Robson Martin. Britain, Portugal and South America in the Napoleonic Wars: Alliances and Diplomacy in Economic Maritime Conflict (ENG)

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forcements from England or from Spencer. Wellesley hoped to be able

to attack the fortress of Peniche but required heavy 24lb guns and asked

Cotton to allow the Alfred to remain with the army. He would not detain

the ship if ‘the moment shall arrive at which you may have it in your

power to attack the fleet’. If the reinforcements from England or

Spencer’s force arrived off the Tagus, Cotton was ordered to direct them

to Wellesley’s position.

On 30 July Wellesley received Castlereagh’s orders informing him of

the reinforcements expected from England tempered with the news he

had been superseded. By this time Wellesley had gained a detailed picture

of events in Spain and Portugal and decided to press ahead with the

landing, ordering Spencer to head for the Mondego. Although he had

received Castlereagh’s despatch of 15 July intimating it was desirable to

assist the Spanish in Andalusia he decided against changing his orders to

Spencer to withdraw his forces from that region. Wellesley had received

intelligence from Cotton on 31 July that a French force in southern

Spain had surrendered to the Spanish at Bailén on 26 July.

Spencer arrived off Wellesley’s headquarters at Lavaos on the night of

5 August. Wellesley had commenced the initial landing on 1 August and

by 5 August his forces were ashore. Spencer’s forces were all landed by 8

August. Wellesley now had just over 15,000 men and began to advance

towards Lisbon to cover the landing of the brigades of Generals An-

struther and Acland, which arrived on 17 and 20 August respectively. An

advance force from Junot’s army was driven back at Roliça on 17 Au-

gust. Then, on 21 August, a force of 13,000 men under Junot attacked

his command at Vimiero and again the French were beaten back, this

time with the loss of 2,000 men. Dalrymple and Burrard now arrived as

Junot entered into negotiations for the surrender of his force; an armi-

stice was agreed on 22 August. The armistice was turned into the notori-

ous Convention of Cintra. The French army was to evacuate Lisbon and

be returned to France in British ships accompanied by all the property

they had seized.

The Russian ships were secured in a separate convention between

Cotton and Seniavin. The officers and men would be returned to Russia

without any stipulations on their future conduct. The ships would be

held by Britain until six months after a general peace. Seven were sent to

England, arriving at Spithead on 6 October. Two ships were unfit for

sea, the Raphael (80) and the Yaroslav (74), and were to be repaired in the

Tagus. Seniavin stayed in England until heading back to Russia in August

RITAIN, PORTUGAL AND SOUTH AMERICA

224

HE SPANISH INSURRECTION AND BRITISH POLICY

225

1809. Two ships were returned to Russia in 1813, Silnyi (74) and Moshtch-

noi (66), the others, in a very poor state, had been sold with the Russians

reimbursed at their original value.

Despite the furore that greeted the news of the convention in Eng-

land, the objects of the operation had been achieved; Portugal was free

of French troops and the naval threat from Lisbon had been removed.

By the end of August the Portland Government had made a major com-

mitment to Iberia, with 30,000 men available for operations in Portugal,

and the strategically important city of Lisbon providing an excellent base

for future operations in Portugal and, possibly, beyond.

…

At first glance British policy towards Portugal and South America seems

to offer little opportunity for a wider understanding of British involve-

ment in the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. Certainly Brit-

ish commitments in Portugal and South America could have helped to

limit French territorial expansion, but how did they contribute to win-

ning the wars against France? How did involvement help achieve British

war aims of a friendly Low Countries, continued access to the Mediterra-

nean and Baltic Seas and European markets? Without the military means

to take on France such aims could not be secured by British efforts

alone. In this wider context, examining British policy towards Portugal

and South America during 1806-1808 highlights much about how ends,

means and ways were largely understood and implemented into a cohe-

sive package; that is, once the nature of the conflict for Britain is under-

stood. For Britain the wars were not about seizing huge tracts of Euro-

pean territory, instead they were about maritime security and hence the

means and ways to achieve those aims were maritime: the aim was mari-

time security, the way was maritime economic-based conflict and the

means was maritime-based expeditionary warfare.

