Robson Martin. Britain, Portugal and South America in the Napoleonic Wars: Alliances and Diplomacy in Economic Maritime Conflict (ENG)

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The second issue was the Portuguese succession. João had become

João VI of Portugal in 1816 upon the death of his mother and his reign

lasted until his death in 1826. João had returned to Portugal in 1821 to

rule over the dual monarchy of Portugal and Brazil but his son Pedro

had different ideas declaring Brazilian independence in 1822. Miguel,

Pedro’s brother, had tried two abortive attempts at rebellion in Portugal

to unseat his father and was eventually banished in 1824. Hence, upon

João’s death Pedro acceded to the throne of Portugal and Brazil but re-

sided in the latter, hence Miguel saw his opportunity and was proclaimed

King of Portugal in 1828. Although the main conflict did not erupt until

1831, three years after the publication of Napier’s first edition, when

Pedro abdicated in Brazil and sought British help in removing Miguel

from the Portuguese throne, the problems surrounding the Portuguese

and Brazilian successions stretched back to the very events Napier was

describing and in which Strangford had (or had not) played a key part.

Strangford attempted to rebuff Napier’s arguments in Observations on

Some Passages in Lieut-Col. Napier’s History of the Peninsular War, published

in 1828. Strangford claimed his dispatches ‘were originally written, as their

date proclaims, on board His Majesty’s Ship Hibernia’ but admitted they

were rewritten in London at the request of Canning who thought it

‘quite impossible to publish the whole of my letters as they then stood’.

According to Strangford, Canning wanted to protect individuals remain-

ing in Lisbon after the evacuation and who would be at the mercy of

French reprisals and to ensure the despatches contained no information

regarding a possible British attack on the French held forts in the Tagus.

Moreover, Strangford had ‘too strongly expressed the feelings which had

been excited in my mind by the conduct of some of the Portuguese min-

isters’. Such revelations would prove offensive to the government

Strangford would soon be re-accredited to and would harm negotiations

with the Portuguese over the opening of Brazil to British trade.

Napier asserted the evacuation was down to Smith’s actions after

Strangford had been forced to leave Lisbon. He argued when Strang-

ford was on board the Hibernia he had the intention of returning to

England. Then ‘Smith, seizing the favourable moment, threatened to

bombard Lisbon, if the Prince Regent hesitated any longer’. Strangford

maintained during the time off the Tagus ‘Smith had no negotiations

whatever, with the government of Portugal. The whole of that Officer’s

transactions with the Portuguese government, at that period, was limited

to one solitary letter to Mons. d’Araujo, the minister for foreign affairs;

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which letter, dated on the 22

of November, proclaimed those meas-

ures of hostility’.

Strangford was convinced neither the hostile measures implemented

or Smith’s letter ‘had the slightest effect in producing the Emigration,

which had been definitvely resolved upon at a Council, held at Mafra, on

the 24

of November, before Sir Sidney Smith’s communications or mine

were received by the minister to whom they were addressed’. Smith’s

letter was dated 22 November but it was not delivered until 24

Novem-

ber, ‘the very day on which the Council was held, and the determination

to embark taken, in consequence of intelligence that the French had ac-

tually advanced’. Strangford was naturally keen to protect his former

patron and argued the evacuation was:

…the result of that admirable work of political providence and

sagacity, the Convention, signed in London by Mr. Canning, on the

22d October, 1807. It was the result, most assuredly not of any-

thing that I said or did, during my brief visit to Lisbon, on the

night of the 28

November, when the Royal Family were already

embarked, but of the information received at Mafra on the morn-

ing of the 24

, that the invasion had begun, and that the case had

thus occurred, on the actual arrival of which the Prince Regent

had, from the first to last, stated His departure to depend’.

Regarding the actual events of 28-29 November Strangford stated again

he ‘arrived at Lisbon on the night of the 28

of November, and almost

immediately saw M. d’Araujo, who was already on board ship’. He then

‘proceeded to the vessel in which the Prince Regent was embarked, and,

notwithstanding the assertion to the contrary in Colonel Napier’s

“Note,” I had a long and a most confidential interview with His Royal

Highness’. Strangford stated the Regent was apprehensive ‘but “fully

determined” (I use his own words) “to throw himself on His Majesty’s

forgiveness, and, at all events, to prefer the noble enmity of England to

the false insidious friendship of France.” His resolution to depart was

irrevocably taken. It required no confirmation from me’.

