Robson Martin. Britain, Portugal and South America in the Napoleonic Wars: Alliances and Diplomacy in Economic Maritime Conflict (ENG)

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While British ministers in London reacted to the growing crisis in Portu-

guese affairs, Napoleon had been making detailed plans for the conquest

of the country. It was surely no coincidence that an essay appeared in the

Paris Moniteur of 6 November describing the major topographical fea-

tures of Spain and Portugal.

The Franco-Spanish Treaty of Fontaine-

bleau had dictated how Portugal was to be partitioned between the two

allies; the political settlement was a cover for the seizure of the Portu-

guese navy. On 2 November Napoleon ordered Decrés to assemble 200

naval officers for service at Lisbon.

Further orders were sent to Junot

on 8 November noting the Portuguese ports had been closed, but it was

not enough. Napoleon was increasingly concerned British troops would

arrive at Lisbon to thwart his plans.

On the 12

Napoleon wrote yet again to Junot, this time enclosing

‘a list of the naval officers who are under orders to join you’ and hop-

ing ‘in any case you will seize the Portuguese fleet’. Once Lisbon had

been occupied and the fleet seized 200 infantrymen were to be placed

on board each ship, the naval officers distributed throughout the fleet

while a battalion of naval gunners would arrive to man the guns. Na-

poleon wanted the Portuguese fleet readied for offensive operations

and Junot was to arm ‘such vessels as are fit for it, [to] keep the crews

on board at full strength, and provision them, so that I may have 7 or

8 battleships ready to sail anywhere’.

After being foiled at Copenha-

gen, Napoleon was desperate to acquire the Portuguese fleet. His aim

was to maintain a fleet in being of 111 warships, ready to threaten Brit-

ish interests in Ireland, Surinam, Brazil, Algiers, Tunis, Egypt, Sicily or

South America.

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While Napoleon expanded his plans, the political and diplomatic

situation in Lisbon in late October and early November continued to

degenerate. The populace of Lisbon, worried about the possible arrival

of a Royal Navy squadron and angry at the thought of the Regent desert-

ing them for Brazil, had begun to voice their opinions. Strangford was

also concerned some were urging a revolt against the ‘Traitor Prince’,

observing ‘alarm and confusion are every where visible’.

Strangford was

concerned Sousa’s dispatches had misinterpreted British policy and

hence the Portuguese Court were acting on inaccurate information about

British intentions.

The uncertainty lifted a little on 2 November when Strangford re-

ceived Canning’s dispatches of 22 October, detailing government policy

and the signing of the secret convention. Strangford thought the con-

vention would be ratified ‘but not in total’. The Portuguese Court would

not retire to Brazil unless French troops moved against Portugal and

the materialisation of this threat had been warded off by the closure of

the Ports – or so they believed. Also, although Araujo denied it, Strang-

ford believed Napoleon had made demands regarding the Portuguese

navy.

In a personal communication of the same day Strangford noted

Lima, recently arrived in Lisbon, had declared Napoleon ‘was resolved

on destroying the house of Braganza if the Prince did not…comply

with his demands to their full extent…[this] has produced the most

terrible consequences. It has awakened the Prince’s fear, and I fear,

destroyed all the courage which had been infused into him’. Although

the Prince Regent would probably flee on the appearance of a French

army, Strangford thought João believed there would be no French inva-

sion and hence his ships were not in any danger. The Portuguese ex-

pected a British naval force would confine itself to blockading the Ta-

gus. Strangford perceptively lamented to Canning that ‘this deceived

and misguided Sovereign seems not to be aware that the entire Penin-

sula is but as one country in the eyes of Bonaparte’. All this left Strang-

ford with the uneasy feeling the ‘conduct of this court is beginning to

assume a very suspicious appearance’.

The events of 6 November seemed to reinforce Strangford’s interpre-

tation of Portuguese policy. While attempting to enter the Tagus the brig

HMS Raven was fired upon by Portuguese batteries. This prompted a

nearby British privateer to capture a Portuguese ship. Strangford was

certain the Portuguese had fired first. Further evidence of Portuguese

hostility was provided by the implementation of an embargo on all Eng-

lish vessels in the Tagus. To this Strangford inquired if the Regent would

limit hostilities to the exclusion of British ships from the Tagus and was

told that depended on the future conduct of Britain. On 8 November

orders were circulated for the arrest of British nationals and the seizure

of their property while Araujo requested Strangford and Gambier collect

their passports and leave Lisbon. It was widely rumoured Spain would

shortly declare war on Portugal, although the Portuguese were convinced

the actions implemented against British commerce and warships would

placate the Spaniards.

