Robson Martin. Britain, Portugal and South America in the Napoleonic Wars: Alliances and Diplomacy in Economic Maritime Conflict (ENG)

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The Portland Cabinet had not been responsible for the British expedi-

tions that had met with repulse and humiliation at Buenos Ayres and

Constantinople - yet they had to deal with the fallout. Where they could

claim credit for the successful exercise of British maritime power, the

Cabinet’s swift and decisive action at Copenhagen, it had provoked con-

siderable anger across Europe. The operation to evacuate Lisbon had

also been a success, but had illustrated the limitations of pure naval

forces acting alone. Despite the success at Copenhagen and Lisbon, his-

torians agree the wider strategic situation remained pretty bleak.

With

Austria and Prussia out of the war, Russia allied with France, Portugal

occupied by Junot and Spain falling under gradual French control, Brit-

ain’s only remaining European allies were Sweden and Sicily. Hence,

there was little chance of any of the major European powers facing up to

French control of western and central Europe.

All this left Britain, Rich-

mond succinctly argues, ‘practically singlehanded in the great struggle’.

Now in possession of a central strategic position at Lisbon and with

naval forces at Cadiz, Napoleon could potentially utilise his 80 sail-of-the-

line, currently collected in various ports along the European coastline, for

a number of objects. Access to both Iberian ports might solve the age-old

French problem of dividing their naval forces between Atlantic and

Mediterranean fleets and therefore serve as the assembly points for the

collection of sizeable fleet concentrations. Lisbon and Cadiz were the

traditional maritime gateways to South America and hence the threat of

French and Spanish maritime intervention in that region was enhanced.

Napoleon might use also naval forces to launch an invasion of the British

Isles, or for an offensive thrust into the Mediterranean. Finally, and un-

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derlying all the above, while France and Spain retained naval forces there

was the danger they would take Napoleon’s Continental Blockade to the

logical next level by attacking British commerce overseas, and French

access to Lisbon and Cadiz, both adjacent to the vital trade routes to the

West and East Indies and South America, posed an acute threat.

The danger posed by French naval forces moved from the theory to

reality in early 1808 when, taking advantage of a gale which blew the

blockading Royal Navy squadron off station, the Rochefort squadron

under Admiral Allemand put to sea and entered the Mediterranean with

five ships-of-the-line. On his way to Toulon, where he anchored on 6

February, Allemand seized one Portuguese and six British merchant

ships. Now falling under the command of Admiral Ganteaume, a squad-

ron of ten ships-of-the-line, three frigates, two corvettes and seven

armed transports carrying munitions, provisions and French troops set

sail on 7 February. Just over two weeks later on 23 February Ganteaume

arrived off Corfu (handed over to France by Russia at Tilsit) and landed

the reinforcements and stores. With his departure delayed by contrary

weather, Ganteaume hauled anchor on 23 March and, sailing by Sicily

and the North African coastline, anchored in the safety of Toulon har-

bour on 10 April. Collingwood had given chase but for a number of

reasons, including poor weather and the failure of his frigates to pass

timely intelligence, had missed the opportunity to catch Ganteaume.

Although Collingwood deeply regretted not bringing Ganteaume to bat-

tle he was at least satisfied his enemy had not achieved much of note.

During these years of isolation and faced with resurgent French naval

activity and the economic effects of the Continental blockade, Britain

reacted to, rather than shaped, events. Yet, in reacting, ministers in Lon-

don did have a coherent response: they would continue to wage an all-

out maritime war for national survival.

In this sense the value to Britain of the successful operations at Co-

penhagen and Lisbon now became patently clear. French naval plans had

to be neutralised by the continued blockade of enemy ports. The re-

moval of Danish and Portuguese ships added little to the capabilities of

the Royal Navy but did damage Napoleon’s plans for naval aggrandise-

ment. Moreover, removing the threat at source also removed the require-

ment for a Royal Navy blockading force, thereby freeing up naval re-

sources for other operations. Where there were enemy naval forces, such

as at Lisbon with the arrival of the Russian ships and at Cadiz and a

number of other ports, French and Spanish naval forces would be block-

aded thereby protecting the flow of British overseas trade which was

vital to the British economy and war effort. But, as we have seen with

Allemand’s escape from Rochefort and Ganteaume’s cruise into the

Mediterranean, the system was not infallible. Hence there was the re-

quirement to hunt down enemy naval forces when they managed to put

to sea, as indeed Collingwood had done. Although Collingwood had

failed to bring Ganteaume to battle his pursuit pressurised the latter into

returning to Toulon without causing much material damage to British

interests. After Trafalgar Britain was certainly dominant at sea but the

Royal Navy did not always have everything its own way. It was not a

complete ‘command of the sea’; instead British naval power provided a

workable command of the sea (based on battle, blockade and denying

France additional naval power) as a means to an end. This allowed exist-

ing British trade to prosper and provided the security to open up new

markets thereby maintaining the economic well being of the nation.

