portugal and South America in the Napoleonic Wars: Alliances and Diplomacy in Economic Maritime Conflict (ENG)

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breaking the international rules necessary for a general peace to work.

British perceptions would be seemingly justified by his attitude to peace

talks in 1806 and his Berlin decree of 21 November 1806 declaring war

on British commerce. Following on from the British Order in Council of

16 May 1806, which declared the coast from the Elbe to Brest under

blockade, it might seem that Napoleon was responding to British aggres-

sion.

In fact Napoleon had acted first in April, forcing neutral Prussia

to close her coastline to British commerce.

Further evidence would

come with Napoleon’s intervention in Iberian affairs which ‘symbolised

everything that Britain was fighting against’.

The point can also be

made that Britain only had to wait for Napoleon to fall out with one of

the continental powers for a new European war to commence. If the

Talents strategy was to hang in and wait for something to turn up, then

they only had to look to the experience since 1793. The European pow-

ers had been beaten only to resume the war if it was in their interests or

if backed into a corner, such as Austria and Russia in 1805, Prussia and

then Russia during 1806-1807, (of course, something would turn up in

Spain during 1808 and with Austria in 1809).

When we consider the strategic situation in 1806 the Talents decision

to secure British aims and preserve British resources was, theoretically, a

wise one. French military success in 1806 and 1807 brought the war to

Prussia and Russia’s doorstep and impacted on policy in a way British

diplomacy and military support could not. Britain, protected from French

military power by the Channel and the Royal Navy, had the option to

withdraw from Europe. Britain was now concerned with ‘surviving and

winning over the long haul’.

Hence in light of the strategic realities Brit-

ish efforts were, according to Hall, concentrated on ‘objectives of obvi-

ous benefit to Britain…a policy avoiding direct confrontations with

France on land’.

This strategy involved preserving those parts of the

Continent not under French control for British trade, acting to defend

British maritime security and by looking to overseas operations where a

small British army could act in conjunction with a dominant navy in order

to safeguard and expand the maritime-based economic foundations of

British power. For, as Esdaile notes, although Britain was ‘supreme at

sea’ after Trafalgar she was ‘far from unassailable’.

The problem with the Talents strategy was they badly handled the

implementation, infuriating Tsar Alexander and contributing to degener-

ating Anglo-Russian relations. Once the 1806 peace talks had broken

down the Talents looked to preserve British interests in the Mediterra-

RITAIN, PORTUGAL AND SOUTH AMERICA

HE STRATEGY OF THE TALENTS MINISTRY

nean. With the strategically important island of Sicily already reinforced

earlier in the year

and the British victory over French forces at Maida

on 4 July apparently enhancing security,

attention turned to the east.

Preventing the growth of French influence at the Porte remained a major

factor in the Talents policy. In November 1806 a naval force under Vice

Admiral Sir John Duckworth was dispatched to lend weight to negotia-

tions between the Turks and the Russians. Upon reaching Constantin-

ople he could not engage in talks or force the Turks to fall in with British

policy. His expedition had no troops with which to occupy the forts

guarding the Straits and so he retreated under fire from Turkish batteries.

Exiting the Dardanelles he was joined by a Russian squadron under the

command of Vice Admiral Seniavin.

The dissipation of British re-

sources by the Talents continued in November 1806 when an expedi-

tion, under the command of Major General Alexander Mackenzie Fraser,

was sent to secure Alexandria from a possible French attack. This task

would be accomplished on 16 March 1807.

All this ensured that within the framework of the Britain-France-

Russia power dynamic there was little room for the aims of the smaller

European states. They had begun to realise resisting France was futile,

while accepting support from her enemies was folly.

This led to the

majority of the minor states, including Portugal, placing their hopes in

neutrality and appeasement to preserve their independence. Even this

could not be enough to satisfy France, as Schroeder has noted. Napo-

leon’s definition of neutrality was not that states stand aside, but that

they ‘get out of his way and present no obstacle to his will’. Neutrality

entailed complete compliance with French wishes. The alternative was to

lose independence through diplomatic or direct military control, usually

resulting in either Napoleon or one of his close friends or family becom-

ing the new sovereign. For example Napoleon crowned himself King of

Italy in 1805; Genoa and Naples were annexed; demands were made

upon the Papal States to close their ports to British shipping and expel

British residents.

Taking all the above into account it comes as no surprise the Talents

have received scathing criticism. Muir and Esdaile have pointed to the

fundamental weakness of the ministry; cobbled together from different

factions it ‘lacked cohesion and common purpose’.