Yet, despite all the apparent and highly visible hostility towards Brit-

ain, behind the scenes at a Council of State on 9 November the Regent

confirmed his determination to flee to Brazil. Strangford complained

there could be no certainty of the actions of the Regent as Portuguese

policy seemed to fluctuate wildly.

He seems to have missed the point,

for the Portuguese policy of appeasing France required apparent compli-

ance with French demands to prevent the occupation of the country and

the inevitable British assault on Lisbon which would follow – Copenha-

gen displaying the lengths to which Britain would go to prevent naval

forces falling into French hands. Appeasement would also avoid the

need to evacuate Lisbon leaving the kingdom at the mercy of French

forces. Hence Portuguese policy had a public face to appease France and

a private dimension, in which the Prince Regent could be a little more

candid about his intention to evacuate for Brazil. So while he assured

Britain the court would indeed flee should the French invade, the Regent

tried a desperate last attempt to buy off France sending Don Pedro-Jose-

Joaquim Vito de Menezes, Marquis of Mariovola, on a mission to Paris.

It was hoped Mariovola would convince Napoleon of the favourable

disposition of the Portuguese Court by offering him the chance to gain

control of the Portuguese throne without resorting to force. This would

be achieved by a marriage between the Bonapartes and the house of

Braganza. To sweeten the deal Mariovola was provided with Brazilian

diamonds to present to Napoleon; in the event Mariovola only ever got

as far as Madrid.

On 10 November Lisbon was thrown into near panic as a rumour

that France had declared war swept through the city. In fact, as already

noted, France had issued the declaration regarding Portugal on 22 Octo-

ber. Hence though Strangford only learned on 21 November this specific

rumour was unfounded and had been started by Araujo, the fact he was

unaware of the French declarations illustrates the lack of accurate intelli-

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gence in Lisbon upon which he could base his implementation of gov-

ernment policy.

By the time Strangford had confirmed it was just a

rumour, the tension in Lisbon had increased even further. For, as the

Portuguese became increasingly desperate to prevent an invasion from

French land forces, the possibility of the city becoming the scene of a

British attack increased with the arrival of Smith and his squadron of six

sail-of-the-line on 16 November. His force was strengthened by the arri-

val of two powerful ships the three-decked 110-gun Hibernia and the 80-

gun Foudroyant. Smith interpreted the Portuguese order to seize British

persons and property as evidence of ‘the distinct avowal on the part of

the Portuguese Government of the relinquishment of neutrality’. The

appointment of John Bell to perform the functions of ‘agent for British

prisoners of war’ confirmed Portuguese intentions.

Smith’s force was an imposing battle fleet sent to browbeat, or per-

haps bluff, the Portuguese into implementing the convention of 22 Octo-

ber. It was certainly of sufficient strength to allow the Portuguese to sur-

render with grace or provide an escort for the Portuguese fleet to Brazil

and it was certainly strong enough to defeat the Portuguese fleet, which

was twice the size of Smith’s force. There were, however, a number of

problems which quickly became evident to Smith. Although a strong

battle fleet, his squadron lacked bomb vessels and gun boats which, as the

attack on Copenhagen made patently clear, were essential in an amphibi-

ous assault. Secondly, as will be discussed below, he was also lacking

troops to conduct such an assault or at least to seize the Tagus forts. Fi-

nally, Smith did not have any sloops or brigs and only a single frigate;

hence his ability to send vessels into the Tagus to gain intelligence, com-

municate with Strangford or to enforce a blockade was seriously compro-

mised. On 17 November Smith had to utilise a local fishing vessel to send

his secretary, Mr Spence, up the Tagus. Spence discovered Strangford had

received his passports on 9

November. On the evening of 18 November,

accompanied by Spence, Strangford left Lisbon in the fishing vessel and

reached the squadron the following night. Gambier remained in the city

trying to obtain the release of British persons and property; in this he was

unsuccessful and he retired to the squadron.

The Russian Mediterranean Fleet

There was another issue to complicate matters. Ministers in London

were becoming increasingly worried over the actions of the Russian

Mediterranean fleet and the potential for Russo-Portuguese or Franco-

Russian co-operation at Lisbon. In 1780, during the American War of

Independence, a Russian squadron had entered the Tagus and, recognis-

ing the strategic importance of Lisbon, made an unsuccessful request to

utilise the city as a base for operations in the Mediterranean. The Rus-

sians had also successfully lobbied the Portuguese to join the League of

Armed Neutrality in 1782.

