Robson Martin. Britain, Portugal and South America in the Napoleonic Wars: Alliances and Diplomacy in Economic Maritime Conflict (ENG)

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been ordered to withdraw 7,000 men from Sicily and sail for Gibraltar in

the first instance and then back to England. He had commenced this

process in early October, finally embarking 7,258 rank and file by 29

October. Ministers now wanted to make use of this force as it withdrew

from the Mediterranean, hoping it could call at Lisbon and offer assis-

tance. In early October Castlereagh had been unsure where Moore actu-

ally was and whether he would arrive in time to contribute to govern-

ment plans.

On 7 November Hawkesbury summed it all up:

We want a reinforcement for the Mediterranean in the event of

Moore having left it, we want a force eventually to occupy the forts

in the Tagus, and to secure the retreat of the Royal family of Portu-

gal and we want a force for Madeira.

On the same day he forwarded orders to Gibraltar for Moore. They con-

tained a discussion of the situation in Portugal and instructions to be

ready to head for the Tagus if Strangford or Smith requested his force.

He was specifically directed not to land at Lisbon unless the important

forts of St. Julian and Bugio were delivered into his possession. If the

Portuguese had acceded to French pressure and closed the ports he was

to detach 3,000 men to Madeira and proceed to England with the re-

mainder of his force.

Hawkesbury was concerned Moore might not have left Sicily or may

not actually reach Gibraltar in time to react to the additional instructions

and provide assistance at Lisbon or Madeira.

As a contingency minis-

ters decided to organise another force of 7,000 men, under the command

of Major General Brent Spencer, to sail from England for the Tagus and

‘be put in possession of the Forts commanding the Tagus, or whatever

other spot, from which that embarkation is to take place’. Once the Por-

tuguese fleet had been secured Spencer’s force would divide: 3,000 men

heading for Madeira while 4,000 would reinforce Sicily. If Moore was at

Gibraltar or the Tagus then all of this additional force was to head for

Sicily.

Even ministers found the situation a little confusing, Hawkes-

bury quizzing Canning whether he had ‘made myself intelligible’.

Canning was doubtful the Regent would follow the course of evacua-

tion agreed in the convention:

…in the other [event], and I cannot but apprehend the more prob-

able course, of the project of the migration to the Brazils being laid

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HE SMITH EXPEDITION TO LISBON

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aside, and in either of the cases provided for in my other dispatch

of this date, of a refusal on the part of the court of Lisbon, either

to ratify the convention, or to act up to it when ratified, or any

other hostile step or Declaration against this country;- should it

appear to Rear Admiral Sir Sidney Smith and to your Lordship,

possible that the Portuguese fleet might be either captured or de-

stroyed by a bold and sudden attack by his Majesty’s land and sea

forces - it is left to your Lordship’s discretion in conjunction with

Rear Admiral Sir Sidney Smith to direct the operations of the army

to such an object.

Many British observers agreed with Canning. ‘Our Portuguese paradise’,

Auckland lamented to Grenville, ‘seems to have gone to the infernal

regions’. He added ‘Liverpool had quite persuaded himself (and indeed

seemed to have ministerial authority for it) that the Braganza dynasty

would be transferred with all the ships to Brazil’. Auckland also criticised

the government for a ‘want of due decision and foresight’.

Writing to

Howick, Brougham regarded the emigration of the Portuguese Royal

family as ‘a step which I never will suspect of till I see him there’. To

Rosslyn he lamented the Brazil scheme ‘never will be done as we desire it

without our interference. They may send a part of the family over, but it

will be to keep us out of concern’. He realised the need for British mari-

time intervention to force a decision deploring ‘ministers are stark mad if

they do not make Sir Sidney call in his way out; but Lord St. Vincent

would have been the man for that business’.

In Lisbon the Regent was increasingly worried a British expedition

would arrive off Lisbon. He stressed to Strangford the necessity of the

Portuguese navy remaining in the Tagus to escort him to Brazil, but did

recognise ‘the expediency of blockading the Tagus by an English squad-

ron, to prevent the Port of Lisbon from becoming a naval station for the

Enemies of Great Britain’. Although the Regent hoped this would pre-

vent the French capturing his navy, he warned a ‘forcible attempt to

seize our fleet, which in support of our own character as a Sovereign we must resist,

would certainly tarnish the unsullied reputation which England has hith-

erto enjoyed amongst nations’. Using a recent and relevant example he

pointedly remarked Portugal was ‘not in the same situation with regard

to England, as Denmark’.

