Robson Martin. Britain, Portugal and South America in the Napoleonic Wars: Alliances and Diplomacy in Economic Maritime Conflict (ENG)

Подождите немного. Документ загружается.

to frustrate the French and Spanish ministers the Portuguese might gain

time ‘until the season is too far advanced for the rapid

approach of a

French army to Lisbon’. Fitzgerald hoped the Portuguese might be per-

suaded to allow Britain free intercourse with Brazil if they were diverted

from their ‘narrow-minded jealousies and groundless suspicion of us’.

He continued to lament that ‘could one ever hope that the Prince Regent

might be brought to act by the counsels of honest enlightened ministers,

instead of the pernicious suggestions of low domestics, menials and

priests’. If instead of relying on these advisors the Prince decided that

‘Dom Rodrigo de Sousa and Don John d’Almeida be recalled to his

councils, they are our friends, and there might be a prospect of his

adopting such a resolution’ as fleeing to Brazil.

Fitzgerald was not the only observer concerned over the deepening

crisis. The Naval Chronicle reported it was widely believed in England the

Portuguese ships in the Tagus were to be seized by the Royal Navy and

Madeira occupied.

Writing to Leveson Gower, Lady Bessborough com-

mented ‘little Souza says in London he is sure his Prince will not yield,

but believes in his whole Gove

going to the Brazils’. She hoped ‘we

could get some ships there time enough to assist them: they say six sail

are going, but I am afraid that it is too late’.

In Lisbon Strangford had impressed upon the Regent the demands on

Portugal were ‘conducted on a different principle and aim at different

objects’ from previous occasions. Britain had done everything a friend

and ally should and offered assistance in ‘a safe and honorable mode of

preserving his existence’. The Regent confirmed he was worried about

British commercial motives in transferring the court to Brazil, realising it

would compensate for lost markets in Europe. All Portugal wanted was

to remain neutral in the conflict; France would be appeased and the inva-

sion forestalled by implementing a ‘phoney war’ with Britain. This met

with little sympathy from Strangford who argued it was ‘impossible since

no such practical arrangements could supercede the Authority of those

laws which justified all captures made subsequently to a declaration of

war’. Furthermore ‘that according to our system, the sword must be en-

tirely sheathed, or entirely drawn’.

Prince João informed Strangford he would offer conciliatory meas-

ures to France although Strangford reported the ‘Portuguese ministers

have declared these demands to be entirely inadmissible. They have of-

fered however to shut the Ports of Portugal against the commerce of

England’. ‘The French and Spanish ministers are however completely

RITAIN, PORTUGAL AND SOUTH AMERICA

124

HE PORTUGUESE CRISIS OF 1807

125

dissatisfied’ Strangford continued, to those countries nothing would be

acceptable ‘short of a total [and] hearty cooperation with the designs of

France’. In addition the French minister had sent dispatches to Junot at

Bayonne ‘who in consequence of their content, will probably march

without delay’. The Regent again stressed to Strangford he would flee to

Brazil if all the measures to prevent a French invasion failed. In order to

convince Strangford of his determination to resist France, João had con-

sented to the departure of his son, the Prince of Beira, for Brazil. Strang-

ford, familiar with the customs of the Portuguese Court distributed 100

Moidores among the members in order to press the Regent on the sub-

ject of the departure of Beira.

Strangford now pointed to ‘the daily increasing probability that part

of the Portuguese navy will fall into the hands of France’. He requested

Canning to pay particular attention to Sousa’s answers regarding ‘the

eventual disposal of the Portuguese Navy, and the possibility of a por-

tion of it being demanded by, and given up to Bonaparte. I have had

much conversation upon this matter with the Portuguese ministers, [and]

I confess that I am not entirely satisfied with their expectations and

mode of reasoning concerning it’. He warned:

Sousa will also be instructed to urge in the strongest manner the

fatal consequences which would result from the presence of an

English squadron in the Tagus….should [it] be necessary to afford

protection to the retreat of the Prince to the Brazils, it is asserted

that the most prudent mode of doing so would be the application

of a particular squadron for that purpose, directing it to join the

Blockading squadron either at Ferrol or Cadiz.

While Strangford tried to persuade the Portuguese to flee to Brazil,

Gambier concentrated on minimising losses to British commerce. While

Gambier was in London Canning had informed him British merchants

should be ready to remove their property from Portugal at very short

notice. Gambier headed back to Lisbon, arriving on 21 September con-

vinced the threat to British commerce and property in Portugal was real.