Strangford

concluded: ‘1°. That the emigration was not owing to the “negotiations of

sir Sidney Smith.” 2°. That it was not owing (what assuredly I never pre-

tended) to my visit to Lisbon on the 28

November. 3°. That it was ow-

ing to a series of transactions and engagements which had taken place in

the interval between the 13

of August and the 17

of November’. It

was, according to Strangford, achieved by the power of diplomatic inter-

course rather than the menaces of Smith’s Royal Navy squadron.

With Strangford’s view now in the public domain, Napier reasserted

his original attacks. Strangford responded with Further Observations on

Some Passages in Lieut-Col. Napier’s History of the Peninsular War also pub-

lished in 1828. He reasserted the contentious despatch ‘was, as far as

manual operation was concerned, undoubtedly written in Bruton-street,

but I repeat, that it was a mere compilation and arrangement of my origi-

nal dispatches, all and every one of which were written and dated on

board the Hibernia’. It was rewritten ‘under the special directions of the Secre-

tary of State – that it contained nothing that was not contained in them’.

Napier then reasserted the Moniteur declaration and Smith’s letter

caused the emigration.

Strangford argued there was no allusion ‘to the

House of Braganza in the Moniteur of the 2d of November’. He drew atten-

tion to the ‘minor and scarcely official paper, the Journal de l’Empire, of

the 31

October’ in which appeared ‘some remarks on His Majesty’s decla-

ration relative to the Copenhagen Expedition. In this long paper, which

was copied into the Moniteur of the 1

of November, there is the fol-

lowing passage, describing the supposed fatal policy of England towards

her allies. “England would have lost (or ruined) Denmark, if that court

had yielded to fear. It is thus that she will have lost (or ruined) Portugal,

and that the House of Braganza, IF it makes common cause with Eng-

land, WILL HAVE ceased to reign.”’

In fact these demands by Napoleon

had been known in Lisbon on 23 October, when news arrived of Napo-

leon’s outbursts at the diplomatic levee in Paris.

Napier was convinced more praise should have gone to Smith for

offering assistance while threatening menace if the convention was not

implemented. He now concluded praise for the success should be split

three ways between Strangford, Smith and the declaration in the Paris

Moniteur. In the end the Regent behaved as he always said he would and

fled to Brazil with his fleet. One recent commentator has perceptively

noted with ‘consummate skill, Dom João had played the weak hand that

fate had dealt him’.

While another concluded neither Smith or Strang-

ford ‘played the decisive part in bringing about the final decision. This

was left to Junot’s troops’.

By examining the movements and correspondence of Smith and

Strangford from 24 to 29 November a clear picture of Strangford’s in-

volvement emerges. According to Smith, Strangford remained with the

squadron blockading the Tagus until Smith received Araujo’s reply, dated

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25 November, on 27 November informing him preparations for emigrat-

ing were underway and the Regent would embark the next day. Smith

then sent Strangford ‘back to Lisbon, accompanied by his Flag Lieuten-

ant, on board the Confiance under a flag of truce’. Strangford did not

reach the Portuguese fleet until ‘the morning of the 29

when the fleet

was actually under way, and coming out to place itself under the admirals

protection’.

On 6 December Smith confirmed Strangford had been

landed ‘after M d Araujo’s answer on that subject was obtained’.

According to Strangford, upon his arrival he had a ‘most interesting

communicating with the Court of Lisbon’, during which the Regent

‘wisely direct all his apprehensions to a French army and all his hopes to

an English fleet’. Strangford provided assurances Smith’s squadron

would protect the retreat from Lisbon.

In a later dispatch dated 30

November/2 December, however, Strangford made the following state-

ment: ‘I have the Honour and Happiness of being able to inform you

that the result of my communications with the Prince Regent has been

the actual departure of His Royal Highness and family for the Brazils’.

