Robson Martin. Britain, Portugal and South America in the Napoleonic Wars: Alliances and Diplomacy in Economic Maritime Conflict (ENG)

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squadron but captured by the French would be imprisoned for at least

six months and possibly face the death penalty. These terms would be

applied to persons either assisting others to leave Lisbon or inciting re-

volt among the populace. Hence Cotton remarked on 16 May there had

been very few refugees arriving at fleet during the preceding three weeks.

Such measures implemented by Junot could have prevented Cotton from

gaining any independent knowledge of events in Lisbon or opening up a

communication with the French or Portuguese. Yet, as Harriot Slessor

noted, the lure of a ‘good fee’ ensured there was some information

passed between the Portuguese and the British fleet.

The aggressive blockade continued. On the evening of 23 April an

attack by ships boats from Nymphe and the Blossom (18) was launched

upon the Garrota brig corvette under the command of Lieutenant

Lebland-Plasson. This was a 20-gun vessel manned by 150 Frenchmen

and now lying above Belem. Two previous attempts had not even

reached the brig and now, approaching with 150 men in eight boats,

Captain Conway Shipley of the Nymphe had decided to personally lead

the attack. Pulling against the tide, Shipley found the Garrota to be addi-

tionally defended by a floating battery of 24pdrs. The British force

boarded the French vessel only to be repulsed as Shipley was killed. Sev-

eral of the British boats fell foul of each other in the confusion that fol-

lowed the loss of their commander as fire from the floating battery and

the guns in the fort of Belem killed two and wounded another two mem-

bers of the attacking party. The boats retreated to their ships.

The gun-brig Cheery (12) arrived off the Tagus on 27 April carrying

the important instructions Castlereagh had forwarded to the Admiralty.

Cotton was ‘immediately to open a communication by a flag of truce

with the existing government at Lisbon’. Communication was to be

made with the civil government, the Portuguese military commander,

Seniavin and Junot. In the light of the recent French edict Cotton was

not optimistic about the feasibility of contacting the French and Russians

or even the populace of Lisbon. Cotton, like Smith in November 1807,

decided to use Portuguese fishing vessels as a means to contact all the

groups mentioned except the French command. He was pessimistic

about the chances of success noting ‘there is nothing like any authority

existing in Lisbon either civil or military, but what is immediately under

the command of General Junot’. Cotton decided to distribute a procla-

mation throughout Lisbon, which would allow him to judge the disposi-

tion of the parties. According to Krajeski he wanted to pressure the au-

RITAIN, PORTUGAL AND SOUTH AMERICA

194

HE BLOCKADE OF LISBON

195

thorities in Lisbon from below by appealing to the general populace. In

the pamphlet he communicated British policy: the blockade of Lisbon

was a measure of self-defence designed to prevent French forces from

using the Tagus as a base from which to launch an invasion of the Brit-

ish Isles. Cotton offered an option to resolve the privations Lisbon was

suffering, which would entail the ‘most liberal terms of Maritime capitu-

lation, by which the blockade may be removed and the people entirely

relieved from distress’.

The British strategy of blockading enemy naval forces in their Euro-

pean ports was largely a success. At Lisbon the Russian ships and those

Portuguese vessels left in the river, if not negated, posed a threat to Brit-

ish trade routes to the West Indies, East Indies and the Mediterranean.

Cotton’s blockade removed the threat such ships could post to British

overseas interests at source. This was entirely in accordance with tradi-

tional British practice; enemy squadrons were concurrently blockaded

along the French and Spanish coasts. The system was not infallible, but it

worked, as any that did escape were vigorously pursued. This had more

than a defensive effect. Cotton’s blockade of the Tagus, Purvis’ blockade

of Cadiz, Saumarez’s presence in the Baltic and Collingwood’s deploy-

ment in the Mediterranean plus the other British squadrons blockading

enemy ports all removed enemy naval forces from the seas allowing Brit-

ain to exercise a workable command of the sea to further the prosecu-

tion of the war by expanding overseas maritime-based commerce. We

shall shortly return to Cotton and the situation in the Tagus but only

after examining the wider effects of blockading enemy naval forces in

Europe to provide a safe overseas environment for the free flow and

expansion of British maritime trade by returning to the controversial and

tangled web of British South American policy.