Of course this is only one side of the story and British policy cannot

be studied in isolation. During these years France attempted to dominate

the European markets and hit the British economy by excluding British

commerce through the Continental blockade. But France also needed to

fight aggressive wars in order to make war pay, through booty and plac-

ing indemnities on defeated powers. Moreover, her massive army could

not be sustained on French soil and had to live off other nations. Finally,

Napoleon himself had little long-term strategic vision other than French

CONCLUSION

ONCLUSION

227

hegemony at the expense of the other powers of Europe.

All this cre-

ated an expansionist dynamic which would eventually lead to further

European conflict. In this situation Britain needed cash, not just for her

own ever-increasing expenses, but to provide financial assistance to

European allies when they took up arms against France. To guarantee

her own security, Britain could not and would not follow the French

model. British economic strength was built on overseas trade and colo-

nies, protected by the might of the Royal Navy. By blockading enemy

fleets in ports and aggressively pursuing them if they escaped and by

launching maritime-based expeditions in Europe and overseas to pre-

serve maritime supremacy, Britain continued to fight.

For the Talents, this key issue – of continuing the fight – was high on

the political agenda during the early months of their ministry. Peace with

France was a serious option, although the prospect of a lasting peaceful

arrangement with France was remote (even more so after the death of

Fox). Once it became clear neither side was completely committed to the

Paris peace talks the Talents concentrated on limiting the spread of

French power; a noble aim badly implemented leading to a dispersal of

British maritime-based military power. In reacting to everything, the

Talents failed to recognise what was central to achieving British aims and

what was on the periphery, and criticism of their European policy seems

justified. Muir has argued their policy in the Mediterranean and South

America ‘squandered their resources in futile expeditions’.

In particular,

the ill-treatment of Russia contributed to a breakdown of relations that

would lead to the Franco-Russian alliance of 1807. But is it possible for a

ministry to have achieved absolutely nothing of strategic worth in over a

year in office? As we have seen, with the weight of historical opinion

against the Talents it may seem so.

But in one respect the Talents strate-

gic thinking can be rescued from opprobrium.

The Portuguese Crises

During 1806-1808 Portugal became one of the major theatres in the con-

flict between France and Britain, and both the Talents and Portland ad-

ministrations moved to safeguard British interests in Portugal with great

speed and determination. The crises were generated by French policy.

For Napoleon it was essential to close the entrepôt into the Continental

blockade Portuguese ports, in particular Lisbon, had become. Interven-

ing in Portugal also provided the opportunity to increase French naval

power and to seize the harbour and facilities of Lisbon, while providing

an excuse for introducing troops into Spanish territory for future use.

Finally, Napoleon had clear, though ill-defined, designs on Brazil and the

South American possessions of Spain. It was essential for Britain to pre-

vent all this. Lisbon was essential for commercial and Royal Navy activi-

ties in the Mediterranean and Atlantic, as well as being an entrepôt for

British goods. It was also important the Portuguese court remained inde-

pendent, preventing France from laying claim to Brazil.

All the Portuguese wanted was to be able to continue their peaceful

existence and trade with Brazil and Britain, hence their policy was reac-

tive and largely depended on the line of action taken by Napoleon. As

Oliveira has succinctly argued:

From 1801 to 1807 (as before) Portugal’s external policy wavered

between the pressures of England (whose assistance was indispen-

sable both economically and militarily) and those of France. Partly

supported by the latter, Spain tried to be given a free hand and

help in Portugal, which might enable her to invade the country and

possibly to rebuild the Iberian unity lost in 1640.

Yet in 1806 it appeared Spain, frustrated with the French alliance, was

seemingly less hostile to Portugal. Napoleon was occupied in central and

northern Europe applying only diplomatic pressure on Portugal. This

policy had some success as Franco-Portuguese relations thawed due to

the state of relations between Lisbon and London. British inability to

prevent the Spanish invasion of 1801 and failure to support Portuguese

interests at the Peace of Amiens created dissatisfaction in Lisbon. With

Britain unable to guarantee Portuguese security, the Portuguese imple-

mented a strategy aimed at appeasing France.

