Robson Martin. Britain, Portugal and South America in the Napoleonic Wars: Alliances and Diplomacy in Economic Maritime Conflict (ENG)

Подождите немного. Документ загружается.

tary Canning) addressed to Admiral Seniavin and the Russian Con-

sul General at Lisbon, may be the means of opening a communica-

tion for the purpose of making the proposal above mentioned.

Cotton was allowed to take such measures as he thought ‘expedient for

the delivery of the said packets, and to avail yourself of the opportunity

to convey to the Russian Admiral a proposal for the surrender of the

fleet to His Majesty on the condition referred to in our order aforesaid’.

He was also ordered to distribute Sousa’s proclamation inducing Portu-

guese naval and military officers and men to flee to his squadron. In

another order of 29 December, in response to a letter from Castlereagh

and perhaps acting on the advice proffered by McKinley, the Admiralty

instructed Cotton to blockade the ports of St. Ubes and Porto and to

‘stop all neutral vessels destined for these ports’.

Strangford, now in London, voiced his concerns over the situation in

the Tagus in a memorandum to Canning of 18 February 1808. He

wanted the British minister appointed to the Brazils, a post that he in-

deed wished for, to call in at Lisbon on his way to South America.

Rather naively, he believed using a flag of truce the minister could com-

municate with the Portuguese Regency. The object was to persuade the

Portuguese ‘the true and sole origin of the calamities which now desolate

Portugal, is the presence of a French army and a Russian squadron’.

Upon the ‘retreat of the French troops beyond the Portuguese frontier

and the surrender of the Russian ships, the admission of provisions into

the port of Lisbon would be restored, and it’s inhabitants be suffered to

renew their accustomed relations of commerce with England and the

Brazils’. Although Strangford did not envisage much success, he hoped

an ‘official representation’ with a ‘due appearance of studious solicitude

for the independence of Portugal’, would prevent Napoleon from ravag-

ing the country.

Off the Tagus in late January, Cotton enacted his orders attempting

to open up an avenue of communication with Seniavin but, at first,

failed. He informed the Admiralty ‘all intercourse with the squadron

under my command’ was ‘entirely forbidden’ by the French. Cotton

hoped Captain Erskine of the Defence would be able to pass a message to

a Spanish or Portuguese officer while conveying Spanish prisoners to St.

Ubes. This plan failed when the Defence was detailed to investigate sev-

eral strange sails. Due to the poor weather in the Tagus at the time of

year Cotton found it impossible to carry out the Admiralty’s orders re-

RITAIN, PORTUGAL AND SOUTH AMERICA

184

HE BLOCKADE OF LISBON

185

specting the Burling Islands. With a dangerous lee shore he found it

difficult blockading the Tagus during the winter months, a point repeat-

edly made by Smith in 1807. A north north east wind acting in concert

with a lee current temporarily drove the squadron off their station.

Aware of the wider naval situation, Cotton was worried the French

Rochefort squadron might escape and attempt to join with the Russian

ships in the Tagus.

On 31 January a boat bringing two English nationals, John Carpenter

and William Ford, came upon the squadron. They had remained in Lis-

bon to collect debts after the evacuation of British nationals and now

provided Cotton with copies of various edicts and decrees issued by the

French. While his force recovered from the privations suffered on the

march to Lisbon Junot appealed to the inhabitants of the city not to fear

the French forces but to remain calm, arguing the Regent had sacrificed

the interests of the population for his own escape. By 14 December, with

his troops rested, Junot’s confidence grew and he took the initial repres-

sive step of prohibiting the population from assembling. The merchants

also brought news of Seniavin who had offered any remaining English

nationals a place of retreat and protection from the French. The Russian

squadron had ‘on board some English families:- the Russian officers are

by no means on terms of friendship with the French’. In fact relations

were worsening between the French and Russians as the former com-

plained of the latter’s consumption of provisions. In Lisbon the Portu-

guese were ‘extremely dissatisfied’ and they reported the city had only

enough wheat to last until March.

