Potter David. Henry VIII and Francis I
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420 chapter nine
obtained.
115
Paget did not tell his master this and it was certainly not in
accord with Henry’s instructions of 28th.
116
However, it mattered little
since, when Sturm returned to Ardres on the 1 December, he was told
by Fraisse and La Planche that Francis had changed his mind under
Tournon’s inuence, persuaded that the terms, especially for Scotland
were unworthy.
117
Sturm concealed this setback from Paget at rst, sending word by
Bruno on 2nd that he was going back to court. In fact, once Bruno
was back at Ardres, they decided to send Sturm and Fraisse back
to court to nd out what had happened and come to some agree-
ment on a Franco-Protestant alliance. Sturm was to talk to Tournon,
Annebault and the King, while Fraisse reported to Mme d’Etampes
and Longueval.
118
e discussion probably produced the mémoire
entitled Avis d’aucuns moyens, drawn up for presentation to the King.
First, noting the contacts with the Emperor, which they suspected were
designed to frustrate their negotiations, they made four proposals: (1)
Francis to satisfy Henry’s claims and the latter to keep Boulogne as
a guarantee; (2) the Protestants to arbitrate the time and method of
payment; (3) the Protestant estates to negotiate the liquidation of the
perpetual pension in order to end all future sources of dispute; (4)
Mary Stuart to be guarded in the name of the Protestants until she
reach marriageable age. e sting in the tail was the holding out of the
Protestant alliance to ‘whichever of the two kings showed themselves
most favourable to peace.’
119
When, on 5th, Sturm and Fraisse arrived at Villers-Cotterêts, they
talked rst to Tournon and were then joined by L’Aubespine. Sturm
outlined the proposals in the Avis, concealing from Tournon the pro-
posed Franco-English-Protestant alliance, and though Tournon raised
considerable diculties, the interview with the King on 7 December
went well.
120
Francis agreed both to let the English keep Boulogne
115
Johann Sturm to Jakob Sturm, 10 Dec. 1545, Pol.Corr. III, p. 684.
116
Henry VIII to Paget, 29 Nov. 1545, St.P., X, pp. 730–733. Paget was to put for-
ward more claims – to Ardres, for instance – in order to see if greater oers would be
made and what means would be suggested for guarantees.
117
Johann Sturm to Jakob Sturm, 10 Dec. 1545, Pol.Corr. III, p. 684.
118
Ibid., p. 685.
119
NA, PRO 31/3/13, fos. 153–157: ‘celluy des deux Roys qu’ils auront trouvé plus
equitable et prompt à la dicte paix.’
120
Johann Sturm to Jakob Sturm, 10 Dec. 1545, Po1.Corr. III, p. 687.
‘
to entreate with the sworde in hand
’
421
as a guarantee and, provided the Scots were included in any treaty,
hinted that the marriage of Mary Stuart and the prince of Denmark
could go forward as long as the Scots agreed; all this was on con-
dition that it was proposed by the Protestants and not by his own
envoys.
121
He promised, too, not to co-operate with Pope or Emperor
against the Protestants. e same evening, Marguerite sent her secre-
tary, Frotté, to Sturm to tell him ‘the negotiation goes well and both
she and Madame d’Estampes favouring it.’
122
e success at the peace
party seemed assured when, of all people, Tournon and Annebault
produced on 9th a mémoire by which Francis promised to pay what
he owed Henry, leaving Boulogne as a gage. Of the sums in dispute
he was prepared to accept Protestant arbitration, and, as for Scotland,
he promised to send to the Governor to ascertain his opinion on the
young Queen’s marriage. Should all this be unacceptable, he would
agree to a truce for two or three years.
123
All this seemed very hope-
ful and Francis even decided to let his ocial negotiators at Ardres,
hitherto subordinate, into the secret.
124
121
Ibid., p. 687. Francis had already informed the Protestants that if there were
any treaty or truce ‘seront comprins les Royne douairyere d’Escosse et petite Royne,
leurs estats, royaulmes, lieus et loyaulx subgectz.’ (Pariset, ‘La France et les princes
allemands,’ no. 2).
122
Ibid., p. 687: ‘das die sach wol stünd, auch was sie und die madama des amps
in der sach handelten.’