Such determination to resist a British assault was seemingly backed up

by military preparations taking place within Portugal. The Portuguese

army was divided into three corps of around 6,000 men each, concen-

trated in and around Lisbon and the coast. Gambier concluded this de-

ployment ‘is evidently intended to defend any attack which may be made

from the Sea; and not for the purpose of opposing the advance of the

French or Spanish troops on the frontiers. The state of the Portuguese

navy, the repair of the batteries, and other circumstances tend to show

that such is the object’.

On 29 October Gambier expanded on this

report detailing the deployment of individual Portuguese regiments in

and around the River Tagus.

Writing after the event, Foy also concluded the Portuguese had posi-

tioned troops on the banks of the Tagus to repulse a sea-based attack.

The Regent had tried to raise a levy of recruits by increasing the estab-

lishment of the Infantry Regiments to 1,200 men while ordering the forts

on the banks of the Tagus to be repaired and armed. ‘Still more anima-

tion was manifested in the naval service’, Foy argues, ‘Squadrons were

required to defend the entrance of the Tagus against the English fleet’.

‘Every vessel in the navy that was thought sea-worthy, was refitted,

equipped, and provisioned without a moments delay’. Foy thought these

moves were ‘More of show than reality’. Preparing the fleet was a sensi-

ble move for the Portuguese as they could use it to transfer the Royal

Family to Brazil. The Portuguese Ambassadors had been expelled from

Paris and Madrid and Lima, now back in Lisbon ‘gave additional weight

to the arguments with which he had filled his correspondence’.

Ministers in London must certainly have viewed the actions of the

Portuguese with concern. For all their protestations of friendship,

preparations in Portugal seemed to be directed more at repelling a

British amphibious assault than a French invasion from the Spanish

border. In early November accounts were reaching London of

French troops marching on Portugal, while in an attempt to prevent

invasion the Regent had closed the ports. Information had been re-

ceived from Paris that the official French paper, the Moniteur, de-

clared ‘the House of Braganza shall cease to reign’.

On 10 November

Canning received intelligence from Strangford stating the decree or-

dering the closure of the ports had been signed and would shortly be

made public. The intention of Portugal to accede to French demands

had been communicated by Araujo to Strangford on 17 October. The

Prince would not send his navy away because the French would im-

mediately declare hostilities and he needed the ships to evacuate Lis-

bon, a move he would not implement until danger was imminent.

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HE SMITH EXPEDITION TO LISBON

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Ministerial uncertainty regarding Portuguese intentions was removed

on 11 November when the Foreign Office received confirmation the

Regent had indeed closed his ports to British ships:

I have judged it proper to accede to the cause of the continent by

unifying myself to his Majesty the Emperor of the French and

King of Italy and to his Catholic Majesty, in order to contribute as

far as may be in my power, to the acceleration of a Maritime Peace.

The Regent ordered ‘the ports of this kingdom be shut against the

entry of all ships of war and merchant vessels belonging to Great

Britain’. Strangford remarked France would ‘not be satisfied with the

measures of hostility towards England which Portugal had been com-

pelled to take’.

Although Strangford reported the Portuguese had made some efforts

to prepare their fleet, British apprehensions regarding the earlier agree-

ment to send the Prince of Beira to Brazil were well founded; no attempt

had been made to implement this plan. The Regent now wanted an as-

surance from Strangford that an ‘English squadron should not enter the

Tagus with hostile intentions, providing he sent away the Prince of Beira

without delay’. Strangford assured Canning he would not give such a

promise and noted the Regent was again acting under the influence of

several pro-French advisors who convinced him further appeasement

would save the country. Clearly playing on the Regent’s paranoia after

two recent revolutionary conspiracies in Brazil during 1788-89 and again

in 1798, the pro-French advisors argued those ministers who did urge

flight were engaged in a plot to overthrow him once the Royal Family

had reached Brazil.

Along with these discouraging reports Canning did receive some good

news. On 17 October Gambier had organised the sailing of a convoy of

64 vessels from Lisbon, evacuating most of the English residents of the

city, with a further 46 ships leaving Oporto. On 28 October he reported

the forts at the entrance of the Tagus had not been furnished with the

necessary instructions to prevent the entrance of British trade and as a

consequence several British merchant vessels had managed to gain ac-

cess to the harbour.