The situation in Lisbon had remained remarkably calm. After his arri-

val Junot had granted the Regency Council a degree of respect while his

forces recuperated. He had divided his army into three corps to exercise

control over the country; the main French force remained in the vicinity

of Lisbon with further divisions situated around Porto in the north and

Setuval in the south. Junot could not afford to lose control of the situa-

tion while his forces were thus dispersed. Then, in late December 1807,

with his forces not only rested but concentrated, Junot seized control of

the government, on 1 February suppressed the Council and replaced the

flag and arms of Portugal with the symbols of the French Empire. The

Portuguese army was reduced from 37 regiments of cavalry and infantry

to 6 foot and three horse, 5,000 men were amalgamated into the French

army and 8,000 men were sent to Bayonne (of which 2-4,000 men de-

serted on the march through Spain). The remaining troops were dis-

banded. To pay for the conquest and the reforms, on 23 December Na-

poleon imposed an indemnity of 100 million francs on the country.

Informed of these developments on 31 January Cotton managed to

pass a letter to Seniavin.

While waiting for a reply, on 2 February he

received additional intelligence from nine people who had escaped from

the fort of St. Julien. They informed Cotton of Junot’s seizure of power,

his self proclamation as Governor General of Portugal and the receipt of

4,000 French reinforcements. This seemed a clear signal that Portugal,

similar to other conquered territories such as the Kingdom of Naples,

would be turned into another French satellite state. Further intelligence

regarding the dispositions of the Russian fleet reached Cotton on 7 Feb-

ruary from McKinley now back on active duty in the Lively (38) and who

had carried out a reconnaissance of the Tagus. He observed eight large

ships-of-the-line and a frigate drawn up in a line between Cassilis point

and Belem with a line-of-battle abreast of the arsenal and two frigates at

Belem; all were flying French colours (and were presumably the refitted

Portuguese vessels mentioned by Foy).

Despite the reports from Carpenter and Ford regarding Seniavin’s

reluctance to assist the French, Cotton remained unsure as to the Rus-

sian’s real disposition. Some illumination came on 7 February when two

Russian officers, accompanied by a French officer, came upon the

squadron under a flag of truce. Seniavin had received Cotton’s letter of

19 January and had sent the two officers. One was Le Conseiller de Cour

Poletica, ‘a person who possesses all my confidence, and whom I have

charged to receive all letters to my address’, Seniavin stated. Seniavin

confirmed all the previous intimations of his character, stating ‘that I am

not less afflicted at the actual state of the relations between our two au-

gust courts - Those regrets can not be otherwise than reciprocal, be-

tween two nations who have so long been accustomed to esteem each

other’.

While one of the Russians distracted the French officer the other

passed on important information. From this conversation Cotton found

the Russians ‘to be extremely dissatisfied with their station’. They were

‘subject…to the immediate control of the French. Who have possession

of all the Old Batteries on the banks of the Tagus and are daily erecting

new ones’. He concluded ‘however disposed the Russian officers might

be to quit the Tagus the thing was not practicable, closely watched as

they are by the French’. Here again, control, or lack of it, of the Tagus

forts was a critical factor influencing the situation in the river.

BRITAIN, PORTUGAL AND SOUTH AMERICA

186

HE BLOCKADE OF LISBON

187

With regard to Strangford’s plan for the starvation of the Russians the

two officers provided worrying intelligence: the Russian fleet was not

short of victuals and actually carried supplies for at least ten months.

Furthermore, as Foy noted, Junot had procured 10,000 barrels of flour

from Cadiz to provision the forts and vessels and to make a reserve sup-

ply of 500,000 rations of biscuit; ‘daily subsistence was secured, without

its being necessary to resort to any extraordinary measure’.

As Krajeski

has noted this news ‘made capitulation of the Russian squadron unrealis-

tic without the use of force’.

