Robson Martin. Britain, Portugal and South America in the Napoleonic Wars: Alliances and Diplomacy in Economic Maritime Conflict (ENG)

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ron’ Cotton was ‘forcibly to detain the whole of such combined squad-

ron’.

As a consequence of the volte-face of Russian policy ‘the capture of

the Russian squadron in the Tagus has become an object of the greatest

importance’. If the Tagus could not be forced, he was to implement a

strict blockade, which could only be relaxed if the entire Portuguese and

Russian fleets were surrendered to him. If the Portuguese fleet escaped

from the Tagus, Smith was to be detached to escort them to Brazil.

Spencer’s troops would assist his operations, while another force under

Moore could be expected. When Cotton had completed his mission he

was to return to Spithead and report his proceedings to the Admiralty,

having left a suitable force off the Tagus to blockade any ships left be-

hind in the river.

The Portuguese Crisis Resolved

Lying off the Tagus with his squadron, Smith moved his flag from the

London onto the Hibernia on 20 November. With Strangford now on

board his new flagship Smith decided circumstances dictated the squad-

ron could not be used for peaceful measures. Strangford suggested ‘the

expediency of establishing the blockade of the Tagus’ as soon as French

or Spanish troops entered Portugal and once the invasion commenced,

Portugal should be regarded as part of French territory.

Portuguese intentions were apparently confirmed when the sloop

Confiance (18) arrived off Lisbon on 21

November and attempted to join

the fleet but was prevented by fire from a Portuguese battery. The fol-

lowing day it succeeded in joining the squadron and communicated Can-

ning’s dispatches of 7 and 12 November containing instructions relating

to the Russian fleet.

With the approval of Strangford, Smith had al-

ready sent notification to Araujo of the decision to blockade the river

and issued a clear threat arguing his squadron ‘cannot have been assem-

bled for the mere purpose of demonstration or simple blockade...my

government requires and expects something more from such a force’.

Smith hoped the recent example meted out to the Danes would ‘operate

on the reasonable and dispassionate part of the Prince Regents council

and prevent Lisbon becoming the theatre of similar scenes of horror

with the additional evils of famine, insurrection and the presence of a

foreign permanent garrison’. By fleeing to Brazil the Regent would ‘spare

himself the regret now felt at Copenhagen that the offered alternative

was not accepted, since the result cannot be otherwise than similar’. As

the Portuguese court seemed to be driven by the apprehension of ‘a land

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attack to close with the French requisitions’, Smith hoped ‘the greater

apprehension of one from the opposite quarter may have the effect of

producing a contrary decision and conduct’. Despite the bluster, Smith

allowed the Regent a little room for manoeuvre noting diplomatic meas-

ures could achieve the desired result and knowing ‘the character of the

ministers and the real disposition of the Prince, Lord Strangford keeps

the door of negotiation open’.

Strangford confirmed the blockade prevented food supplies from

entering the Tagus. When added to the pressure on food supplies already

caused by the arrival of the Russian squadron and the increased numbers

of Portuguese troops in the city, the Portuguese were forced to impose

restrictions on food made with flour, bread excepted. This, Strangford

thought, caused ‘the greatest distress and alarm in Lisbon’ as Canning

had intended.

‘Thus’, Fortescue noted, ‘matters were brought to a crisis

at last’.

But resolving the crisis was not as simple as this comment

might suggest. From the start Smith found the blockade difficult to

maintain. Strong westerly winds were blowing into Tagus preventing his

big ships-of-the-line from closing to the lee shore. His ‘absolute want of

more frigates [and smaller vessels], which...can venture, and remain near

the bar’ and hence tighten the blockade was now clearly limiting his abil-

ity to fulfil the mission. Smith hoped if the weather lifted the blockade

would ‘be rendered more close by the ships being able to keep nearer the

shore’. Conducting a close blockade on a dangerous lee shore in bad

weather with ships-of-the-line was a risky business.