…

While ministers tried to resolve the situation in the Tagus during the

spring of 1808, the vexed question of South America remained on the

political agenda. As with the Talents South American policy, historians

have tended to dismiss the Portland government’s strategy towards

South America in 1808, regarding it rather fortunate military commit-

ments to the region were not undertaken.

Of course, with the benefit of

hindsight, it is obvious a commitment to South American operations

would have limited the British ability to react to the Spanish uprising of

May 1808. Yet, as we have seen, ministers had already considered the

options available in South America and decided on a strategy of spread-

ing British trade and influence rather than direct military intervention.

The military option only returned to the agenda as Spain fell under

French military and political influence increasing the likelihood of Na-

poleon laying claim to all of Spanish Latin America and the prospect

of direct French intervention in the region. British ministers had good

reason to be worried. In the Convention of Fontainebleau France and

Spain had agreed the King of Spain would become Emperor of the

two Americas. The colonies, islands and overseas possessions of Por-

tugal were to be divided between the two allies. During the early

months of 1808 French policy towards Spain became increasingly bel-

ligerent. Troops occupied ever more Spanish territory culminating in

Napoleon’s declaration of 24 February denouncing the Spanish Royal

Family. As relations degenerated the Spanish court made a half hearted

attempt to flee after which it fractured between the supporters of

Charles IV and Godoy, and those who supported Charles’ son Ferdi-

nand, who argued for a Francophile policy. With the nation slipping

THE PORTLAND MINISTRY AND

SOUTH AMERICA IN 1808

HE PORTLAND MINISTRY AND SOUTH AMERICA IN 1808

197

towards outright revolt against Charles and Godoy, it was Ferdinand

who maintained the support of the army and acceded to the Spanish

throne on 19 March following Charles’ abdication.

With enhanced influence over Spanish affairs Napoleon hoped to

utilise the links between the Old and New Worlds as the whole of the

Spanish Empire was now, at least theoretically, at his command. In April

he asked Decrés to employ a few brigs and frigates off the coasts of

Mexico, Cayenne and the River Plate. The aim was to introduce agents

into Mexico and Montevideo to inform the Spanish Americans of the

transfer of power in Madrid. Napoleon believed the population would be

delighted at the potential advantages of a Francophile policy.

On 11

May Napoleon was thinking of mounting an expedition to Montevideo

to ship arms to the Spaniards. With a squadron stationed at Montevideo,

the French would possess an excellent base for future operations in the

region. On this point, Napoleon inquired exactly how many French

ships Decrés had actually despatched to Spanish America.

A second

letter followed the very next day, ‘I think that you comprehend my sys-

tem of war’, he informed Decrés, ‘England this year has borrowed bil-

lions. It should be harassed with expenditure and tiredness’ achieved by

basing French commerce raiding squadrons in South America to inter-

dict British maritime trade. One crucial component, so Napoleon

thought, was the force in Lisbon, now numbering three battleships, three

frigates, and nine Russian ships.

Later in May he inquired if Junot had

the necessary ships, transport tonnage and plans and charts to com-

mence an expedition to Brazil, if of course he could evade the British

blockade of the Tagus.

During the summer of 1808 Napoleon’s head

was full of various plans to seize South American territory, Mexico, Ha-

vana and the Philippines.

A New British Strategy?

For ministers in London the transfer of the Portuguese government to

Brazil presented a glorious opportunity. The uprising against British

forces of 1806 had shown it would be impossible to conquer territory,

thereafter the main object was not large-scale military conquest, but to

‘occupy strategic points from which to establish commerce with Spanish

America…in this way British influence could be established without

requiring the burdens of direct rule over the whole continent’.

Hence by

1807 the strategy of conquest had been abandoned. According to Muir,

ministers ‘decided to attempt to forestall the French by reviving their

South American strategy in a different form’ to foster unrest in the Span-

ish colonies.

Ministers had also considered placing a Bourbon on a

South American throne but the establishment of a friendly government

in Brazil opened up a range of options including the potential for devel-

oping that country as an entrepôt for British trade into the wider region.

With this in mind it was vital to ratify the Anglo-Portuguese conven-

tion of 22 October 1807. Canning had delayed the process due to objec-

tionable clauses inserted by the Portuguese. The evacuation removed

such obstructions and the convention was ratified on 4 January 1808.

