Robson Martin. Britain, Portugal and South America in the Napoleonic Wars: Alliances and Diplomacy in Economic Maritime Conflict (ENG)

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abled to do it more at his leisure by the suspension of Bonaparte’s meas-

ures against Portugal’.

By the end of October Canning was ‘tired to

death’ with the negotiations and had heard another rumour ‘Portugal has

made its peace with France, shutting her ports’. If this was so then he

informed Sousa ‘the expedition to Madeira must sail forthwith’.

On 4 November Canning received intelligence that the whole of the

Portuguese navy was now collected in Lisbon. Strangford, worried and

complaining of illness, presented a note to Araujo, advising several ships-

of-war should accompany the Prince of Beira to Brazil. It was not neces-

sary they should go as far as Brazil, but ‘they may remain in safety at

Madeira...or even at Gibraltar’, out of the reach of French influence.

Araujo assured him the Regent would ‘never permit a single ship…to be

added to the fleets of his enemies’. In reply Strangford delivered a warn-

ing to the Portuguese government. If they continued to keep their ships

in the Tagus, ‘courting the demands of France’ Britain would be ‘justified

in any steps which it may think proper to pursue’. He also reported the

Portuguese were strengthening the Tagus forts, orders had been given

‘for the equipment of some gun boats’ and ‘for the construction of

forges for the purpose of heating shot’ at the arsenal. These preparations

would seem more appropriate for repelling a sea-borne assault rather

than a land invasion and added to the uncertainty with which ministers

regarded the future actions of the Portuguese.

Strangford was also worried that the five French and six Spanish war-

ships sheltering in Cadiz were, it was rumoured, ‘completely ready for

sea, victualled for six months and…[had] about 4,000 troops on board’.

Eight Spanish ships including four frigates ‘victualled in the same man-

ner’ were at Carthagena and there were three ships-of-the-line and three

frigates at Ferrol. Although Britain had deployed Royal Navy squadrons

to blockade these remaining isolated units if any escaped ‘they might

make an attempt to enter the Tagus’ in support of a French overland

invasion.

Strangford communicated to Canning, and to Admiral Purvis block-

ading Cadiz, that the Portuguese policy of appeasement was gathering

pace as a result of a heightened fear of France and the belief British mili-

tary support would be ineffective. Strangford thought the political rela-

tions between England and Portugal were on the point of a considerable

change and the latter would ‘be very shortly compelled to shut her ports’.

The Portuguese seemed convinced such a move would save them, be-

lieving ‘Bonaparte has relinquished his design of invading Portugal’.

RITAIN, PORTUGAL AND SOUTH AMERICA

134

HE PORTUGUESE CRISIS OF 1807

135

Contributing to the Portuguese delusion was the assumption ‘it is certain

that the French Troops have not yet begun to pass the Spanish frontier’.

In fact four days after Strangford wrote to Canning Junot would cross

the Bidossa into Spain on his long march to Portugal.

Completely oblivious to the changed strategic situation, it seemed to

the Portuguese cabinet that by adhering to French demands they had yet

again preserved their independence. They believed Brazil could be de-

fended against attack from France by their own forces and in any such

event Britain would provide assistance. Crucially, the arrival in Lisbon of

news of Whitelocke’s humiliating surrender gave the Portuguese confi-

dence if they eventually sided with France that Brazil would be secure

from British attack. According to Francis the Portuguese felt ‘if the

Spaniards could beat off a British attack by land, they could do so equally

well’.

The news of this reverse certainly added to the perceived incom-

petence and ineffectiveness of military operations undertaken by the

British army. In consequence, Fortescue asserted, the Regent ‘began to

waver’ in his determination to resist France.

As the crisis in Portugal escalated Macaulay has suggested the British

government ‘did not categorically reject the idea of a simulated war...as a

means of buying time while preparations were made to transfer the Por-

tuguese court to Brazil’.

The Regent may have felt he was justified in

this request as Britain had tolerated ‘mock warfare’ with other countries

under certain circumstances. In 1801 an agreement had been reached

with the Northern Powers.

