Robson Martin. Britain, Portugal and South America in the Napoleonic Wars: Alliances and Diplomacy in Economic Maritime Conflict (ENG)

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trading concerns, British operations could provide much needed support

to Prussia, Russia and Sweden. In May ministers were informed Sweden

and Prussia had agreed to undertake joint operations and station a force

of 24,000 men at the Baltic fortress of Stralsund, in Swedish Pomera-

nia.

Canning was delighted to hear Russia and Prussia had signed a

treaty of concert on 26 April committing both countries to the joint

prosecution of the war until a general European peace and confirming

the continuance of the war in Poland.

Sweden had asked specifically for

British troops to be sent to Stralsund. In this promising situation minis-

ters were optimistic the time was right for a British force to be sent to

the Baltic and on 1 June 10,000 troops under Lieutenant General Wil-

liam Cathcart were ordered to Stralsund to assist the Northern powers.

Alongside a policy of assisting those powers still fighting Napoleon,

maritime security remained at the forefront of British thinking, particu-

lary in the Mediterranean. The cabinet hoped to utilise the Sicilian garri-

son for operations along the Italian coast. Castlereagh judged 8,000 Brit-

ish troops could act in conjunction with Neapolitan forces and discre-

tionary instructions were forwarded to General Fox the commander at

Sicily. In May 1807 the Sicily garrison was reduced to reinforce the posi-

tion at Alexandria, then in June it was decided to evacuate Alexandria

with the troops going back to Sicily. These orders arrived at Sicily in July

along with orders for Fox to return to England handing over command

of the British garrison to Sir John Moore.

Preventing enemy warships from sailing to wreak havoc on British

trade and overseas possessions was still a major concern and Castler-

eagh’s thoughts turned to the 22 French and Spanish battleships shelter-

ing in Cadiz since Trafalgar:

…if the means can be found before the close of the year, there is

every motive for not adjourning it over the spring; as we can hardly

flatter ourselves that, in the present of his power, Buonaparte will

suffer any maritime point of such moment to remain long exposed

to attack: and I can no doubt that, within the period requisite to

move the troops from a distance, we shall see French garrisons in

Ferrol, Cadiz, Lisbon, and Carthagena.

Although he thought the defence of the city might be weakened by the

removal of a Spanish force to Hanover, Castlereagh was unsure whether

a British force could be spared for such an attack with the commitment

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HE STRATEGY OF THE PORTLAND MINISTRY

105

to the Baltic. The arrival at Sicily of Fraser’s troops from Alexandria

would free up 7,000 men who could be stationed at Gibraltar to act as a

strategic reserve for the Iberian and Mediterranean regions. Castlereagh

was keen to look at every contingency which could ‘improve our chance

of bringing the effort [on Cadiz] within the scope of our power’. He did

not look to destroy Cadiz, but ‘a temporary occupancy of the harbour

above the fortress…as would secure the surrender or destruction of the

fleet’.

By 14 August, with the strategic situation in Northern Europe

degenerating, Castlereagh thought the force to be stationed at Gibraltar

was in a position to be brought home, sent to the colonies or ready to

annoy French designs. These troops could be spared because, in a clear

policy statement, Castlereagh concluded a ‘disposable force [was] no

longer necessary in the Mediterranean for offensive operations’.

Yet, in the eastern Mediterranean Canning was determined to prevent

the continued growth of French and Russian influence at Constantin-

ople, which would allow them to make gains at the expense of the weak

Ottoman Empire. Canning, like Grenville before him, was concerned

Russia was becoming distracted from the contest with France. In this

respect British interest ‘clearly is that Russia should be devoted, in heart,

and soul, and strength, to the one object of the contest with Bonaparte’.

Therefore ‘an accommodation now with the Porte is infinitely desirable’

and a ‘pacific policy with respect to Turkey the wisest that we can adopt

under the present circumstances’.

With troops at a premium if diplo-

macy did not work Mulgrave pressed for naval operations arguing ‘it

appears to me highly important that the Russians shou’d be induced to

block up the Bosphorous with their Black Sea squadron whilst we stop

up the entrance to the Dardanelles’ and in May Sir Arthur Paget was

ordered to the Porte to ‘treat for peace, whenever the Porte comes to it’s

senses’.

