Robson Martin. Britain, Portugal and South America in the Napoleonic Wars: Alliances and Diplomacy in Economic Maritime Conflict (ENG)

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giving Britain the upper hand in the Mediterranean. The threat of an inva-

sion of Portugal temporarily receded; Stuart and St. Vincent were with-

drawn from Lisbon, as maritime forces were now required to undertake

offensive operations against Naples and the Italian provinces.

During the Second Coalition (1798-1802) further French pressure was

brought to bear on Spain in the hope Madrid would declare war on Por-

tugal. The Spaniards responded by ordering the Portuguese to abandon

the alliance with Britain, close their ports to British shipping and pay

indemnities. If Portugal failed to meet these demands Spain would in-

vade. The Portuguese again asked for 10,000 British troops to help de-

fend the country.

The British response was favourable; assistance

should be given, even though this could not be considerable, to ‘prove to

the government of Portugal the disposition of your Majesty to do every-

thing in your power to protect them’. If the country could not be pro-

tected then the royal family and fleet should be escorted to Brazil.

Although it was clear Portugal would be threatened at some time the

French army in Egypt was to be the main object for a British expedition-

ary force. A secondary force would defend Portugal. The force in Portu-

gal was downgraded to the point where the British contingent was negli-

gible and its commander returned to England. On 24 May 1801 Spain

declared war on Portugal and with assistance from French auxiliary

troops, launched an invasion. In London the Portuguese question was

debated in Parliament. The ministry decided a squadron under the com-

mand of Rear Admiral Sir James Saumarez should be detached from the

Channel Fleet to proceed to the Tagus. Saumarez reached Lisbon in late

June only to discover the Portuguese military had been completely inca-

pable of defending the country and preliminary peace negotiations with

France and Spain were underway. Although not actually finalised until

September, the so-called ‘War of the Oranges’ had effectively ended on 6

June with the peace of Badajoz. The Portuguese bought off France and

Spain by closing their ports to British shipping and paying an indemnity

to France, but the latter rejected the treaty as it did not admit French

garrisons into Portugal.

British ministers were also worried about the Portuguese island of

Madeira astride the vital trade routes to the West and East Indies. To

prevent the French seizing and utilising the island as a cruiser base the

cabinet sent a detachment of 1,000 infantry with 50 artillerymen to take

possession of the island and forestall French designs. This action an-

gered the Portuguese who criticised the occupation of the island when

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Britain had argued there were no troops available to assist in the defence

of mainland Portugal. Events had moved too quickly in 1801 for Britain

to offer any assistance to Portugal or to react once the Portuguese desire

for peace was known.

Britain viewed the Peace of Amiens, concluded on 27 March 1802, as

vital breathing space and a chance for recovery in the struggle with

France. An agreement from Napoleon to guarantee Portuguese neutrality

removed the immediate threat and as long as it held, Britain could place

Portuguese affairs into the background. In Lisbon the Portuguese court

were aggrieved by Britain’s attitude at the talks. They had wanted conces-

sions at Amiens especially for the losses incurred in the Peace of Bada-

joz. On this latter point they were extremely angry over the Spanish re-

tention of Olivença, a town that to this day remains a part of Spain. Feel-

ing betrayed by Britain, the Portuguese adopted a more conciliatory atti-

tude towards France in an effort to prevent further attacks.

In early 1803 France appeared to be making naval preparations to

undertake another attempt to exclude Britain from the Mediterranean.

Napoleon also demanded Britain surrender the island of Malta, recap-

tured from the French in 1800, as had been agreed at Amiens. This de-

mand was refused and Britain began to make preparations for war. All

confusion over British determination to oppose Napoleon was removed

by the declaration of war on France of 18 May 1803. With war renewed

Portugal was again vulnerable to Franco-Spanish aggression. Britain con-

sented to a declaration of Portuguese neutrality in June and the following

month the Portuguese raised the question of British assistance. Lieuten-

ant Colonel Robert Stewart was dispatched to Lisbon to assess Portu-

guese military preparations. As evidenced by the events of 1801, on pre-

vious occasions Portuguese reports regarding their military effectiveness

had been inaccurate. If this was still true there would be no British aid

forthcoming to a country that did not wish to help itself.

Stewart found the Portuguese army under strength, badly equipped,

dispirited due to the defeats at the hands of the Spanish in 1801 and

discontented with unfulfilled promises of increases in pay.

Concluding

his report Stewart thought if Britain was to intervene, a substantial mili-

tary commitment would have to be made, the whole of the Portuguese

military reorganised and the whole Portuguese infrastructure reformed.