At Tilsit Russia had ceded her key Mediterranean bases in the Ionian

Islands to France removing the necessary facilities to project maritime

power in the region and leaving the Russian Mediterranean Fleet isolated

and exposed. The two possible routes back to a friendly port for the

Russian Admiral Seniavin were both dangerous. He could not enter the

Black Sea without forcing the Dardanelles (and Duckworth’s failure pro-

vided a recent example of how difficult that would be) while to return to

the Baltic involved sailing the length of the Mediterranean, passing the

Gut at Gibraltar, before transiting the English Channel. With the Turks

hostile in the east and the Royal Navy prevalent in the west, finding a

neutral port was perhaps the best Seniavin could hope for. British Minis-

ters were aware Seniavin was sailing through the Mediterranean, possibly

headed for the Baltic, but were unsure of his orders and intentions. With

Russia taking a pro-French stance at Tilsit and rumours of the formation

of a maritime confederacy aimed at Britain, the movements of Seniavin’s

fleet combined with French demands on Portugal all added up to rather

sinister circumstances. In September Collingwood, shadowing the Rus-

sian fleet, thought Seniavin had been ordered to surrender his ships to

France and accordingly informed Purvis of their movements. But, as

Collingwood informed Mulgrave, contact between the British and Rus-

sian fleets ‘to the last hour of their being with us, was perfectly friendly’.

The Russian officers had ‘lamented the misfortune that had befallen their

Country….they had no suspicion of any hostile intention of their court

towards us’.

Collingwood had considered the possibility of Franco-Russian opera-

tions aimed at Sicily but with Seniavin heading west it appeared more

likely the Russian fleet might be acting in concert with the French forces

destined for Lisbon, or to join with the Franco-Spanish fleet in Cadiz

(though Hawkesbury’s concerns the Russians may combine with French

forces for an attack on India were, perhaps, less likely). On 5 November

Canning, angry at the Russian handover of the Ionian Islands to France,

pressed upon Hawkesbury the importance of taking ‘provisional, precau-

tionary and amicable possession of the Russian fleet….What Russia has

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actually done in the Mediterranean [giving up the Ionian Islands to

France] is quite enough to justify this measure if we chose to take it as a

measure of war’.

On 13 November 1807 Canning received confirmation of measures

‘adopted by the Court of St. Petersburg for the purpose of forming a

Maritime Confederacy against this Country’. Russia would unite with

France and had proposed to Sweden to join against Britain ‘on the prin-

ciples of 1780 and 1800’.

Canning now wanted to intercept the Russian

Mediterranean fleet and to convey it to a British port, stressing to Chat-

ham it was ‘impossible that we should let the Russian fleet which is now

returning from the Mediterranean to proceed either into the Baltic, or to

any port of the enemy’.

Canning had received intelligence from Purvis of a Russian frigate

arriving at Gibraltar and announcing the imminent appearance of the

remainder of the fleet. The captain of this frigate informed Purvis that

Seniavin hoped to winter at Portsmouth. Taking this new development

into consideration, Canning determined not to actually intercept the fleet

unless it attempted to pass Portsmouth and head for the Baltic. The Czar

had, however, refused an offer to winter the fleet in Portsmouth and

Seniavin would find it difficult to head for the Baltic due to the advanced

stage of the year. Canning informed the Admiralty if Seniavin tried to

enter an enemy port he was to be warned off ‘and in case of an attempt

to force such entrance’ it should be ‘oppose[d] by force’.

These orders

were despatched to Smith on 14 November.

Canning, discussing his plan with Chatham, wanted to ‘assemble a

sufficient force to overpower them [Seniavin’s fleet], as soon as they

shall have passed Portsmouth, and to bring them by persuasion, or by

force if necessary, into a port of Great Britain’.

In reply Chatham

thought the Russians intended to put into Lisbon or a French or Spanish

port.

Portland supported these moves, admitting to Canning on 13

November the ‘measure proposed of bringing Admiral Seniavin’s fleet

into a British port has so often entered my thoughts, that I have no hesi-

tation in continuing in it’. He was convinced ‘if properly represented it

will not injure our interests in the feelings or opinions of the Russian

nation’. In another letter of the same date he mooted ‘holding Seniavin

and his fleet as a deposit until the Russian government reverts to its ante-

rior system of politiks’.

Uncertainty over the actions of the Russian fleet lifted a little on 16

November when Smith found four 80s, four 74s, one 64, one 44 and a

32 gun transport, sheltering in the Tagus (see Appendix IV). Seniavin

had passed Malta on 7 October with orders to join the French ships at

Cadiz but, after passing Purvis at Gibraltar, had headed for the Atlantic.