123
Ibid., p. 689 (9 Dec. 1545). is is very close in contents to a document preserved
in copies in the BnF. It has become attached to the French instructions for 1546 and
its signicance has not, therefore, been understood. It is an instruction from Francis
I to his ocial negotiators, Soissons, Remon and Philibert Babou, superseding former
instructions of the 27 Nov. 1545. Here they are told that if the English will not come
to terms on Boulogne and the Scots ‘qui sont les deux principaux poincts de la dicte
negotiation’ they are to inform the King of English demands. Even it the King were
to agree to the marriage of Edward end Mary Stuart for the sake of peace, this would
only mean he could send trusted persons to persuade the Queen Mother and Parlia-
ment. He was prepared to promise, though, that if they refused, he would stop aiding
them. As for the pension, he would be willing to increase it, but on no account would
he let the English keep Boulogne. ere are some obvious discrepancies between this
and the document handed to the Germans, notably about Bou1ogne and the length of
the truce proposed. Nevertheless, its contents indicate that the two documents must
be contemporary, and the dierences may be explained by the possible desire of the
French to make the Protestants believe they were more willing to come to terms than
was actually the case. (transcript, NA, PRO 31/3/14, fos. 260r–261v.)
124
is is shown by the nal part of Francis’ instructions to his commissioners
(c. 9 Dec. 1545: ‘Le Roy entend que La Planche déclare au dict sieur de Soissons et
ses collègues ce qu’il a appris des protestants et de Paget, et des articles que le dit
sieur a vue, et sentira comme de luy mesme des Protestants s’il luy est possible quelle
422 chapter nine
e cause of this second reversal of French policy may be seen
either in a struggle for inuence around the King or in French fears
of the Emperor, itself the product of a very real fear of Gardiner’s
activities at the Imperial Court. Bruno told Paget that Francis had been
annoyed at La Planche’s original proposals but that, when he received
a cool answer from the Emperor, he fell into a rage and called for the
proposals of 9 December to be penned out.
125
is certainly reects
the sequence of negotiations going on at this time between the abbé
de Longpont and the Emperor’s confessor for a joint declaration of
enmity against England.
126
By 1 December, such a plan had been poi-
soned by the Emperor’s complaints about French troop-movements,
127
but France was still trying to keep its options open.
128
Pressure from
favourites cannot be ruled out, but Francis was strong enough to resist
it when necessary. In December 1545, it seemed that everything was to
be gained by an agreement with England if an Anglo-Imperial under-
standing could thereby be avoided: hence the proposals of 9th.
responce ils auront eue d’Angleterre sur les dicts articles. Si n’entend pas toutesfois
le Roy jamais qu’on parle qu’il les ayt entendu, mais si les Protestans en parloient au
dict de la Planche on pourra respondre doucement comme de luy selon la teneur de
cette instruction. Pareillement de ce qu’il remonstrera aux dicts Protestants et fera
entendre à Paget comme de luy-mesme tant sur le retour de Monsieur l’Admiral que
sur l’entrevue des dicts deux Roys et aultres choses quelconques, que le dict sieur
Roy entend que le dict de la Planche die qu’il en advertira les dicts sieurs deputez
cy-dessus, est ce que la Planche a donné par escript à Messieurs les Deputez le der-
nier jour de Novembre au matin de ce que luy fut, le vingt septieme du dict mois de
Novembre, commandé,’ transcript, NA, PRO 31/3/14, fos. 260r–261v. is document
clearly indicates that La Planche had received an earlier instruction on 27 November,
countermanded in all but minor points here. La Planche had therefore gone back to
court aer the rst formal meeting on 26th.
125
Paget to Henry VIII, 15 Dec. 1545, St.P., X, pp. 774–745.
126
Francis I to Mesnage, 3 Dec. 1545, BnF fr. 17890, fo. 51, on ‘la volunté que
led. Empereur avoit de traicter amytié avecques moy et se declairer ennemy du Roy
d’Angleterre.’
127
‘Double du memoire porté au Roy par Malestroict,’ 1 Dec.[ 1545], BnF fr. 17889,
fos. 88–9; Mesnage to Annebault, 28 Nov. 1545, BnF fr. 17889, fos. 115–118: ‘Je suis
en doubte si les propos dessusdictz sont pour acheminer les ambassadeurs au Roy
d’Angleterre à faire ce que l’Empereur demande.’
128
Mesnage to Francis I, 8 Dec. 1545, BnF fr. 17889, fos. 108–109. Mesnage told
the Emperor’s confessor that Francis did not really wish for peace with England. In
other words, the French Court was attempting to see which was the best bargain that
could be obtained.