On 22 November Smith’s force was augmented by the arrival of the

Plantagenet and Conqueror (74s). With the squadron thus strengthened,

Smith and Strangford discussed the possibility of attacking the Portu-

guese fleet and both reached the same conclusion. According to Smith,

Strangford regarded it as ‘perfectly practicable...if the efforts of His Maj-

esty’s ships be joined to those of an efficient cooperative body of troops

by land’ while Smith himself was of the opinion ‘the Portuguese fleet is

quite out of the reach of any attack to be made by a fleet alone however

superior in number and efficiency’. Even after passing the forts of St.

Julian and Bugio a fleet alone trying to force the inner Tagus would be

‘more or less disabled...[from] a very considerable crossfire, the entrance

and sides of the passage all the way up to the town being lined with bat-

teries and forts….The fleet would have no anchorage out of the range of

enemy shot, as was same case in sea of Marmora’. Clearly Smith, who

had been an eyewitness to the embarrassing failure of Duckworth’s

aborted attack on Constantinople the previous year, had taken on board

the lessons regarding the limitations of pure naval forces and concluded

a successful attempt to force the Tagus and assail the forts would need ‘a

combined land and sea force’.

Strangford agreed with Smith; the Portuguese fleet might be attacked

but the retreat from the Tagus ‘would be too uncertain, and too much at

the mercy of accidents and chances, that it would be wise to provide for

it, by the occupation of the adjacent forts’. The force needed would be

no more than 9-10,000 troops, as long as the operation was implemented

before the arrival of the French and the Russians remained neutral. Ac-

cordingly he ordered Moore’s force to sail for Lisbon, where it would

join with the troops coming from England, prior to any attack on the

Portuguese fleet. To achieve this communication he had to go through

Smith, as one of his ships would have to carry the dispatch to Gibraltar

where Moore was expected. He stressed the need for Smith to send for

Moore ‘without delay’.

Strangford concluded a blockade of Lisbon

throughout the winter would present great difficulties with attendant

troopships, thus the first force to arrive would be landed by Smith at

Peniche to await the other. Smith agreed, stressing there was ‘little pros-

pect…of a successful close blockade in the winter months’ and, character-

istically, noted ‘the good policy of devoting an adequate land force imme-

diately, to the object in question and thus to finish the affair at once’.

According to Gambier, the Portuguese had now collected 18,000

troops in and around Lisbon and ‘evidently intended to defend any at-

tack which may be made from the sea and not for the purpose of oppos-

ing the advance of the French’. Deployed as they were a British land

force was required to drive off the Portuguese troops prior to taking

possession of the Tagus batteries in order to guarantee a safe passage for

Smith’s fleet. There was an opportunity for swift action as Gambier

thought few of the Portuguese forts and batteries guarding the harbour

were of regular construction. He also reported it was only a few days

since ‘General Gomes Freire was called by M de Araujo and his opinion

required in regard to the military arrangements. He was asked whether

the object was to defend the country or the port, M de Araujo answered

that it was the port they wished to defend’.

Despite Portuguese preparations Strangford resolved to make one last

diplomatic effort. If this failed he would urge ‘the surrender of the mili-

tary and commercial marine of Portugal’ to Britain. He forwarded a letter

to Araujo demanding a personal audience with the Regent. While he was

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in Lisbon on this mission the blockade of the Tagus would be main-

tained.

Smith accordingly organised a flag of truce under which Strang-

ford could safely sail upriver. He left the fleet in the early afternoon of

27 November in the Confiance and arrived at Lisbon the next night after a

tedious passage.

He found ‘a great and rapid change has taken place in

the conduct of the Portuguese government’. Preparations were under

way ‘for the execution of those articles of the convention which relate to

the disposal of the Portuguese navy…[the] Regent and all of the Royal

family are embarked and propose to sail instantly, as a French army is

within nine leagues of Lisbon’.

Sir Sidney Smith’s nephew, Lieutenant

G S Smith, differs slightly in the dates stating on 28 November ‘the ad-

miral sent the Confiance into Lisbon with a flag of truce, Lord Strangford

went also, and my Uncle ordered me to accompany him as signal officer.