For Holland Rose

the administration clung to a ‘plan of doing nothing and of doing it ex-

pensively’.

Their policy ‘does appear short-sighted in its approach to

the thorny problems of Napoleonic France’, argues Hall, ‘Supposedly

putting Britain first, the Talents failed to recognise that what Britain

needed most of all was freedom from Continental threat’.

Muir con-

cludes they ‘showed little ability or inclination to help their allies’.

For

Simms the administration was an ‘unhappy interlude’.

Esdaile has criti-

cised the Talents for not being entirely committed to the struggle in

Europe,

while Glover highlights their failure to launch diversionary

raids along the French and German coastline to draw French troops

from the conflict in the East.

Fortescue called them the ‘Ministry of all

the Blunders’.

For Derry the administration ‘proved to be a singularly

unfortunate one. Almost everything it attempted ended in frustration

and disappointment’.

The Talents reacted to events in a piecemeal way.

Their legacy was a ‘dispersal of effort’ as expeditions were sent to Egypt,

Calabria, South America and the Dardanelles. All this led to a ‘succession

of embarrassing defeats’.

Gray argues ‘there was a British expeditionary

force nearly everywhere, except where there ought to have been one’.

Sitting in the middle of this dispersal of British military force was

Portugal, a country becoming increasingly important in the economic

maritime war between Britain and France. Unable to force Britain to

admit defeat by direct means, such as invading the British Isles, Napo-

leon wanted to plug the gaps in his European commercial system. Lis-

bon was an important entrepôt into Europe for British goods and the Por-

tuguese refused to close their ports to this trade. Seizing Lisbon also fell

into a strategy of threatening British naval interests at their weakest

points. For example the French considered attacking Egypt again in 1800

and 1801, the Cape of Good Hope in 1805 and schemes were even

mooted for an assault on India in 1807-1808. Key to these plans was

continued French naval rebuilding, but, as Dwyer and Simms have

noted, while France was unable to compete with British power at sea the

only way Napoleon could get at Britain was through an expansionist

policy on the Continent. Portugal had provided naval assistance and

victuals to the Royal Navy throughout the wars (see Appendix III).

There was also the Portuguese navy, an important consideration as Na-

poleon attempted to rebuild the French navy. Finally Portugal with her

weak government and notoriously poor army seemed to present few

problems to a French conquest.

…

BRITAIN, PORTUGAL AND SOUTH AMERICA

During the years 1806-1808 the small country of Portugal became the

frontline in the deepening politico-economic conflict between Britain

and the French Empire. At the heart of Anglo-Portuguese relations

was a mutually beneficial maritime trade. In the face of French at-

tempts to close Europe to British trade, it was important that Lisbon,

an important entrepôt, remained open. In the wider naval context dur-

ing 1806-1808 the port of Lisbon and the Portuguese Navy became

increasingly important in the Anglo-French conflict. Finally, Portugal

had an important colonial possession in South America: Brazil, with

its raw materials and potential markets, was a region with attractive

opportunities for British commerce.

The main strategic concern for Portugal was the attitude of her

powerful neighbour Spain. Due to her geographical position with

regard to Spain and the position of Brazil with regard to Spanish

America the politics of Portugal were, according to one contempo-

rary, ‘interwoven with the politics of her neighbours’. A major prob-

lem for the Spaniards was their slender hold over their territories in

South America. The supremacy of the Royal Navy prevented commu-

nications between the old and new worlds; in 1804 Royal Navy war-

ships seized a Spanish treasure fleet which, unsurprisingly, was fol-

lowed by a declaration of war from Madrid. To compensate for this

weakening hold on her colonies it was thought Spain would naturally

console ‘herself with the prospect of possessing Portugal’.

As Cor-

bett noted, ‘In every war we had with Spain the security of our an-

cient ally had always been a serious preoccupation’.

THE IMPORTANCE OF

PORTUGAL

Anglo-Portuguese Commercial Relations

There was a long history of commercial interaction between Britain and

Portugal stretching back to the twelfth century.

It was The Methuen

Treaty of 1703 which gave Britain a foothold in Portuguese markets. It

was the defining moment in Anglo-Portuguese relations and until 1806

Portugal ‘was an important pawn on the chessboard of European His-

tory’.

The Treaty confirmed the dominance of imported Portuguese

wines over the traditional French wines imported into England. It also

confirmed an imbalance of goods traded. Portuguese imports were

mainly necessities from Britain, such as textiles and cereals, while British

imports from Portugal consisted of mainly luxury items, especially wine.