His fleet had then been scattered by a gale and his ships entered the Ta-

gus in an ad hoc manner between 10 and 17 November where the Portu-

guese offered assistance to his somewhat battered fleet.

It was reported

the squadron intended to winter in Lisbon but Smith was suspicious of

Russian intentions and was ‘anxious for precise instructions how to act’

from the Admiralty. A second force (two 80s, two 74s, a 36-gun frigate

and a 20-gun sloop) was rumoured to be approaching Lisbon from Gi-

braltar and Smith had already warned off a Russian frigate from entering

the Tagus. He concluded it was ‘not unlikely that they may combine with

the Portuguese navy and cooperate with it in endeavouring [sic] to op-

pose His Majesty’s forces in their efforts to attain the objects for which

they were sent’.

This intelligence arrived in London on 25 November and appeared to

confirm British fears Seniavin’s movements were timed to coincide with

the expected arrival of French troops. Next day Canning ordered Smith

should ‘forcibly detain’ the Portuguese and Russian ships if they tried to

put to sea and wanted the Royal Navy squadron reinforced to make it

‘fully equal to the combined Russian and Portuguese squadrons’, which

on paper made a total of 22 ships-of-the-line. He also urged Smith

should prevent any other ships entering the Tagus.

British concerns over Russian policy reached new heights on the

morning of 2 December when Sir Robert Wilson arrived in London with

dispatches from St. Petersburg containing a formal declaration of war on

Britain. Horward has dramatically argued once the British government

received this declaration ‘the Lords of the Admiralty began working on

plans to capture the Russian squadron at Lisbon’; yet, as we have seen,

such action had already been discussed within the cabinet.

In response

to the declaration a Russian frigate lying off Portsmouth was immedi-

ately seized; Canning quipping to Camden he hoped ‘Seniavin would be

so good as to come to Portsmouth to look for it’. Chatham thought

Seniavin never intended to head for Portsmouth and was optimistic if

‘he quits Lisbon for any other destination, I do not conceive he has

much chance of success, in his undertaking’.

Portland raised the diffi-

culties of dealing with this force if it left the Tagus: ‘is it not a question,

and one that will not admit of a moments delay, whether it should not be

taken possession of?’ By 4 December he had ‘a prodigious asking to get

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hold of Seniavins fleet. The court of Lisbon can not be in a more desper-

ate plight than they are at present’.

With the Cabinet resolved to implement hostile measures against the

Russian fleet in the Tagus, Mulgrave raised the question of the command

of British naval forces off Portugal. Writing to the King he recognised

‘the character of that service has so materially changed by the arrival of

the Russian squadron’. With the desire of the cabinet to increase the

blockading force Mulgrave wanted to send an officer senior to Smith out

to take command. He recommended Sir Charles Cotton, Vice Admiral

of the Red.

The choice of Cotton has met approval from contemporaries and

historians alike.

In November 1807 his good friend Collingwood had

heard many rumours Cotton was to go to the Baltic or America.

Mul-

grave had actually offered Cotton provisional command of the Copenha-

gen force in early July if a more senior admiral refused, but Cotton had

already turned down several commands in 1807 due to ill health; it seems

the Baltic command would have come too soon into his convalescence.

Also, the force destined for the Baltic operation grew so large as to re-

quire an officer senior to Cotton. Nevertheless, his professional handling

of this unusual offer and his conduct in the discussion seems to have

impressed Mulgrave who informed the King that Cotton was an ‘officer

highly qualified to discharge the duties of that command’ off Portugal

and this doubtless appealed to the King who highly approved of the

choice.

On 4 December, Cotton was appointed ‘Commander in Chief

of a squadron of his Majesty’s ships and vessels employed on the coast

of Portugal’.

Plans to Attack Lisbon

Meanwhile Castlereagh, now recovered and back at the War Office,

informed Spencer he was to proceed to Lisbon and place himself under

Moore’s command. Spencer’s force would be used for ‘securing, and

carrying from Lisbon the Prince Regent and Royal family of Portugal, or

for bringing off the Portuguese and Russian navy’. If this was impossi-

ble the Portuguese and Russian ships were to be destroyed. Spencer was

specifically instructed not to land his force unless the Tagus forts were

given up to him or if they could be seized with the minimum of effort.

If Moore’s force was strong enough to execute the tasks then Spencer

was to reinforce Sicily.

Moore had already turned his thoughts to the

Russian ships, which had passed Sicily while he had been on the island.

In response to their ambiguous conduct he had directed they should not

be permitted to enter any of the ports of Sicily where British troops

were stationed.

