Robson Martin. Britain, Portugal and South America in the Napoleonic Wars: Alliances and Diplomacy in Economic Maritime Conflict (ENG)

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inapplicable they may be’ to the situation in Portugal and Brazil should

be renewed.

Canning also wanted a specific agreement on the future role of the

Royal Navy squadron situated off Brazil. Originally there was no time-

scale for this squadron remaining in Brazilian waters and Canning was

keen to ensure a continued naval presence in the area to back up British

diplomacy. Strangford was provided with two options: he could stipulate

it would stay for a fixed period subject to renewal on the expiry of this

period or he could qualify a period of time by a ‘conditional expression’.

Canning suggested an example of this latter option, ‘so long as HRH the

Prince Regent shall continue to desire the presence of Hmy’s squadron,

and as the various and important services of Hmy’s Navy shall enable

Hmy to afford it’. In return for the security afforded by the squadron the

Portuguese court must agree to the admission of all Royal Navy warships

into Brazilian ports for repair and victualling.

In a third and secret despatch of the same date Canning provided an

overview of British policy. Brazil was now seen as the seat of Portuguese

government and the economic reform of the much-neglected country

was to be an initial object. Strangford was specifically instructed to

‘direct the attention of the Brazilian Government to the care and cultiva-

tion of those ample and improveable resources which it’s American Do-

minions afford’. With regard to Portugal, although Britain would not

acknowledge the right of any usurper to the throne, she was not

‘prepared to engage for it’s restitution to it’s lawful sovereign’. Canning

could not ‘imagine that there is any near prospect of the Prince Regent’s

reestablisment there in perfect independence’. Any return to Europe

would be based on a compromise with France and ‘must lead, after no

long interval, to a recurrence of the same difficulties and dangers from

which HRH has recently rescued himself by a noble effort’, an effort that

would be very difficult to repeat. If the Regent wanted to return to Por-

tugal then it would lead to ‘great mischief’ and such an outlook would

‘not fail to induce a comparative neglect of the internal resources of that

country in which HRH now resides’.

Canning wanted to exploit the commercial opportunities opened up by

the transfer of the Portuguese government, recognising a ‘formal and

definite agreement…is indispensible’, but was willing to give the Regent

some time to settle in Brazil before pressing for firm commercial agree-

ments. Hence any made ‘in the first instance’ should be general and

agreed to by the Portuguese ‘without hesitation’ and should not extend to

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any other objects than those necessary for the immediate opening of Bra-

zil to British commerce, subject to duties agreed on, although it was not

necessary to fix a precise scale. Ideally Canning wanted ‘a distinct prefer-

ence’ for British imports though this demand was not to be pressed too

much. It would be sufficient ‘to stipulate reciprocally that each govern-

ment should treat the other on the footing of the most favoured nation’.

Despite this Canning was keen to dissuade the Regent from setting high

duties; such a policy would eventually ruin Portuguese revenue, which ‘in

a great measure depend[s] upon the import trade of the Brazils’. With the

removal of Portuguese manufactures from the Regent’s influence there

was no reason to repress the manufactures of Brazil so that those in Por-

tugal could flourish. Instead, Brazil would benefit from a flourishing trade

with Britain which would increase to ‘an almost unlimited extent, if the

intercourse between the two countries should be wisely and judiciously

placed on such a footing, as to induce the British merchant to make the

Brazils an emporium for the British manufactures destined for the con-

sumption for the whole of South America’.

Many goods exported by Brazil, such as coffee and sugar, were similar

to the staple exports of the British West Indies. This posed a problem.

João would probably desire preferential agreements with his possessions

in the Portuguese East Indies in a similar way that Britain treated the

West Indies. Canning hoped to grant the same arrangement to the im-

portation of British East India goods into Brazil as Portuguese West

Indian goods into Britain. Therefore, he would only apply import restric-

tions on sugar and coffee. Other Brazilian exports, such as dye, tobacco,

hides, drugs and cotton, would find unlimited markets in Britain while

the requirements for naval stores such as hemp and timber was of in-

creased importance given the situation in the Baltic. Canning was espe-

cially interested in the importation of Brazilian cotton; if imported in

Brazil ships it would be granted the same duties as British ships, but Brit-

ain would desire a similar concession in Brazil. Canning hoped these

measures would suppress ‘the existence in any quarter of a suspicion that

this country might be desirous of depressing Brazilian navigation, for the

purpose of extending her own’. One obstacle to a trade agreement with

Brazil was the retention in British ports of several Portuguese ships. Af-

ter comparing the value of the granting of cotton licences in Brazil with

the value of these ships Canning did not see any advantage in condemn-

ing the latter as prizes and asked for advice from Bathurst, President of

the Board of Trade, and Perceval, Chancellor of the Exchequer.