The growth of the British textile industry and corresponding rise in cot-

ton imports helped the Portuguese economy. In the closing years of the

eighteenth century Brazilian cotton imports accounted for more than 20

per cent of total British cotton imports.

Portugal’s expansion as a wine producer brought benefits but

‘enchained Portugal to England’. By 1798-1807 the Portuguese were

exporting around 44,487 barrels of wine to Britain per annum.

Portugal

bought back manufactured woollen goods from Britain for export to

Brazil, with the imbalance made up by specie shipments, direct from

Brazil to England by the Royal Navy and the Falmouth packet service.

By the middle of the eighteenth century over £1,000,000 per year was

estimated to enter Falmouth alone; adding yet more weight to the per-

ception that South America was awash with gold.

The flow of gold

from Brazil to Britain now ensured English naval support would be

forthcoming ‘if it appeared…that Portugal was seriously threatened by

either Spain or France’.

As early as 1713 ‘the opinion was firmly en-

trenched among a powerful class of Englishmen’ that the ‘Portugal trade

was the most advantageous English trade anywhere’. A strong body of

Portuguese commercial interest was now allied with the City of London.

This created a very powerful group who influenced British domestic

politics by pushing for intervention in Portuguese affairs.

The European and South American territories of Portugal witnessed

an economic revival in the middle of the eighteenth century.

Repressive

policies were implemented in Brazil to ensure Portuguese exports would

have a guaranteed market. By 1750, according to Williams, the Iberian

Peninsula offered ‘the greatest outlet on the Continent for British manu-

facturers’.

For the first time Portuguese trade with Britain changed

from a negative balance to a trade surplus: ‘the period 1796-1807 appears

BRITAIN, PORTUGAL AND SOUTH AMERICA

HE IMPORTANCE OF PORTUGAL

to have been a new Golden Age for Portuguese trade’.

In 1802 British

exports to Portugal had been worth £1,171,000. Despite falling to a low

of £452,000 in 1803, by 1806 the figure was back up to £1,194,000.

Despite the value of trade with European Portugal it was widely rec-

ognised that Brazil dominated all Portuguese economic issues: ‘Portugal

could not have survived if it had been reduced to its European territory

alone’.

The discovery of gold in Brazil had transformed the fortunes of

the Portuguese Court, who regarded their South American possessions

as a ‘milch-cow’ and who derived a substantial part of their income from

a tax, called the ‘Royal Fifth’, of 20 per cent on all Brazilian gold.

Oliveira has argued from ‘the late 1600s to 1822 Brazil was the essence

of the Portuguese Empire. With some exaggeration one might even say

that Brazil was the essence of Portugal itself’.

The Brazil trade pro-

duced the majority of Portuguese income, stimulated foreign connec-

tions and trade, provided commercial balance and allowed investments

in the arts. Direct trade with Brazil from other nations was restricted to

prop up the re-exportation of products through the ports of Portugal.

This trade was a major contributor to the Portuguese economy, in par-

ticular sugar and tobacco, and the export of home produced salt, wine

and fruit. Cereals and cloth products made up the bulk of imports.

The Portuguese themselves realised how important Brazil was; a 1711

book by André João Antonil had stated as much.

Martinho de Melo e

Castro, the Minister of Marine in 1779, remarked ‘The conservation of

Brazil…is absolutely essential, as it is demonstrably certain that Portugal

without Brazil is an insignificant power’.

In October 1797 a discussion

regarding the relationship between the Portuguese Empire and the

mother country concluded ‘the strength of the Portuguese Empire lay

not in Europe but in the new world’.

There were growing concerns in

Portugal that Brazil might follow the precedent set by Britain’s colonies

in North America and the French colonies in the West Indies. The pol-

icy of suppressing Brazilian trade and internal development led to two

Brazilian revolutionary conspiracies in 1788-9 in Minas Gerais and in

1798 in the Bahia region.

The importance of Brazil was also a major strategic weakness for the

Portuguese as Brazil was exposed to a power with maritime capability.

This was an important consideration for British ministers who could

offer protection or threaten attack. It also ensured there was a continual

fear France might intervene in the region. The one remedy to solve this

inherent strategic vulnerability was to move the seat of Portuguese gov-

ernment to the New World.