Owing to contrary winds and the tide we did not get up to Lisbon till the

at night’. ‘When we arrived Lord S. went immediately to the Court,

but did not see the Prince till next morning’, when ‘At 8 in the morning

we came away again. Lord Strangford found the Prince on board ship, I

followed him out in the boat’.

Onboard Hibernia, Smith had no knowledge of Portuguese intentions,

writing to Strangford on 28 November ‘I need not tell you how impa-

tient I am to have a word or sign from you….Send me from moment to

moment a word by Telegraph on any card or scrap of paper. The signal

officer can convey it from any staff or mast. This state of suspence is

unbearable’. Captain James Lucas Yeo in the Confiance was ordered in

case the ‘flag of truce is no longer required for its original use, to hawl it

down, and act against the French, and immediately occupy the batteries

within his reach that are tenable’.

Smith implored Strangford, ‘send me

pilots, let my marines occupy the forts, and I will come up abreast of, or

above the town, the moment the wind will let me; then I shall be more

than at par with Junot’. He hoped the Prince would call a levee en masse to

defend the city. Added to this letter was:

A hasty P.S. to a dispatch from Lord Strangford to Sir S.S. dated Lisbon 29

November “Much difficulty is made about giving up the forts. The

soldiers won’t give them. You had better stand in as near as possible

without passing them. Orders have been given to treat the English

as friends and protectors. An alliance has been declared with Eng-

land. The powder has been taken out of the forts. Make your ap-

pearance or all is lost. Le Prince chancelle tryoms”.

The Embarkation of the Portuguese Royal Family

At daybreak on the morning of 29 November Confiance sighted a fleet

under sail. By 8 a.m. Strangford was back on the sloop and could con-

firm the Portuguese fleet was coming downriver. On board the Hibernia,

Smith observed the Portuguese ships ‘coming to sea at 11.30’. Hibernia

shortened sail and ‘made various signals to the Squadron’. Unsure of

Portuguese intentions Smith took no chances and prepared his fleet for

action. The Bedford ‘answered signal to prepare for action [and] formed

line of battle ahead of the Hibernia’. The Elizabeth cleared for action at

11.40 a.m. and Foudroyant answered a signal ‘to prepare to salute [and] to

prepare for battle, beat to quarters [and] cleared ship for action’. The

signal to prepare for action was also recorded in the logs of London, Marl-

borough, and Monarch. The Plantagenet log records Marlborough making a

signal at 6 a.m. informing the squadron seven sail were coming out of

Lisbon. At 8 a.m. the Plantagenet observed they were part of the Portu-

guese fleet and at 10 a.m. ‘cleared ship for battle’.

The fleet was carrying the Portuguese Royal family as they com-

menced their voyage to Brazil. On board were the contents of the treas-

ury, the bureaucratic infrastructure of the Portuguese state and a host of

individuals fleeing the city; possibly up to 15,000 people. The fleet com-

prised the Principe Reale (84); the Conde Henrique, Medusa, Principe de Brazil

and Rainha de Portugal, (74s); and the Alfonso d’ Alberquerqe, Don João de

Castro and Martim de Freitar, (64s). The frigates were: Minerva (44), Golfino

(36), Urania and an unnamed ship (32s). Three 20-gun corvettes and a

12-gun schooner completed the naval part of the flotilla. Remaining in

the Tagus were 20 Portuguese vessels including the 74-gun Vasco de

Gama, which, although undergoing repairs, was nearly ready for sea.

Smith stated that another three 74s including the Maria the First were

‘mere hulks and the one on the stocks the Principe Regente is only in

frame’; five frigates and corvettes also left were either unserviceable or in

need of repairs (see Appendices V and VI).