He stressed the reason was his visit to the Regent on the night of 28

November and his offer of assistance and friendship during the embar-

kation. He did admit that when he initially arrived at Lisbon that night he

found the Portuguese royal family already embarked and ready to sail. It

has been suggested the meeting on the night of 28 November had not

been with the Regent but with Araujo. At this meeting it was agreed

Strangford would meet the Regent at 8am the following day but the royal

family sailed the next day and this projected meeting ‘never took place’

as Strangford was back on board the Confiance at the appointed time.

Smith had already intimated that when the Portuguese fleet came out

of the Tagus he was unsure of Portuguese intentions; if they were evacu-

ating he would not have cleared for action. The actual decision to evacu-

ate Lisbon had been made on 24 November when the Regent had ap-

proved orders for the embarkation to begin. On the previous day he had

received two important pieces of information: news of Napoleon’s fa-

mous declaration the house of Braganza had ceased to reign, and intelli-

gence Junot had entered Portuguese territory. According to Fortescue

these facts ‘were sufficient to throw the Portuguese Government into

hopeless panic and confusion’.

The declaration by Napoleon appeared in the Paris Moniteur on 15

November. Traditionally it is supposed to proclaim the ‘House of Bra-

gança has ceased to reign’. The Moniteur of this date states the ‘Prince

Regent of Portugal lost his throne’, and this ‘fall of the House of Bra-

gança remains proof of the loss of anyone attached to England’.

Foy

argues the Portuguese government was unaware of the French advance

until 24 November, the same day the infamous Paris Moniteur allegedly

arrived at Smith’s squadron. Now the Regent had nothing to expect

from France as had been made clear in the Moniteur:

After all, it was better to reign in America than to be a prisoner in

Europe. To make such an evident fact as this clear to the dullest

understanding, did not require the vehemence of Sir Sidney Smith,

or the rhetoric of Lord Strangford. It was a more eloquent coun-

sellor that the two Englishmen, it was fear, that at last overcame

the perpetual fluctuation of the Prince Regent: he resolved to em-

bark.

Therefore on 25 November the Regent gave orders to receive the

French in a friendly manner to hopefully delay the advance and provide

time for the embarkation. The following day he published a decree an-

nouncing his decision to flee to Brazil and by the 27

the Regent and

royal family were embarked, but two days of bad weather prevented the

fleet making sail until 29 November.

Some English historians have surmised Strangford presented the

Moniteur to the Regent and that it was the catalyst for embarkation.

Oman was convinced Strangford received a copy of the Moniteur on 25

November containing the proclamation, which then influenced the Re-

gent. One historian of Latin American history has even argued Strang-

ford ‘arranged the successful escape…largely on his own initiative’, a

statement not supported by the evidence of ministerial involvement con-

tained in the Foreign Office files. Unsurprisingly for a committed Tory

and critic of Smith, William James stated the reason for the embarkation

was the Moniteur and ‘the reasoning of Lord Strangford’ while for Fortes-

cue ‘but for the firmness of Strangford, the Emperor [Napoleon] would

have had his desire’.

In fact there is no mention of the Moniteur in either Strangford’s or

Smith’s official correspondence on the matter. The only reference seems

to be in the wording of the letter Smith sent to Araujo on 22 November

where he states he wanted to avoid ‘language of menace, indeed while

that of France as well as its conduct is of the most menacing description

tending to nothing less than the subjugation of the European territory of

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the ancient Royal House of Braganza’. Strangford says nothing of a

Moniteur in any of his Foreign Office correspondence. This does not

necessarily mean a copy was not present at Lisbon, but simply if there

was Smith and Strangford did not think it important enough to mention

it to the Admiralty or the Foreign Office.