Stewart’s report proved to be of little use.

With Napoleon assembling

a flotilla in the Channel ports and rebellion flaring up in Ireland, all re-

sources were needed in England as extensive preparations were undertaken

across the country to repel any French invasion attempt. In September

1803 additional French demands were made on Portugal to close her ports

while Spain made diplomatic moves towards Napoleon. In this situation

ministers had to confine themselves to thinking of a small pre-emptive

strike on Brazil. When it was decided that even this could not be achieved

they urged the Portuguese to deliver their fleet to Britain for safekeeping or

to transfer the royal family and fleet to Brazil. If Portugal did not comply

ministers threatened attacks on her colonies. In no position to offer direct

assistance Britain could only watch as the Portuguese paid another subsidy

to France thereby preserving their immediate security.

In late 1804 Britain captured a Spanish treasure fleet, a move unsur-

prisingly followed by a Spanish declaration of war. This raised the possi-

bility of another Spanish invasion of Portugal. British ministers were

particularly concerned after the 1803 Portuguese pay off; it seemed to

confirm France was gaining leverage over Portugal. The powerful argu-

ments put to the Prince Regent by Jean Lannes, French ambassador to

Portugal, were backed by the threat of the seemingly invincible French

army and had a great influence on Portuguese policies. Lannes had per-

suaded the Regent the only way to remove the threat of a British mari-

time expedition taking Brazil (or possibly attacking Lisbon) was to

downgrade the importance of the colony.

French designs towards Britain and Portugal were halted by the diver-

sion of forces to war with Austria and Russia. Spanish support for

French proposals wavered after the crippling defeat of their naval forces

at Trafalgar. It seemed to the Portuguese their policy of appeasement

had again, at least temporarily, succeeded.

…

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Appendix IV

The Russian Mediterranean Fleet

‘List of the Russian Squadron now at anchor in the River Tagus from a

most authentic source November 17

1807’

Name Guns Commander

Jverdoi 80 Vice Admiral Seniavin /

Captain Maleef

Silnoi 80 Captain Maligin (acting)

Raphael 80 Captain Bourtchensky (acting)

Mostuoi 74 Captain Crowe

Elene 74 Captain Bouitchensky

Jaroslaw 74

Selaphael 74 Captain Rojnoff

Ratvisan 64 Rear Admiral Grieg /

Captain Artishiff

Skoroi 80 Captain Skeltin

Venus 44

Kilduine 32 Transport

Ships expected from Gibraltar

Seid el Badar 80 Captain Bailie (Turkish Prize)

St Peter 74 Commodore Baratnisky

Orel 80 Captain Bouitchensky

Mosco 74 Captain Etssen

Leochy 36 (Frigate)

Spitzbergen 20 (sloop)

Source: Smith to Pole, No. 2a4, 18.11.1807, ADM 1/19.

…

Appendix V

The Portuguese Fleet

‘List of the Portuguese fleet which sailed from the river Tagus on the

29th of November 1807 and joined with the squadron under the orders

of Rear Admiral Sir Sidney Smith’

Name Guns

Ships-of-the-line

Principe Real 84

Rainha de Portugal 74

Conde Henrique 74

Meduza 74

Alfonso d' Albuquerque 64

D João de Castro 64

Principe de Brazil 74

Martim de Freitar 64

Frigates

Minerva 44

Golfinho 36

Urania 32

And one other name not known

Brigs

Voador 22

Vinganca 20

Lebre 22

Schooner

Curioza 12

(Signed) Joaq

Joze Mont

Torres Major General, Copy W Sidney Smith

Source: Smith to Pole, No. 2a10, 1.12.1807, ADM 1/19.

…

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Appendix VI

The Portuguese Ships left at Lisbon

‘List of the Portuguese ships of war that remained in Lisbon 29th Nov

1807’

Name Guns Comments

Ships-of-the-line

St Sebastiaõ 64 Unserviceable without a

thorough repair

Maria Prim

74 Ordered to be made into a floating

battery but not yet fitted

Vasco de Gama 74 Under repair and nearly ready

Princera de Beira 64 Condemmed ordered to be

fitted as a floating battery

Frigates

Fenix 48 In need of thorough repair

Amazona 44 " "

Perola 44 " "

Tritaõ 40 past repair

Venus 30 " "

Copy furnished by the Portuguese Admiral unsigned

W. Sidney Smith

Source: Smith to Pole, No. 2a9, 1.12.1807, ADM 1/19.