It also supports Napier and Fortescue’s

assertions that Strangford’s plan never had any chance for success. With

little hope for an immediate Franco-Russian maritime capitulation Cot-

ton voiced optimism on one point: there remained the possibility of a

Portuguese uprising. With the Russian fleet and the French army provi-

sioned they might not care too much if the Portuguese populace starved

and with the Portuguese already deeply unhappy at French occupation it

might be possible for the Royal Navy to covertly initiate an uprising in

Lisbon. Cotton had therefore distributed pamphlets to the Portuguese

urging them to quit Lisbon and to flee to the safety of the fleet. But, he

lamented, the effect had been ‘trifling’.

In fact Junot, although isolated in Lisbon, had been making the best

of his situation. With plentiful supplies from the arsenal and a ready sup-

ply of labour by the spring of 1808 his army had recovered from the

forced marches of November 1807 and was in a state of military readi-

ness. He could now muster 24,000 French, 15,500 Spaniards and 5,000

Portuguese with which to defend the country. Of this force around

15,000 French were available for field operations. Junot had deployed his

troops to reinforce French dominance over the Portuguese and prevent

insurrection while sealing off possible landing points for a British expedi-

tionary force. French engineers had strengthened the Tagus forts and

batteries installing long-range mortars and furnaces for the heating of

shot thereby keeping the Russian ships under guard and, perhaps, dis-

suading a British attempt to force the river.

Junot had moored the Russian and refitted Portuguese ships across

the Tagus to protect the entrance to the river and hoped to utilise the

ships for offensive operations. Horward asserts that Junot contemplated

interfering with the dispositions of the British squadron by sending ves-

sels down the Tagus until the plan was scrapped once Cotton received

reinforcements. Krajeski has argued the aggressive French naval plans

ensured Cotton’s blockade ‘would not go unchallenged’ and Cotton had

to ‘employ aggressive naval tactics to contain Junot and maintain the

blockade’s viability’. Although Seniavin’s squadron was involved in the

defence of the harbour, he refused to land marines to strengthen the

garrison of Lisbon; although allied with France Russia had not declared

war on Portugal. Junot also pressed Seniavin to sail from the Tagus and

attack Cotton, but as Foy notes, ‘Neither for the purpose of attack nor

of defence, could the French reckon upon the aid of any force but their

own’.

Collingwood now provided useful information to Cotton regarding

Seniavin’s character. Writing on 1 February he thought Russian Admiral

‘a good kind of man – perhaps not very brilliant and as obstinate as a

Russian can be, he hates the French – and never yet was near them with-

out dispute, and quarrel – at Corfu they were bickering all the time’. He

also expressed his disappointment at Cotton’s appointment: ‘I wish you

had something more promising before you than the blockade of the Rus-

sians at Lisbon’. Knowing the depth of Seniavin’s anti-French feelings

Collingwood was concerned Cotton could not enhance his reputation as

he was ‘convinced they never will come out’.

On 9 February Cotton received further intelligence regarding the

situation in the Tagus from McKinley and Captain Smith of the Nautilus.

This was not much different from before but all of the Russian ships

were now observed to be lying above Belem. The report from Captain

Smith contained more valuable information regarding the French dispo-

sitions in Portugal and Spain. Napoleon was expected to arrive in

Bayonne near the border with Spain, which was an indication as to

French intentions in the Iberian Peninsula. Smith then gave the strength

of Junot’s force in Lisbon as 28,879 infantry and 3,653 cavalry. In Spain

Dupont had 23,979 infantry and 3,121 cavalry while Moncey’s force

comprised 17,983 infantry and 3,330 cavalry. It was expected the French

forces in Spain would be augmented to a total of 140-150,000 men. The

objectives of this force were to place a strong garrison at the fortress of

Cueta and to undertake a siege of Gibraltar. He also expressed the opin-

ion the Spanish nation was apathetic to the French forces now stationed

in their territory. All this created an air of unease for the future of

Franco-Spanish relations.

Cotton now decided it was safe to send McKinley in the Lively to take

possession of the Burling Islands. McKinley approached the islands on

12 February in company with the Viper (14) schooner and called on the

main fort to surrender. After receiving the garrison’s refusal, the order

RITAIN, PORTUGAL AND SOUTH AMERICA

188

HE BLOCKADE OF LISBON

189

was repeated, whereupon the fort ‘hoisted Portuguese colours and fired’.