In this situation both the Talents and Portland administrations reacted

to threats, real or perceived, to British maritime security concerns. The

Talents sent a special mission under Rosslyn and the Portland admini-

stration agreed a diplomatic convention with the Portuguese. Diplomatic

pressure could not work in all circumstances, however, and both admini-

strations dispatched Royal Navy forces to poise off the Tagus. The in-

herent advantages of maritime power allowed British naval power to be

rapidly placed on the spot, providing highly visible leverage to British

diplomacy by acting as a floating diplomatic mission while retaining the

capacity for violent action. A presence in the Tagus also allowed for

valuable intelligence gathering for ministers making decisions back in

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ONCLUSION

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London. In 1806 the arrival of the Royal Navy seemed to complicate

matters, St. Vincent’s fleet alarming the Portuguese and the Spaniards. In

1807 Smith’s threats to attack Lisbon in a similar way to Copenhagen

may (even if he could not back them up) have had some impact on the

Prince Regent. After the evacuation of the Portuguese court a naval

force under Cotton remained off the Tagus blockading hostile naval

forces.

Both administrations, however, also found naval forces alone could

not guarantee successful outcomes. Any hostile fleet in the Tagus could

not be attacked without first securing the Tagus forts. Rosslyn, St. Vin-

cent, Smith and Strangford all thought land forces were vital to any as-

sault on the Tagus while in 1808 Cotton pointed to the difficulties in

attacking the forts when they were occupied by French troops. One of

the key limits on British strategy was the small numbers of troops avail-

able for such operations. The Talents, unlike the Portland government,

did consider defending Portugal and having an expeditionary force at

hand offered to send it to Lisbon.

But once it was obvious the Portu-

guese did not want assistance, due to their belief there would be no inva-

sion, the Talents looked to the transfer of the Portuguese court and na-

val forces to Brazil. Moreover, the poor state of the Portuguese army

precluded any possible combined operations to defend Lisbon. When it

became obvious to London the supposed threat to Portugal, largely ema-

nating from Yarmouth’s correspondence, was in fact false, the Talents

swiftly moved onto other objects. As noted, the threats may have just

been a French ruse, to keep British troops tied up in Lisbon while Napo-

leon undertook offensive operations against Sicily or Prussia. The prob-

lem of recalling troops once they had been committed to Portugal was

clearly recognised by the Talents (it is one of the unique attributes of

maritime forces that they are inherently easier to withdraw than a land-

based commitment). The surprise and alarm expressed by the Portuguese

may also give some credence to claims that they knew something of the

Spanish plans to break with France.

For the Portland government, providing troops for a possible assault

was a major problem in part due to the Talents dispersal of effort in send-

ing troops to South America and the Mediterranean. The only force avail-

able to the Portland administration had been sent to the Baltic to safe-

guard British naval interests in that theatre. As the danger to Portugal es-

calated, Castlereagh withdrew troops from the Baltic after the successful

operation at Copenhagen and from the Mediterranean, concluding there

would be no opportunities for offensive operations in the region. Cer-

tainly British maritime preponderance granted a degree of mobility to Brit-

ish land forces, a factor Napoleon himself recognised. But it also had

problems. It proved difficult to recall troops once they were ordered over-

seas and despite the best efforts of Canning and Castlereagh, when mat-

ters came to a head in Lisbon in November 1807 there were no troops at

hand to force an entry into the Tagus if the Portuguese decided to side

with France. As Corbett noted, in order to make a truly effective contribu-

tion to war, navies must have the ability to project power ashore.

After the evacuation of the Portuguese court in November 1807 there

remained the threat posed by Junot in Lisbon and the Russian fleet in

the Tagus. But British ministers did not consider sending British troops

to free Portugal from French occupation. This was made clear to the

Portuguese in April 1808. Instead, ministers looked to South America

and Spanish possessions in Europe as the key targets for offensive op-

erations while naval force would be used to negate the threat of the Rus-

sian fleet and the captured Portuguese vessels escaping from the Tagus.