In yet another separate communication to Strangford, Canning stated

government policy on a point requiring delicate consideration. Brazil was

an excellent entrepôt for British manufactured goods to enter Spanish

America. In fact an illicit trade between the two empires had developed

over a number of years. But with Brazil and Spain now nominally at war

Canning expressed concern over the ‘interception likely to be given to

any direct intercourse between the South American dominions of Portu-

gal and Spain’. Madrid opposed direct entry of British goods into its

colonies hence Canning specifically argued the illegal trade should be

encouraged. He presumed ‘the wants of the inhabitants of those

[Spanish] provinces might induce the local governments to connive at a

trade carried on with the port of the island of St. Catherines’. This illegal

trade could be carried ‘either in Brazilian or even Spanish ships provided

security from British capture were to be assured to them’. Canning

thought it right Strangford be given the power to ‘grant licences, free of

any expenses or charges whatever, to protect from British capture Span-

ish vessels or, if required, Portuguese vessels, trading between the ports

of Brazil and the Spanish colonies’.

This was not an isolated case as

Russia, Sweden, Spain and even France all looked to the illegal import of

British goods.

While Canning looked to open direct commercial links with Brazil,

Sousa remained in an obstructive mood. He was unwilling to grant

export licences and argued for the punishment of Beresford over the

occupation of Madeira. Of course Canning would not agree to this

and Sousa eventually dropped the condition, but it caused a four-

month delay in organising exports. Canning was also concerned

about ‘half a dozen ulterior demands all of which, as I understand

from your [Sousa’s] “Most Secret”, open note…are to be conceded

to you exactly as you please to dictate them’. Canning had prevented

the sudden export of goods from Britain to Brazil on the understand-

ing the Regent would grant licences once settled into his new home.

Already frustrated and angry, Canning informed Sousa it was ‘five

months since I have seen my family, and after the fatigues of the last

three months I had hoped to get a few days holidays during the re-

cess. I have already lost about one third of it. If we are to go on dis-

cussing it all next week I must lose it all. What I beg therefore is a

decisive answer’.

If Sousa continued to be ‘impracticable’ Canning concurred with the

opinions voiced by Bathurst and would:

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…tell Souza plainly that his licence is no longer wanted nor shall

be taken for any thing ; but that the British Government will licence

without scruple every export that the British laws do not prohibit;

leaving his Government to act as they please.

The only reason Sousa’s arguments regarding the limiting of licences

had been adhered to was to prevent the overflowing of the Brazilian

markets. The Portuguese would have then prohibited imports and

caused goods to return to Britain in circumstances similar to the after-

math of the seizure of Buenos Ayres in 1806 when British goods

flooded the market. Bathurst argued what is ‘most to be apprehended is

the system of exclusive monopolies which existed in Lisbon, and may

be revived in the Brazils’.

Canning was convinced Sousa was ‘playing all sorts of tricks: and that

he is in very bad hands. But I still think it important to manage him, if

we can, and to get out of him the cotton licences by any process of

wheedling or any reasonable degree of concession’. He thought the Brit-

ish seizure of various Portuguese ships and cargo since the closing of the

ports in 1807 had been harsh on the Portuguese. The total value of the

property detained was £306,500 of which £39,500 was from the ships

and the remaining £267,000 from the cargo. Canning had attempted to

gain the release of the ships and cargo but the ‘Admiralty has resisted

this release so strenuously that I have three of four times returned to the

charge and been driven back with loss’. The refusal made Canning ‘more

disposed to say that all that has been captured subsequently to the emi-

gration of the Portuguese court ought to be restored unconditionally’.

British concerns over French intentions in South America heightened

with Napoleon’s seizure of Charles IV. Portland wrote to the King on 21

April stating ministers had ‘long entertained the most anxious apprehen-

sions that the growing influence of France must at no distant period give

to that power the command of the wealth and resources of the Spanish

provinces of South America’. Ministers had not previously considered

loosening the ties between Spain and her colonies, but it was now

‘probable that the interval may be short between the seizure by France of

the Spanish Government at home & the occupation by the same power

of its colonies abroad’.