‘
to entreate with the sworde in hand
’
423
Paget had to wait until 14th to hear of the proposals of 9th.
129
Given
the instructions he had already received,
130
it is not surprising that he
rejected them out of hand as providing nothing new
131
but this was a
serious mistake. As Bruno rightly pointed out, the terms of 9th were the
product of a temporary mood produced by the cooling-o of Francis’
relations with the Emperor.
132
Paget’s unwillingness to descend to his
lowest terms destroyed any chance of success
133
and was itself a product
of unsettled English business with the Emperor; he was instructed not
to give way should Gardiner’s talks with the Emperor look like being
successful.
134
e news had not come through before the collapse of
the Calais negotiations and the responsibility must lie between Paget’s
mismanagement and his master’s wish to have the best of both worlds.
Francis I testily remarked to the German negotiators that he was glad
they now saw Paget’s ‘peu de foy,’ especially the ‘mocquerie’ of his
having dragged up all the old demands over Normandy and Aquitaine
that he been sleeping for 60–70 years. He commiserated on the waste
of their time.
135
When, on 20th, Henry decided to accept virtually the
129
Paget and Marguerite had exchanged letters in which she pledged herself and
Mme. d’Etampes to work for closer amity with England and vouched for the propos-
als already put forward by La Planche. e latter had to make excuses for the fact
that Marguerite had leaked a letter of Paget to the Imperials earlier in the year, much
to his embarrassment (Paget to Henry VIII, 5 Dec. 1545, St.P., X, pp. 757–758 and
p. 347). e initiative pre-dates Francis’ reversal of policy by several days and may
thus indicate Marguerite’s inuence. La Planche’s methods in holding out the unlikely
prospect of a French rejection of the Papacy, indicates some understanding of English
preoccupations, though it grossly over-estimated Paget’s credulity. For the promise of
French rejection of Papal supremacy, cf. Scarisbrick, Henry VIII, pp. 472–475, espe-
cial1y for the aair of June 1546.
130
e instruction of 29 November (St.P., X, pp. 730–733) orders Paget to stand
out for Ardres to see if the French would oer anything more. at of 4 December
(ibid., pp. 749–752) prescribes four further degrees to which Paget might descend, but
only ‘upon a manifest apparance that they woold rather breake up then assent to the
rst.’ ese degrees are to be found in a memo in Petre’s hand, possibly for a Council
meeting (NA SP1/211, fo. 158).
131
Paget to Henry VIII, 15 Dec. 1545, St.P. X, pp. 768–778.
132
Ibid., p. 776.
133
‘this night musing in my bed I thought, if it wer possible to induce Your Majestie,
for the quiet possession of Boulloyn and Ardre with the whole countyes of Boullon-
noys and Guisnez, to remitt the debtes alredy past, and thinterestes of the warre, with
the pension perpetual, it wer a happy bargain for the French King,’ ibid., p. 776.
134
Council to Paget, 18 Dec. 1545, St.P., X, p. 785–.
135
Francis I to the Protestant ambassadors, Dec. 1545, Pariset, ‘La France et les
princes allemands’ Francia, 10 (1992), no. 4.
424 chapter nine
same terms as those proposed by Marguerite, Mme d’Etampes and
Longueval, it was too late.
136
By 22nd, Bruno had decided that the best that could be done was
to x up a truce, though he promised to persuade the two ladies to
lead Francis away from the Pope and the Scottish alliance.
137
However,
when Sturm again returned from the French Court it was to report a
new hardening of the French attitude; even a truce would now be made
dependent on the inclusion of the Scots. An English copy of a proposed
truce
138
contains no mention of the Scots and at the last moment both
sides refused to budge on this vital question, despite the frantic eorts
of the Protestants.
139
A meeting of the English Council in mid-Decem-
ber had decided that the exclusion of the Scots was ‘very expedient,’
agreed to further negotiations on 1 May but rejected nally Protestant
arbitration of the disputed debts.
140
By 30th, the Council’s attitude had
even hardened
141
as had that of the French Court. Sturm hinted at the
reason: ‘the French King is as nere a conclusion with themperour as
the Kinges Majeste is and that themperour hath requyred hym to send
unum ex intimis which he will do.’