On 1 November Harriet Slessor confirmed ‘The

English are gone, and safe at sea’ but ‘the French do not appear satis-

fied’. To her it seemed obvious that ‘great preparations are making, and

in all haste, to get a Squadron ready, in case it should be wanted, to take

off the Royal Family to the Brazil. But no one is allowed to think it,

much less give a hint of the kind’.

The British response

Upon learning of the Portuguese decision to close their ports Canning

immediately forwarded further instructions to the Admiralty for Smith.

On arrival off the Tagus he was to ascertain from Strangford if the Por-

tuguese court had ratified the 22 October convention. If so and

‘preparations are actually making for the bona fide execution of the arti-

cles which relate to the Portuguese fleet’ Smith was to declare his readi-

ness to cooperate. If the convention had not been ratified, or the prepa-

rations were not made with due haste, or if there were any circumstances

that in the opinion of Strangford required immediate action, or if the

British minister had left Lisbon, then Smith would implement hostile

measures. Canning was keen to have the Portuguese crisis resolved as

quickly as possible; ‘if there should not exist any circumstances which, in

the judgment of Lord Strangford...may make it desirable not to push

matters at once to an extremity’ then Smith was ‘immediately to institute

a strict blockade of the Tagus, which he is to declare to the Portuguese

government that he has orders to enforce in the most rigorous manner’.

Once implemented:

…he has no authority to relax the [blockade] in any degree on any

other condition whatever than that of the surrender to him of the

Portuguese ships of war and Brazil ships now lying in the Tagus;

These ships Sir Sidney Smith is to declare his readiness to take in

deposit for H.R.H. the Prince Regent; pledging his Majesty’s word

for their restoration at the conclusion of a definitive peace.

If the Portuguese court refused to hand over the ships Smith was in-

structed ‘to continue the Blockade in its utmost rigour’, and ‘seize, cap-

ture or destroy every Portuguese ship or vessel that he may fall in with’.

Portugal had been given ample opportunity to either remove her ships or

hand them over to Britain. If the Portuguese Court refused their ships

would be forcibly seized for the British Cabinet were determined not a

single Portuguese ship, whether naval or commercial, would fall into

French hands.

Implementation of policy was left to the discretion of Smith and

Strangford who, as the men on the spot, would be in full possession of

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HE SMITH EXPEDITION TO LISBON

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the facts. If they thought the task could be achieved by the force at their

disposal, Smith was ‘not to hesitate to force his way into the Tagus, and

to seize and bring away the whole of the Portuguese shipping, or to de-

stroy such part of it as he may find it impossible to remove’. If the task

could not be accomplished Smith was to inform the Admiralty of the

force required while confining his operations ‘to maintaining and enforc-

ing a strict blockade’.

These orders were transmitted to Smith on 12

November.

At the very least Smith could prevent hostile warships from

entering the Tagus and was on hand to escort the Regent to Brazil,

which was the official pretext for his presence there.

On the same day Castlereagh, now recovering from his illness in

Brighton and continually updated as to the state of affairs, wrote infor-

mally to Cooke, one of the two Under Secretaries at the War Office.

Highlighting an expression in a previous letter from Cooke: ‘I don’t quite

understand the expression in your letter, “Nothing settled as to giving up

their fleet”; Castlereagh outlined remarkably similar views to those ex-

pressed by Canning:

Our relations with the Court of Portugal are become so critical,

and the ultimate determination of that Government, whether to

throw themselves with their fleet into our hands or those of

France, may so much depend upon a momentary impulse, and the

possibility of giving an instant support to a party in their councils,

that I cannot but seriously lament that any minor considerations of

convenience should be suffered to stand in the way of our having a

powerful squadron off the Tagus, with such a proportion of land

forces on board as might enable us, at any moment, to enter that

river, and perhaps decide the question in our own favour. We can

never hope to accomplish this by corps acting from a distance.

With regard to the importance of having a naval force ‘with land forces

on board, to be immediately stationed off the Tagus, I should still be dis-

posed to look to Moore’s force’, with the reinforcements to be ordered

from Britain to the Mediterranean. With the return of 20 sail-of-the-line

from Copenhagen, he wanted 4,000 men to be embarked in ten of these

ships and sent to the Tagus, freeing the ships under Smith for employ-

ment elsewhere.