The Cabinet viewed with alarm the ‘possible un-

ion of all the wealth and power both of the New and Old World concen-

trated in the hands of France & directed against…[British] dominions’.

The question now was ‘what may be necessary to prevent the inordinate

growth of a tyrannical usurped power’. The Cabinet were convinced ‘no

time should be lost in exerting every endeavour to prevent the dominion

of France from being extended over the Spanish colonies’. Portland

hoped this could be achieved by impressing upon the Spanish colonies

that their Sovereign had been betrayed with a view to precipitating an

uprising against the French-controlled mother country. He urged for

swift British pre-emptive action against the Spanish colonies to safeguard

them from French attacks.

After the tribulations of 1806 and 1807 the King was understandably

cautious and asked for more detailed proposals, recognising the danger

of sending forces to South America without clear aims and long-term

objects. With the Cabinet desiring troops be withdrawn from Sicily and

re-deployed in the Baltic, he expressed concerns over the number of

men required for the expedition to South America, hoping a substantial

force would not be needed to execute the plan ‘at a moment when it

has been deemed adviseable to detail ten thousand men to assistance of

Sweden’.

The Situation in South America

While Cotton continued the blockade of Lisbon, Canning engaged in

commercial negotiations with Sousa, and ministers tried to balance a

number of strategic options and pressures, Francis Hill arrived in Brazil

on 9 March to find the Regent had opened his ports to commerce of all

nations on 28 January. Less than a week later Sousa Coutinho, the Portu-

guese Foreign Minister, talked to Hill about the strategic situation in the

region. Hill informed Canning the Portuguese ‘entertain sanguine hopes

that the Spanish settlements in South America may be induced to declare

in favour of the Prince Regent’. On 6 April Hill conversed again with

Sousa Coutinho and informed Canning he had ‘scarcely sat down, when

he began to converse upon the subject of the possessions in South

America belonging to the Crown of Spain’. The main object of Portu-

guese policy, Hill now concluded, was to persuade the Spanish colonies

to declare in favour of the Regent who would then become sovereign of

the entire continent. The Portuguese would try fair means, but if this

failed they would ask Britain for military assistance. Already they had

sent a confidential person to Buenos Ayres to sound out the Spaniards,

but Hill saw little chance of success. Hill deferred from commenting

upon these plans until he received directions from Canning, although he

failed to inform Canning of the full extent of the Portuguese designs. By

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2 June Hill was aware the officer sent to Buenos Ayres, Brigadier Gen-

eral Corredo, had returned to Rio. The Spaniards had informed him they

feared a joint Portuguese and British attack but were unwilling to join

with the Portuguese crown. Hill again deferred from expressing an opin-

ion in case it was construed as official British policy.

In the meantime Sir Sidney Smith in the Foudroyant had arrived at Rio

Janeiro on 17 May, a full two months before Strangford was expected.

After switching his flag to the three-decker London he gave a dinner on 4

June to celebrate the seventieth birthday of King George III. The major-

ity of the Portuguese royal family, ministers and court of attended. The

Regent expressed his gratification for the invitation and the presence of

the British squadron. Smith cultivated the ‘most perfect understanding

with every individual member of this government…for the advancement

of the alliance and the good of his Majesty’s service’. He also reported

the Regent thought the squadron essential to prevent the ‘arrival of any

French force in the River Plate’ and would assist with keeping the ships

in a proper state of health and efficiency.

Strangford himself arrived in Brazil on 22 July 1808 after a voyage of

77 days. Two days later he wrote to Canning with the results of his first

audience with the Regent on Brazilian soil. On the subject of a return to

Portugal the Regent ‘conceived it to be a matter far beyond the range of

probability’. He feared the ‘eternal alienation of Portugal from the House

of Braganza’ and hoped Britain would realise her interests and security

‘required that the ports of Portugal should not be left in the power of

France’. Strangford was specifically requested by the Regent to empha-

sise his willingness to help Britain in any attempt to free Portugal from

France and in return ‘there was nothing which he was not ready to cede

to Great Britain’ for the attainment of this object.