142
Yet again, mutual suspicion had destroyed trust. In the winter of
1545, the great fear of both sides was the coalition of the other with the
Emperor. Paget was therefore right to expect the French to suspend
talks until the outcome of Friar Gusman’s mission became known.
143
We also know that Mesnage was sending back reports that the English
were telling the Emperor that they were only dallying with the French.
144
136
Henry VIII to Paget, 18 Dec. 1545, St.P., X, pp. 799–801.
137
Paget to Henry VIII, 22 Dec. 1545, BL, Cotton, Calig. E IV, 80.
138
BL Harleian 7571, fo. 37.
139
Tunstal, Paget and Tregonwell to Henry VIII, 29 Dec. 1545, St.P., X, pp. 815–
816.
140
Memorandum of a discussion in the Council, mid-December. On the truce (and
here Hertford is noted particularly) the Council ‘thinke it very expedient to leave out
the Scottes yf it be possible. And yf not, to comprehende them with condicion that
themperour etc. so as the tyme for truex continue according to the former instruction,
viz. the last of October. And in that case of comprehension that Mr Paget do dispatche
to my Lord of Winchester for themperours consent.’ NA, SP1/212, fo. 116r–v (L&P,
XX, ii, 1036).
141
e excuse that the Scots could not be comprehended without the Emperor’s
consent could not be used in case the French ask him for it and he grant it. See Coun-
cil to Paget, 30 Dec. 1545, NA SP1/212, fos. 157–158 (L&P, XX, ii, 1060).
142
Paget to Petre, 26 Dec. 1545, NA SP1/212, fo. 128r (L&P, XX, ii, 1040).
143
Paget to Petre, 26 Dec. 1545, St.P., X, p. 809 (L&P, XX, ii, 1039).
144
Mesnage reported a message from England that, while Francis was doing his
utmost to obtain peace, ‘ledict Roy d’Angleterre asseure l’Empereur par ces lettres
‘
to entreate with the sworde in hand
’
425
is would be a clear signal for the French to withdraw any tenta-
tive commitments for fear of being compromised with the Emperor.
e ultimate reason for the failure of the Protestants was the chronic
suspicion engendered by tripartite diplomacy, in this case exacerbated
by the simultaneous negotiations at Calais and the Imperial Court.
Alongside concerns about honour, there was a degree of pragmatism
in both courts which could envisage the success of either approach
and the use of one negotiation as a bargaining counter for the other.
at the result was failure should not be surprising.
e Protestants were by no means unequal to their task. ough
Sleidan may have been relatively young and inexperienced at this time
and Baumbach something of a sleeping partner, this did not detract
from the abilities of Bruno and Sturm both of whom Paget praised
highly.
145
eir connections at the French Court with French diplo-
mats who had worked in Germany proved extremely useful in opening
up secret talks. eir fundamental aim in oering their mediation – to
ensure an alliance which would protect them against the Emperor’s
imminent attack – was wise though admittedly over-optimistic in the
context of the history of Franco-Protestant relations. at both Kings
were anxious not to oend them is indicated by the subsequent rela-
tions of both Henry and Francis with them. e texts of both Kings’
letters to the Protestant Estates on the occasion of the breakdown of
talks survive and conrm this. Both were anxious to put the blame
squarely on the shoulders of the other, while the English Council
instructed Paget to warn them against the Franco-Imperial negotia-
tions ‘mayned by Frere Gosman.’
146
qu’il luy tiendra promesse et qu’il entretiendra seullement le Roy en bonnes parolles
sans traicter paix avecques luy.’ (Mémoire of Mesnage to the Admiral and Tournon,
24 Dec. 1545, BnF fr. 17889, fos. 198–9; Mesnage to Francis I, 25 Dec. 1545, BnF fr.
17889, fos. 96–97).
145
Paget to Henry VIII, 15. Dec. 1545, St.P., X, p. 774; on 2 December: Paget had
written to the King that ‘is Sturmius, Sir, is a great practisioner, and whatsoever he
sayth is all togidre French; but yet if he had not ben, the rest of his colleges be such
shepe, except Brewno, who is more witty and grave then inventive, we had broken up
er this tyme.’ St.P., X, p. 747.
146
Henry VIII to the States of the Schmalkaldic league, Westminster, 30 Dec. 1545,
Ludwig von Seckendorf, Commentarius historicus et apologeticus de Lutheranismo
(Frankfurt, 1692), bk. III, sect. 32, 124; additio II, p. 572; Francis I to the same, 9 Jan.