Canning would also make such a ‘mock

war’ offer to Sweden in January 1808: Britain would not regard a Swed-

ish agreement with France, Russian and Denmark, designed to prevent a

Franco-Russian invasion of Sweden, as an overtly hostile move. The

unbalanced Gustavus IV refused the offer. According to Ryan, the re-

fusal ‘wrecked the slight possibility which, despite the hostile declara-

tions, existed at the end of 1807 that the state of formal war between the

Baltic powers and Britain might not necessarily result in belligerent ac-

tion’. This situation would have been acceptable and extremely beneficial

to Britain and Russia in the Baltic.

A similar agreement with Portugal would not have safeguarded the

Portuguese navy from France. As Fortescue noted Canning had been

‘apprised of the change of attitude in the Portuguese Government’ and

in consequence ‘was determined to endure no trifling’.

Writing to

Strangford Canning hoped Araujo was not ‘so infatuated with the absurd

notion of a “nominal war”’ and declared that as soon as the idea had

been put forward by Sousa ‘it was rejected at once as wholly inadmissi-

ble’. In the draft for the above dispatch he had declared the suggestion

of mock war was ‘rejected with the contempt it deserved’. This statement

underlined Canning’s growing frustration at the vacillations of the Portu-

guese court; ‘in the present state of the world’ Britain could not allow

nations to ‘declare war…with impunity’. To accept such an arrangement

would ‘encourage all the other neutral nations to enlist themselves on the

side of France, without fear of the resentment of Great Britain’. Such a

situation would have had dire effects on British commerce and the ability

to fund the war against France if other neutral nations, in particular the

United States, demanded similar arrangements. Canning wanted to make

an example of Portugal and send a clear message to the remaining neu-

tral nations regarding British intentions. Consequently there would be no

mock hostilities with Portugal, the Regent must choose one way or the

other; France or Britain.

…

RITAIN, PORTUGAL AND SOUTH AMERICA

136

One source has erroneously claimed the decision to send a Royal Navy

squadron to the Tagus was not made until 9 November.

This is untrue;

the decision had already been made before Strangford’s communication

of 14 October reached London on 4 November. In the second article of

the Convention of 22 October it had been agreed a British naval force

should, to use Canning’s words, ‘assist -i-e in a certain sense to compel the

embarkation for the Brazils’.

The very same day the convention was

signed Canning informed Strangford the ‘squadron destined for this ser-

vice will sail immediately under the command of Sir S. Smith’.

On 27

October the Admiralty decided on the vague instruction that a commis-

sion be made out ‘for Sir Sidney Smith as commander in chief of a

squadron for a particular service’.

On 29 October Castlereagh con-

firmed Rear Admiral Sir Sidney Smith was to proceed to the Tagus.

Sir Sidney Smith, Rear Admiral of the Blue, was probably the most

famous and dashing British naval officer alive. He was the famous ‘Hero

of Acre’ who, it was generally believed and claimed by Smith himself, had

foiled Napoleon’s plans to expand the French empire in the east at the

siege of Acre in 1799. Napoleon himself would later claim of Smith’s

actions at Acre: ‘that man made me miss my destiny’.

He was experi-

enced in the art of diplomacy having promoted British influence at the

Sublime Porte. He also had a long and successful record in littoral war-

fare, serving with Swedish forces at Svenskund in 1790 and had been

knighted by the King of Sweden for his services. At Toulon in 1793 he

organised the burning of half the French fleet sheltering in the harbour.

He saw further employment at Boulogne and on the Neapolitan coast

where he became embroiled in an argument with Sir John Moore, which

THE SMITH EXPEDITION

TO LISBON

may have affected his judgement in the unfolding crisis in Portugal. In

1796 he had been captured and imprisoned in Paris but had escaped;

leaving a personal message to Napoleon inscribed on a shutter. Smith was

part of the squadron under Duckworth that failed in an attack on Con-

stantinople after forcing the Dardanelles in 1806. His high public profile,

reputation and extravagant character were ideal for dealing with the im-

pressionable and archaic Portuguese court. He was also available for ac-

tive service; after the Dardanelles he had returned to England in June and

had been recuperating at Bath. Once outside ministerial influence the

outcome of this crisis would depend upon a close working relationship

between Smith and Strangford and this may also have played a part in the

selection of Smith. The Dictionary of National Biography states: ‘it has

been supposed that the name Sidney referred to a kinship with the

Strangford family of Smythe, which had intermarried with the Sidneys’.