The Portuguese government had expressed a desire to take advantage

of the confusion and disarray in Spain to expand the Brazilian frontiers

at the expense of Spanish South America. Portuguese plans to expand

the southern borders of Brazil had long been voiced and would domi-

nate Brazilian policy for the next twenty years. In 1675 the limits of the

province of Rio were defined as reaching the River Plate. Three years

later the Portuguese sent an expedition to occupy ‘their’ territory, settling

at Sacramento, opposite Buenos Ayres. During the following decades the

Spaniards launched several attempts to destroy the settlement, finally

succeeding in 1704 although it was restored in the treaty of Utrecht of

1713. The 1750 Treaty of Madrid granted Sacramento to Spain, but the

Portuguese did not evacuate it and Pombal denounced the treaty in 1761.

During the Seven Years War Spain again ousted the Portuguese but the

Treaty of Paris returned the colony to Portuguese control. The Treaty of

San Ildefonso in 1777 put Sacramento, and control of the River Plate

estuary, back in Spanish hands.

Such plans were given enhanced clarity and focus with Brazil now at

the centre of the Portuguese state and on 25 July Strangford outlined

official Portuguese policy to Canning. The Portuguese argued their plan

for seizing Spanish possessions along the River Plate was designed to

pre-empt any French attempts to do likewise. Although Sousa had ap-

parently tried to negotiate with the local Spanish commanders (as com-

municated to Hill in March) this approach had failed and Strangford

concluded the Portuguese would use force to achieve their aims. The

Spanish colonies were a vulnerable and tempting target, hence the Portu-

guese planned to launch an attack as soon as November. If the plan went

ahead and succeeded at least Britain could benefit, Strangford argued, as

‘it would be highly desirable to retain for His Majesty, either Montevideo

or Buenos Ayres’.

Unlike Hill and Strangford, who had deferred from expressing a firm

opinion regarding Portuguese plans for territorial expansion, Smith was a

keen supporter of the schemes and had, in fact, already turned his ener-

getic mind to possible future developments in South America. Writing to

the Admiralty during his voyage to Brazil Smith had noted the region

was important for British commerce and a good source of naval stores,

and wondered whether the whole population, sharing a common lan-

guage and religion, might be united under one form of government. He

also began to consider spreading British influence to the Spanish colo-

nies through the medium of Portuguese Brazil, thereby bringing the

whole of South America under the control of one government. He raised

the potential danger France posed to South America and concluded he

needed more vessels to cover the 1,000 miles of Brazilian coastline; of

course such an increase in his available force might also prove useful for

assisting the Portuguese to expand the borders of Brazil.

In August Smith seemingly backed up Strangford’s assessment of 25

July. The Portuguese, he reported, had opened communications with the

Viceroy of Buenos Ayres with a view to continuing the commercial rela-

tions between the two regions. They also hoped to gain territory on the

River Plate as the price of the continuing commerce. If this could not be

achieved peacefully then it would ‘immediately become necessary to oc-

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cupy the posts on the north shore of the River Plate with Portuguese

troops as the only means of preventing the French from doing it’. To

implement this plan the Regent had asked Smith to support operations

with his naval force and intimated that he should take overall command

of the operation. The Regent apparently stressed to Smith the advan-

tages of commerce and independence of the Spanish government

achieved through the new Portuguese court in Brazil and noted the dis-

position of the descendants of the original Portuguese settlers who natu-

rally looked to Portugal for their protection.

Smith used the view common to all who supported operations in

South America ‘that attack is the best mode of defence where attack is

expected from any quarter’. If the Portuguese did not occupy the terri-

tory along the River Plate with troops the ‘French may, and probably

will, make an effort to do it’. Smith could not guarantee the security of

this region as a naval blockade ‘necessarily interrupted and distant at this

season on a very bad coast’ might not provide effective security against a

French attempt. He could not guarantee the success of his mission until

the size of the force destined for these operations was clear. The current

size of his own squadron was ‘little applicable to attack or covering coast

operations’, though he professed his readiness to ‘cover that vulnerable

part of the frontier of our ally’, and did ‘not refuse the command of the

Portuguese part of the force, as there is no British army officer here to

direct the land part’. He thought there would be ‘no difficulty in the en-

terprise against the enemy we have to deal with, if we have adequate and

applicable means’. Smith hoped for a few of the Irish catholic regiments

and smaller naval vessels to navigate the River Plate.

