Robson Martin. Britain, Portugal and South America in the Napoleonic Wars: Alliances and Diplomacy in Economic Maritime Conflict (ENG)

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France as a global economic struggle for survival and that at the end of

conflict the accounts would have to be balanced. If Britain ended the

wars as the carrier of global trade it would compensate her for the sacri-

fices made in the same way the European powers would want territorial

compensation for their war efforts.

To assist the spread of British commerce the Portland ministry looked

to exercise influence throughout the region by placing an Anglophile

Bourbon monarch on a South American throne. This latter scheme came

to nothing, but ministers grasped at the opportunity presented by the

flight of the Portuguese royal family to Brazil to achieve their ends in a

slightly different way. Set against the maelstrom of Napoleonic Europe

the transatlantic voyage of the Portuguese court to Brazil seems rather

small fry but it was crucial in providing, for the first time, a friendly and

receptive government in South America. As with the Talents, one thing

pressed greatly on the Portland cabinet: the dire possibility Napoleon

might concentrate the power of the New and Old worlds against Britain.

With the Prince Regent installed in Brazil Napoleon could make no le-

gitimate claim to Portugal or Brazil. Britain, on the other hand, could

cultivate the relationship with Brazil as the conduit for the spread British

maritime-based commerce in the region. Only when it seemed increas-

ingly likely Napoleon was determined on a takeover of Spain, did minis-

ters consider sending troops to South America. But once rebellion broke

out in Spain the Portland administration held back, waiting to see if Brit-

ish troops could be utilised in Iberia. South America was still on the

agenda right up until late June 1808, but the arrival of the Spanish depu-

ties and the realisation that the revolt was widespread caused ministers to

make a firm commitment to Europe.

This, of course, suggests interest in South America was part of what

might be termed the British ‘Plan B’ in the period. Duffy for one has

argued British ‘imperial’ policy ‘became the fall-back defensive strategy

for successive British governments’.

South American projects were

always subordinate to European considerations as expeditions were

shelved to progress peace talks in 1796 and 1800-1801; for strategic rea-

sons, such as removing the French from Egypt in 1801; or to assist Pitt’s

coalition building in 1804-1805.

With Prussia teetering on the brink of

destruction in November 1806 Earl Fitzwilliam wrote to Grenville not-

ing ‘these are only preparations to the destruction even of the Russian

empire; there is an end of the old world, we must look to the new’.

Hence, British intervention in South America was intrinsically linked to

BRITAIN, PORTUGAL AND SOUTH AMERICA

234

ONCLUSION

235

the European situation, and in particular relations with Spain and Portu-

gal. It is interesting to note that the dates for considered military opera-

tions Duffy mentions above all occurred in periods when Spain was at

war with Britain. There were no firm plans to intervene in the region

before Spain changed allegiance in 1796, or after the peace of Amiens,

until British actions forced the Spaniards to declare war in late 1804. Of

course, after 1808 Spain was fighting with Britain against France, and,

though this did cause problems in the relationship over conduct in South

America, they are beyond the scope of this study.

All this seems to add weight to the ‘Continental’ interpretation of the

wars, the mainstay of which is that France could only be defeated in bat-

tle in Europe. But such an argument misses one key point. French

strength lay in her territory and population, providing a large army,

which was used to devastating effect during the Revolution and Empire.

British statesmen could not pursue a Napoleonic Clausewitzian doctrine

to decisively defeat the French in battle and force them into agreeing to

British war aims at the peace table. Instead, for military, social, economic

and doctrinal reasons, British strategy was more subtle, relying on the

nation’s rather unique strengths. An insular position, limited European

interests (besides the key Low Countries), an economy heavily involved

in overseas trade and a powerful navy provided Britain with the advan-

tage in a long-term maritime war of financial attrition.

If British intervention in South America was about spreading influ-

ence and commerce, then the figures show it was worthwhile.

On 22

January 1808 the Regent opened the ports of Brazil to all friendly na-

tions, in effect ensuring Britain would dominate trade with the new seat

of Portuguese government. Commercial and diplomatic representatives

were despatched to press for British concessions. By the end of 1808

there were estimated to be around 100 British merchants resident in Rio;

soon ‘Britain rapidly and completely replaced the mother country in

commerce’.

An additional treaty was later signed in Rio on 19 February

1810, setting the import duties on goods entering Brazil at 15 per cent

for British goods, 16 per cent for Portuguese and 20 per cent on other

countries. This in effect was ‘economic capitulation, an acknowledge-

ment of the shift of Brazilian dependence from Portugal to England’.

This had the effect of discontinuing the British factories that had trans-

ferred to Brazil whereas those that had remained in Portugal were free to

resume their business in the aftermath of Junot’s expulsion from the

country in 1808.