Reaching the Dardanelles on 28 July Paget found news of the French

victory over Russian forces at Friedland on 14 June had completely

changed the regional and wider strategic situation. While the diplomatic

moves of the Cabinet were faltering, a joint Anglo-Russian fleet was

blockading Constantinople. The Russian contingent was under the com-

mand of Vice Admiral Dmitri Seniavin. He had entered the Royal Navy

in 1783 as a youth and served on the North American station for six

years. He left the Royal Navy in 1789 and served as a Captain in the Rus-

sian navy, retiring from the service when Czar Paul allied himself to

France. When Russia joined the Third Coalition Seniavin had rejoined

the navy.

Collingwood noted ‘Admiral Sinavin [sic] and I were great

friends: he seemed to like me, and I had a kind of regard for him, be-

cause he professed to hate the French’.

Seniavin had achieved the only

major success of the whole operation, defeating a Turkish fleet off Lem-

nos on 1 July. News of increasing Franco-Russian co-operation (see be-

low) altered the situation. Seniavin, now supposedly commanding a hos-

tile fleet, withdrew his force from co-operating with the British squadron

and sailed westward along the Mediterranean, his eventual aim being to

reach the Baltic.

The South American Issue

It fell to the Portland ministry to deal with the fallout from the Talents

South American policy. In light of the ‘disastrous consequences’ of the

Talents strategy Hall suggests Castlereagh harboured serious reservations

regarding the region.

Fortescue, naturally, lambasted the government

for even considering further intervention: ‘It seems incredible at this

distance of time that British ministers should have given serious consid-

eration to so wild a design’. Such an attitude could be expected, but

South America remained on the agenda due to, Fortescue believed, ‘how

desperate the situation in Europe must have appeared to them’.

We shall soon see how British strategy developed during this period

but it is important to note Napoleon continued to develop plans for

French intervention in the region. Apart from drawing away British

troops from the European theatre, Napoleon hoped that entangling Brit-

ain in a South American war might prove just too costly for London. In

August 1807 he thought with a great number of English speculators in

Montevideo it might be wise to station five or six French frigates off the

coast to intercept trade.

‘Brazil is not important for war’, Napoleon

wrote in September 1807, it was the commercial ports of Oporto and

Lisbon that ‘must fix all our attention’.

Yet two months later he clearly

saw Lisbon as a launchpad for future maritime operations, ordering 200

naval officers to Portugal on 8 November 1807.

At the same time he

was again quizzing Decrès whether it would be possible to employ a

couple of frigates off the coast of Brazil.

With Napoleon certainly interested in South America, in May Castler-

eagh drafted a detailed memo to consider the mode of future British

South American policy. He criticised the Talents for lacking direction in

their policy and compounding their errors by dithering for three months

before sending reinforcements. The key problem with the 1806 occupa-

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HE STRATEGY OF THE PORTLAND MINISTRY

107

tion, in Castlereagh’s view, was the Spanish Americans wanted Britain to

help them gain independence from Spain but Popham had stated he was

taking possession Buenos Aires for Britain. This had angered the people

who did not want to be freed from the Spanish yoke only to be governed

from London. The principal Spanish individuals had fled the city and

assembled troops to retake Buenos Aires. Now with Whitelocke’s force

on the way to the region, the sensible question for the Cabinet was

whether the value of Buenos Aires, ‘either during war, or upon a peace,

is such as to compensate for the drain and incumbrance it must prove

upon our other military operations and on our population’. If it was not,

then was there ‘some principle of acting more consonant to the senti-

ments and interests of the people of South America’, which would not

involve Britain in ‘conquering this extensive country, against the temper

of its population’. Whatever the Cabinet decided he lamented White-

locke’s force was not adequate to defeat the population, to protect them

from Spain or guarantee their independence at a peace table. He also

noted the Talents had been assembling an expedition of 8,000 men un-

der Wellesley destined for Mexico.

Castlereagh wanted a wider discussion about British aims in the re-

gion, recognising the importance of a clear policy. Such a policy had to

operate on some ‘enlarged principle which shall be intelligible and capti-

vating to the country [South America]’. If not, military operations

‘cannot well be expected to lead to any permanent national advantage’.