The Regent had asked Smith if it would be necessary for him to de-

clare war on his neighbours, to which Smith replied it was not as the

Spaniards had withdrawn their ambassador from his court and had coop-

erated with the invasion of Portugal. Smith advised all Spaniards should

be expelled from Brazil. In August Smith met with Sousa Coutinho and

Strangford to discuss the possibility of a Portuguese invasion of the

Spanish colonies. Smith again reported he had advised caution; he had

not seen the Portuguese troops who were destined for this service and

could not pass judgement on their effectiveness. On the whole Smith

thought the plan ‘well-calculated for the occupation of the country’ if the

governing councils followed the proposal for a change of political system

put to the Spanish colonies by the Portuguese. If an occupation was to

be achieved by force then Smith preferred a close blockade of Montevi-

deo, which the inhabitants were already starting to evacuate, while Portu-

guese forces would be landed at Sacramento from where they would be

able to threaten Buenos Ayres. ‘To execute all this’, Smith continued, ‘a

few corps of British troops would certainly be necessary’. British troops

would be vital to garrison Montevideo once that place had fallen either

by blockade or agreement. On this point Smith had directed Captain Lee

of the Monarch to open up a line of communication with the Spaniards in

that area. The object of this was to induce the garrison and inhabitants

‘to combine their means with ours to repel the menaced French occupa-

tion of their territory’.

Just as these plans began to gather momentum, rumours of an upris-

ing in Spain against the French occupation reached Brazil in August,

completely changing the situation in South America. Smith planned to

inform the Spaniards of the changes in the politics in their mother coun-

try, which he hoped would ensure an amicable reception for any Portu-

guese or British expedition. In stating to the Admiralty he had decided

not to fall in with any Portuguese until ‘the means disposable, and the

mode of applying them proposed, were more fully detailed to me’, Smith

was a little disingenuous.

Although the Portuguese dropped their ambitious plans for attacking

Spanish America, the Regent remained keen to extend Brazilian territory

to include the River Plate. The difference was now he wanted to appoint

his wife Carlota as Regent of the Spanish colonies. After the events at

Bayonne it was believed Carlota, as Ferdinand’s sister, was now the le-

gitimate ruler of the Spanish colonies. Smith raised the possibility of

Carlota taking over the Spanish crown in South America to the Admi-

ralty and may have voiced his personal support for her claims. Smith was

certainly a proponent of a Portuguese expansionist policy and had been

keen to lead the Portuguese troops himself alongside the naval support

provided by his squadron and admitted as much in his dispatches.

Smith’s continued dabbling and plotting with Carlota would lead to his

rather unseemly and convoluted recall in May 1809.

Taking advantage of the ‘wonderful, and wholly unexpected, opportu-

nity’ that seemed to be opening up in Iberia British policy was now to be

orientated back towards Europe.

Plans for intervention in South Amer-

ica, which were still being mooted as late as June 1808, were dropped. A

British attack was now impracticable and troops destined for service in

South America under Wellesley were instead earmarked for Iberia. As

Hall argues, while Spain was in revolt, ‘Napoleon could make no credible

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claim to rule that country’s colonies, so removing the need for British

action against them’. Perhaps more importantly, it would be extremely

difficult for Britain to justify attacking Spanish possessions while the two

countries were fighting a common foe.

This point was recognised by

Canning when, in September 1808, he finally ended any thoughts of fur-

ther British involvement in Spanish South America. Due to dramatic

changes in the strategic situation in Spain, he informed Strangford, Brit-

ain could not now ‘countenance any design hostile to the peace and inde-

pendence of the Spanish Dominions in South America’. Any attempts by

Portugal to seize Spanish territory would have serious implications for

British policy in Iberia. Again the fortunes of the two regions were inex-

tricably linked as Canning emphasised the ‘ties of common interest and

friendship by which Spain and Portugal are now united in Europe’.

A continuation of British interventionist policy in South America

would have provided excellent propaganda for those convinced Britain

was pursuing an imperialistic policy of conquering the colonies and other

choice possessions of the globe while the European powers devoted

themselves to the bloody wars against France. Certainly, this had been a

component of British policy while France dominated continental

Europe, excluding British commerce. Britain certainly had seized, and

would continue to seize, the possessions of its enemies, but once Spain

moved from foe to potential friend British policy moved swiftly to pro-

vide support to Iberian uprisings against France.

…