With the tedious negotiations out of the way Canning indulged the Re-

gent granting João £20,000 credit in London while £80,000 in gold was

to be shipped to Brazil to help in the establishment of the new Portu-

guese government.

It was also important for Britain to have a presence

at the new court of Portugal and Francis Hill, formerly Secretary of the

British legation at Copenhagen, was appointed Secretary of the Legation

to the mission to the Court of Portugal and the Brazils on 16 January.

Canning informed Hill he was to act as the British chargé d’affaires until

the arrival of the British Minister. Hill would sail with the gold but was

to make clear the money was to be repaid out of any loan Sousa man-

aged to raise on the credit of the Portuguese court.

As for diplomatic representation, on Christmas Day 1807 Canning

rebuked Fitzgerald, who had been lobbying for the mission to Brazil,

informing him the King had approved of Strangford’s nomination for

that post, and ‘signified his approbation in so strong a manner as to leave

on my mind the conviction that His Majesty, would not have approved

of any other choice’.

Portland now suggested a mark of Royal favour

would add additional weight to Strangford’s mission, stressing the

‘advantage which would be derived to the management of your Majesty’s

concerns at the court of Brazil by his returning there with the decora-

tions of the Order of the Bath’. Portland was ‘aware of the impression

which such marks…never fail to make on the publick mind in foreign

courts’ and Strangford duly received this honour on 16

March 1808

(though, as we shall see below, he did not actually sail until April).

Where British trade went it had to be protected by force and, of

course, such forces could provide passive, or perhaps, offensive assis-

tance to the new seat of Portuguese government. On 25 January 1808

Smith was ordered to proceed to Brazil as Commander-in-Chief of a

squadron that would eventually be increased to six ships-of-the-line. For

the time being he was to take two ships-of-the-line and the sloop Confi-

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HE PORTLAND MINISTRY AND SOUTH AMERICA IN 1808

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ance from the squadron blockading the Tagus and to proceed to Rio or

the nearest port on the Brazilian coast to the seat of Portuguese govern-

ment. His object was to remain in Brazil ‘for the permanent protection

of the coasts of the Portuguese dominions’. Canning stressed to the Ad-

miralty the delicate nature of the political situation between Britain and

Brazil while negotiations were progressing in London for the establish-

ment of commercial treaties and this information was forwarded to

Smith. Hence Smith was warned to preserve the strictest discipline with

regard to intercourse between the inhabitants of the Brazils and the

crews of all British ships; Brazil was an attractive proposition for sailors

wishing to desert and the resultant problems might have impacted upon

the negotiations. The British Minister appointed to Brazil would have to

‘obtain the full and undivided confidence of that sovereign’ so Smith was

instructed ‘to take particular care to communicate on all points relating

to the interests and protection of the court of Brazil with H.M. minister

resident at that court, and to attend to his suggestions in the execution of

the important service hereby entrusted to your care’. It is clear that from

the outset Smith, with a history of independent action, would be subor-

dinate to the British minister at the Brazilian court.

With a maritime commitment to protect British trade and assist with

the security of the Portuguese government, the Portland Cabinet, like the

Talents before them, did, initially, consider the options for a British mili-

tary expedition to the region. In essence, Brazil could be utilised as a

launch pad for providing direct assistance to the forces of independence

in the Spanish colonies. Imperial conquest was not now the British aim,

instead the objective was to seize, or gain access to, maritime bases.

early as 20 December the Duke of York was arguing for Britain to obtain

a South American port.

Next day Castlereagh quizzed selected mem-

bers of the Cabinet regarding South American strategy. With over 20,000

men at Sicily but no plans for offensive operations in the region and it

becoming increasingly clear Spain was subject to French occupation he

looked to British operations in the River Plate. Importantly, Castlereagh

had looked into the official records and read Campbell’s ‘able paper on

the Brasils’ from 1804. He agreed with Campbell’s concerns that France

would attempt to found an empire in South America utilising the Span-

ish colonies. The link between Spanish imperial and domestic issues was

obvious and Castlereagh wanted to pre-empt French plans to utilise her

erstwhile ally by examining the possibility of setting aside 8,000 men to

seize Montevideo. Alternatively, 5,000 men could be stationed at Buenos

Ayres to assist the Portuguese in securing their vulnerable southern bor-

der and ‘influence’ any changes in the governance of Spanish America.