Castlereagh now informed Moore of the ‘recent con-

duct of the Court of Russia, in renouncing all connexion with His Maj-

esty’, therefore, ‘the capture of the Russian fleet in the Tagus is to be

considered as one of the principal objects to which you are to direct

your exertions’.

Evidently a conversation had taken place between Captain George

McKinley and William Wellesley-Pole, Secretary to the Admiralty, on 5

December regarding the actual practicalities involved in such a project.

McKinley had gained first hand experience of the Tagus forts while with

St. Vincent’s fleet in 1806. He wrote to Pole on 7 December: ‘Agreeably

to your directions I have the honour of stating to you the observations I

have been able to make relative to the destroying or annoying the En-

emy’s ships in the River Tagus’. McKinley immediately ruled out a sug-

gestion from Pole regarding fire-ships. If the Portuguese and Russian

ships were anchored at Belem, with the strong tide and winds, they were

too distant for such an attack. McKinley thought the forts guarding the

entrance to the Tagus ‘strong and well situated to command the entrance

of the river as to prevent the fleet from proceeding to attack’. When

McKinley had left the Tagus in October 1806 he thought an attack on

Cascais had been possible ‘with sea forces, having a strong body of

troops ready to land in a very fine bay’. This force could then march on

to fort St. Julien ‘which is not fortified on the land side, nor either is

Cascaes fort or any of the forts within St. Julien’s and they are all com-

manded by hills very near them’. These views reinforced the necessity of

devoting a substantial land component to seize the forts as a precursor

to any naval operations in the Tagus. McKinley offered to head for Lis-

bon to take part in any attack, emphasising the significance of his local

knowledge.

McKinley also confirmed the belief Lisbon was vulnerable to mari-

time blockade. During his time there in 1806:

…[a] great number of ships entered the Tagus from the Mediterra-

nean and Baltic laden with grain and many from the Western Is-

lands with pulse, none of which was ever sent from Lisbon again,

which corroborates every information I could ever receive that

Lisbon even after a good harvest could not ensure more than five

months provision.

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He was convinced ‘no port or coast can be more easily or closely block-

aded than Lisbon and Portugal’. He envisaged a loose blockade; the ma-

jority of the ships would never have ‘any occasion to be nearer the Rock

of Lisbon than ten or twelve leagues’. This would provide the fleet with

sufficient seaway ‘against a heavy gale of Westerly wind’ which would

blow the fleet towards the dangerous Catchops and the shore. With a

frigate and several smaller vessels stationed in the bay closer to Lisbon,

the fleet would be in a position ‘to reach in three or four leagues to the

Northward of the Rock, and communication kept up between them and

a frigate and smaller vessels stationed in the bay’. McKinley was con-

vinced enemy fleets would ‘never attempt to come out in the night and it

very seldom occurs that they can come out against the flood in the day’.

More likely, thought McKinley, would be an attempt at dawn ‘at the first

of the ebb’. If northerly gales buffeted the blockading squadron ‘the bay

of Lisbon will afford shelter to our fleet without the range of shells, and

lye in smooth water and good holding ground’. A single frigate, sup-

ported by a sloop and two smaller vessels, stationed between the Rock of

Lisbon and Cape Espichel, would ‘effectually stop all supplies from en-

tering the Tagus’. To prevent supplies entering St. Ubes, two small cruis-

ers could be stationed to the south of Espichel. Another pair of small

cruisers should be stationed between the Burlings and Peniche with two

more ‘off Cape Mondego and three off Oporto and its vicinity and a

frigate to range the coast’. With such force distributed, McKinley argued,

the coast of Portugal would be blockaded effectively.

Two days after McKinley submitted his report the Admiralty for-

warded further orders to Cotton. After arriving off the Tagus he was to

assume command and take the Hibernia as his flagship. Smith was to

‘hoist his flag on board such other one of the ships under your com-

mand as he shall fix upon’. Cotton was informed of the Franco-Russian

alliance and the arrival in the Tagus of the Russian squadron. New or-

ders, taking into account all these changes, had also been forwarded to

Smith requiring him to seize ‘all Russian ships of war and merchant

ships’.

There remained a possibility the Russian squadron might try to forci-

bly prevent a Portuguese evacuation. In this situation Cotton was to first

demand possession of the principal forts necessary for the safe passage

of his squadron up river ‘for the purpose of attacking the Russian squad-

ron, and conveying the Portuguese fleet out of the Tagus’. If the Portu-

guese fleet attempted to put to sea ‘in company with the Russian squad-