It appears Smith had contacted Canning in July, possibly offering his

services for an expedition to the Baltic due to his experience in the re-

gion. Canning replied on 5 July, thanking Smith for ‘ideas on the subject

of our naval operations in the Baltic’. ‘I trust and believe they will be

carried into effect’, Canning continued, ‘while I agree with you in regret-

ting that the means of executing them, in the extent to which they ought

to be carried, should be now to be in a great measure created’. Canning

assured Smith he understood the ‘motives and feelings by which you

profess to be activated, with a view to the publick: at the same time that

I thankfully acknowledge those of personal kindness and good opinion

which you are so good as to express towards myself’. He ended this

communication by impressing upon Smith ‘the existence, on my part, of

sentiments perfectly reciprocal’.

A further consideration may have played on Canning’s mind. In 1807

most of Smith’s close political friends were in opposition to the Portland

Cabinet, most notably Grenville and Windham. After Smith was cen-

sured for his conduct at Sicily in 1806 Grenville wrote to Windham de-

claring he had ‘every reason to agree with you in the wish of making the

censure on Sir Sidney Smith as mild as possible’.

Despite his close links

to the Whigs, Smith, a Member of Parliament from 1802, did not exclu-

sively attach himself to any single political party; his political beliefs were

centred on policies beneficial to the English nation. For example, in

1802 he had addressed the House on the naval estimates and, having no

friends in the Tory government, criticised the budget cuts.

The Port-

land Cabinet expected attacks from the commons and some sections of

BRITAIN, PORTUGAL AND SOUTH AMERICA

138

HE SMITH EXPEDITION TO LISBON

139

the press in the aftermath of the Copenhagen expedition. Such criticism

would be intensified by a similar occurrence at Lisbon. Portugal was

England’s ‘Ancient Ally’ and to attack Lisbon could have stretched the

support of many members of the commons. In September 1807 Auck-

land remarked of the Copenhagen expedition ‘a strong opinion of the

national injustice and outrage of the act is very prevalent’. For the Port-

land administration, in office only a few months, to have a Whig friendly

officer in command of such an action could have deflected some of the

possible outrage from the opposition benches and press.

Smith was provided with very clear orders. Immediately upon arrival

off the Tagus he was to contact Strangford and ‘conform yourself to

such intimations and recommendations as his Lordship may from time

to time transmit to you’. Ministers still hoped for a successful diplomatic

resolution to the crisis and Smith was explicitly ordered ‘not to enter the

Tagus except upon the express requisition of His Majesty’s Minister at

the Court of Lisbon, intimating to you the expediency and prudence of

your so doing’. If Smith found ‘assistance may be wanted for fitting out

the Portuguese Fleet, you are to furnish it from your squadron to the

utmost of your power’. If the Portuguese decided to flee, Smith was to

accompany them ‘with the whole or such part of your squadron as may

be necessary on the occasion’. He was ordered to take particular care not

to leave behind:

…any portion either of the military or commercial marine of Portu-

gal which it is possible to convey to the Brazils, or to remove to any

British port, or within the protection of any British squadron, and

whatever cannot be so removed, it is material should with the con-

currence of the Portuguese Government be immediately destroyed.

Smith was to implement every possible measure in his power to protect

‘persons and property of British subjects, so as to favour their removal in

safety from Portugal if circumstances should render the same neces-

sary’.

On 30

October the Admiralty forwarded instructions to Smith

ordering him to sail for the Tagus with the London (98), Marlborough,

Elizabeth, Bedford, Monarch (74s) and the Solebay frigate (32) from Ply-

mouth while the Admiralty directed the Hibernia (110) to be detached

from the Channel Fleet to join him off Portugal.

As the Cabinet formulated its response to Napoleon’s threats to Por-

tugal Castlereagh fell seriously ill. As early as 19 September Lady Bess-

borough had seen Lady Castlereagh who had talked of ‘Ld. Castlereagh’s

encreasing debility’.

Hinde has surmised this may have been due to the

physical and mental strain of his job; he had been:

…showing signs of fatigue during the summer, on one occasion in

July being too exhausted by 8 o’clock in the evening to introduce

to the Commons his proposals for increasing the army. For the

next two months he carried on, as usual taking more than his full

share of the anxiety and labour of the war. But sometime towards

the end of October he collapsed.