British troops would establish a commercial post for manufactured

goods in a region with 4 million Portuguese and 10 million Spanish in-

habitants. Portland and Camden approved of the plans and hoped other

members of the Cabinet would agree.

Lord Liverpool certainly did,

having the idea of recapturing Montevideo and presenting it to Brazil.

There was another factor at play. A clash between HMS Leopard and

the USS Chesapeake on 22 June 1807 had been only the most obvious

manifestation of degenerating relations between Britain and the United

States. The affair had its root cause in disagreements over the impress-

ment of British nationals on board American ships and the seizure of

American ships trading with the West Indies. US President Thomas Jef-

ferson responded with the Embargo Act, passed by Congress on 22 De-

cember 1807, which forbade all American trade with Britain and France.

Before news of the act reached London George Rose had already sub-

mitted a long memorandum to Canning on Christmas Day 1807 arguing,

as a sensible precaution in case of a rupture with America, Britain could

use Brazil to introduce manufactured goods into Spanish America. Rose

submitted further ideas to Canning on 31 December 1807 and 26 Janu-

ary 1808.

In this complex strategic situation the Portland Cabinet, like their

predecessors, turned to Wellesley, who again acted as a special advisor

on military matters. After examining the official papers relating to South

America, on 8 February he submitted a memorandum to the Cabinet.

Pointing to the failures of 1806-1807 he argued attempts to conquer the

region would fail: ‘the only mode in which they can be wrested from the

Crown of Spain is by a revolution and by the establishment of an inde-

pendent government within them’. It was a common belief the new seat

of Portuguese government would encourage the Spanish colonies to

fight for independence but Wellesley had not seen any proof in the offi-

cial papers of a desire from the Spanish colonies to break with Madrid,

but he thought it probable some yearned for independence. As a first

step he recommended Britain should secure Buenos Ayres to enhance

Brazilian security. Finally, he thought an attempt against Mexico required

too substantial a force and would be difficult to defend against possible

American aggression in that theatre.

Of course, policy towards South America was one of a number of

strategic issues discussed within the cabinet during the spring of 1808.

BRITAIN, PORTUGAL AND SOUTH AMERICA

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Set against the background of military requirements for the Baltic, Sicily

and other various operations, on 2 April Canning penned a memoran-

dum probably designed for circulation prior to a Cabinet meeting. In it

he turned his thoughts to the potential benefits offered by intervention

in the region. Agreeing with Castlereagh he argued ‘South America has

been too much irritated to be immediately attempted – time and concilia-

tion must be applied to them’. He had conversed with the Duke of Or-

leans ‘on the subject of a former plan of mine for placing some of the

Bourbon family on a Throne in America’, noting that the ‘Bourbons can

never make peace with the usurper of their Throne, this makes them

ours’. Despite Wellesley’s advice he hoped attention could be moved

from South America northward to the province of Mexico where Can-

ning wanted to ‘create

a government…that cannot fail being dependent

upon Great Britain’. Such a change in policy would have several benefits:

‘Mexico cannot become a maritime power, either for war or commerce’,

therefore ‘England would have the carrying trade of it’. British interven-

tion would also prevent American aggrandisement in the region for ‘If

England will not assist Mexico in these objects, America will force her

into Independence, and herself become the carriers’. This was an impor-

tant consideration set against worsening Anglo-American relations due

to the British enforcement of the Orders in Council. Hostilities between

London and Washington were certainly not inconceivable. In this case,

Canning thought, British intervention in Mexico might inspire Louisiana

to join with Britain as ‘they hate the Americans’. Seizing Mexico,

whether by force or installing a Bourbon on the throne, would also help

protect British possessions in the West Indies from American encircle-

ment. Canning hoped the ‘expedition for Mexico should commence

preparation and sail in August’.