McKinley returned fire upon which ‘they struck their colours’. Foy, play-

ing down this action, calls the Portuguese troops ‘invalids’. Cotton then

garrisoned the forts, which he considered ‘strong and well situated’, and

placed Lieutenant George Huskinson of the Royal Marines in command.

Unfortunately, McKinley dashed Cotton’s hopes the islands could pro-

vide fresh water for the squadron; he had found a spring but it could

only supply about a butt of water per day.

The aggressive blockade of the Tagus continued. On 13 February

Captain Yeo in the Confiance, which was closer to Lisbon than the main

part of the squadron, thought he saw the Russian squadron preparing for

sea. Seeking confirmation he sent in two ships boats under the command

of the master’s mate Robert Trist. Upon entering the Tagus this force

encountered a French gunboat at anchor off fort St. Pedro, between the

forts of Belem and St. Julien. According to Yeo’s account, Mr Trist

‘instantly boarded in a most gallant manner’ the gunboat and ‘after an

ineffectual resistance on the part of the enemy captured her’. This was

certainly a remarkable achievement as the force on the French gunboat

numbered 50 men and Trist was accompanied by only 16 sailors. The

ship turned out to be La Cannonier No. 1 armed with one 24lb gun and

two 6lbrs and detailed to protect the Tagus fishing vessels. Such small-

scale operations were symptomatic of the aggressive ethos of the Royal

Navy, whether in boat work, blockade or fleet actions. Moreover, such

operations were carried out where possible by Cotton to gain intelligence

from Lisbon and information regarding the Russian fleet while providing

some interference with French attempts to strengthen their naval posi-

tion in the Tagus.

Cotton received the Admiralty order confirming his position as Com-

mander in Chief of Royal Naval forces from Capes Finisterre to St. Vin-

cent on 18 February. Three days later he reported on French propaganda

circulated by Junot declaring the Prince Regent had ‘renounced all his

rights to the sovereignty of this Kingdom’. Echoing Napoleon’s famous

declaration in the Paris Monituer Junot stated the ‘House of Braganza,

ceases to reign over Portugal’. In its place the country would be adminis-

trated and governed by the French through a Council of Government.

Realising naval forces must possess the ability to project power ashore

in order to be truly effective, the Cabinet in London had tried to ensure

troops were available to Cotton. Spencer’s force had finally put to sea for

the second time on 21 February heading for the Tagus. He came upon

the blockading squadron five days later and transferred to the Hibernia to

converse with Cotton. On the same day Cotton received Admiralty or-

ders instructing him to send Spencer onto Gibraltar if his force could

not be productively employed off the Tagus. Castlereagh had directed

Spencer to consider an attack on the Russian ships in the river but

thought it was probably too large a task for his 5,000 men. With Junot

having 36,000 French troops in Portugal, 16,000 of which were stationed

in and around Lisbon, Cotton and Spencer agreed an attack was imprac-

tical. Spencer also confirmed Junot had succeeded in strengthening the

forts: St. Julien and Cascais contained 156 guns, there were another 43 in

Belem and Bugio, and a further 183 along the Tagus. As Spencer did not

expect any assistance from the Portuguese inhabitants in an attack, Cot-

ton informed the Admiralty it was not possible ‘from the existing state of

things to employ the force under Major General Spencer with any effect

in offensive operations in the Tagus’. On 16 March Cotton received the

Admiralty orders of 22 January enclosing the instructions for Spencer

detailing him to proceed to the Spanish fortress of Cueta and examine

the possibilities for an attack.

Spencer sailed onto Gibraltar and on 18 March discussed the options

with the Governor of the rock, Sir Hew Dalrymple. Both men agreed the

fortress of Cueta was too strong for Castlereagh’s envisaged coup de

main.

Smith, who had opened the Admiralty instructions to Spencer of

22 January containing Castlereagh’s secret orders of 15 January, had also

reached a similar conclusion.

