Robson Martin. Britain, Portugal and South America in the Napoleonic Wars: Alliances and Diplomacy in Economic Maritime Conflict (ENG)

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Just as British ministers looked to the New World when the strategic

situation in Europe was less than promising, when that situation

changed, as it did in Spain and Portugal during the summer of 1808,

British policy was re-orientated back to the Old World. As we have seen

it was an increasingly belligerent French policy towards her Spanish ally

which lay at the root of this change. Charles’ abdication on 19 March

and Ferdinand’s accession provided Napoleon with an opportunity to

solve many Spanish issues once and for all. Refusing to accept Ferdinand

as King of Spain, Napoleon called father and son to Bayonne. There, on

5 May, Napoleon forced both to relinquish their claims and hand over

the throne to him. News of these developments spread, adding to the

rebellious tinderbox which had already sparked the violent uprising in

Madrid of 2 May. The brutal suppression by French troops under the

command of Marshal Joachim Murat of that initial revolt was followed

by a widespread Spanish uprising against the French occupation, organ-

ised and supported, on a provincial level.

In London, British ministers began to receive information about such

developments in May but the lack of reasonably accurate intelligence

from Spain and Portugal left a degree of uncertainty regarding the degen-

erating situation in Iberia.

Relying on the French and indigenous press

was unsatisfactory and there were few official avenues through which

news could reach London. At Gibraltar, Dalrymple kept ministers in

London informed of the events in Spain but received no official response

on what he should do. It was not until 25 May that Castlereagh replied to

Dalrymple’s requests for orders. As Hall has argued ‘the Cabinet, already

preoccupied with plans for attacking Spain’s colonies and some European

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HE SPANISH INSURRECTION AND BRITISH POLICY

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possessions as well, was uncertain how to regard a Franco-Spanish con-

flict’. Set against a history of recent French military prowess in Europe

ministers, quite naturally, decided to wait and see how events turned out

before making a firm commitment; in Muir’s words, the cabinet

‘suspended rather than abandoned its previous plans’.

There was a small British force under Spencer already in the region

and Castlereagh hoped it could be utilised in Iberia before any possible

operations in South America were undertaken. Spencer was again to

examine the possibility of attacking Cueta as ministers did ‘not consider

this temporary appropriation of M.-Genl. Spencer’s corps, as likely to

interfere with operations in South America….the state of the seasons in

that quarter [South America] would not render it desireable to move

them from Gibraltar before the middle of August with a view to such a

service’. Dalrymple suggested British troops could be used to support

the Spaniards and Castlereagh gave permission for 10,000 men to be

made available from Gibraltar but made it very clear this force would be

best used to occupy a position where the Royal Navy could support it

from the sea, thereby freeing Spanish troops to take the field. On this

point Dalrymple was instructed to ‘particularly direct your attention to

Cadiz’. Spencer was in the vicinity of Cadiz and could have fulfilled this

role but unsurprisingly the Spanish were hostile to the idea and it would

take a further two years before any such arrangement would be con-

sented to.

On 1 June Castlereagh submitted to the King arrangements for an

expeditionary force, though the Cabinet were undecided where this force

would serve, Castlereagh noting the options as ‘the coast of Spain or

eventually in South America, should no favourable opening present itself

in Europe’. Ministers were hoping for a campaign in Europe, but if there

was no change in the situation regarding Spain then Castlereagh, agreeing

with Canning’s assertions, looked to operations ‘both in the River of

Plate and the Northern Provinces [Mexico]’. He considered the latter

more important, remarking of the ‘possible expediency of directing the

whole force against Mexico’. On the same day, Wellesley submitted a

memorandum detailing the equipment required for a South American or

Mexican expedition.

The Spanish Insurrection and Cotton’s Blockade

While ministers employed a wait-and-see policy, news of the events in

Spain reached Cotton off the Tagus on 13 May, passed on by Captain

Smith of the Nautilus, stationed off Oporto and corroborated by Purvis

on 16 May.

Suitably informed Cotton again received Satarro on 18 May.

This time he brought the French response to the English proclamations

of 28 April and 12 May stating Junot had informed Napoleon of the

proposals and was awaiting instructions. Cotton would not discuss the

terms with Satarro, insisting no official business could be conveyed

through a middleman. Instead he thought Junot should have sent a

French officer to talk about terms and Cotton expected this to happen

once Satarro had returned to Lisbon. He therefore drafted the conven-

tion between Britain and the groups in Lisbon, as had been directed in

the Admiralty despatch of 16 April ‘without any alteration whatsoever’.