Canning’s plans had a long-term object: British commercial domi-

nance of the South American continent. The reasons were obvious:

faced with the Continental blockade, lacking Continental allies, an em-

barrassment in Sweden, stalemate at Lisbon and unable to collect suffi-

cient forces to attack Spanish possessions, Britain did not have any stra-

tegic or commercial openings in Europe. But now, with a friendly gov-

ernment in Brazil and the potential for stirring up trouble in Spanish

America, Canning thought Britain must look to the Americas for allies,

though in the context of degenerating Anglo-American relations this

policy was not without risk. In his remarkable memorandum he envis-

aged British control of global commerce. Russia had voiced concerns

Britain was pursuing an imperialistic policy while the Continental nations

bled themselves white fighting France. All this was to Britain’s advantage

and would lead to British dominance of global trade. It was a belief not

without foundation for as Canning argued ‘England must see

the neces-

sity and the means of braving all the maritime powers of Europe’ in her

quest for markets. ‘The system I have proposed’ Canning concluded:

…makes England the carrier of the commerce of the continent of

Europe, as, no other could, under the above circumstances, trade

to the W. Indies and Spanish America but herself; this would anni-

hilate the marine of all the powers in Europe, as, in a few years for

want of employment, it would sink into insignificance.

In this case ‘England would, by adopting these measures with prompi-

tude and vigour, become mistress of the seas’. In this memorandum,

Canning perceptively outlined and laid the foundations for the post-war

situation, which would be dependent on the expansion of overseas com-

merce. Canning was also perhaps looking to a post-war situation in

which British goods remained out of the European markets. Global op-

erations to spread commerce were a real option for British ministers if

there was no way back into European markets or if they decided to for-

sake European commerce and turn to the New World.

Here is a clear statement of intent; British strategy was certainly to be

‘imperialistic’, but not in ‘realist’ terms of conquest. Britain’s position as

the global superpower would be achieved by the spread of a ‘liberal’

maritime empire through commercial influence, or ‘soft’ power, facili-

tated by the world’s largest merchant marine and protected by the

world’s largest naval force, the Royal Navy. This would provide the fi-

nance necessary to continue to fight Napoleonic France.

Canning’s memorandum was obviously presented to the Cabinet be-

cause on April 10 Castlereagh submitted a further memorandum to the

King in ‘compliance with the desire expressed at the last meeting of the

Cabinet on the South American question’. This memorandum outlined

the state of British forces at home and abroad and provided the Cabinet

with information as to the force that would be available for overseas

operations. On 1 April 1808 there were 114,445 men overseas and

198,656 stationed in the British Isles, giving a total force of 313,101. This

was a vast improvement on the 265,827 total forces as stated on 1 Janu-

ary and is testament to Castlereagh’s efforts to improve manpower

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strengths during 1807 and early 1808. He concluded the army exceeded

the total force required by 29,441 men, including 20,000 men set aside

for operations. Accordingly an expeditionary force of 16,000 men, drawn

from Gibraltar, the West Indies, North America, Madeira and from the

troops in Britain, would be available to implement government policy in

South America.

With South American operations discussed and now clearly decided

upon by the Cabinet on 17 April Canning finally informed Strangford he

was to proceed to Rio de Janeiro as British Minister. The young diplomat

would be isolated on the other side of the world so Canning provided

precise instructions. He began by stating the benefits the Portuguese

would find in Brazil as the transfer of government placed them in a

‘position perhaps even better calculated for extending and improving the

intercourse of their respective subjects’. Canning stressed the need to

look forward to the time when Brazil ‘shall have acquired strength and

consideration far superior to that which Portugal enjoyed among the

nations of Europe’. Strangford was instructed to give formal support to

‘this growing empire and…establish the relations of the two countries on

a permanent footing of mutual cordiality and of equal and reciprocal

advantage’.

On this point he was instructed to conclude two treaties

with the Brazilian court. The first would be a general treaty of friendship

and alliance; the second would be a more specific treaty of commerce.

Canning viewed the establishment of a friendly court in South America

with optimism. British policy towards this area had been traditionally

driven by economic factors; the markets of the area would be flooded

with British manufactured goods in return for specie. This trade would

always be balanced in the favour of Britain.

Canning was not interested in embroiling Britain in Portuguese poli-

tics stressing the ‘general political relations of the British and Portuguese

Monarchies are not altered by the removal of the Portuguese Govern-

ment’. Strangford was not to negotiate on any political matters until the

Regent was firmly established in Brazil ‘and until the fate of Portugal

itself shall have been definitively settled’. Any negotiations and treaties

would be solely conducted on commercial matters. Canning also brought

up the subject of the Convention of 22 October 1807. It was possible

the Regent might want to turn this convention into a public treaty, espe-

cially the unfulfilled articles. To this there would be no objection but

Canning urged a note of caution that if such a treaty was to be agreed,

Strangford should ensure all existing treaties with Portugal ‘however