By 1812 British exports to Brazil alone were worth

over £2,000,000 whereas in 1807 they had been valued at £1,200,000.

This compensated for the loss of trade with Portugal, which in 1806 had

a value of nearly £1.2 million. In 1808 official trade with Portugal only

amounted to £811,000,

while direct British exports dropped to a low of

£431,000. Exports to Madeira and the Azores, which in 1807 had been

worth £264,000, more than doubled to a total value of £643,000 the

following year.

Although trade with Brazil was certainly important the expansion of

commerce could never replace the European markets. Instead, the key

factor in combating the Continental blockade was the transfer of the

Portuguese government which allowed Britain to penetrate the more

lucrative markets of Spanish America. Although South America was

never as valuable as contemporaries believed, Popham had optimistically

estimated South America shipped 50 million dollars per year to Euro-

pean Spain when trying to gain approval for his plans,

the value of the

trade has to be seen in the context of the struggle between Britain and

France. Platt’s figures show that British exports to areas in the Americas

outside of the US, valued at £7.8 million in 1805 and £10,440,000 in

1807, increased following the arrival of the Portuguese royal family in

Brazil to £16,590,000 in 1808.

With the traditional European markets

denied to British goods:

Latin America, with Spain, Portugal and Gibraltar acting largely as

entrepôts for Spanish America and Brazil, was providing the main

outlet for new trade during a period in which the important Euro-

pean and North American markets were particularly lean.

It is hard to argue with Platt’s assessment that for a few years South

America ‘really was important to Britain’.

There is one final issue to consider: a key argument from British

statesmen to justify intervention in South America was the fear that

France would either seize territory in the region or gain access through

the conquest of Spain or Portugal. France had landed troops near Rio de

Janeiro in 1711. A repeat performance might leave France in possession

of an excellent cruiser base near the trade routes to the East Indies and

China.

In September 1796 British intelligence reports had indicated

French pressure on Portugal to hand over Brazilian territory, declare the

Amazon open to French and Spanish ships and pay an indemnity of 25

million livres.

The threat seemed to increase when Spain allied with

BRITAIN, PORTUGAL AND SOUTH AMERICA

236

ONCLUSION

237

France in 1804.

Moreover, despite her military success, the campaigns

of 1805 had left the French economy in ruins. Napoleon viewed Spain

and her empire as a ‘milch cow’ and lumbered her with a debt of 60 mil-

lion francs.

In 1806 Napoleon composed a plan for 60,000 French and Spaniards

to invade Portugal, with a French expedition of 8-9,000 men heading

for Brazil to prevent the Portuguese court fleeing there.

In the Con-

vention of Fontainebleau of 1807, France and Spain agreed the King of

Spain would become Emperor of the two Americas. The colonies, is-

lands and overseas possessions of Portugal were to be divided between

France and Spain.

In August 1807, with a great number of English

speculators in Montevideo, Napoleon thought it might be wise to sta-

tion five or six French frigates off the coast to intercept trade;

he re-

turned to the subject again in November.

During the course of 1808

Napoleon would consider numerous plans for operations in South

America.

In April he asked his Minister of Marine, Denis Decrés to

employ a few brigs and frigates off the coasts of Mexico, Cayenne and

the River Plate. The reason was to introduce agents into Mexico and

Montevideo and to inform the Spanish Americans of the transfer of

power in Old Spain, which Napoleon naturally thought would be advan-

tageous to the colonies.

In May he wrote to Decrés ordering him to

send a shipment or arms to Montevideo, a port which he considered an

ideal base for French expeditions, and inquired how many French ships

had actually been despatched to Spanish America.

It appears he was

thinking of sending an expedition to Montevideo demanding that the

French forces now occupying Lisbon were to make ready three ships of

the line, three frigates and the nine Russian vessels there ready for of-

fensive operations.

By the end of May he was inquiring if there were

enough transports and if the fleet could escape a British blockade and

make for Brazil.

Believing that Britain was approaching financial ex-

haustion he wanted French commerce-raiding squadrons based in South

America.

After his takeover in Spain, Napoleon thought the whole of

the Spanish Empire was at his command and during the summer of

1808 considered plans to seize South America, Havana, Mexico and the

Philippines.

Despite all the potential for bluster and propaganda from

Napoleon, there was some substance to the British belief in the French

threat to South America.

Hence, during the vital years 1806-1808 when Britain stood, largely

alone, South America became a key consideration in the British ability to

stay fiscally sound and, consequently, in the fight against France. With

little hope of raising another coalition in Europe the opportunity pre-

sented by Popham was just too good to turn down. Clearly British states-

men were tempted by the supposed rich resources of the region and

were fearful of French intentions. But it must be remembered the strate-

gic situation was dire during these years as ministers looked to use the

meagre British land forces available for operations in a theatre where, in

conjunction with the exercise of maritime power, they could really make

a difference to the British war effort.