In order to guarantee the Vasco de Gama and any remaining ships a

safe passage, Smith was anxious to take possession of Fort Bugio at the

mouth of the Tagus which he thought ‘tenable against all that can be

brought against it for a long time’. Again, Smith realised the forts were

the keys to the Tagus but the Portuguese refused his request and, as his

squadron had not forced the Tagus, this circumstance was not covered

by the convention of 22 October. Accordingly Smith detached the ma-

rines of the London, Hibernia and Marlborough ‘to obtain possession by

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force or otherwise’ of the forts ‘during the momentary interregnum or

cessation of all authority’. But on the night of 30 November a gale blew

up and the marines were recalled to the fleet. Smith felt the frustration of

his plan, as it would not be practical ‘when the fort is garrisoned by the

French without a series of land operations’.

Prince João had been caught between two menacing forces: invasion

by land or assault from the sea. Portuguese policy had always hoped ap-

peasing Napoleon would remove the spectre of a French invasion. The

Regent accepted any concession to France but, as Francis notes, ‘not to

tolerate an invasion of his country, and he stuck to his point’.

So many

times before the threat of French military action had failed to materialise,

but now a combination of factors forced the Prince to make a firm deci-

sion. The shock of finding out Napoleon really did intend to remove the

House of Braganza from the Portuguese throne; the threat Lisbon might

be destroyed by a French attack and the pressure, backed up by thinly

veiled threats of Lisbon becoming another Copenhagen, applied by

Smith, all helped push the Prince into activity. The precise catalyst for

the evacuation was, however, the arrival of Junot’s army at Abrantes on

the morning of 24 November, where a permanent bridge of boats pro-

vided the last crossing point on the Tagus 75 miles away from Lisbon.

After consulting his ministers João followed the course of action he had

already stated many times to Britain: evacuation to Brazil. Dealt a poor

hand, João had played what advantages he had rather well. Time and

distance provided warning of a French advance while support and

threats from Britain were offered in equal measure. By buying time João

had kept his options open right to the last minute.

Junot had reached Ciudad Rodrigo on 19 November and found fur-

ther orders to hurry onto Lisbon. Napoleon’s concerns again centred on

the belief British troops were on their way from Copenhagen to Lisbon

and the Regent was simply trying to buy time for this movement to be

completed.

As they approached Lisbon, Foy later recalled, the French

were in good spirits; they realised if the Portuguese were going to put up

any resistance they would have done so at Abrantes. Pushing on towards

Lisbon, the van of Junot’s force reached Sacavem, two leagues from

Lisbon, at 10 p.m. on the evening of 29

November. The next day, 1,500

French troops, the vanguard of Junot’s force, entered the city unop-

posed. These men ‘were in bad order and worn out with fatigue’, Junot

was ‘at the head of the skeletons or rather the wrecks of his four picked

battalions’.

Oman has argued there was ‘certainly no example in history

of a Kingdom conquered in so few days and with such small trouble as

was Portugal in 1807’.

Despite the ease of the invasion Junot had

missed his main target of the Portuguese fleet and as a result he also

missed his chance to gain a marshal’s baton.

Aftermath of the Portuguese Evacuation

Anxiety had been increasing in Britain over the probable outcome of

the Portuguese crisis. In late November Lady Bessborough lamented

‘All Port Drinkers are groaning over the fate of Portugal’.

The Duke

of Northumberland, believing the situation was so bad it could only get

better, was concerned Strangford had not been able to ‘write me a single

line these two months’. He had feared the want of exertion on the part

of the government had presented Bonaparte with an opportunity of

seizing the Portuguese fleet.

The apparent lack of Government activity

also brought criticism from Auckland who informed Grenville there had

been ‘uneasiness approaching to consternation in the Cabinet on learn-

ing that the Russian squadron had got in’. He bemoaned ‘in truth the

measures of “the vigorous Government” have in this affair been inex-

plicably late’.

According to The Times of 18 December important intelligence was

circulated that the ‘PRINCE REGENT and government of Portugal had

at length been driven to the expedient of emigrating from their country’.

All uncertainty was removed on Saturday 19 December when news of

the evacuation was published.