With such a small force under his com-

mand there was little Spencer could achieve in the region. He remained

at Gibraltar awaiting reinforcements which might provide the opportu-

nity to undertake offensive operations. In May he received instructions

to join with Purvis off Cadiz to investigate the possibility of attacking the

French ships sheltering there.

It was also known to Cotton that several British nationals were serv-

ing as officers in the Russian fleet. With the two countries now suppos-

edly at war this situation could not continue. He wrote to Seniavin on 29

February requesting such officers be conveyed to the blockading squad-

ron, arguing there should be no obstacles to this as Russian officers serv-

ing in the Royal Navy had been allowed to resign their commissions.

Cotton ended his private letter by thanking Seniavin for protecting the

British subjects that had sought shelter on his fleet.

Seniavin replied on 7 March apologising for the delay as Cotton’s

letter had been detained, presumably by the French. With regard to the

BRITAIN, PORTUGAL AND SOUTH AMERICA

190

HE BLOCKADE OF LISBON

191

British officers only seven remained on board Russian ships: Rear Admi-

ral Alexander Grieg, the Commander in Chief of Russian forces in the

Ionian Islands prior to Seniavin’s arrival, William Krove and Robert El-

phinstone both Post Captains, Commander Thomas Chandler, Lieuten-

ant Samuel Moffet and two men called Birt and Lind who were Sur-

geons. Seniavin was unable to comply with Cotton’s request, however, as

on 22 February he had received instructions to remove these officers and

send them overland to St. Petersburg ‘after having expressed to them the

kind thanks of the Emperor My august Master for the services which

they have rendered’. Seniavin made it clear to Cotton all the officers ‘will

soon be on their road furnished with every necessary for their safe con-

veyance’. He was pleased to report all the officers had received ‘marks of

honourable distinction’ from the Czar and they were to be withdrawn to

prevent embarrassment in the present state of affairs between the two

countries. By 4 March Cotton could inform the Admiralty all British

officers in the Russian squadron had resigned their commissions.

The sloop HMS Swallow (18) joined Cotton’s force on 5 March in

company with eight victuallers carrying around five months supply of

provisions. There remained a problem sourcing fresh water. To replenish

the squadron Cotton had to detach a ship-of-the-line thereby reducing

his force. In the early days of March he was unwilling to do this as re-

ports had reached Cotton ‘of the enemy’s intention to put to sea’; but by

mid-March he was receiving reports of ‘little cordiality’ between the

French and Russians, which, if true, reduced the possibility of a com-

bined enemy force putting to sea. Cotton’s predicament was alleviated to

some extent on 13 March when the Elizabeth re-joined the squadron.

Previously on 8 March Cotton had sent home the Minotaur after he had

taken the Resolution (74) under his command. This enabled him to send

Alfred to the Bayonnes to collect much needed supplies of water for the

squadron.

On 29 March a vessel flying the Portuguese flag came out from the

Tagus and joined the blockading squadron. On board was Mr Satarro,

formerly the agent for supplying British ships with provisions. Now he

was acting as commissary to the French. After boarding the Hibernia he

explained the object of his mission was to gain permission for the impor-

tation of flour into Lisbon to feed the Portuguese population. He argued

the French had secured a supply for themselves which would last around

six months but the supply for the populace could only last for a further

two to three weeks. Cotton flatly denied this request, as it was in direct

contradiction to his orders. Satarro then asked permission for a number

of merchant vessels carrying several Portuguese nobles on board, to

leave the Tagus and sail for Britain. Cotton acceded to this second re-

quest but only on the condition the ships were thoroughly examined

upon exiting the river. News of these developments was forwarded to

the Admiralty with additional information regarding to the enemy forces

in Lisbon. There were 15,000 French troops in Lisbon and its environs

and the Russian ships lying in the Tagus, according to Cotton’s judge-

ment, did not ‘indicate a disposition to come from thence, but remain as

when last reconnoitred’.

This important intelligence arrived at the Admiralty on 9 April and

was forwarded to the War Office.