At first it was believed he would be unable to continue at the War Office

and ministers should look for a permanent replacement. With Castler-

eagh convalescing at Brighton Hawkesbury undertook his duties. On 2

November Hawkesbury informed the King that Castlereagh was a little

better though still confined to his room but a few days later he seems to

have had a relapse; it was thought his constitution was broken due to

internal bleeding.

Hence for a number of weeks one of the key drivers

of British strategy was removed from Whitehall. Castlereagh did remain

up to date with Portuguese policy while recuperating in Brighton but it

was not until 15 December he could inform Hawkesbury he was feeling

better and was ready to return to London and only in late December was

he well enough to return to the War Office.

By 6 November Canning was convinced Smith’s original orders of 30

October were far too lenient. He now asked Hawkesbury if Smith’s force

‘can be made up to 8 sail of the line…for the purpose of dashing into

the Tagus if necessary…[and] destroying the Portuguese Fleet if the gov-

ernment persisted in keeping it there against the Treaty (see art 4 & 5)’. The

intention was that Smith, upon arriving off the Tagus, should send a

note to the Portuguese stating:

…in pursuance of those articles of the treaty, which he takes for

granted will have been ratified by the Prince Regent & in conse-

quence of the casus fadeius the shutting of the ports being certain he

is instructed to require that one half of the Portuguese navy shall

forthwith set sail for the Brazils: that upon compliance he has or-

ders to protect it to a certain latitude but that a refusal will be con-

sidered as a declaration of war & if the treaty has not been ratified

the refusal of this ratification is to be considered also as war.

RITAIN, PORTUGAL AND SOUTH AMERICA

140

HE SMITH EXPEDITION TO LISBON

141

‘Upon either of these refusals’ Canning continued ‘he must proceed in-

stantly to take measures of force’. Ministers realised this was to be a joint

force; to attack the Tagus Smith was to have 5-6,000 troops which, al-

though enough ‘to enable him to execute this service…he ought to have

10,000 rather than fail’.

Canning wrote directly to Smith informing him

of the change in orders. He also included an optional paragraph, which

was not to be forwarded to Strangford unless he found delays in sending

the Portuguese ships to Brazil. In this case he would inform the Court he

would consider such delays as an ‘infringement of the convention and to

act accordingly’.

The next day Canning transmitted to Hawkesbury the draft additional

instructions to Smith, ‘with that of a note to be presented by him on his

arrival’. With regard to the British land force it should be ‘collected &

ready to embark at a moment’s notice…if there is no embarkation, & if

upon investigation it is thought there cannot be a successful attack the

army will have no business there at all’. In either of these cases the

troops were to head for Gibraltar; though if the force could not attack

the Tagus, Canning raised the possibility of sending it to Brazil while

leaving a suitable naval force to blockade Lisbon.

Canning also wrote to Strangford, noting ‘many circumstances stated

in your Lordships last dispatches, contribute to excite considerable suspi-

cion and alarm’. The seemingly hostile preparations in Lisbon ‘appear to

indicate a disposition to yield to the demands of France beyond what has

been avowed to His Majesty’. Although Strangford was convinced of

Portuguese sincerity, Canning viewed the unfolding situation with pessi-

mism. He confessed ‘it seems hardly to be doubted that the Portuguese

Gov[ernmen]t [ent]ertain a notion of carrying their compliance with the

Demands of France farther than the mere shutting of their Ports’. The

overriding concern of the Cabinet remained the Portuguese fleet, Can-

ning stressing articles 4 and 5 ‘which provide for the safety of the mili-

tary and commercial Marine of Portugal are by far the most important’.

Strangford should employ ‘any means whether of persuasion or menace

to procure their instant execution’. Canning further stipulated to Strang-

ford the part of the Portuguese fleet to go to the Brazils which was

agreed in the Convention ‘should forthwith sail from the Tagus upon the

notification of the arrival of Sir Sidney Smith’.

The Portuguese preparations to repel a naval assault brought a clear

and concise statement from Canning. Strangford should:

…give it to be understood, that the continuance of hostile prepara-

tions, manifestly pointed against a supposed attack from a British

naval force…can be considered in no other light than as an indica-

tion of the consciousness on the part of that Court, of having given

or being about to give, some just ground of offence to Great Britain.