On Monday 21 December The Times

provided details of a communication from the Admiralty made on the

afternoon of 19 December describing the events. ‘Lord Strangford’, it

continued, ‘has discharged the arduous and delicate duty imposed upon

him with honour to himself, and in a manner worthy of the Sovereign he

represents’. Readers were assured the ‘Russians remained idle spectators

of the embarkation, and no act of hostility took place between the Rus-

sian and English ships of war’.

Canning was certainly overjoyed when he heard the operation had

been a success. He wrote to his uncle ‘Huzza! Huzza! Huzza! We have

saved the Portuguese Royal Family and the Portuguese navy...Denmark

was saucy and we were obliged to take her fleet. Portugal had confidence,

and we rescued hers, and will protect her’. Relieved the Russians were

‘quiet spectators of the whole transaction’, he displayed his natural ag-

gressive spirit: ‘I wish they would come out’.

On the following day the

King congratulated Canning rejoicing ‘at the escape of the Royal family

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of Portugal from the clutches of the French and no less the removal of

the Portuguese navy from their reach’. With the Portuguese now on the

way to Brazil, he also noted it would lead to ‘the opening of new and

very extensive channels of commerce for England’.

It appeared Canning’s direction of policy was a key factor in the suc-

cessful outcome and Richmond wrote to ‘sincerely congratulate you on

the success in the Tagus’. It gave him great pleasure that Strangford, a

fellow Irish peer, ‘who is I understand a very young man seems to be a

very promising recruit to your services’ had conducted the business in ‘a

masterly way’. ‘I cannot allow myself to receive an envelope, with your

name in the corner’, Harrowby wrote to Canning, ‘without thanking you

for the delicious moral it contain’d. It will make us eat our mince pies

with double relish, & Buonaparte’s Bologna sausages sit heavy on his

stomach’. Portugal had been ‘an object of great anxiety, knowing nothing

of what had been, or could have been done – but the result which we

now know is the strongest of all’. George Rose, MP and Treasurer of the

Navy, wrote to Canning congratulating him on the evacuation wonder-

ing if it might be one of the most important events of the war.

Despite the four ships-of-the-line and five frigates left behind in Lis-

bon the evacuation removed the majority of the Portuguese commercial

and military marine from the reaches of France. Although France gained

the port of Lisbon it was virtually useless without an active naval squad-

ron to exploit its proximity to British trade routes and on this point

Seniavin had already displayed his intention to remain neutral. As Her-

bert Richmond noted, ‘a base without a fleet is as useless as a sentry-box

without a sentry’.

Smith himself had recognised the ‘necessity of pre-

venting the Tagus becoming the central position of a French naval force

to be created by the simple change of the colours on board the Portu-

guese fleet’.

For Pocock it was ‘a repeat of Nelson’s rescue of the Bour-

bons from Naples in 1798 on an oceanic scale’. British success would

have been complete if the remaining ships could have been destroyed.

Richmond correctly states ‘But for all the haste with which Junot moved

Napoleon’s design was forestalled, as it had been at Copenhagen, by

Britain’s sea power’. ‘By these two actions at Copenhagen and Lisbon

the Cabinet deprived Napoleon of the service of no less than twenty-five

capital ships. Even if some of them were old, this was no inconsiderable

force; it was a force which Napoleon greatly desired to acquire’.

With the crisis in mainland Portugal resolved, in late December a Brit-

ish expedition under Beresford headed for Madeira. As he approached

the island Beresford despatched a frigate to gather intelligence. On 23

December he learned the inhabitants had spent the previous two months

preparing for a British attack; ‘very considerable’ works had been con-

structed to defend Funchal, the regular garrison had been increased and

the militia called out. By 1 p.m. on 24 December, Beresford’s force of

the Centaur, York and Captain, (74s), and the 64-gun Intrepid, with the

Africaine, Alceste, Shannon and Success frigates under the command of Rear

Admiral Sir Samuel Hood, was clearly in position to mount an attack on

Funchal. Beresford was aware news of the evacuation of Lisbon had

arrived on the Island a few days before causing all the defensive activities

to stop. His intelligence now reported the people were not ‘disinclined to

receive the English’. He called upon the governor, Pedro Fagundes

Bacellar d’Antas e Meneres, to surrender the island. This was agreed and

British troops were landed. The articles of capitulation were signed by

Meneres and Beresford on Boxing Day 1807, Madeira was to be kept by

Britain until Portugal, and the Regent, were free from control or influ-

ence of the French.