1545, St. Germain, copy in NA SP1/213, fo. 53r–v; Council to Paget. 29 Dec. 1545,
SP1/212, fo. 147r–v.
426 chapter nine
e disappointment of the Protestant envoys was palpable but, as
Rory McEntegart has argued, the fact that peace was concluded six
months later may owe something to the fact that they had got the
powers to the negotiating table. Henry may have revived his interest in
talks with the Protestants in the spring of 1546, probably mainly aim-
ing to gain their help in recruiting mercenaries for his continuing war
with the French. If so, he received a cool answer, for the Schmalkaldic
League was now threatened by a direct attack from the Emperor.
147
In
the nal analysis, though, the success of Protestant mediation was more
important for the German princes than for the French and English
governments which, though nearing the end of their nancial tether,
believed themselves still to have reserves of strength. All this is dem-
onstrated by the persistence of Protestant interest in Anglo-French
relations. eir belief in the help to be obtained by the co-operation
of Henry and Francis persisted until the battle of Mühlberg brought
about the collapse of the League. Meanwhile, the military options had
not yet been exhausted in the Anglo-French war.
147
McEntegart, Henry VIII, the League of Schmalkalden, p. 210; Scarisbrick, Henry
VIII, p. 465.
CHAPTER TEN
THE ADMIRALS’ PEACE: THE TREATY
OF ARDRES-GUÎNES (JUNE 1546)
On 7 June 1546, in the gently rolling elds between the French
fortress-town of Ardres and the English stronghold of Guînes and not
far from the site of the pomp and extravagance of the Field of Cloth of
Gold,
1
two negotiating teams led by the English and French Admirals,
John Dudley, viscount Lisle, and Claude d’Annebault, met in a tent
to put their names to a treaty which was to end the last war between
Henry VIII and Francis I. e name ‘Admirals’ Peace’ is appropriate,
especially in the light of the extravagant poem by John Leland which
ends with plaudits for the two Admirals and their work.
2
e treaty
does not have the reputation of other great diplomatic events of the
sixteenth century and there has been a certain amount of misunder-
standing about its provisions. us, gures given for the sum agreed
to by France in terms of indemnity range from 800,000 to 2 million
écus and, while some claim the guarantee to the Scots was worthless,
others that it was calculated to bind English policy. In France it has
seemed a bad deal, extracted from an ageing Francis I aer a period
of failure and in England as a fatal bargain which, by maintaining
Henry VIII’s conquest of Boulogne, undermined the nances of the
crown and generated a massive social and economic crisis.
3
at apart,
1
e name of the Treaty is ambiguous, variously given as Ardres, Andres, ‘Campe’
etc. ere is no doubt that the boundary between French and English ground ran
near the villages of Ballinghem, Andres and Campagne and that the Field of Cloth of
Gold extended between this and the hamlet of Campagne, the main street of which
marked the boundary of the Calais pale (‘Campe . . . whiche is a village therin half your
highness and the other parte the Frenche Kinges.’ Longleat MSS, SE/I, fo. 132v). e
dating clause of the treaty gives: ‘Acta fuerent haec sub Tentoriis in Agro prope Vil-
lam vocatam Campensem in connibus Ardreae & Guysnarum’ Rymer, 3rd ed. Foe-
dera VI, p. 137. Original copies of the treaty: AN, J 651/B, no. 18bis (English), NA,
E/30/1318 (French) L&P, XXI, i, 1014.
2
Dana F. Sutton, John Leland, Two Poems on the French War pub. by the Univ.
of Birmingham Philological Museum Project (electronic text: www.philological.bham
.ac.uk/warpoems). It is perhaps signicant that no comparable plaudits seem to have
been published in France (see below Conclusion).
3
G. Salles, ‘Guerre et négociations,’ pp. 65–76, sought to exploit English sources
for a French audience but oered little judgment other than that the nancial circum-
stances compelled both sides to come to terms.
428 chapter ten
the treaty deserves attention as the last major event of the turbulent
and complex relations between Henry VIII but we need also to try to
understand it in terms of the pressures of the time and ask why Francis
was willing to conclude a treaty which ostensibly le him dispossessed
of a strategic outpost of his kingdom. e signing of the peace by two
evenly balanced negotiating teams also reects the symmetries of the
end of the two reigns, with both ageing and jaded kings nominally
allied to the Emperor Charles V but anxious about his intentions, both
deeply suspicious of the other and anxious to capitalize on the alliance
of German Protestant princes. It had proved exceptionally dicult to
achieve this peace; as with the Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis a dozen
years later, it took two attempts and some false starts before accept-
able terms could be agreed. e existence of a wide range of sources
in German and Italian archives, as well as the well-known English and
sparse French sources justies a thorough re-examination of the treaty
in the context of the multi-faceted relations between France, England,
the Emperor Charles V and the German Protestant princes.