‘I cannot help feeling anxious on this subject’ Castlereagh continued,

‘I think we shall have a bad case if Portugal slips through our fingers, if

our friends in the cabinet or Portugal can justify their submission to

France by any colour of pretence to a want of timely support from us’.

‘This charge might have been inconvenient when all our means were

employed in the Baltic’ he remarked, but now:

…when they are now altogether disposable, I do not see that any

satisfactory answer could be made to it; nor do I conceive that we

could contend that six sail of the line off the Tagus, without

troops, could afford us any chance of being effectually useful in

supporting the British party in the Portuguese councils; or that the

arrangement we had made for securing a co-operation with our

land forces in aid of our squadron afforded any reasonable hope of

their assistance being procured at the moment it might be required.

‘The arrangement which appears to be decided on’, and in which Castler-

eagh appears not to have had much input, of sending naval force and

land forces separately ‘may satisfy the terms of the secret treaty; but I do

not think it will in any degree satisfy either the spirit of our relations with

that State, or our own separate views and interest’.

Castlereagh believed what was required was a true amphibious force;

this would have allowed Smith to:

…apprize Lord Strangford that he was prepared to enter the Tagus

the first moment his lordship could reconcile the Portuguese Gov-

ernment to his doing so, with adequate means both to keep down

popular commotion, to assist in completing the equipment of their

fleet, and to put the Government in that state of independence

which might best enable them, if France did not acquiesce in their

views of compromise, to retire in safety to the Brazils.

The fundamental problem for the Portland administration was ‘The

whole of this arrangement in regard to Portugal may now, perhaps, come

too late in point of time’ he lamented, ‘France may have prevailed’. ‘I

think’ he continued, ‘it would be a satisfaction to our own feelings, and

essential to our public justification, to have made, as early as the return

of our forces from the Baltic would permit, arrangements which, in their

nature, we could contend to be adequate and applicable to the case on

which we had to act’.

Impatience was growing in the British cabinet, particularly with Can-

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HE SMITH EXPEDITION TO LISBON

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ning and Castlereagh, who now appeared to be distancing himself from

Canning’s policy. On 12 November Canning expanded his instructions

to Strangford of 7 November to the form of an ultimatum. The time for

the Regent to decide had come; he could either oppose French demands

or face a conflict with Britain. If the convention had not been ratified,

or, once ratified, it was not being abided to, it would be interpreted as a

sign of ‘determined hostility’. In this instance Strangford was to instruct

Smith ‘the time is arrived for his execution of the instructions with

which he is furnished, for the purpose of carrying into effect any meas-

ures of hostility against Portugal, which may be in his power’. The ‘most

effectual of those measures would undoubtedly be, the direct attack

upon the Portuguese fleet in the Harbour of Lisbon,’ if this was not

practical then he was to establish and enforce ‘the most rigorous Block-

ade of the mouth of the Tagus’. The blame for this situation would lie

solely with the Portuguese as a ‘consequence of their refusal or hesitation

to fulfill their engagements with his Majesty’.

Canning believed the Portuguese had been given ample opportunity

to fulfil their obligations as agreed in the convention and was prepared

to act if they were not. By implementing a blockade in the mouth of the

Tagus he wanted to starve the population of Lisbon hoping this would

provoke civil unrest and force the Regent to accede to the articles of the

convention or to give up his navy. In a revealing communication he ar-

gued if Portugal declined to avert ‘the calamity attendant of a blockade,’

then this measure would have consequences ‘when directed against a

country of which the inhabitants derive a principal part of their suste-

nance from foreign supply’. This blockade would not be lifted ‘by any

concession short of the absolute and unconditional surrender of the

whole Portuguese marine’.

During these years Portugal imported 15-18 per cent of its grain;

Admiral Campbell had considered the vulnerability of Lisbon to a block-

ade in 1804. The main source of grain imports was the Barbary Coast

and Portugal needed specie from Brazil to pay for this trade. A strict

blockade to prevent the arrival of both the specie and food would have a

disastrous effect. He estimated ‘Portugal cannot subsist above three

months in the year’ without the Barbary imports.

It is clear from the

official records Canning was using every available form of pressure to

further foreign policy whether it was diplomatic, military or economic.