Cotton displayed a good grasp of the wider strategic context:

Although the circumstances of a revolt in Spain, and its probable

consequence in Portugal, might perhaps justify some alteration, did

not the importance of acquiring immediate possession of the Rus-

sian squadron in the Tagus (by any means) so as to deprive the

enemy of their assistance, and supersede the necessity for main-

taining so large a British force off Lisbon (in conformity to their

Lordships suggestion in the order above mentioned) appear para-

mount to every other consideration.

Horward has argued as the revolt spread across Spain the value of the

Russian squadron to Junot increased as he became more isolated from

possible supporting forces. But according to Satarro the French had

asked Seniavin what his line of conduct would be if Napoleon suffered

disaster in Spain and Portugal. Seniavin apparently replied ‘Russia not

being at war with Spain or Portugal, the fleet would not act in any man-

ner hostile to either of those countries’. Then Seniavin was asked what

he would do if the British attempted to force the Tagus, to which he

replied ‘unless a very commanding and superior force rendered such a

measure improper- fight them’. Whether Cotton thought the reports

from Satarro were accurate is not certain. He did inform the Admiralty

there had been in riots in Madrid on 2 May where 30,000 French were

now cut off from reinforcements.

The last week in May was eventful for Cotton. He received the Admi-

ralty orders from 9 April to 13 May, which included the news he had

been promoted to Admiral of the Blue on 28 April.

In May the impor-

tance of occupying the Tagus forts as a precursor to forcing the river was

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again evidenced with the loss of the Rapid (12) gun-brig, sunk by fire

from the French occupied batteries.

The loss of the brig was balanced

by the opening of a new source of intelligence. Mr Wilson, formerly a

British merchant in Lisbon, had found a small boy abandoned in the

streets of Lisbon and sent him out to the squadron, whereupon Captain

Pigott of the Blossom wrote to Wilson asking him to provide information.

Wilson acquiesced and sent a report to Pigott on 31 May stating the

French had ‘about four thousand in the forts and environs of Lisbon’.

The people of Lisbon were suffering at the hands of the French because

of the British blockade, and ‘every hour threatens insurrection’. The

French now had 13 vessels in various states of readiness and, although

the Russian ships had all been repaired, Seniavin’s flagship had recently

suffered lightning damage to its mast.

Wilson managed to escape from Lisbon and arrived on board the

Hibernia on 8 June, reasserting his previous intelligence report. Cotton

thought him ‘an intelligent man’ and was convinced there were only ‘3 to

4,000 French troops…now in Lisbon’ along with 5-6,000 Spaniards.

Wilson confirmed reports from Captain Creyke of the Eclipse sloop that

French forces in Porto had been taken prisoner by their former Spanish

allies. Realising the effect this may have upon the situation on Lisbon

Cotton penned a proclamation to be distributed throughout the city:

Inhabitants of Lisbon!!!

Your enemies and oppressors the French, have been driven out of

Oporto by your loyal Countrymen, and the brave Spaniards, the

government instituted by the Prince Regent is reestablished and

the Portuguese colours again flying upon your forts.

All the assistance His Britannic Majesty’s fleet can afford, shall be

readily given to you, and your generous allies the Spaniards, in the

noble attempt to emancipate your capital from the severe oppres-

sions it has suffered since the French army marched into it.

Wilson’s estimates regarding the size of the French forces in and around

Lisbon were based on the amount of bread baked in Lisbon for distribu-

tion to the French. His figures were corroborated by reports from a

Spanish officer, Don Sebastian Solis who arrived on board the Hibernia

after escaping from Lisbon. He had been sent by the Spanish Junta at

Seville to incite the Spanish troops in Lisbon to rebel against the French

and asserted there were only 1,200 Spanish and 4,000 French in the city.

The French had disarmed the Spanish contingent when they heard the

news of unrest in Porto and Spain.

According to Krajeski Cotton ‘believed that now was the time to

send British troops back to Lisbon’.

Cotton informed the Admiralty

that because there were no more than 4,000 French in the city, ‘five or

six thousand British troops might effect a landing, gain possession of

the forts on the banks of the Tagus, and, by cooperating with His Maj-

esty’s fleet give to our possession the whole of the maritime means now

collected in the Tagus’. He contacted Dalrymple at Gibraltar asking for

the use of Spencer’s 5,000 men.