Canning and Castlereagh did look to attack the Tagus, but deferred to

the opinion of Cotton that forcing the river would be a dangerous

proposition. The nature of the river, highlighted by the failed boat attack

on the Garrota in April 1808, the extensive defences strengthened by the

French in 1808, evidenced by the loss of the Rapid in May 1808 and the

presence of the Russian fleet, all combined to make a successful attack

unlikely. In order to resolve the situation and free Cotton’s ships for

other operations, ministers decided to implement a different policy. Pro-

posals would be made to the Russians, French and Portuguese for a

maritime capitulation. The men of Junot’s army and Sinivian’s fleet

would be allowed to return to their countries. Sinivian’s ships would be

held for six months after a general peace. In return Britain would allow

supplies into Lisbon. These efforts were based on the opinion, provided

by well informed individuals such as Strangford and Captain McKinley,

that Lisbon was vulnerable to blockade. It seems Junot’s decision to gain

a source of supply from Cadiz prevented the success of the blockade, at

least in the short term.

Efforts to negate the Portuguese and Russian ships were part of a

wider policy to secure dangerous warships from the clutches of Napo-

leon. It worked. In the years 1806-1810 Britain added 101 captured war-

ships to the Royal Navy, prompting Glete to argue the ‘naval conse-

quences of the Tilsit agreement...were thus largely favourable to Great

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231

Britain’.

Comparisons between the action at Copenhagen and the Portu-

guese crises are inevitable but history tends to concentrate on the spec-

tacular, such as Copenhagen, to the detriment of the more mundane,

such as Lisbon. Although aggressive at an operational military level both

were essentially defensive in nature: to protect British maritime security.

It could be argued such operations were, with regards to British maritime

preponderance, more important than fleet battles. Temperley succinctly

noted ‘Nelson destroyed nearly twenty men-of-war at Trafalgar. Canning

obtained over thirty from Denmark and Portugal.’ The successful trans-

fer of the Portuguese Court, Temperley continues, ‘is in reality one of

the most important of the time’ but has ‘been obscured by the greater

notoriety of the Danish expedition’.

Such aggressive actions could, however, have wider detrimental diplo-

matic effects. After Copenhagen one British commentator noted: ‘The

entire front of Europe from the Bosphorus to the North Cape is in hos-

tile array against us, and our court must have been very badly informed

of the tempers and feelings of the continent towards us if it has yet to

learn that we are everywhere detested’.

In 1807 Canning helped to ex-

plain the reasoning behind such actions; ‘we are hated throughout

Europe – and that hate must be cured by fear’. He viewed such opera-

tions as reminding the powers of Europe what British naval power could

achieve.

But Canning’s bluster did not blind him to the fact that alli-

ances, particularly with Russia, were essential for Britain. By acting out of

self-interest Britain certainly was enhancing her maritime security, but at

what price? Isolated from Europe both the Talents and Portland admini-

strations looked to South America, thereby opening up their policies to

the charge Britain ignored the needs of Europe and instead concentrated

on overseas Empire building.

South America

So the crucial question is: was Napoleon right? Did Britain follow an

‘imperialist’ maritime strategy while turning her back on potential allies in

Europe? Taken at face value the weight of evidence seems to support

this theory. Yet, British involvement in overseas colonial operations was

a central part of war strategy and South America had been on the agenda

for some time as a theatre where major military and naval operations

might be implemented, but nothing concrete came of the many plans.

This all changed in 1806 and for the next two years the region played an

important role in British strategy. Hence, after ignoring calls for British

intervention in northern Europe and attempting to promote British in-

terest at the Ottoman Porte, it was the key region where the Talents un-

dertook offensive operations. As Hall has argued Popham’s actions were

a ‘sudden, apparently heaven-sent, opportunity to expand British impe-

rial power in South America’

for it was a region where ‘British interests

at their most blatant, could be pursued’.