The Royal Navy also provided the means for maritime expeditionary

warfare and here ministers found a more vexing problem, for collecting

enough troops together to provide the land contingent to react to strate-

gic necessities was problematic. In early 1808, thanks to Castlereagh’s

reorganisation of British strategic commitments, a body of troops were

available for overseas operations. On 1 February he noted an extra

22,000 men could be added to those available for military operations. He

now wanted a rapid reaction force totalling 30,000 men with sufficient

transports to be based at Cork, the Downs, Harwich and Portsmouth.

Out of this total, a force of 10,000 men would be reserved for overseas

service. Castlereagh assured his colleagues he would not release any

transport tonnage until the Cabinet had decided on a strategy for the

coming year.

This, of course, was the key issue as the strategic options for ministers

were extremely limited, hence British maritime expeditionary warfare,

combining both land and seapower, would be limited to restricting the

spread of French power on the periphery of Europe.

The problem with

this strategy was that the key partners, Sweden in the Baltic and Sicily in

the Mediterranean, were both lightweight compared to the military might

of France. It could be argued they were both in fact security risks to Brit-

ain as they required British money, ships and troops for protection.

Supporting any state that opposed France was, however, important to

Britain for as Castlereagh recognised ‘our character is most deeply in-

volved in not abandoning Sweden in favor of separate objects’. ‘What

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was at stake’, Muir and Esdaile have noted, ‘was Britain’s very credibility

as an ally’.

In the Baltic the first commitment was financial as Gustavus IV of

Sweden was paid £1.2 million to continue fighting France. But support-

ing Sweden had further problems, for not only was Gustavus mentally

unstable but Britain risked incurring greater hostility from Russia. The

situation between Gustavus and Russia degenerated into a Russo-

Swedish war in February. The second British commitment was a squad-

ron under Admiral James Saumarez sent to the Baltic on 20 February to

protect Sweden, though he was delayed in sailing until 24 April.

The

reason for the delay was the addition of 10,000 troops under Sir John

Moore who, it was hoped, could garrison Gothenburg freeing Swedish

troops to undertake operations against the Russians and hence avoiding

direct Anglo-Russian military conflict. Moore was specifically ordered

not to operate under Swedish command. Yet, at the same time Saumarez

was sent further instructions confirming that whilst his main object was

to help defend Sweden, he was also to seriously investigate the possibility

of destroying the Russian Baltic fleet based at Kronstadt to prevent

France utilising this naval force.

The implementation of the Baltic expedition was a disaster. Saumarez

arrived off Gothenburg on 7 May with Moore joining him ten days later.

Moore clashed with Gustavus over the employment of the British expe-

dition leading to Gustavus ordering Moore’s arrest; the latter evaded

capture to return to England with his force. The fundamental problem

was ministers were unsure of how to deal with Sweden and Gustavus. As

an advocate of war with France Gustavus was potentially a useful ally,

but this opened up the problem of further antagonising Russia as re-

flected in the orders sent to the respective British commanders. As Hall

has argued, ‘Britain’s Baltic strategy was falling between two stools’,

Moore could not fight the Russian land forces but Saumarez could en-

gage the Russian fleet. The removal of Moore’s force from the Baltic

signalled an end to offensive operations in the region. For the remainder

of the year British activity would be restricted to naval operations by

Saumarez’s squadron.

To the south, British strategy in the Mediterranean would also be

defensive for on the last day of 1807 Castlereagh had concluded ‘the

present state of the continent, is strongly against undertaking any offen-

sive operations in that quarter’.

Sicily again remained at the forefront of

strategic thinking in January though Castlereagh noted with troops re-

quired for other operations the garrison would be limited to 16,000

men.

Collingwood, off Syracuse in February, voiced his concerns re-

garding French activity on the mainland which pointed to a possible

attack. Collingwood also drew attention to the very poor state of the

Neapolitan forces on Sicily.

Throughout early 1808 the Cabinet re-

mained worried about the French threat and considered reinforcing the

island but the Sicily garrison remained constant (numbering 16,185 effec-

tives on 1 April).