Strangford could not feasibly have conversed with the Regent until

the night of 28

November at the earliest if he managed to meet the Re-

gent at all. His influence upon the timing of the evacuation was not as

great as he, or Canning, thought. Even if a declaration from Napoleon

did help influence the Regent he had already made a decision on 24 No-

vember several days before Strangford could possibly gain a personal

audience. Once the Court of Lisbon had been embarked Strangford may

have eased the pain experienced by the Regent at abandoning his country

and people to a French occupation by remaining with the Portuguese

court until the ships had passed the mouth of the Tagus. He also pro-

vided a visible presence of British friendship and assurances the Portu-

guese fleet would not be attacked by Smith. It is open to debate whether

the Prince would have fled without the diplomatic prompting of Strang-

ford and the menaces threatened by Smith. Using the inherent flexibility

of a maritime force, the British fleet poised off the Tagus threatened the

Prince Regent with a repeat of the ‘horror’ experienced at Copenhagen

while at the same time offering salvation. But, ultimately, it was the Re-

gent who had made the final decision.

…

Appendix VIII

Sir Sidney Smith and Sir John Moore

Historians have vilified Strangford and especially Smith for not sending

for Moore’s force at Gibraltar. Fortescue argued his neglect ‘in this in-

stance appears almost criminal, for the entire issue at Lisbon might well

have turned on the arrival of Moore’s battalions’. Fortescue ascribes this

to Smith’s ‘incorrigible jealousy and selfishness’. Moore reciprocated the

ill feeling on the part of Smith, which dated from the operations along

the coast of Naples in 1806-1807. Sailing with a detached squadron

Smith, according to John Knox Laughton, carried on a ‘bitter and not so

successful, [war] against the English military officers, with whom he was

supposed to be cooperating’. This was especially directed against Moore,

‘who was quite unable to understand the real merit hidden beneath so

much extravagance and vanity’. During this period Moore confided his

feelings towards Smith in his diary. ‘I am not obliged to account for the

motives of such a man. From experience, I know that nothing is too

absurd for his folly, nothing too mean or wicked where his vanity or his

interest is concerned’. With two officers displaying immense loathing for

each other it is not surprising difficulties arose.

Smith explained his decision in a letter to the Admiralty on 1 December

arguing he, along with Strangford, agreed it would have been difficult to

keep the transports off the lee shore in bad weather due to the lack of a

safe anchorage outside the Tagus. The sand bars at the entrance of the

Tagus were notorious. In 1796 Jervis lost the use of the Bombay-Castle (74)

for seven days after it ran aground on the Catchops. Bad weather had pre-

vented the evacuation of the Portuguese fleet and in 1808 several more

ships would be lost in the Tagus. Furthermore, Smith saw no design to

which Moore’s troops could be applied now the Tagus forts were in the

hands of the French. Strangford, however, informed Canning he had sent

for Moore on 24 November. To do this he had to inform Smith who could

detach a ship to sail for Gibraltar. As already noted Smith was extremely

short of frigates and smaller ships. From a naval point of view without a

safe anchorage and with the French in possession of Lisbon Moore’s force

would have had to conduct an opposed landing, a risky proceeding in bad

weather. Smith made an informed decision but his behaviour was unpro-

fessional in many respects and it is interesting he seemed to be over anx-

ious to justify his decision in the dispatch of 1

December.

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Moore had waited at Sicily for the forces from Egypt, which arrived

on 17 October. His command left Sicily on 29 October with 7,258 rank

and file, but due to contrary winds did not reach Gibraltar until 1 De-

cember. Upon his arrival he found two sets of confused instructions

from London. The first, dated 8 October, was signed by Castlereagh and

instructed him to leave two regiments at Gibraltar and return with the

rest of his force to England. The second set, dated 7 November, were

from Hawkesbury and ordered him to remain at Gibraltar as his force

might be needed to assist in the Tagus. If this were the case he would

receive appropriate instructions from Smith or Strangford. Moore found

no such instructions at Gibraltar and, taking the initiative, decided to sail

to the Tagus where he could ‘communicate more satisfactorily’ with

Strangford and Smith. Once he had firm information on the situation in

Portugal he would return to Gibraltar to collect the troops who were

waiting for water and provisions.

At sea on 6 December Moore encountered HMS Bulwark, one of the

ships blockading Cadiz, and spoke to Captain Fleming Elphinstone.