…

Appendix VII

The Strangford-Smith Controversy

Controversy and confusion have surrounded the roles Strangford and

Smith played in the actual embarkation of the Portuguese royal family.

Both sides of the political divide tried to claim credit for themselves

through the actions of their respective representative. On 23 December

The Times published the dispatches of both Strangford and Smith and on

Christmas Day reported the beginning of a dispute between the govern-

ment and the opposition as to the ‘degree of merit which may be claimed

by the present Ministry’. The newspaper believed the ‘merit of bringing

about this great political occurrence…particularly depends on BUONA-

PARTE himself’. The reason was his ‘premature declaration that the

House of Braganza should reign no longer, as well as the general terror

which is inspired by his relentless and ferocious character’. These factors

caused the emigration of the Court of Portugal which was ‘an act of the

Prince himself, and not of either the British Ministers at home, or of

Lord STRANGFORD or Sir SIDNEY SMITH abroad’. It concluded:

‘ministers are neither to be censured, nor indeed greatly praised, for an

act, in the execution of which they could have but a small share’.

Contemporary opinion in the navy believed Smith had been cheated

of his rightful share of the credit. One correspondent to the Naval

Chronicle stated:

We sailors remember with just pride that the sole conqueror of

Buonaparte was our leader, and an Englishman; however it may

suit the policy or the temper of this or that administration to forget

that the MAN is Sir Sidney Smith.

Whereas Smith had been ignored by the government Strangford had

been rewarded by Canning for ‘what he did not do’. The dispatch pub-

lished in the newspapers had been doctored by ‘a diplomatic pen…so

eloquently narrated to the country gentlemen by a ministerial orator’. The

opinion of the men in Smith’s squadron was that Buonaparte and Smith

had effected the evacuation.

In fact the Admiralty had examined Smith’s dispatches outlining the

events off Lisbon and delivered to them by Yeo on 28 December. Pole

wrote to Smith informing him their Lordships expressed ‘high approbation

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of your judicious and able conduct in the management of the service en-

trusted to your charge; and in the execution of the various orders you have

received from time to time’. They were also ‘strongly impressed with the

propriety of the whole of your conduct towards the Royal F of P. The re-

spectful attention which you appear to have shewn to the illustrious H. of

Br. has been in strict conformity to their L wishes and they have directed

me to express their compleat satisfaction at the manner in which you have

in this, as well as in every other respect, obeyed their instructions’.

Fitzgerald thought Strangford played no part whatever in bringing

about the evacuation, instead the ‘mad conduct of Bonaparte’ was re-

sponsible. Strangford was ‘fortunate in having become an eye witness to

an event so anxiously desired, and so favourable to the interests of our

country’. Fitzgerald was certainly upset Canning had not sent him to

Lisbon to influence events and was jealous of the praise and rewards

Strangford would receive, admitting to Canning on 21 December

‘Should I myself…not have had to boast of that which may now, per-

haps, be ascribed as a deed of merit to another’.

On 24 December Can-

ning replied, arguing ‘Strangford has been eminently instrumental in this

business: and such is my opinion, and that of his Majesty’s Government

in general of the ability which Lord Strangford has shown in the manage-

ment of it, and of the share which he has had in bringing it to a success-

ful termination’.

One recent writer, who takes a dim view of Strangford’s correspon-

dence on the subject, suggests Canning did not object to him taking

credit for the operation.

Strangford had departed from the fleet in Ta-

gus on 7 December and arrived at Milford Haven in the Confiance at 11

a.m. on 17 December and was given a 19-gun salute upon leaving the

ship.

Strangford later admitted some collaboration certainly took place

and that he was in London on 19 December. Canning supported Strang-

ford in his claim for the credit and tidied up the dispatches for publica-

tion, a point later conceded by Strangford. This may be partly explained

by a private letter he received from Sousa dated 22 December, in which

Sousa hoped Strangford would receive a demonstration of value for his

services. He concluded by stating Canning’s plans ‘would have failed

without the personal influence of Lord Strangford with the Prince Re-

gent, without his wonderful exertions in carrying your plans to a sure and

safe issue’.