Despite the success at Lisbon and Funchal, the task of securing Brit-

ish maritime security was not complete. Measures had to be imple-

mented to blockade the nominally hostile Russian fleet remaining in the

Tagus. In the aftermath of the Portuguese evacuation, Smith was faced

with a dilemma: it was essential to provide an escort for the Portuguese

fleet transferring the Regent to Brazil but the Russian squadron necessi-

tated a Royal Navy blockading force. To implement the former duty, on

5 December Smith directed Captain Graham Moore (brother of Sir John

Moore) of the Marlborough to proceed to Brazil with the ships Bedford,

London and Monarch. Moore was to protect Portuguese territory and pro-

vide visible support to the Portuguese government. Smith would then

send frigates and smaller vessels to enable Moore to protect British trade

while attacking the commerce of France and her allies. Moore was pro-

vided with the option of reducing his squadron to three line-of-battle if it

were adequate for these objects, because if a substantial enemy force

were directed to South America from Europe an appropriate British

force would follow it. On 6 December Moore, with the nominal rank of

Commodore, joined with the Portuguese fleet headed for Brazil.

Severe storms hit the convoy on the 8

and again on 11 December

during which Bedford and the principal Portuguese ships carrying the royal

family were separated from the main force. On the afternoon of 22 Janu-

ary after a voyage of eight weeks the Regent reached All Saints Bay on the

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coast of the Brazilian province of Bahia. He expressed great thanks for

the service provided by Bedford, which had assisted the Portuguese ships

during the storms. The other British ships Marlborough, London and Mon-

arch had arrived at Rio on 17 January. Bedford escorted the Portuguese

ships down to Rio, arriving there on 7 March and finally joining with the

rest of the British squadron and the Portuguese convoy.

Unlike the crisis of 1806 the danger facing Portugal in 1807 was real.

Napoleon had clearly outlined his intentions to close Portuguese ports to

British commerce and utilise the Portuguese navy for offensive opera-

tions. Having crushed Austria, Prussia and then Russia he also had the

opportunity to use military force to extend his Continental blockade to

the extremities of mainland Europe. Intervention in Portugal also pro-

vided cover for the reformation of a troublesome French ally: Spain.

Finally, control of the Iberian powers would provide Napoleon with

access to their South American possessions and a source of commerce

and hard cash. For Britain, the Portland administration had reacted

swiftly to prevent France gaining additional naval forces. The unexpected

arrival of the Russian fleet, however, added another complication to

frosty relations with St. Petersburg and almost left London back at

square one: as 1807 drew to a close there remained a threat to maritime

security in the Tagus. The French were in possession of one of the best

natural harbours in the world with suitable facilities for repair and victu-

alling naval forces, and Junot’s army, once recovered, would be available

for maritime-based operations. The French position in Lisbon, therefore,

posed a threat to British interests in the Mediterranean, the West Indies,

South America and the perennial danger of a French landing in Ireland.

This threat to British maritime security had to be negated by a strict

blockade of the Tagus. Yet, in commercial terms the operation to trans-

fer the Portuguese government to South America, as Castlereagh had

hoped, was a fabulous opportunity for British trade to gain legitimate

access to the region without the need to intervene militarily while pre-

venting Napoleon from laying legitimate claims to the region. These two

fundamental strands of British maritime strategy, blockading enemy

ships in Europe to protect overseas trade, were at the centre of the Port-

land administration’s policy as 1807 ended and a new year began.

…