Once informed of the Portuguese desire to close their ports to British

ships, Gambier immediately wrote to Canning declaring as ‘long as the

French shall show a disposition to carry into execution their threats there

can be no permanent security for British property in Portugal’. He in-

tended to instruct British residents in Portugal to reduce their capital in

preparation for the eventual closure of the ports and the possible need to

evacuate the country. This message was conveyed at a meeting of the

British factory in Lisbon on 25 September when Gambier warned the

assembled merchants to be on their guard and ready for the possibility of

the Portuguese implementing anti-British measures.

In early October

after receiving notice from Strangford, Gambier recommended to British

subjects resident in Portugal they should ‘lose no time in removing their

persons and property’. Gambier then issued certificates to neutral ves-

sels, allowing them to carry British persons and property. Despite these

prompt actions he recognised some would lose property and a few

would be ruined due to outstanding debts from the Portuguese.

In late September it was reported in London that Napoleon had de-

manded naval aid from Portugal. The Naval Chronicle stated a force of ten

sail-of-the-line was apparently in the process of preparation to comply

with French demands.

In fact on 25 September Rayneval repeated the

French demands announcing ‘if they were not acceded to before the end

of five days, he must take his departure and war be immediately declared

against Portugal’. Accordingly he had demanded his passports so that he

could leave the country.

Initially this gesture appeared to lack sincerity;

Rayneval and Campo-Alegre did not actually leave Lisbon until October.

On several occasions in September and October powerful tirades were

directed towards foreign envoys in Paris. Lima was apparently informed

by Napoleon that ‘if Portugal does not do what I want the House of

Braganza will no longer be on the throne in two months time’.

In fact Napoleon had already decided Portuguese compliance was not

enough and in September, in the aftermath of the British attack on Co-

penhagen, began to accelerate his scheme to ‘bind the Spaniards to his

plans even more closely’.

In early October Napoleon informed King

Charles IV of Spain their two countries, along with Russia, were ‘united

in an attempt to exclude the English from the continent, and to exact all

possible vengeance for the crime that they have just committed against

Denmark’. He realised the importance of Lisbon to Britain. In her pos-

session it was ‘an inexhaustible spring of wealth, and a constant resource,

both as a port of call, and as a base for naval expeditions’. In the wider

situation Napoleon stressed peace could not be secured without

‘isolating England from the continent, and by shutting every European

port against her commerce...for England must be forced to make peace,

if tranquillity is to be restored to the world’.

To back up his threats to

Portugal on 12 October he gave orders for Junot to begin his march

BRITAIN, PORTUGAL AND SOUTH AMERICA

126

HE PORTUGUESE CRISIS OF 1807

127

within 24 hours. These moves were entirely consistent with previous

French policy towards a number of states including the Hanseatic towns,

Naples and the Italian provinces.

Junot had been chargé d’affaires at Lisbon for a short time from Febru-

ary to October 1805 and knew the character of the Portuguese court and

the country. His force comprised 20,000 French infantry and 2,000 cav-

alry with 36 artillery pieces. He was ordered to take the northern inva-

sion route into Portugal; marching initially to Burgos, then onto Sala-

manca, Ciudad Rodrigo and Alcantara, following the right bank of the

Tagus to Lisbon. Spain would contribute an auxiliary force of 14,000

infantry, 4,000 cavalry and four artillery pieces to invade Portugal from

the southern route via Badajoz.

Napoleon believed ‘Portugal has de-

clared war on England and dismissed the English ambassador’, but

thought it was a ploy to allow English troops to be transferred from

Copenhagen. Therefore Junot was to begin his march towards Portugal

and enter Lisbon ‘like friend or like enemy’.

Foy argued any doubts about French intentions were removed by

placing Junot in command of the army at Bayonne. A highly ambitious,

tempestuous character, Junot was one of Napoleon’s favourite generals,

an old friend who had served with him at the siege of Toulon in 1793.

He arrived at Bayonne in early September and on 17 October received

Napoleon’s orders to cross the river Bidossa within 48 hours; the next

day the van of the army crossed into Spanish territory.

Napoleon de-

clared war on Portugal on 20 October and two days later a formal decla-

ration was sent to the Portuguese embassy in Paris stating ‘Le Portugal

veut la guerre: Le Portugal aura la guerre’. The remaining Portuguese

legation was ordered to leave Paris within twenty-four hours.

Already

fearful Britain would utilise the inherent strategic mobility provided by

command of the sea, Napoleon thought Portuguese answers to his de-

mands had been drafted in concert with Britain to gain time for British

troops to be transported from Copenhagen to Lisbon to thwart his

plans. In further orders of 31 October he warned Junot that England

would pre-empt the French attempt to seize the Portuguese navy and

urged him to greater speed, remarking that ‘Lisbon is everything’.