Certainly, as recent events had shown, Napoleon cov-

eted Sicily but his plans for conquest were delayed as he looked to the

East and the Ottoman Empire.

Yet, garrisoning the island and provid-

ing naval protection to deter a French invasion was a necessary burden

for Britain as Sicily, and indeed Malta, were essential to projecting mari-

time power in the western and eastern Mediterranean.

Further to the west there remained unresolved issues in Iberia. Accu-

rate intelligence from Spain was at a premium and at least one attempt

was made to introduce a British agent, James Burke, into the Spanish

court at Madrid.

Spain had certainly supported the French invasion of

Portugal as agreed in the Treaty of Fontainebleau, but was uneasy about

the presence of French troops in Portugal and those poised at Bayonne.

Yet, the Spanish government’s apparent willingness to turn against

France, most recently displayed in 1806, left room for long term opti-

mism on the part of British ministers.

What they knew only too well,

however, was while Spain was an ally of France there remained a naval

threat in the region. A French squadron of five sail-of-the-line, Neptune

(80), Algésiras, Argonaute, Héros, Pluton (74s), with the Cornélie frigate and a

brig corvette, were still blockaded in Cadiz by Rear Admiral Purvis.

While Cadiz was uppermost in ministers minds Spanish naval forces at

Ferrol, Vigo and Cartagena were also kept under blockade.

One of Castlereagh’s pet schemes was for an attack on the Spanish

fortress of Cueta in Morocco, a plan already considered the previous

year. Cueta dominated the Barbary coast, a vital source of victuals for the

Royal Navy squadrons blockading Cadiz and Lisbon. On 29 December

1807 he wanted ‘a discretionary instruction’ sent to Moore to attack

Cueta if on arriving at Gibraltar he found his force was not required at

Lisbon. Ministers were already planning an operation in the River Plate

(see Chapter 11) and the force for this service would be sufficient to

reduce Cueta on the way to South America if Moore could not seize the

fortress.

Spencer’s force, originally destined for Sicily via Lisbon and

which had been delayed in sailing, was also now available for operations.

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Castlereagh thought French forces in Spain might attack Gibraltar or

Cueta and hoped Spencer could make a swift, decisive pre-emptive at-

tack on the latter, garrison the fortress and proceed to Sicily. If Spencer

found the fortress too strong he was to proceed to Gibraltar where min-

isters hoped to base a strategic reserve of 9,000 men. On his way to

Cueta, Spencer was to call in at the Tagus and examine whether his force

was sufficient to occupy the Tagus forts ‘to facilitate the entrance of His

Majesty’s fleet with a view to the capture of the Russian squadron, to-

gether with the remaining ships of the Portuguese navy’.

By 30 January

Castlereagh had added Port Mahon, Minorca, to the list of objects that

Spencer was to examine. It was also made clear to Spencer that he was to

position his forces to allow them to be withdrawn and redeployed on

another service.

The Blockade of Lisbon

There remained unfinished business at Lisbon, for having succeeded in

‘persuading’ the Regent to sail for Brazil with his fleet British ministers

were still faced with a threat in the Tagus.

The presence of Seniavin’s

Russian ships in the river seemed a suspicious event perhaps designed to

coincide with the arrival of the French. It was widely believed Junot had

been expected to utilise the naval forces at Lisbon to make a landing in

south-west Ireland, repeating the achievement of 1796 when the Brest

fleet of 17 ships-of-the-line and 13 frigates had actually managed to

transport 18,000 French troops to Bantry Bay but could not land them

due to poor weather. In early 1808 it was believed a repeat of this project

had been deferred due to the failure of Junot’s force to capture the Por-

tuguese ships in the Tagus.

In fact, as we have already seen, Napoleon

did have plans to utilise the naval forces in Lisbon for offensive opera-

tions hence Sir Charles Cotton would continue the blockade instigated

by Smith throughout 1808. The blockade of Lisbon was a vital part of

British strategy; neutralising French maritime forces in Europe allowed

the Royal Navy a free hand in projecting British maritime power on a

global scale.

In late 1807 Canning had ordered the Admiralty to increase Smith’s

force to match the combined strength of the Portuguese and Russian

fleets. After the Portuguese had evacuated Lisbon Smith divided his

force to continue the blockade and to provide a safe escort for the Por-

tuguese royal family. With a diminished fleet in late December 1807

Smith had been ordered, in his own words, ‘to seize and send into port

all Russian ships of war and merchant vessels’.