Instead, he raised the option to spread British ‘soft’ power and influence

in the region: ‘the silent and imperceptible operation of our illicit com-

mercial intercourse with that portion of the world during war would not

be more operative and beneficial, if we approached it only as traders,

than… as enemies’. He was extremely worried that if Britain guaranteed

independence of the colonies ‘we might, in destroying a bad govern-

ment, leave them without any government at all’. There were two ex-

tremes he wanted to avoid, ‘that of conquest, with a view to permanent

possession in ourselves, or to endeavour to dissolve the existing govern-

ment, without any precaution as to the system which is to replace it’.

One alternative which the Cabinet were ‘driven to consider’ was whether the

resources of Spanish America could be mustered by ‘creating and sup-

porting an amicable and local government, with which those commercial

relations may freely subsist which it is alone our interest to aim at, and

which the people of South America must equally desire’. Castlereagh

examined the options in the wider context of the war. ‘Under any fa-

vourable prospect of restoring Europe to something like its former sys-

tem, the temptation to risk much in any attempt of this nature would be

proportionally diminished’. But, in the face of French hegemony in

Western Europe and the consequent economic exclusion from Europe,

‘if we are to carve out a separate existence for ourselves, and to seek to

replace those channels of commerce which may be interrupted or shut

against us, by opening others less exposed to French power, new and

greater efforts must be made’.

In any scheme for liberating the region, Britain must not be simply

‘protectors’ but should be prepared to pursue objects with native forces

‘to be created under our countenance’. The aim was clearly commercial,

of ‘depriving our enemy of one of his chief resources, and the opening

to our manufactures the markets of that great Continent’. Britain could

not involve the country in ‘anarchy and confusion’. Castlereagh wanted

something more subtle, ‘the separation of that continent from its indirect

subjugation to France [via the French alliance with Spain], and the estab-

lishment within it of a local government, by which the interests of the

inhabitants may be better consulted than they now are’. What he wanted

was a Bourbon Prince, perhaps the Duke of Orleans, placed on a South

American throne. Once installed such a ruler could be governed by Brit-

ain and a new administration created which could build a credible mili-

tary force and ‘speedily dispense with the presence of a British army’. As

always, South American policy depended on events in Europe: ‘The de-

termination whether we ought to prosecute the object of South America

seriously and upon system may perhaps, in a considerable degree, de-

pend on the turn things shall take in the next three months on the Conti-

nent’. In submitting the memo, Castlereagh wanted to ‘provoke discus-

sion’ and admitted his own mind was ‘by no means settled’.

Canning responded warmly to Castlereagh’s thoughts on 19 May, ‘I

am quite sure that you are right in principle’, however, he differed over

‘the precise mode of executing your plan. I doubt a Bourbon Establish-

ment’. Instead he envisaged a plan ‘to combine an arrangement for

evacuating South America (reserving at the same time a few military

posts, and commercial stations) with some attempt at a separate peace

with Spain’. Castlereagh then raised the idea of an expedition to Mexico

and sent Miranda to the West Indies to procure information.

Yet, as

Castlereagh admitted, British policy depended to a large part on the

situation in Europe – and that was about to undergo a dramatic change.

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HE STRATEGY OF THE PORTLAND MINISTRY

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The Treaties of Tilsit, July 1807

As ministers assessed all the strategic options open in Europe and de-

cided to commit troops to the Baltic, dramatic events were already taking

place that would drastically alter British priorities. The defeat of the Rus-

sian army at the battle of Friedland brought the war to Russia’s doorstep.

On 20 June Canning could report to the King he was unaware of any

change in the disposition of the Russian court towards Britain.

But on

29 June, after the dispatch of Cathcart, Canning received news of the

crushing blow to the Russian forces. He still hoped Russia would fight

and promised British support. In early July, Canning received more wor-

rying intelligence from the Continent. Although not official he confessed

to Mulgrave it ‘hardly leave[s] a doubt of the disaster of the allies’ and in

response he wanted the Baltic squadron strengthened. By 7 July he was

aware Napoleon and Alexander had begun peace negotiations. Canning

finally received official confirmation on 11 July with the arrival of dis-

patches from the British representative at the Court of Russia, Lord

Granville Leveson Gower. The next day Captain Harvey, sent from

Friedland by Sir Robert Wilson with a letter for Canning, arrived in Lon-

don confirming negotiations were underway.

French military success

had proved to be the decisive factor and a far more potent lever of state

power than British diplomacy, finance and maritime-based expeditions.