This incorrect information would

have a great influence on subsequent events and has attracted criticism

from Krajeski. He argues Cotton’s estimate of the number of troops

needed to force a landing ‘reveals a measure of naiveté about landing

operations’.

This ignores the fact that the presence of a small British

force of 5-6,000 men might have proved the catalyst for a general upris-

ing in Lisbon or if placed in a position of strength ashore could have

provided a bridgehead for the arrival of more substantial forces if the

estimates had been correct.

The reports of the French forces in Lisbon seemed to be borne out

by the activities of the Portuguese. Cotton remarked ‘the fishing boats,

and others having fruit, now hold communication with the fleet without

reserve’. They also provided another source of intelligence: ‘among vari-

ous reports brought by such vessels it is stated by Dom Gomes Freres, is

at the head of a numerous body of Portuguese and on his march towards

Lisbon’. But Cotton was forced to admit the blockade of the Tagus, de-

signed to force the French or Russians into a maritime capitulation

through starvation, had been a failure. There was ‘no appearance of any

want of provisions…on the contrary the boatmen bring bread for sale of

an excellent quality, the barley harvest is I understand already begun, and

the first week in July the commencement of their wheat harvest’. Despite

this on 20 June Cotton was optimistic about the situation in Lisbon after

a further communication from Satarro. Cotton was convinced the

‘manner he now comes forward together with the allusion to Junot’s

intention of putting himself in a situation to obtain an honorable capitu-

lation - induces me to hope that things are approaching to a crisis’.

In response to the developing situation across Iberia Cotton sent the

Antelope to monitor events in Porto. In southern Portugal it seemed as if

the inhabitants were willing to rise against the French occupation while a

request from Coimbra for assistance in seizing French positions was

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received. ‘Grasping the consequence of the uprising’, Horward has ar-

gued ‘Cotton decided to extend his resources to the limit in order to

capitalize on the Portuguese patriotism’. Portuguese troops under the

command of a student José Correra Felles had captured the French held

fort of Santa Catarina at Figueira at the mouth of the river Mondego,

approximately half way between Lisbon and Porto. Cotton sent Captain

Bligh of the Alfred with 200 Royal Marines and 20 officers to strengthen

the position. After receiving a further dispatch from Castlereagh detail-

ing the intention to send a British military force to Iberia, Cotton added

another 100 marines to the garrison at Figueira.

Cotton had heard reports ministers were hoping to commit a force to

Spain but was convinced British intervention in Portugal offered the

greatest chance of immediate success. ‘Portugal will be recovered to its

lawful Prince without much difficulty’, the country could be secured and

held ‘if aided by the assistance of a British force equal in number’ to that

in apparent preparation. With the possibility ministers in London may be

preparing to intervene in Portugal Cotton made promises to the Portu-

guese that a British army was on the way to liberate them from French

rule. There was a caveat, however; a British force would only assist an

uprising, not occasion it. The Portuguese would have to help fight for

their own liberty.

In fact during April and May Junot had been expecting a British am-

phibious landing, although he believed a more immediate threat came

from Spain. Napoleon’s orders for him to dispatch 7,500 troops for ser-

vice in Spain seemed to back this assertion up and hampered his defence

of Portugal.

Initially, Junot managed to keep the threat of a Portuguese

revolt under control but the interruption of grain supplies from Spain

now added to the effects of the Royal Navy blockade. Junot was isolated

and, according to Napier, with ‘a hungry army gnawing at its vitals, the

nation could not remain tranquil’. News of the insurrection in Spain

spread and the number of assaults and assassinations of French soldiers

in Portugal increased. Then, on 9 June, news reached Lisbon that the

commander of the Spanish troops stationed in Porto had arrested the

French forces in the city. Junot immediately disarmed the Spanish troops

in Lisbon, confining them aboard hulks in the harbour. He could now

only count on 28,000 effective men. To alleviate the situation he asked

Seniavin to land some of his crews but the Russian refused, stating he

was not at war with Portugal. In July Junot had to further reduce his

force by sending General Loison with 8,000 men to suppress a rising at

Evora, close to the southern main communication route into Spain. By

the end of July Junot was completely isolated in a country rapidly grow-

ing in hostility to the French presence. Furthermore, there had been

many rumours of English forces destined for Portugal. Then, on 29 July,

a fleet of British transports appeared off Mondego Bay. Junot headed

north to meet the new threat leaving 6,500 men to defend Lisbon and

the Tagus forts.