Reinforcements were on

the way. On 11 December 1807, before the news of the successful

evacuation of Lisbon arrived in England, Cotton hoisted his flag at Spit-

head on the Minotaur (74) and took in with him the Antelope (50) and

Nautilus (18) sloop. His force was increased by the frigate Nymphe (36)

and Milbrook schooner (12) on 19 December. On the following day this

fleet, convoying 62 transports containing Spencer’s troops, finally put to

sea.

Unfortunately, the fleet was hit by a gale on 28 December and

completely scattered, Cotton himself heading for Falmouth.

On 7 Janu-

ary 1808 he received the Admiralty’s instructions of 28 December in-

cluding a copy of Strangford’s letter detailing the arrival of the Russian

squadron in the Tagus and a report intimating the Russians may be short

of provisions.

Two days later he received a duplicate of the Admiralty’s

orders of 1 January detailing him to secure or destroy the Russian ships.

Cotton received further orders on 9 January instructing him to take pos-

session of the Burlings Islands, several fortified islets lying off Peniche,

and to garrison them from his squadron.

Cotton did not put to sea again until 10 January, nearly a month after

he had received the Admiralty’s original orders. After a swift passage he

arrived off the coast of Portugal on 14 January, joining Smith at the

mouth of the Tagus the next day. In addition to the Hibernia, Foudroyant,

Ganges, Conqueror, Plantagenet, Minotaur, Nymphe, and the Talbot, the Defence

and Alfred (both 74s), and Agamemmon and Ruby (both 64s) strengthened

the squadron. Cotton forwarded to the Admiralty a list of the Russian

ships in the Tagus on 17 November 1807. On this date Admiral Senia-

vin’s force comprised four 80s, four 74s, one 64, and two frigates. An

additional squadron of two 80s, two 74s with a frigate and a sloop were

expected to arrive off the Tagus after passing Gibraltar. With the French

in possession of the Tagus forts Cotton’s squadron was not strong

enough to force the river, and his actions would have to be confined to

blockade.

As the senior officer in the fleet, Cotton shifted his flag into the

Hibernia. Smith remained with the squadron contrary to his orders to

escort the Portuguese court to Brazil, a decision the Admiralty later ap-

proved. Cotton now had to find Smith a suitable ship and the ‘ensuing

friction’ between the two men led to ‘outright disagreement’ over the

condition of the ships in the squadron. Smith initially moved into the

Minotaur but she was in need of repair, and he thought wholly unfit for

his rank. On 18 January a gale further damaged the Minotaur and Smith

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moved into the Foudroyant, taking the ship to Gibraltar in late January

for repairs.

Krajeski has criticised Smith for ignoring orders when it

suited him and that some ‘of his actions while off Portugal implied that

he wanted to reap the credit for what had transpired there since No-

vember’.

Certainly, one admiral was enough for a squadron of this

size.

There remained a distinct possibility of naval action in the Tagus. On

24 January the Russian squadron was moored and fitting out for sea,

though it was not yet ready to come out of the Tagus.

According to

Foy when Junot arrived these ships were actually moored in order of

battle behind the bar but there was little cooperation between the sup-

posed allies; ‘Seniavin was a Muscovite of the old stamp, who spoke no

language but that of his country. His officers loudly censured what they

called the infatuation of their Emperor for Napoleon’. Of the 20 Portu-

guese ships left behind, in the best condition and soon fitted out for

service were the Vasco de Gama and the Maria the First, three frigates, and

seven lesser vessels. Such preparations were, however, hampered by the

exhaustion of naval stores to fit out the fleet that had sailed for Brazil

and the evacuation of the majority of sailors and officers with the Re-

gent. Despite the non-cooperation of the Russians and the problems

with the Portuguese ships, Junot succeeded in organising ‘a small squad-

ron, which, though not capable of venturing to sea, assisted in prevent-

ing the English from forcing the bar of Lisbon’.

In this situation Cot-

ton objected to the Admiralty instructions to send three ships onto Pur-

vis Cadiz, instead keeping his fleet together off Lisbon.

Plans for a Maritime Convention

Alongside the naval blockade to neutralise Junot’s force and the Russian

ships in the Tagus, there was a plan to put certain proposals to Seniavin,

Junot and the Portuguese Regency Council (comprising five nobles pre-

sided over by the Marquis of Abrantes), left behind by the Prince Regent

to govern Portugal in his absence. Schneer has argued these plans were

at the core of the Convention of Cintra, which would later cause so

much controversy in Britain.