Napoleon and Czar Alexander had signed the Treaties of Tilsit between

7 and 9 July. The articles implied the formation of a maritime confederacy

designed to force Britain into a general peace by aligning the whole of Con-

tinental Europe against her. If this failed to produce peace then the navies

of Sweden, Denmark and Portugal would be forced to cooperate with

French plans. Russia would enforce the Continental blockade and declare

war on Britain.

Canning could not be sure of what was contained in cer-

tain secret articles but supposed intelligence caused him to surmise, in the

words of Mowat, that ‘the two Emperors were plotting a continental and

maritime coalition against England, that Denmark was the nodal point, and

that the Danish fleet was to be their chief engine’.

Mackesy has argued with Britain now isolated once again, ‘the alterna-

tives of 1798 and 1803 were reopened to Napoleon’. By using the ‘ports

of Western Europe from Cadiz to Copenhagen, and the fleets of many

countries, he could revive the invasion plans and issue forth against Eng-

land and Ireland’. In this context it was essential for British ministers to

prevent France from seizing the neutral navies of Denmark and Portu-

gal, totalling over 30 battleships.

The British Response

Canning had already outlined his views on war policy while serving as an

under secretary at the Foreign Office during 1796-99 in Pitt’s ministry.

He realised Britain was in a precarious situation when isolated from the

Continental Powers. In 1797 there had been little option but to engage in

peace talks with France and he played a significant role in preparing the

British representation. After the talks failed, Canning was convinced of

the impossibility of a negotiated peace with France favourable to British

interests. The war had to be continued.

A decade on Tilsit marked the zenith of Napoleon’s European Em-

pire and left Britain strategically isolated. Further additions to regener-

ating French maritime power from Denmark and Portugal would have

seriously limited British strategic options. ‘With Napoleon in control

of much of the European coastline’ Esdaile has argued, ‘the future was

distinctly uncertain’.

In August 1807 Canning explained British insu-

lar policy was designed to protect the pillars of maritime power: com-

mercial and naval superiority. This policy ensured ‘we are hated

throughout Europe – and that hate must be cured by fear’. ‘We have

now, what we have had once before and once only, a maritime war in

our power’, in which Britain was unencumbered ‘by any considerations

of whom we may annoy, or whom we may offend - And we

have...determination to carry it through’. ‘Our interest is that till there

can be a final settlement that shall last, every thing should remain as

unsettled as possible’. The object of British foreign policy was ‘to

teach the world’ that while Britain accepted any offer of peace media-

tion, ‘whenever the true balance of the world comes to be adjusted, we

are the natural mediators for them all, and it is only through us alone

that they can look for secure and effectual tranquillity’. Without allies

and threatened by French naval ambitions, British strategy, with no

commitments to Continental allies, would concentrate upon British

objects.

Canning was not the only member of the cabinet who recognised

that, after Tilsit, Napoleonic France posed a unique and fundamental

threat to British maritime security. Mulgrave agreed, arguing ‘I have so

often expressed my opinion that Buonaparte is to be checked and sup-

pressed only by the adoption of his own system’. This would be

achieved ‘by the full exercise of power for the attainment of the object

to which it can be applied, and that the old course of proceeding which

we still value in morals and have hitherto adhered to, must give way

RITAIN, PORTUGAL AND SOUTH AMERICA

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HE STRATEGY OF THE PORTLAND MINISTRY

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when a question of power and means between France and Great Brit-

ain is at issue’.

With a clear approach to the threat posed by French Continental he-

gemony outlined, Canning began to implement policy. Despite all that

had happened Canning viewed Russia as the power Britain should court

and he wanted to pursue a policy of moderation, avoiding actions that

might sour long-term Anglo-Russian relations. He believed the policy

taken towards Russia, ‘that of managing the Emperor’s feelings, but at the

same time showing that we are not afraid of him is most likely to succeed

in bringing him to reason’. His long-term hope was for the disposition of

the Czar to ‘change for the better in time’. Canning was convinced the

‘Emperor of Russia had agreed to force Denmark to shut the Sound’, but

British policy would not be too belligerent. ‘I do not want war with Rus-

sia’, he assured his wife Joan, ‘but to frighten the Emperor, and soothe

him back into good counsels’.

Certainly Canning viewed Russia as a

lapsed friend, who could return to a pro-British stance with time.

Canning’s hope came under immediate strain as relations degenerated

with the court of Denmark. By 10 July he was certain Denmark would

shortly accede to French demands to close the sound to Britain and

place her navy under French control.