The Need for Peace
What, then, ultimately prompted Henry and Francis to agree to the
peace in June 1546? For the Parisian preacher François Le Picart, the
upheavals of 1544 provided an object lesson in divine providence.
True peace could only be made by God and the fall of Boulogne to the
English was a sign of God’s anger; until the people of France mended
their ways, they would continue to fear both king and Emperor.
4
Naturally, historians are apt to seek for more mundane explanations.
As has been seen, stubbornness on both sides had repeatedly delayed
the conclusion of peace. Henry VIII undoubtedly saw Boulogne as the
great achievement of his old age. Francis I could not accept its loss
and was prompted perhaps by a general consensus of his inner advis-
ers late in 1544 in favour of peace with the Emperor.
5
From what we
4
L.J. Taylor, Heresy and Orthodoxy in Sixteenth-Century Paris, pp. 196–197.
5
La Hargerie to Mesnage, 21 Feb. 1545, BnF fr., 17889, fo. 232: ‘j’ay entendu que
plus que james le Roy a [au] coeur l’aaire du Boulenoys.’ A report to Charles V from
France at this time: ‘Sire, je trouve en extreme demonstracion tous ceulx qui gouvernent
que j’ay veu trescontens de la paix avec vostred. Majesté, et mesmes m’a dit en passant le
cardinal de Tournon que en vingt ans qu’il menoit aaires il n’a veu appoinctement que
plus doige durer . . . mais tous sont fort animez contre le Roy d’Angleterre, mesmes Bayard
the admirals
’
peace 429
have seen of the reports of Gardiner and Paget, some of Henry VIII’s
key advisers had come to the conclusion that Boulogne was not worth
the cost of hanging on to it, though they were by no means in the
majority. Again, we have seen that Surrey at Boulogne was rebuked
for encouraging the King to hang on to the town. Yet, it is also clear
that military preparations were being stepped up in the early months
of 1546. Van der Del thought that this was primarily for defence
but was probably wrong.
6
Preparing for war both by land and sea had
the advantage of preparing for all eventualities. Peace talks might well
break down again; on the other hand, it was essential to negotiate from
a position of strength.
Protestant mediation had proved a failure and John Mason’s return
empty-handed from the Rhineland early in May convinced Paget, for
one, of the uselessness to England of a German alliance.
I am sure the k.m. by this tyme seyth what frendship his highnes may
looke for in Almayn, which in my poore opinion is nothing; and ther-
for I am sure his gret wisdome will considre there is litle trust to be
geven there, not moche to thEmperor and none to any other frend that I
can see.
7
e need for peace was obvious, though it remained to convince the
King about Boulogne. Here, the role of Paget may have been crucial,
since the secretary told the French ambassador in the following year
that he had pushed for peace in the teeth of opposition from the rest
of the Council.
8
New talks were Paget’s last attempt to achieve peace in
the face of this hostility. In France, the talks at Calais under Protestant
mediation may have been pushed by opponents of Tournon and
Annebault in order to gain the credit for making peace (though this
remains uncertain). But the nal negotiations of April–June 1546, again
under neutral mediation, involved Annebault closely, with Tournon
qui dit que l’on vendra femme et enfans ou l’on le mettra hors de Bologne.’ (HHSA,
Frankreich, Varia 5 fo. 169).
6
Van der Del to Charles V, 10 March, 10 March 1546, L&P, XXI, i, 365.
7
Paget to Petre, 14 May 1546, NA SP1/218, fo. 126r (L&P, XXI, I, 831). See also
Philip of Hesse to Mont, 13 May 1546, SP1/218, fos. 137–138 (L&P, XXI, i, 834 (2,3)).
Paget’s strategic analysis is very close to Gardiner’s, cf. Gardiner to Paget, 13 Nov.
1545, Muller, Letters, p. 187.
8
Odet de Selve to Montmorency, 29 Aug. 1547, Correspondance politique d’Odet
de Selve, no. 217.