Complete Portuguese compliance with French demands would proba-

bly have had little effect upon Napoleon’s policy. Franco-Spanish coop-

eration in the partition of Portugal was confirmed when the two coun-

tries signed the Convention of Fontainebleau on 27 October. This treaty

envisaged a Franco-Spanish conquest and partition of Portugal. The

country would be divided into three parts of which Spain would get one

region. Annexed to the treaty was a convention in which Napoleon re-

solved to concentrate a second army of 40,000 at Bayonne. This force

was to provide assistance to Junot’s force in case Britain intervened in

Portugal, though it was agreed the second force would not enter Spain

without the permission of Madrid.

There was another aspect to further complicate Anglo-Portuguese

negotiations. In late September Strangford had raised the question of the

Portuguese island of Madeira. The island’s main harbour at Funchal was

an important staging point for ships sailing to and from the West and

East Indies and South America. In 1801, when Spanish forces invaded

Portugal, a British expedition had forcibly seized the island; the Portu-

guese court was naturally worried about another possible occupation.

Strangford had promised the Portuguese no expedition would be sent to

the island or any other colony ‘until due [and] formal notice of that in-

tention shall have been given to the government of Portugal’. He re-

minded the cabinet João was still bitter about the last occupation because

the expedition had been kept secret from him until it was underway, ‘a

repetition of it would be highly injurious to His Majesty’s interests’. He

informed Canning that Sousa would receive orders to speak with him

regarding the occupation of the island by British troops.

Castlereagh,

worried Madeira might fall into French hands, had already communi-

cated to the King ‘that a force of about 2,000 men should be sent to take

possession of that Island, under a declaration that it is to be restored to

Portugal whenever her independence is properly respected by France’.

Initially the Portuguese governor of Madeira had been instructed to

make a show of force if a British expedition appeared. In early October

Portuguese policy changed emphasis. As far as Strangford could ascer-

tain the governor was now ‘instructed to urge a capitulation, on the ap-

pearance of the British troops’ but he urged Canning to exercise caution

warning ‘the Portuguese Government seem to expect that no expedition

should be sent to Madeira, unless French Troops should march into this

country’.

The Portuguese court regarded an occupation of Madeira as a

consequence of an invasion of Portugal by France or Spain. Concerned

at this, Canning resolved to make some ‘more effective stipulations re-

specting Madeira’ and was convinced Sousa had not been informed of all

the events in Lisbon and the real policy of the Portuguese Court. The

Portuguese had also not informed British merchants in Madeira of the

impending danger. Canning, writing to Sousa, was ‘very uneasy’ regard-

RITAIN, PORTUGAL AND SOUTH AMERICA

128

HE PORTUGUESE CRISIS OF 1807

129

ing Araujo’s request that Britain should not send an expedition to the

island until all matters between the French and Portuguese had been

resolved.

The Anglo-Portuguese Convention of 22 October

Fully apprised of Portuguese intentions to close their ports and the situa-

tion in Lisbon and Madeira, Canning pressed ahead with diplomatic ne-

gotiations with Sousa. On 27 September the Regent had informed Sousa

he was provided with full powers to conclude a convention with Brit-

ain.

By 17 October Canning was ready to write to the King asking for

powers to conclude a convention with Sousa. On 19 October he warned

Sousa that ‘I cannot engage for what we may be compelled to do by the

navigation of any neutral for the next three weeks, I should be loth to

engage for a forebearance which may not be possible to shew’. The fol-

lowing day he informed Sousa ‘you know we do not wish to encourage

the shutting of the ports: in preference to going to the Brazils – But the

contrary’.

By 21 October Canning was in a position to approach George III to

gain permission for a formal convention and the following day he signed

a secret convention with Sousa guaranteeing if a French force invaded

Portugal the Portuguese royal family and navy would flee to Brazil. This

secret convention had to be ratified in Lisbon to have any effect and Can-

ning realised maritime power could influence the Portuguese decision.

The Convention began with a statement of intent from João, signed

on his behalf by Sousa, to transfer the royal family, the government and

the treasury to Brazil rather than comply with the full extent of the

French demands, in particular those regarding the seizure of British sub-

jects and the confiscation of all British property. The Regent then stated

‘at the same time, in order to avoid war with France (if it is possible),

(has) agreed to close the ports of Portugal to the English flag’. The Re-

gent realised such an act could justify Britain to:

…seek reprisals by military occupation of the island of Madeira or

of all other colonies of the crown of Portugal; or by forcing entry

into the port of Lisbon and employing hostile means which are the

most effective against the military and merchant navy of Portugal;

equally considering that the only well founded apprehension of the

ports of Portugal could bring the temporary occupation of the

Portuguese colonies by the British forces, and that a hostile action

or declaration from France against Portugal could not fail to bring

about the same effect.