Portland wrote to Canning on 22 December informing him of the

‘sense I have of Ld Strangfords services makes me desirous of conferring

that honor upon him which will be the most…beneficial to him’. An

Irish Earldom would be ‘more likely to have an effect upon the courts of

Portugal & I believe from what I colluded from two or three of our col-

leagues, would be more generally approved by them’. Canning replied

stating he had talked to Strangford about the Earldom but Strangford

requested to be provided with a British peerage. Canning himself

thought Strangford should ‘rather

have the Blue, the Irish Blue’ but

noted to Portland ‘that your Grace seemed to think impossible among

the conflicting claims for it.’ Canning had conversed with the independ-

ent Whig Lord Moira, whose views he respected, and would later press

for the appointment to command forces in Portugal in 1808, whose

opinion was ‘clearly in favour of Red Ribband’. Mulgrave thought if

Strangford had ‘the Red Ribband, and Sir Sidney an increase of his pen-

sion, the rewards will be pretty fairly distributed’. On 30 December Port-

land informed Canning the King had consented and Strangford would

receive the Red Ribband.

And there the matter rested until events brought the debate back to

life by the historian William Napier in 1828.

He thought Strangford ‘a

young man of no solid influence or experience’, whose ‘efforts to make

the royal family emigrate, had entirely failed’ and accused Strangford and

Canning, both Tories, of collaborating together on dispatches to deni-

grate the role played by Smith. In particular he argued:

Strangford’s despatch, relating this event, although dated the 29

of November, on board the Hibernia, was written the 19

Decem-

ber, in London, and was so worded, as to create a notion that his

exertions during the 27

and 28

had caused the emigration, a

notion quite contrary to the fact.

Napier made strenuous efforts to get to the truth behind the events of

the war and was also an officer and a gentleman and would not con-

sciously lie but by attacking Strangford he was attacking the Portland

Cabinet of 1807-1808. Napier was still bitter about the cabinet’s treat-

ment of Moore, his great hero. By sending Moore to Sweden in 1808 the

Cabinet ‘had no other object, than the factious one of keeping an excel-

lent general…at a distance from the only country where their services

were really required’.

Canning and Castlereagh were responsible for

Moore’s appointment to serve under Lieutenant Generals Sir Hew Dal-

rymple and Sir Harry Burrard in Portugal in 1808 to which Napier la-

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mented ‘The secret springs of this proceeding are not so deep as to baf-

fle investigation ; but that task scarcely belongs to the general historian,

who does enough when he exposes the effects of envy, treachery, and

base cunning, without tracing those vices home to their possessors’.

Napier attacked Canning and Castlereagh for plotting to drive Moore

‘into private life’ by forcing his resignation, at the least ‘ministers were

resolved at any cost to prevent Moore from commanding the army des-

tined for Portugal’.

Certainly Canning was not keen on Moore going to

Iberia and seemed to sway to opinion in the Cabinet, perhaps supported

by the King. Furthermore, Napier blamed them for the tragic outcome

of the 1808-1809 Corunna campaign culminating in the death of Moore.

He called their plans ‘immature’; the plans, and in intimation the indi-

viduals, only became ‘mature, on the 6

of October [1808 when] sir John

Moore was finally appointed to lead the forces into Spain’.

Napier’s

other hero was Napoleon, whom he considered a military genius. Can-

ning, a staunch Anti-Jacobin, and Castlereagh both refused to accept

Napoleon’s right to be Emperor of the French. Napier attacked the gov-

ernments ‘shifts and subterfuges’ and criticised their ‘ridiculous denial of

Napoleon’s titles’.

Napier’s two main political targets were both dead (Castlereagh in

1822 and Canning in 1827) by the publication of his monumental work

in 1828, hence Strangford was the next best target. While Napier was

writing two major issues dominated European politics. The Greek War

of Independence (1821-1833) impinged on wider Anglo-Russo-Turkish

relations. Britain was concerned over Russian ambitions at the expense

of Turkey while the latter attempted to suppress Greek independence

movements. The main calls for British intervention came from the oppo-

sition Whigs, but Castlereagh as Foreign Secretary until 1822 and Can-

ning his successor until 1827 formulated British responses to the conflict

and the wider Eastern Question. Both decided on official non-

intervention in the conflict. Strangford was British ambassador at Con-

stantinople 1821-1824 and then to Russia 1825-1826. Canning’s cousin

Stratford-Canning was British Minister to Turkey in 1826-1827. Napier’s

older brother, Lieutenant General Sir Charles James Napier, was Gover-

nor of Cephalonia, one of the Ionian Islands, from 1822 until 1830, and

was a keen supporter of the Greek independence movements. By attack-

ing their handling of the Portuguese crisis in 1807, Napier, a Whig, was

also calling into question Canning and Strangford’s handling of recent

and current international issues.