This was a clear indication ministers in London were worried Portugal

would eventually side with France. The Cabinet concluded the Portu-

guese were not making suitable efforts to prepare their fleet for a voyage

to Brazil and thought this was symptomatic of a change in policy to-

wards Britain. With the growing threat of a French invasion the Cabinet

wanted the Portuguese fleet removed from the Tagus. If diplomatic

measures failed to ensure the agreements were carried out, Canning was

prepared to allow Smith to ‘menace’ the Regent and use military means

against Portugal to implement the articles agreed to in the convention.

This authorisation was conveyed to Strangford by Canning; he again

stressed the need to carry out the 4

and 5

articles and if the intended

voyage to South America was being delayed by ‘insufficient prepara-

tions’, then Strangford was to ‘procure the surrender of the fleet to the

custody of Great Britain’. In a mood of desperation he suggested the

‘fleet might sail from the port of Lisbon, as if for the purpose of pro-

ceeding to the Brazils, and might fall into the hands of H Mys squadron

stationed off the Tagus’.

To Sousa, who had his own doubts regarding the ratification, Can-

ning admitted he had ‘not been without my suspicions for some time’

over the conduct of the Portuguese court. He was also annoyed with

Sousa and could not agree with the Portuguese minister ‘that the send-

ing of a squadron at the time when you recommended it, would have

had any good effect. Earlier it might have done much: and we had

made preparations for the purpose, But then you deprecated it: then

you wished us to trust – and I am sure that to trust by halves is never

wise’. ‘The convention was everything – or nothing’. Canning had

‘believed with you, and upon the credit of your beliefs, that it was eve-

rything. If it turns out nothing, I have been deceived, but so have you

too, I have no doubt – and I shall never reproach you with the decep-

tion’.

Writing to Leveson-Gower, he described the convention as

‘either the best, or the worst measure ever adopted’. With a fleet on the

way to the Tagus and an army at Gibraltar, ‘a few weeks, perhaps days,

must determine the question’.

BRITAIN, PORTUGAL AND SOUTH AMERICA

142

HE SMITH EXPEDITION TO LISBON

143

One recent study has argued that ‘Britain refrained from precipitating

the crisis’.

The orders of 30 October to Smith preventing him from

entering the Tagus unless Strangford thought it expedient, certainly give

that impression. By early November, however, Canning was growing

impatient with the Portuguese court and had taken the decision to force

the situation. If the Portuguese fleet did not sail to Brazil as stipulated in

the convention of 22 October, Strangford would demand its surrender.

If this was refused, force would be used to capture or destroy it. Portugal

had been informed of the changed strategic situation on the Continent

and Britain, as had been the case with the Danish navy, would never let

neutral naval forces fall into the hands of Napoleon.

Smith Sails for Lisbon

On 9 November Smith raised his flag at Cawsand Bay, Plymouth, in the

powerful 98-gun three-decked HMS London. After being delayed by con-

trary winds for 48 hours, he set sail for Lisbon. With him he took the

Elizabeth, Marlborough, Monarch, Bedford, all 74s, and the frigate Solebay.

At Plymouth Admiral Young was ordered to instruct the Plantagenet and

Conqueror, both 74s, to sail for the Tagus.

Despite the confidence dis-

played by Canning, some members of the Cabinet expressed concerns

about Smith’s likely conduct. By instructing Smith to present a note to

the Portuguese Canning was investing him with diplomatic powers.

Hammond informed Canning that, according to Hawkesbury, the Cabi-

net were aware of previous problems with Smith’s interpretation of or-

ders in 1806, and were ‘decidedly of opinion that Sir Sidney Smith

should not be invested with any powers or possess any political discre-

tion whatever’. Hammond therefore deferred drafting the full instruc-

tions to Smith until Canning could return to London.

The problem for

ministers and Canning in particular was that Smith would have to be

invested with certain credentials if, upon arrival off the Tagus, he found

Strangford had either demanded his passports or been told to leave Lis-

bon. In such a case Strangford would cease to act as the official minister

to Portugal and could only await the arrival of Smith who would convey

more diplomatic leverage than Strangford due to the threat posed by the

naval force under his command.

Ministers strived to ensure if Smith needed additional troops to those

already set aside then they would be available. They faced a number of

difficulties, however, related to the dispersal of forces by the Talents and

the inherent constraints of maritime operations. As noted, Moore had