João voiced his appreciation for the sentiments of friendship and good

faith expressed by Britain and the desire to help the transfer of the Por-

tuguese court to Brazil. In return for João’s pledge to flee, Canning

promised to respect Portuguese feelings and interests and to act with

moderation towards Portugal while preventing ‘the colonies, the military

and merchant navies of Portugal, in its entirety or partially, to fall into

the hands of France’.

The first article of the convention confirmed no British expedition

would be sent against Madeira, or any other Portuguese possession, until

there was ‘certainty of some hostile move or declaration of France against

Portugal, or that Portugal, in order to avoid war with France, will have

consented to commit to some sort of an act of hostility against Great

Britain by closing its ports to the English flag’. When it was deemed nec-

essary for any such expedition, it would be discussed with Sousa. The

Portuguese were not to send any reinforcements to Brazil or Madeira,

unless in agreement with Britain. The Portuguese also agreed to transmit

secret orders to the governor of Madeira informing him not to resist any

English expedition ‘in which the commandant is announced on his word

of honour that the fixed/arranged expedition has been prepared with the

full agreement of His Royal Highness the Prince Regent’.

In the second article the Regent agreed if he left Lisbon of his own

free will, Britain would assist the evacuation by sending six transports to

Lisbon and organising ‘an army of 5,000 men who will be sent to Portu-

gal at the first request of the Portuguese government’. It was agreed that,

although one unit of this force might go to Madeira, it would not garri-

son the island until after the Regent had arrived there or passed the is-

land. The third article stated if the Portuguese closed their ports the Re-

gent agreed to ‘the admittance of English troops to the Island of Madeira

immediately after the exchange of the ratification of this convention’.

Britain would hold the island for Portugal until the conclusion of a defi-

nite peace with France.

In article four João promised ‘never to surrender in any case, whether

completely or partially, his military or merchant navy, or to reunite them

with those of France or Spain, or of any other power’. If the Regent fled

to Brazil, his navy and merchant vessels would accompany him. Those

ships unfit for the voyage would be handed to Britain for safe keeping.

RITAIN, PORTUGAL AND SOUTH AMERICA

130

HE PORTUGUESE CRISIS OF 1807

131

Article five committed the Portuguese to despatching to Brazil ‘half (of

the navy) (roughly five or six transport vessels, and eight or six frigates

semi-armed at least)’ once the Portuguese ports were closed. This naval

force could ‘unite with the British squadron also designated for this end,

to serve as transport for His Royal Highness and the royal family to Bra-

zil’. Command of the Portuguese fleets would be given to ‘officers

whose political principles are approved by Great Britain’.

Canning com-

mitted Britain to never recognising ‘any Prince who is not the heir and

legitimate representative of the royal family of Braganza’ on the throne

of Portugal and to continuing the ‘friendly relations’ with the Regency

council to be left behind in Portugal after the evacuation. The conven-

tion was to be ratified and the ratification exchanged in London in se-

crecy within six weeks.

There were two additional articles. The first guaranteed, in the event

of the ports being closed, the opening of a port to allow ‘all the English

merchandise which are currently admitted into Portugal’ to be ‘imported

freely in the payment of bills which are paid at the present time accord-

ing to the same articles in the ports of Portugal’. More importantly the

second additional article stated:

…the moment that the Portuguese ports are closed to the English

flag, and for as long as it continues, the existing treaties between

Great Britain and Portugal must be considered as suspended as far

as they agree to the Portuguese flag (having) the privileges and

exemptions which the other neutral nations enjoy. According to

the right of the people, it will not be a neutral state.

On the same day the convention had been agreed, Canning wrote to the

Chevalier Dom Joâo de Almeida. Almeida had been the Portuguese min-

ister in London during the Revolutionary wars from 1796 until his recall

in July 1799 and Canning, as Under Secretary at the Foreign Office, was

in ‘habits of intimacy’ with him.

Upon returning to Lisbon Almeida

became Minister for Foreign Affairs and War. He had criticised the Brit-

ish occupation of Madeira in 1801, ironically noting how an expedition-

ary force was available for that operation while the British government

had insisted there were no troops available to defend Lisbon. Almeida

was generally regarded as an Anglophile and may have voiced his criti-

cisms to prevent attacks from members of the Portuguese court who

looked to France for security. He had been removed from government

in August 1803 as part of the Portuguese policy of appeasing France but

remained at court trying to promote British influence.