The British War Effort and Economic Maritime Conflict

Clearly during the years under consideration here Britain was not fight-

ing to overthrow Napoleon or even to decisively defeat France. British

war aims were to safeguard the Low Countries, preferably through Aus-

trian control, and to limit French expansion in Western Europe while

retaining access to the Mediterranean and Baltic seas. These aims could

only be achieved with the help of Austria, Prussia and Russia. During

1806-1808 there was little chance for the formation of a coalition of

European powers to achieve these objects. French military success

knocked Austria, Prussia and Russia out of the wars during these years.

Even peace with France was not ruled out, though the Talents and Port-

land governments realised this could never be a general peace, but rather

another breathing space such as Amiens. With peace unlikely Britain

continued to stand alone facing the combined might of Imperial France

aligned alongside virtually the whole of Continental Europe. Britain was

‘more than ever before dependent upon her naval superiority for her

own security, for strategic action in the one field where the initiative was

hers’.

Therefore, as Schroeder has stated, the ‘year 1807 must therefore

rank with 1940 (perhaps even surpass it) as Britain’s finest hour’.

Britain would continue to fight to preserve and expand maritime

strength upon which ‘depended the vigorous life of the great nation

which supplied the only power of motive capable of coping with the

demonic energy that possessed the spirit of the French’.

It was mari-

time trade, the lifeblood of the nation, which allowed her to come out

of the war in a favourable position. Not favourable in narrow strategic

terms of conquest, or formal empire, but favourable in terms of mari-

time trade and finance. In other words, as the nineteenth century devel-

oped, what would be recognised as the fundamentals of an informal

empire.

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ONCLUSION

239

While France could and did carry on the war if her trade fell due to

her ability to draw on the resources of conquered countries British

statesmen simply could not allow the economy to be a victim of French

Continental hegemony. It was widely recognised Britain’s ability to con-

tinue the war depended on foreign trade and especially exports of manu-

factured goods and it has been estimated if British trade fell by one third

then the capacity to carry on the war would have been greatly if not fa-

tally damaged.

Long-term borrowing and taxation, to pay for increasing

British war expenditure and to provide the means to subsidise European

allies, was the cornerstone of British fiscal strategy. This could only work

if British trade continued to flourish in a secure maritime environment to

provide the finance to fund ever increasing war expenditure.

Though Britain was willing to accept some spheres of influence

within Europe, France in Western and Central Europe and Russia in the

East, any actions which threatened the British Atlantic economy were

resisted with vigour. Moreover, Britain could not let her enemies steal a

march in these regions. The importance of opening new markets in

South America can only be viewed in this light and British interest in

overseas trade was entirely dependent on naval supremacy. Clearly Na-

poleon had short and long-term ambitions to contest British maritime

power through the acquisition of naval force and extensive rebuilding

plans. Attempts to prevent the Portuguese navy from falling into French

hands, and the subsequent blockade of the Russian fleet in the Tagus

were part of this. The British Atlantic economy could only be protected

by a chain of key strategic naval bases, allowing the Royal Navy to pro-

ject power. Some of these bases were in British hands, such as Gibraltar,

Malta, Bermuda and English Harbour in Antigua, but others were under

the control of other powers, such as Port Mahon, Palermo, Livorno and

of course Lisbon. The operations of British maritime commerce and the

Royal Navy, as Corbett noted, were dependent on such bases.

With Europe falling under French military and economic hegemony

during 1806-1808 the Talents and Portland administrations reacted

swiftly and decisively to safeguard the elements that were integral to Brit-

ish maritime power: a healthy and secure Atlantic economy, based as it

was on maritime commerce, protected by the supremacy of the Royal

Navy, and supported by a network of naval and commercial bases.

Though the Talents will still be criticised, and in some respects justifia-

bly, their policy towards Portugal was strikingly similar to that of the

Portland administration, which has received praise for its actions. Yet the

Talents policy of imperial expansion in South America, even if the imple-

mentation was flawed, at least provided the Portland administration with

a clear example of how not to approach the problem; something the

Portland administration clearly understood and took to heart.