British Intervention in Portugal, June-August 1808

Throughout 1808 ministers had been faced with a number of options as

to where a limited number of British troops could be committed. Mari-

time-based forces might be dispatched to South America, Spanish pos-

sessions in Europe could be attacked and an expedition had already been

sent to the Baltic. Events in Spain and Portugal would prove the catalyst

for a firm commitment to one theatre of operations.

From the beginning of the Spanish uprising intelligence regarding the

situation in Iberia had been at a premium, and hence the response from

the British Cabinet was naturally tentative. Cotton was blockading Lis-

bon and Spencer was in the right place at the right time but, not strong

enough for offensive operations and unable to gain access to Cadiz,

there was little tangible he could do with his force of 5,000 men. The

possibility of large-scale British military intervention in Spain or Portugal

was brought to the fore with the arrival in London on 8 June of two

delegates from the northern Spanish province of Asturias. They re-

quested military supplies, arms and munitions, a Royal Navy squadron

stationed off the Asturian coast and the importation of British goods

into the province. They were shortly followed by a delegation from the

province of Galicia. The response from the press and the public was

extraordinary; as Muir states, ‘London was caught in a Spanish fever

which lasted until the end of the year’. Across the political spectrum

there was widespread support for the Spaniards with only a few voices

speaking against sending aid to the Peninsula.

On 12 June Canning decided Britain would ‘afford every assistance

and support to an effort so magnanimous and praise-worthy’ by supply-

ing arms and providing naval support.

This was a clear commitment of

support from the Portland cabinet to any nation willing to take up arms

against the French. With a history of failed coalitions and abortive expe-

ditions to Continental Europe, however, British military commitments

would be in support of, rather than in lieu of, those willing to fight

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France. The mood was encapsulated by Canning’s famous address to the

Commons of 15 June stating that ‘there exists the strongest disposition

on the part of the British government to afford every practicable aid in a

contest so magnanimous’. He continued:

We shall proceed upon the principle, that any nation of Europe

that starts up with a determination to oppose a power which,

whether professing insidious peace or declaring open war, is the

common enemy of all nations, whatever may be the existing politi-

cal relations of that nation with Great Britain, becomes instantly

our essential ally.

The intention was clear and designed to be heard in Vienna, Berlin and

St. Petersburg. Canning was committing British help not only to the

Spaniards, but any other country who took up arms against France.

The cabinet was keen to make a firm military commitment to the

region and on 14 June 1808 Wellesley was informed he had been ap-

pointed to the ‘command of a detachment…to be employed upon a

particular service’.

Castlereagh still considered defending the cause of

independence in Spanish America, but only if the war in Europe became

hopeless. He was supported by Wellesley, who looked to Gibraltar and

then South America if nothing could be done to support Spain.

On 21

June Castlereagh could confirm Wellesley’s destination would be Spain,

but his final instructions would be formed on the receipt of more defini-

tive intelligence from Iberia.

On 30 June the Cabinet came to a firm decision. Wellesley’s force

based at Cork would be sent to assist the Spanish and Portuguese na-

tions ‘in throwing off the yoke of France’. The deputies from Galicia and

Asturias were, however, unwilling to allow British forces into any of their

garrisons or to embark on coordinated operations with a British army.

Instead, they impressed ‘the importance of directing the efforts of the

British troops to the expulsion of the enemy from Portugal’; to which

object Wellesley was to direct his attention. British forces would be es-

sential to support the insurrection in that country so it ‘may thereby be-

come general throughout that Kingdom, as well as Spain’. Foremost in

Castlereagh’s mind was the French and Russian naval forces in the Ta-

gus. If the French were too strong for an attack on Lisbon, Wellesley

was to move his force by sea to Vigo and await reinforcements. In case

extra troops were needed Castlereagh was preparing 10,000 reinforce-

ments to sail in three weeks’ time. Castlereagh ordered an officer of engi-

neers to observe and prepare information ‘with respect to the execution

of the proposed attack on the Tagus’.

After Castlereagh wrote this dispatch Mulgrave received Cotton’s

estimate stating French strength in Lisbon was not more than 4,000

men. Mulgrave informed the King it was the confident opinion of Cot-

ton that 5-6,000 British troops ‘might effect a landing, gain possession of

the of [sic] forts on the Tagus’. Mulgrave was optimistic a combined

force could ‘gain possession of the whole of the maritime means in the

Tagus’. But the only change Castlereagh made to Wellesley’s original

instructions was to instruct him to head for the Tagus in person to assess

the situation.