Krajeski has argued Castlereagh had

seen Cotton’s dispatch of 29 March and ‘subsequently drafted a detailed

memorandum for the admiral. Essentially, Castlereagh used Satarro’s

request as a catalyst for negotiating the surrender of Seniavin’s squad-

ron’.

Horward has similarly argued the receipt of the information re-

garding Satarro’s requests led to the Lords of the Admiralty resolving ‘to

use the opportunity to open negotiations for the surrender of the Rus-

sian squadron’.

In fact the Cabinet viewed Satarro’s request as a means with which to

follow a policy already decided upon. After laying Cotton’s letter before

the King, Castlereagh wrote to the Admiralty with amended orders for

Cotton. He was instructed to open a communication with ‘the existing

government at Lisbon, in consequence of the application made to him

thro’ Mr Sataro [sic]’. It was not clear from Cotton’s dispatch on whose

authority Satarro was acting when he asked for the importation of flour

into Lisbon. Castlereagh thought it wise Cotton should communicate

with the Portuguese Regency, the Portuguese military commander, Ad-

miral Seniavin and Junot. Cotton was to impress upon the Portuguese

the British blockade was solely a measure of self-defence as the French

occupation of Lisbon now threatened the British Isles with invasion.

Any suffering of the population in Lisbon was due to the French pres-

ence; hence Britain was motivated to alleviate this perceived suffering by

offering to end the blockade in return for a French capitulation of their

maritime forces.

Although Castlereagh drafted the convention that Cotton was now to

offer to the French, Russians and Portuguese, the terms had in fact been

already laid out by Canning in his communications with Castlereagh in

December 1807. Britain wanted the Russian ships in the Tagus to be

RITAIN, PORTUGAL AND SOUTH AMERICA

192

HE BLOCKADE OF LISBON

193

delivered to Cotton and held as a deposit until six months after the con-

clusion of a definitive peace between Russia, Sweden and any other pow-

ers. Seniavin and his men would be returned to Russia without ‘any con-

dition or stipulation respecting their future services’. All enemy merchant

vessels in the Tagus would be taken as deposit and returned to their

rightful owners at the conclusion of peace. Neutral ships would be al-

lowed to sail with their cargo for Britain or Brazil but would be subject

to examination either by Cotton or upon reaching their destination. In

return Cotton would allow the entry of provisions into the ports of Por-

tugal. Castlereagh was concerned Seniavin would not consider himself in

a position to negotiate a surrender of his fleet. In this case if all the other

points were agreed upon Cotton could conclude a convention excepting

the articles relating to the Russians but Castlereagh accepted this arrange-

ment would ‘still render it necessary to maintain a large force off the port

of Lisbon to watch the Russian squadron, to the manifest detriment of

other important services’. Cotton was to consider this latter arrangement

only as a last resort ‘in the event of the failure of the more general sur-

render of the maritime means collected in the Tagus’.

While ministers decided upon policy in London, Cotton was faced

with a further problem. Perhaps due in part to his distributing pam-

phlets, a number of Portuguese nationals had fled Lisbon seeking refuge

with the British squadron. On 5 April he had dispatched 173 refugees to

sail to England in the Hindustan only for a further 175 to arrive two days

later. Again, Cotton resolved to transport them to Plymouth. Most of the

refugees were members of the Portuguese armed forces or the profes-

sional trades who had not fled to Brazil in November 1807. The influx

posed several problems. They were extra mouths to feed and water, a

major consideration for a squadron on blockading duty. Cotton could

not decrease his force and had to wait for merchantmen to convey the

refugees to Britain. Some of the refugees were Portuguese officers and

the captains of the fleet complained to Cotton of the expense incurred in

having to entertain these men. Compounding Cotton’s problems on 25

March the Milbrook was wrecked on the Burlings Islands. Although the

crew was saved, this loss impaired Cotton’s ability to enforce the inshore

blockade that relied on small, fast manoeuvrable ships.

It was not until late April that the flow of refugees slackened. On 11

April Cotton had received an edict dated 5 April, signed by Junot, which

stated any British ships entering the Tagus, even if they were under a flag

of truce, were to be fired upon. Anyone fleeing from Lisbon to the