In the words of one popular

historian: ‘The seriousness of Britain’s long term desire to add the sup-

posedly suppurating Spanish Empire to her dominions – thereby making

good the losses in North America – should not be underestimated’.

A key problem for the Talents, however, was the implementation of

this policy. The very nature of Popham’s actions caused problems right

from the start. The Talents admitted to the King they had looked to the

region and they did threaten the Portuguese that Brazil would be seized

if they sided with France, but the cabinet had not made any firm deci-

sions as to wider British involvement, Grenville recognising once in-

volved it would be difficult to wriggle free from the region. Then Po-

pham presented a fait accompli, which for commercial and domestic rea-

sons could not be ignored. After Pophams’s trumpeting up of the value

of South America, and the landing of a large amount of cash as evidence,

the Talents could not just evacuate the region. After the failure of peace

talks with France ruled out South American exchanges for security in

Europe and distrustful of Russia and Prussia, for a brief period of time

the Talents lost themselves in the dream of conquering the entire region

and founding a new empire in South America to replace the North

American empire lost in 1783 to balance against European Napoleonic

hegemony. There was another driver behind their policy: the fear of

France or America becoming the dominant power in the region.

The Talents, therefore, decided to build on Popham’s initial success.

But the inherent difficulties in communicating with the region caused the

Talents to react to events rather than to try and shape them. By the time

orders had arrived in theatre the situation could be completely changed.

Compounding this was the administration’s clear lack of understanding

of the nature, people and geography of the Spanish Empire. Windham

initially looked to spreading British influence ‘by a mild and gradual op-

eration’, but the degeneration into wild schemes for conquering the

whole continent in various ways reveal a government desperate for suc-

cess but without little experience of actually forming clear aims and then

implementing them. Grenville clearly informed Lauderdale South Amer-

ica, once conquered, would never be restored in any peace treaty. There

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233

were dissenting voices, but Grenville and Windham pushed on with an

aggressive imperialistic land-grab policy. Eventually realising the prob-

lems faced, the Government turned to Wellesley who injected a degree

of focus, clarity and realism into the plans but it was probably too late.

The Talents complete lack of strategic direction regarding South America

was brought to a head by the appointment of Whitelocke and his conse-

quent bungling in the region.

Although the Talents were spared the fall out of their and White-

locke’s failure, it comes as no surprise that history has not been kind to

their dabbling in South American projects. Fortescue described Wind-

ham’s ‘project for the invasion of South America upon both coasts’ as a

warning that ‘a man of exceptional ability…may be a mere child in his

conception of the operations of war’.

Glover points to the ‘feckless

strategy’ made worse by Whitelocke’s shambolic attack on Buenos Ai-

res.

While even Napier thought the Whig ministry ‘remarkable for un-

fortunate military enterprises’, in particular for assembling 9,000 men for

‘permanent conquests in South America...perhaps in imitation of the

Roman senate, who sent troops to Spain when Hannibal was at the gates

of the city’.

For Hall the Cabinet ‘allowed itself to be sucked into the

morass of South America’.

The in-coming Portland administration were also critical of their

predecessors, Castlereagh noting the Talents lack of a coherent strategy

towards South America and their indecision in not following up Po-

pham’s actions sooner.

South America was now too agitated against

Britain for direct military intervention, hence, as Duffy has recognised,

the main object after the Talents failure was not large-scale military con-

quest, but to ‘occupy strategic points from which to establish commerce

with Spanish America…in this way British influence could be established

without requiring the burdens of direct rule over the whole continent’.

Castlereagh clearly did not see conquest leading to permanent possession

as a viable option and was particularly concerned the entire region might

erupt in rebellion, leaving no semblance of government. This was a real

fear; after the revolt against Popham in 1806 what South America

wanted was independence from all imperial control. Carefully assessing

the situation, the Portland administration looked to the benign spread of

British influence or soft power through the growth of illicit commerce

with South America. This is patently clear in Canning’s memorandum on

Mexico: to call in the strength of the New World to counter French

dominance of the Old World. Canning clearly viewed the war with