Canning now wrote to Almeida admitting ‘the uncertainty which has

hung over the affairs of Portugal’ had made him unwilling to ‘express a

more decided opinion upon them’. Canning hoped Almeida and others

would do their utmost ‘to save not only the independent existence, but

the honour and credit of your country’. ‘I hope, and am willing to be-

lieve’, Canning continued, ‘that every member of your Government has

been acting with the same good faith and openness which you, I am con-

fident, will have inspired and recommended’. On this point Canning

suspected Sousa may have been misled by Lisbon. ‘I am sure he has told

us all that he knew’, but he lamented ‘I do not feel quite so sure that he

has been enabled to tell us all that he ought to know’. British forbearance

of Portuguese policy was, in spite of ‘every strong impression of distrust,

created by representations of such apparent authenticity as nothing but

our confidence in those whom the Prince Regent has recently called to

his councils could have warranted us in disregarding’.

Canning impressed upon Almeida not to let the evacuation plan be

‘laid aside’ arguing if:

…the apparent remission of Bonaparte’s demands lulls the Prince

Regent into a false security, you are lost. All that has passed in the

last two months, your spirited counsels, your unexpected

determinations, the zeal which you have shewn, and which you

have been able to communicate to others, (and or at least to force

them to assume the appearance of it) will, in that case, only ensure

your ruin.

He warned if the Portuguese did not execute the plan as agreed in the

convention Napoleon ‘will never forgive you having conceived it’. Can-

ning was convinced even if the present crisis abated, it would arise again

in the future due to the important economic and strategic position Por-

tugal occupied in the ongoing Anglo-French conflict. There was one

solution the Portuguese should implement, to ‘execute at least in part the

resolution which had been taken. Establish the Portuguese Empire in the

Brazils – leave a vice-royalty or a Regency in Portugal’.

With the convention agreed upon, Canning could fully inform Strang-

ford of British intentions. In four separate dispatches of 22

October he

replied to Strangford’s request for precise instructions on how to pro-

BRITAIN, PORTUGAL AND SOUTH AMERICA

132

HE PORTUGUESE CRISIS OF 1807

133

ceed, providing a full explanation of government policy while consider-

ing all circumstances that might arise. If Portugal shut her ports, but

there were no other hostile measures, Strangford was to remain in Lis-

bon. If anything did arise that made his residence in Lisbon inexpedient

he was to leave for England. If the Regent adhered to his promises to

evacuate Lisbon and asked for Strangford to accompany him, he was to

accompany the Portuguese and act as minister to that court in Brazil.

Canning forwarded a copy of the convention particularly directing

Strangford’s attention to the 2

Article, which ‘stipulates for military aid

from this country to protect the embarkation at Lisbon’. Without guaran-

tees of safety from the Portuguese ‘it is impossible that either a military or

even a naval force of His Majesty’s should be safely trusted in the Tagus’.

Canning had received assurances from Sousa that Portugal would not

consent to ‘any measure unfriendly to the interests of this country’, but

was unsure whether João would resist the demand to shut the ports, par-

ticularly as Sousa had signed the statement of intent declaring the Regent

would close the ports if it was thought France could be appeased. If Por-

tugal did shut the ports, Canning realised all Europe would be closed to

British commerce and he would be ‘compelled to treat them all as one

common enemy’. He thought the Portuguese experience of apparent

danger followed by salvation, as had recently happened in 1806, instilled a

large degree of complacency in the court. If João did evacuate, Canning

mused, it might be possible to establish a Regency Council which, with

British assistance, could organise the defence of the country.

On 22 October Canning informed Strangford an expedition would

sail for Madeira as soon as the Portuguese closed the ports. Next day he

detailed an ‘abundance of rumours…of the most alarming nature’, in-

cluding reports of French troops marching through Spain, that an em-

bargo had been laid on British shipping and the Portuguese navy was

ceded to France. Despite these rumours Canning had ‘on the faith of the

Prince Regent’s letter, of your Lordship’s dispatches, and of M de

Souza’s readiness to give every security that treaty could give, proceed in

the course in which we set out and I have accordingly signed the Con-

vention’. He was worried Sousa had not received official instructions on

two points: the admission of British goods into Brazil, which had been

promised in the convention, and the nature of instructions sent to Ma-

deira. With regard to the evacuation Strangford was to work together

with Almeida. It was ‘the one point to press: and almost equally whether

the Prince is forced to it by the advance of the French army, or is en-