At Cintra, Junot’s army would be granted

the same rights as were offered in these earlier plans to the Russian fleet

in the Tagus. The details of this scheme were later raised in the House of

Commons during February 1809 with regard to the Convention of Cin-

tra. Lord Henry Petty stated:

It appears that so late as the year 1807, it had been suggested by

Lord Strangford, that it might be possible to reduce the Russian

fleet by blockade, to such a state as would in all probability lead to

a maritime convention. This was followed up by a letter from the

Admiralty to Sir C. Cotton, authorising him to conclude a maritime

convention upon the terms in which this convention was con-

cluded.

As Schneer argued, ‘no one knew that the much criticized treaty con-

cluded with the Russians had been authorised in Whitehall nine months

before’ the signing of the Convention.

The plan, as developed by Canning, was actually a response to intima-

tions from Strangford and Sousa. They surmised, as had Campbell in

1804 and McKinley in late 1807, that a blockade of the Tagus would

cause great distress in Lisbon. Portugal was an importer of foodstuffs, in

particular African and American grain, fish from Newfoundland and

meat from the Azores. All of this trade could be stopped by a British

blockade. On 25 December 1807 Canning outlined to Castlereagh cer-

tain proposals to be put to Junot and Seniavin. The first argued the dis-

tress in Lisbon could be alleviated by relaxing the blockade ‘on condition

of the French General consenting to withdraw his army from Lisbon’.

The blockade might be suspended altogether ‘on condition of the

French evacuating Portugal’. Although Canning was ‘without any very

sanguine hope of the success of any such proposal’, he thought Cotton

‘should be instructed to make this conditional proposal – either to the

Regency of Portugal, or directly to the French General’.

Relying on information from Strangford, Canning wrote to Castler-

eagh suggesting ‘a proposal for the surrender of that fleet upon honour-

able conditions might be listened to by the Russian Admiral’ due to the

privations of the blockade. If the fleet was surrendered ‘the officers and

men shall not be considered as prisoners of war – but shall be conveyed

to Russia by the earliest opportunity, at the expense of Great Britain’.

Horward has argued Cotton received a secret dispatch from the Admi-

ralty containing Strangford’s report and was instructed to open commu-

nication with Seniavin.

Similarly Krajeski has emphasised Cotton re-

ceived ‘several dispatches from the Russian minister in London ad-

dressed to Seniavin and for the Russian minister in Lisbon’, and he used

these as a ‘pretext for opening communication’.

In fact, as would be

expected in a parliamentary government, this plan had been outlined by

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Canning in London. He believed the French would not allow Cotton to

communicate with the Russian fleet and therefore forwarded the dis-

patches mentioned in the Admiralty instruction to Cotton to be con-

veyed to the Admiral who could then pass them to Seniavin under a flag

of truce.

In a third letter of 25 December, Canning responded to a representa-

tion from Sousa claiming there would be a great number of Portuguese

persons, many of them officers and men of the Portuguese army, who

would wish to flee to Brazil if the opportunity arose. All they needed was

transportation. Canning wanted transports stationed off Porto or Viana

in the north and Lagos in the south, for the purpose of carrying off any

Portuguese who wished to emigrate. Sousa had drawn up a proclama-

tion, which he hoped would be distributed along the coastline of Portu-

gal to inspire the inhabitants to leave the mother country and head for

the new seat of government in Brazil. Canning forwarded this proclama-

tion to Castlereagh to convey onto Cotton.

After consulting the King, it was left to Castlereagh to forward two

separate communications to the Admiralty with regard to the first two of

these proposals.

On 28 December, secret instructions were transmitted

from the Admiralty to Cotton:

The Rt Honble Lord Castlereagh, one of His Majesty’s principal

secretaries of State, having transmitted to us an extract of a letter

to His Lordship from Mr Secretary Canning, suggesting in conse-

quence of information received from Lord Strangford a mode of

procuring the surrender of the Russian fleet to His Majesty, and his

Lordship having at the same signifies to us His Majesty’s pleasure

that we should issue such orders as we might think most likely to

effect this desireable object, We transmit to you herewith a Tran-

script of the extract of Mr Secretary Canning’s letter above referred

to, and do hereby require and direct you to take such measures as

you may judge most proper towards carrying His Majesty’s pleas-

ure on this subject into execution.

On 29 December the Admiralty expanded on the initial orders sent out

to Cotton:

…the delivery of the accompanying Packets (which were received

from Mr Alopeus, the Russian minister at this court by Mr Secre-