Such a move would entail a fundamental

reorganisation of the Portuguese structure of government and would be

a frank admission that Portugal was too weak to remain as an independ-

ent country. This idea had been discussed in Portugal as early as 1580,

but the plan would only be seriously considered after the outbreak of the

French Revolutionary war in 1793. If Portugal did defy France by trans-

ferring the Royal family and fleet to Brazil, only the Royal Navy could

guarantee the voyage and subsequent defence of that country. Britain

would then be in a strong position to press for the freedom to export

directly to Brazil. If the Portuguese closed their ports, Britain could re-

taliate by commencing direct trade with Brazil without consent, which

would compensate for the loss of trade with Portugal.

The Naval Situation: Fleet Battle and Blockade

European Portugal was also important to Britain within the context of

the Anglo-French maritime struggle. The Royal Navy was central to Brit-

ish maritime security and economic expansion in this period. The British

battle fleet was designed for aggressive, offensive strategy and tactics, to

destroy the enemy in battle or negate by blockade. Battle was preferable

to destroy the threat, but it was actually quite rare. There were only six

major fleet battles during the wars, Glorious First of June, St. Vincent,

Camperdown, Nile, Copenhagen, Trafalgar, with perhaps another half

dozen squadron-size fleet actions. If enemy fleets avoided battle and

would not come out of port blockade prevented any enemy fleet move-

ments.

The major British naval force was the Channel Fleet, which provided

the ships to blockade the French fleet base at Brest. It also acted as a

strategic naval reserve, for if enemy fleets managed to escape, a not un-

common occurrence, they were aggressively hunted down by Royal Navy

squadrons. This had been applied in the Seven Years War leading to

ultimate victory over France in North America. During the American

War of Independence control of home waters had been lost and the

French had made a decisive contribution to the war in the rebellious

colonies. This was a reminder that British home and colonial defence

was best assured by keeping enemy fleets bottled up in port. As Morris

has noted:

…the blockade of Brest consequently came to complement the

great expeditions to the West Indies that characterised the Revolu-

RITAIN, PORTUGAL AND SOUTH AMERICA

HE IMPORTANCE OF PORTUGAL

tionary War. After 1795 the principal of maintaining the blockade

was consistently applied. Even though the resources that could be

devoted to it were at times limited by deployments to other sta-

tions, there was full recognition that the blockade was indispensa-

ble to the maintenance of the British war effort in other theatres.

Although Esdaile has argued that ‘blockading Europe’s coasts inflicted

immense wear and tear on the Royal Navy’

the Admiralty had largely

managed to compensate for this. By regularly rotating ships between

blockade duties and time in port, wear and tear could be repaired. Ships

were supplied on blockading station by a regular victualling system.

The

blockade not only locked up French fleets in port but it allowed the Royal

Navy to use frigates and flying squadrons to project power worldwide.

Blockade was, however, not infallible. There was always a possibility

the Royal Navy might be blown off station and French or Spanish fleets

escape to wreak havoc upon colonial possessions and commerce. James

notes even while in port the French and allied fleets would ‘occupy the

attention of an equal number of British ships’ while any French squad-

ron that escaped blockade would be pursued by at least ‘two squadrons

of equal force’.

After Trafalgar French naval forces still posed a threat. Not, perhaps,

to take on the Royal Navy in battle but to influence the course of the

conflict by their actions in the wider maritime war. In late 1805 a French

fleet had escaped from Brest. This split into two squadrons, the first un-

der Admiral Leissegues headed to Santo-Domingo to reinforce the

French position. In response Sir John Duckworth headed for the Lee-

ward Islands, caught and defeated Leissegues on 6 February at Santo-

Domingo.

According to Lord Barham, the first Lord of the Admiralty,

Duckworth’s victory ‘puts us out of all fear from another predatory war

in the West Indies’.

The second squadron under Rear Admiral Willau-

mez was to sail for either St. Helena or the Cape, then to cruise in the

West Indies attacking British commerce. In June 1806 intelligence arrived

in Lisbon that a French squadron of six sail-of-the-line and a frigate, had

put into the Brazilian port of St. Salvador, Bahia, on 4 April, remaining

there until the 21

. While the enemy were stationed in the port they re-

fused to let any shipping leave the place.

This in fact was Willaumez’s

squadron that had been cruising between South America and the coast of

Africa intercepting British trade. After their short stay in St.-Salvador to

re-provision they headed to Cayenne, and then Barbados.

On 25 September 1806 Commodore Samuel Hood intercepted a

French frigate squadron from Rochefort bound for the West Indies and

laden with troops, stores, arms, ammunition and provisions, capturing

four fine 40 gun frigates, all of which were added to the Royal Navy.