Important information now arrived in London. On 24 June Spencer

had conferred with Cotton about the possibility of landing troops in the

Tagus. Spencer thought the Portuguese were ‘in a ripe state to throw off

the French yoke’, and Cotton reported at Oporto on 16 June the popu-

lace had risen against the French opening the depots and arming them-

selves. In addition the provinces of Minho, Entre Douro, and Tras des

Montes had also revolted against the French occupying forces. But on 22

June Cotton received intelligence from three Hanoverian deserters who

reported Junot had now concentrated 10,000 French troops in the vicin-

ity of Lisbon. Cotton realised this force rendered ‘success in landing with

so small a corps of forces [as Spencer’s]…very doubtful’. Cotton and

Spencer both concluded the chance of a landing had gone and Spencer

sailed for Cadiz.

Although these reports confirmed ‘a general spirit of

animosity against the French in Portugal’,

Castlereagh now informed

Wellesley that Junot’s force ‘appeared much more considerable that it

was before reported to be by Sir Charles Cotton’.

In response a firm decision was now made to commit a larger force

than originally intended. Castlereagh informed the King on 14 July that

ministers had decided to employ ‘such an amount of force in that quarter

as may provide not only for the reduction of the enemy’s force in the

Tagus, but also may admit of such a detachment being made towards

Cadiz’. The Spaniards had fired on the French ships in Cadiz harbour,

forcing their surrender. Once again it was hoped a British garrison could

enter the town, freeing Spanish forces to take the field. To accomplish

this dual strike Castlereagh wanted to send an additional 5,000 troops to

the Tagus and to supplement them with Moore’s 10,000 men. These

measures would allow a force of 30,000 men to initially operate off the

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Tagus, a sufficient number to permit the subsequent detachment of a

force of 10,000 men to Cadiz.

As Muir has pointed out if the Cabinet

succeeded in concentrating this number of men in the Iberian Peninsular

it would be ‘the largest British army to take the field for many years’.

A British force of this size could not remain under the command of

Wellesley; he was too far down the seniority list of Lieutenant Generals.

The Cabinet envisaged the total force acting as two separate entities un-

der the overall command of Dalrymple, with Lieutenant General Sir

Harry Burrard as his second-in-command. Army headquarters would be

stationed either at Lisbon or Cadiz ‘as the service might require’. This

arrangement would ‘admit of the most active and distinguish’d young

officers being brought forward under them’. It would not go against the

rules and traditions of the service but would allow certain favourite offi-

cers, such as Wellesley, to be given a prominent role in operations. The

King approved committing additional troops and the command structure

of the force. He thought Dalrymple would be ‘well calculated for the

general direction of affairs’ and in Burrard he could not ‘have a more

zealous and more steady second in command’.

Wellesley arrived off Coruña on 21 July to discover the French forces

in Portugal totalled 15,000 with 12,000 in and around Lisbon. With Junot

isolated in Portugal Wellesley, even without Spencer’s force, had ‘no

doubt of success’ once he could land his troops.

After finding his fleet

on 22 July, Wellesley reached Oporto two days later and gained a clearer

picture of the situation in Portugal. All the areas to the north of the Ta-

gus were in arms against the French. He had also heard from Cotton

who informed him of his occupation of Figueira, it would be here or at

Peniche where Cotton thought it ‘most advisable’ for Wellesley to land.

While he visited Cotton, Wellesley decided to send the fleet to Mondego

Bay and prepare to disembark. He hoped by the time he returned from

the Tagus ‘all will be ready to go on shore, either at the Mondego or

Peniche, or farther to the southward if the Admiral thinks it advisable’.

On 26 July Wellesley wrote to Spencer ordering him to proceed to the

Tagus and await his arrival.

On the same day he joined Cotton off the

Tagus. ‘Upon consulting with the Lieutenant General’, Cotton informed

the Admiralty, ‘it was determined the troops should disembark at Fi-

gueira (a place about 16 leagues to the northward of the Burling Island’.

Wellesley proceeded to Figueira on 27 and on 3 August Cotton heard

that ‘the disembarkation commenced the 1st instant’.

Wellesley in-

formed Cotton he would not advance until he received news of the rein-