Cathcart’s force at Stralsund was

supposed to help defend Sweden, join with Prussian troops in Germany

or be available for other operations in the Baltic in support of Russia. In

the post-Tilsit situation these troops were unable to fulfil their original

objectives. In July, with Denmark apparently ready to hand over its fleet

to France, the Cabinet decided to attempt a diplomatic solution but also

planned for a pre-emptive strike upon Danish naval power. A British

fleet under Admiral Gambier, comprising 22 sail-of-the-line with 19,000

troops and including a brigade commanded by Wellesley, was dispatched

to Copenhagen. The Cabinet also ordered Cathcart to move his force

from Stralsund to Copenhagen. Once the decisions had been made and

the forces embarked, ministers could do little but wait for news. An at-

tempt to resolve the crisis through diplomatic channels failed and as a

result the city of Copenhagen was subjected to a ferocious three-day

bombardment by British forces. On 7 September Copenhagen capitu-

lated, giving up the whole of the Danish navy of 18 sail-of-the-line and

52 smaller vessels along with at least 20,000 tons of valuable naval stores.

Despite the fact only four of the Danish battleships and some of the

smaller craft were used by the Royal Navy the expedition was a complete

success. The object of the operation had been to deny France the use of

the Danish ships.

The Danish navy in this period never recovered from

this crushing blow. Numbering a total of 63 ships in 1805 the Danish

navy in 1810 comprised only four ships.

The Danish expedition pro-

vided a very visible example of British aims in the post-Tilsit era; mari-

time power would be utilised to prevent French naval aggrandisement.

During the early months of the Portland administration British policy

had adapted and reacted to the post-Tilsit strategic situation in the Baltic

and the Mediterranean by addressing the legacy of the Talents policy.

Canning wanted to take a moderate line towards Russia, hoping for a

gradual improvement in Anglo-Russian relations in time. Militarily it was

decided to withdraw some commitments, notably at Alexandria, in order

to create a responsive strategic reserve, the maritime expeditionary force

Castlereagh sought. This would be either based in Britain or at Gibraltar.

Cathcart’s force at Stralsund was unable to undertake its original opera-

tions but was in the right place at the right time to form the nucleus of

an expedition to safeguard the Danish navy from French aggrandise-

ment. As Britain reacted to French policy after Tilsit and reorganised

commitments in the Baltic and the Mediterranean another crisis arose to

draw on the meagre resources available to the Portland Cabinet. Free

from military commitments in northern and central Europe Napoleon

could turn his attention to a long considered project: the conquest of

Portugal.

…

RITAIN, PORTUGAL AND SOUTH AMERICA

112

Napoleon’s objectives in Portugal were to force the country into the

Continental blockade, seize Lisbon and the Portuguese navy and open

up Brazil to French influence. Intervening in Portugal also gave him the

opportunity to commence dabbling in Spanish affairs: placing the Span-

ish navy under French control, removing the Bourbons from the throne,

increasing the worth of the country as an ally and opening up Spanish

America to France thereby increasing the flow of money into French

coffers. In 1805 a proposed Franco-Spanish assault on Portugal was

cancelled due to war with Austria and Russia. In 1806 the apparent

French threat was allayed by war with Prussia, so Napoleon enlisted

Spanish help, agreeing with Godoy to partition Portugal into three prov-

inces. The events of late 1806, when it appeared Spain would again

change sides, had caused Napoleon great concern. Once Prussia had

been defeated, the Spanish backtracked, proffering friendship to France,

but the damage had been done. Napoleon forced Spain into the Conti-

nental blockade and ordered her to send 15,000 men to Germany. Dur-

ing the summer of 1807 Napoleon was again preoccupied with events in

the German states and relations with Russia.

On 19 July 1807 Napoleon decided to deal with Portugal once and for

all. He wrote to Talleyrand demanding Portugal must enforce the Conti-

nental blockade by closing all her ports to English commerce, confiscate

English property, detain all English subjects and declare war by 1 Sep-

tember. Talleyrand was to make this declaration to the Portuguese Minis-

ter Lima in Paris and to the French chargé d’affaires Rayneval in Lisbon. At

the same time Talleyrand was to converse with the Spanish minister in

Paris with the aim of concluding a convention to secure the assistance of

THE PORTUGUESE CRISIS OF 1807