Moore was informed (falsely as it turned out) the Regent had refused to

embark for Brazil, would not allow British ships into the Tagus and that

French and Spanish troops had occupied Lisbon. Smith was off the Ta-

gus and Strangford had sailed for England. Two days later Moore came

across HMS Foudroyant and received more accurate details of events and

the evacuation whereupon he returned to Gibraltar where he expected to

find Strangford or Smith ‘or to find letters from them: in this expectation

I have been disappointed’. Most damning to Smith was neither Purvis

nor Dalrymple had been informed of events at Lisbon. Moore was cer-

tainly not impressed by this lack of professionalism, complaining to Cas-

tlereagh it was ‘difficult...to account for such a strange proceeding and

that in eleven days with every means in their power, neither...Smith or

Lord Strangford should have communicated to me events, in which they

knew by my instructions I was so materially interested’. Whether Moore

was needed or not, it was certainly a blunder on the part of Smith not to

inform Moore, Purvis and Dalrymple. One explanation, which might

hold some truth, is summed up by one of Smith’s sympathetic biogra-

phers ‘his failure to keep Moore informed was deliberate and that he

hoped, in this way, to win all the credit for himself’.

Ministers had been desperately trying to ensure an adequate land force

would be available to Smith and Strangford but they had been unsure

where Moore was. On 4 December Castlereagh expanded on previous

orders to Spencer and Moore. Spencer was directed to Sicily but to stop

in at the Tagus; if he found Moore there then he was to put himself un-

der his command. If Moore was not there, he was to communicate with

Strangford or if the minister had returned to England then with Smith.

He was to help in the evacuation of the Portuguese royal family, fleet

and Russian ships from the Tagus. If this could not be achieved he was

to attack and destroy the naval forces. He was not to land his troops

unless he gained access to some of the Tagus forts by consent or force,

or alternatively, gained a position that would allow him to re-embark and

proceed to Sicily.

Upon reaching the Tagus Moore was ordered to take

command of Spencer’s force and to remain at Lisbon if they were

needed for any operations. In fact Moore left Gibraltar on 15 December,

anchoring at St. Helens off Spithead on 28 December.

At Portsmouth

Spencer experienced immense problems with victualling his force and

had to wait for sufficient transport vessels and finally managed to put to

sea on 18 December.

Once news of the successful resolution of the crisis arrived in London

on 19 December further instructions were immediately forwarded to

Spencer. He was still to proceed to Lisbon under the convoy of Cotton

and if his services were required to cooperate with Cotton ‘in order to

capture the Russian fleet’. Castlereagh thought Spencer would be unable

to accomplish any objects in the Tagus due to ‘the accumulation of force

which the French have been able to collect there’, and he was instructed

to proceed to Gibraltar. Castlereagh was, for once, aided in these trans-

actions by inclement weather as Spencer, having been hit by gales on 25

December and which scattered his transports, had put into Falmouth.

When informed Castlereagh ordered him to wait there and gather the

transports but not to put to sea until he received further instructions

from the War Office.

…

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Abbreviations

ADM Admiralty, The National Archives

BL Add Ms. British Library, Additional Manuscripts

Cirencester Report on the Manuscripts of Earl Bathurst preserved at

Cirencester Park

CC Correspondence, Dispatches, and other Papers of Viscount

Castlereagh, Second Marquis of Londonderry

CNP Cotton Naval Papers

Dropmore Reports on the Manuscripts of J. B. Fortescue Preserved at Dropmore,

1892-1927

FO Foreign Office, The National Archives

HAR GC George Canning Papers. By kind permission of the Earl and

Countess of Harewood.

CMN Correspondance Militaire de Napoléon Ier

CN Correspondance de Napoléon I publiée ordre de l’Emperuer Napoléon III

Naval Papers Naval Papers respecting Copenhagen, Portugal, and the Dardanelles,

presented to Parliament in 1808

PD Cobbett’s Parliamentary Debates

WO War Office, The National Archives

WD The Dispatches of Field Marshal The Duke of Wellington, during his

various campaigns in India, Denmark, Portugal, Spain, the Low

Countries, and France

WSD Supplementary Despatches, Correspondence and Memoranda of Field

Marshal Arthur, Duke of Wellington

NOTES