Once the decision had been made to send forces to the Tagus and all

preparations were completed, all ministers could do was to wait nerv-

ously for news of the expedition. The successful completion of the op-

eration would depend on the actions of Strangford and Smith.

Madeira

With the Portuguese closing their ports Canning now ‘looked to an im-

mediate occupation of Madeira’.

On 6 November he informed

Hawkesbury the ‘time for the Madeira expedition is now clearly come…

not a moment ought to be lost in sending the force prepared at Cork. I

hope there are three Regiments though perhaps two would do’. Canning

was concerned ‘you can hardly trust to finding Moore at Gibraltar’ and

therefore ‘a detachment from Spencer might be the shortest & most

secret method?’ The commander of the expedition was, upon arrival off

the island, to ‘transmit to the Gov[eno]r a summons inclosing a copy of

the letter, or rather perhaps a summons stating that he has a letter to

communicate to him, & desiring him to send some confidential person

on board to receive it, and then to state that he demands possession of

the Island on the terms stated in that letter’.

Canning pressed Sousa to send the order for the capitulation to the

governor of Madeira, as agreed in the convention:

You say that you will give it equally whether the Convention be

ratified, or no….Undoubtedly you will. But this expression seems

to imply that you do not intend to deliver it, till that point is ascer-

tained. Now this delay, my dear Sir, is perfectly idle and useless –

useless, according to your own account – for the event is to make

no change in your purpose of delivering it – and idle because if the

order is good for anything it must be given now.

He warned if a British force ‘presents itself before Madeira without the

order, perhaps it may be resisted; and if taken after resistance, you cannot

suppose that we ever will restore the island’. Canning also wondered if

‘more, much more hostile steps may not have been taken by your govern-

ment before we hear again? And is it not therefore your duty to your

country to save Madeira to Portugal by giving it up to us under the order,

rather than to risque [sic] losing it altogether by forcing us to undertake

the expedition without it? The expedition itself cannot be delayed any

longer’. Initially Canning had trusted the Portuguese government ‘but

now, knowing all that we know, and fearing all that we fear’, it would be

ridiculous to suspend British operations, ‘till all our fears are realized’.

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HE SMITH EXPEDITION TO LISBON

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He wondered to Hawkesbury if ‘provision is made for a sufficiently

early occupation’. If the Portuguese ignored the treaty or went against it

they would notify the Governor of the island, ‘We should then arrive too

late to get quiet possession & a forcible attack and bombardment of

Funchal is the necessary destruction of British property’. Canning was

becoming increasingly frustrated by Portuguese inactivity and sent

Hawkesbury ‘two private letters of Souza’s by which you will see that he

apprehends the worst’. If Moore was to go to Madeira, ‘it is indeed abso-

lutely indispensable that a copy of the order should be sent to him now.

But it is not possible to send the Reg

now ready at Cork, to Madeira to

save if possible the chance of the order being revoked before we get

there?’ ‘The 3000 now in course of collection might go to the West In-

dies, or might relieve those at Madeira, if it is necessary that they should

be sent on, within a month after their arrival there. But a month or even

a week gained in taking possession of Madeira is a great deal’.

Can-

ning’s fears were alleviated a little on 10 November when Hawkesbury

informed him he had unconditionally ‘obtained from Sousa this morning

the official order for the surrender of Madeira’.

As always, extended lines of communication, strategic overstretch and

the vagaries of wind and weather all played a part in maritime-based stra-

tegic decision making, hence Castlereagh agreed with Hawkesbury and

Canning that Madeira ought now to be seized by a separate force. On 11

November he wondered to Cooke if the Madeira expedition could be

completed using the troops at Portsmouth, instead of the force at Cork.

‘I should think Beresford a very good person to go to Madeira, with the

three regiments from Portsmouth, having fully considered the subject’.

On 13 November Castlereagh informed the King that instructions would

be given to Beresford to occupy the Island with 3,000 men and to pro-

ceed without delay to avoid a change of mind by the Portuguese govern-

ment. The following day Beresford was informed a British force must

appear ready to attack the island to justify the Portuguese surrender. He

was to take 3,658 troops and appear off the island, fully prepared to

commence the attack; but this was a ruse, he was informed a secret

agreement had been made whereby the Portuguese Governor would

surrender the island on the appearance of a military force. On 16 No-

vember a firm decision was made; Moore was not to send any troops to

the island.

…