Again in 1806 a French squadron under Commodore L’Hermitte had

cruised off the African coast and then proceeded to Brazil to refit.

‘Though largely ineffective and ultimately costly to the French’, one

source has noted ‘here was clear evidence of the ‘the potential danger to

British trade from the West Indies, India and China posed by their pres-

ence at large in the Atlantic’.

In 1807, while blockading Cadiz, Admiral

Cuthbert Collingwood expressed concern that the French and Spanish

fleets would escape, perhaps heading for the Mediterranean, East or

West Indies. After the British attack on South America (see below), the

Spaniards were ‘impatient to get a reinforcement out to their colonies,

the security of their Southern provinces depends upon it, and they will

probably sail whenever the coast is clear’.

In February 1808 a fleet of

10 French battleships sailed from Toulon, and cruised at will around

Corfu, the Ionian Islands, Sicily and Sardinia, before finally anchoring in

Toulon on 10 April.

Here was the real danger of French naval actions

after Trafalgar. The French navy would compound the exclusion of Brit-

ish commerce from Continental Europe by disrupting the sea lines of

communication to interrupt British maritime trade with the object of

undermining the British economy.

If predatory cruises by existing enemy squadrons were transitory

threats to British maritime security, a long-term danger was posed by

French naval building plans. Although Napoleon had seemingly aban-

doned his plans to invade the British Isles by marching the Grande Ar-

mée to the East in 1805, there was a continued threat that France might

gain local naval superiority at some point vital to British interests. Napo-

leon’s determination to reconstruct his naval forces would be achieved in

two ways: an ambitious rebuilding programme and attempts to seize the

navies of the European neutral powers.

In the years immediately after 1805 Britain had a total of 296 ships

(136 ships-of-the-line and 160 frigates) while France and her allies could

only muster 167 ships (96 ships-of-the-line and 71 frigates).

But French

rebuilding plans began to bear fruit during 1806-1808 when 24 ships-of-

the-line were launched or acquired.

France continued to lay down new

ships at an alarming rate: in 1806 eight to the five laid down by the Royal

Navy; in 1807 the figures were 12 and 11 respectively. It was only in

BRITAIN, PORTUGAL AND SOUTH AMERICA

HE IMPORTANCE OF PORTUGAL

1808 that French shipbuilding slackened, laying down only three new

battleships to the seventeen laid down for the Royal Navy. Overall in the

years 1804 to 1808 Britain laid down 50 battleships to the 45 laid down

in French and Dutch ports.

By 1807 Napoleon could theoretically call on 62 French and allied

ships-of-the-line for action against British interests. Apart from the es-

cape of squadrons noted above, the French fleet was mainly held in port

and, importantly, gained little sea-going experience after 1805 although

Glete has noted this served to preserve the fleet as there were no serious

losses, unlike in 1794-1805. The French navy, along with those of her

allies, still posed a long term threat, not just in the war but possibly in a

post-war situation. This threat had to be countered by British statesmen

to preserve and guarantee the future of British maritime supremacy and

the commercial life of the nation.

There was another factor for British statesmen to consider: the emer-

gence of the American Navy as an influence in global politics. Consider-

able debate in the new republic centred on the question of a navy to

protect US interests in America and Europe. Founded in 1794, in 1797-

1799 the US Navy was strengthened in consequence of deteriorating

relations with France and an increasing number of incidents with the

various North African states. Anglo-American relations deteriorated

during 1806-1808 over the British Orders in Council. The British en-

forcement of the right to search neutral vessels, which interrupted

American trade and was regarded in Washington as a provocative meas-

ure against American interests, increased the possibility of anti-British

Franco-American naval co-operation as did the British policy of stop-

ping and searching American ships for British nationals.

The Swedish, Danish and Portuguese navies were all vulnerable to

French ambitions, while the Treaties of Tilsit added the services of the

Russian navy. James has argued Napoleon could feasibly call upon a

French, Dutch, Swedish, Danish and Russian fleet of at least 60 sail-of-

the-line operating in Northern waters, while only half this number were

needed to convoy a possible French invasion of Ireland.

Clearly, if Napoleon could gain access to the minor European navies

to add to his shipbuilding programme battleship parity with the Royal

Navy could be achieved. Of course the bare facts do not tell the whole

story as a lack of sea time, effective leadership, discipline and potential

problems with command would certainly hamper any sea-based expedi-

tions. Yet, it was clear to British statesmen they could not let Napoleon