Just as Napoleon’s actions had prompted British intervention in Por-

tugal and Popham’s actions presented an opportunity for the much-

vaunted intervention in South America, so the Spanish uprising was the

catalyst to re-orientate British strategy back towards Europe. Faced with

the decision of sending Sir Arthur Wellesley to Latin America or Iberia

the cabinet made a firm commitment to the European theatre. With

30,000 men committed to Iberia by the summer of 1808, Britain had

made a major Continental commitment but the mainstay of Britain’s

national well-being remained maritime security (and how Wellesley’s

ultimately successful campaign in Portugal and Spain fits into a wider

maritime-based assessment of Britain’s role in the Napoleonic Wars is

perhaps for a future volume). Suffice to say for now, with a foothold in

Portugal, given the expeditionary and transitory nature of previous Brit-

ish commitments to mainland Europe the key question for many observ-

ers was how long they would stay there?

…

RITAIN, PORTUGAL AND SOUTH AMERICA

240

Appendix I

The Ministry of the Talents, January 1806 – March 1807

First Lord of the Treasury Lord William Grenville

Chancellor of the Exchequer Lord Henry Petty

Lord Privy Seal Viscount Sidmouth (from Sept Lord

Holland)

Lord President of the Council Earl Fitzwilliam (from Oct

Sidmouth)

Lord Chancellor Lord Erskine

Home Secretary Earl Spencer

Foreign Secretary Charles James Fox (from 24 Sept

Howick)

Secretary of State for War William Windham

and the Colonies

First Lord of the Admiralty Charles Grey [April Visc Howick]

(from Sept Tom Grenville)

Master General of the Ordnance Earl of Moira

President of the Board of Trade Lord Auckland

[italicised = sitting in the House of Commons]

Source: Aspinall, A. A., (ed),

The Later Correspondence of George III

, 5

Vols., (Cambridge: University Press, 1962-1970), Vol. 4, pp.xlvi-xlvii.

…

APPENDICES

Appendix II

The Portland Ministry, March 1807 – September 1809

First Lord of the Treasury Duke of Portland

Chancellor of the Exchequer Spencer Perceval

Lord Privy Seal Earl of Westmorland

Lord President of the Council Earl Camden

Lord Chancellor Lord Eldon

Home Secretary Lord Hawkesbury (from 17 Dec

Liverpool)

Foreign Secretary George Canning

Secretary of State for War Viscount Castlereagh

and the Colonies

First Lord of the Admiralty Lord Mulgrave

Master General of the Ordnance Earl of Chatham

President of the Board of Trade Earl Bathurst

[italicised = sitting in the House of Commons]

Source: Aspinall, A. A., (ed),

The Later Correspondence of George III

, 5

Vols., (Cambridge: University Press, 1962-1970), Vol.

5, pp.li-lii.

…

RITAIN, PORTUGAL AND SOUTH AMERICA

242

PPENDICES

243

Appendix III

Portugal, 1793-1806

In 1793 Portugal agreed a defensive and offensive alliance with Spain to

protect her land frontiers, declared war on France and sent a division to

aid her new allies fighting in Catalonia. An agreement for mutual coop-

eration and aid with Britain guaranteed the security of Portugal and her

colonies from the sea. This was confined to cooperation between the

Portuguese Navy and the Royal Navy. After the collapse of the offen-

sive in Catalonia, the Spaniards were forced to make peace with France,

and Portugal immediately became vulnerable to French and Spanish

ambitions.

On 19 August 1796 the Treaty of San Ildefonso created a Franco-

Spanish offensive alliance aimed at Britain and Portugal. On 5 October

Spain declared war on Britain and the Portuguese engaged in peace talks

with France. In August 1797 the Portuguese minister in Paris, Antonio

Araujo e Azevedo, signed a treaty with the French, by which Portugal

agreed to follow a course of neutrality and to close her ports to British

shipping. The British reaction to these developments was one of conster-

nation and suspicion, even after the Portuguese Court rejected the

treaty.

The British reaction to San Ildefonso was to stage a strategic with-

drawal from the Mediterranean and to base the Mediterranean fleet un-

der Admiral Sir John Jervis at Lisbon to prevent enemy fleets from en-

tering the English Channel. The Portuguese minister in London asked

for 10,000 British troops to help defend the country against possible

invasion. Lieutenant General Sir Charles Stuart was ordered to take 5,000

men from the evacuated Mediterranean garrisons, proceed to Lisbon and

examine Portuguese defensive preparations. While stationed at Lisbon

Jervis attacked a Spanish fleet off Cape St. Vincent on 14 February 1797.

This famous victory resulted in Jervis being raised to the peerage as Earl

St. Vincent. He attempted to promote British influence at Lisbon by

convincing the Portuguese they had more to fear from British maritime

power than from a possible Franco-Spanish invasion.

During the French expedition to Egypt of 1798 a Portuguese fleet un-

der the command of the Marquis of Niza served alongside the Royal Navy

leading Napoleon to threaten that Portugal would weep tears of blood for

her actions.

Nelson’s success at Aboukir Bay isolated the French in Egypt